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Abstract
This study aims towards a contextualising, and reading, of MacDonald’s last work of his 
life, the fantasy Lilith, in order to justify the argument that his work in general generously 
repays detailed study, in that it self-consciously addresses and reinterprets post­
enlightenment and post-romantic theology in ways which anticipate future developments, 
both in theological and literary studies, and especially where the two overlap. In addition, 
the thesis also tends occasionally to point to how such close study may help in the future 
to clarify the importance of MacDonald’s place within the Scottish literary tradition, and 
may also help to interpret that tradition, in the light of wider philosophical and literary 
studies. However, such clarification is left to a future study, and the main direction of the 
argument is concerned to address his writing both in its historic context and in terms of the 
question of identity raised in Romanticism and later, in twentieth and twenty-first century 
hermeneutics and theology.
Lilith presents us with a man searching in history (specifically in Vane’s father’s library); 
in his imagination; and in his action, for a source of meaning. The search however leads 
him to a reality which breaks in upon him, as it were, taking him by surprise on a journey 
which seems to take place in another world -  one which utterly confounds the laws of 
reality as he has previously known them. In the process history, identity, notions of time, 
reality, being, morality and the place of knowledge in understanding are all rigorously 
questioned and interrelated. In Vane’s encounter with the central character, Lilith (known 
in ancient mythology as Satan’s wife), we perhaps have a further development of the way 
in which psychology and difficult theological questions are related to one another in the 
encounter between Wringhim and Gilmartin, in James Hogg’s The Private Memoirs and 
Confessions o f a Justified Sinner. The novel, like that of Hogg, leaves the reader with no 
clear conclusion as to its own concept(s) of reality. However, with intertextual references 
to the development of certain themes in MacDonald’s other works, we can interpret where 
this strangely dark, last work of his life, may be reflecting the development of his thinking 
about the way in which the ‘Christ-self relates to the idea of identity, and goes on to 
inform one’s concept of reality.
The person of Lilith is ambiguous, in that she may be interpreted either as the Church, or 
as everything which seems to stand against the Church. In her long mythical history she
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has been seen as Satan’s wife -  a figure to be feared and shunned; in other forms she 
appears as the Black Madonna. In the novel she also functions as that within the 
protagonist’s or narrator’s character which teaches him about his true relationship to 
death; she is also a personification of the painful and confusing emergence of Christian 
identity. MacDonald uses all of this ambiguity to illustrate the nature of the identity of the 
church, a theme he addresses frequently in his writings; the nature, especially, of its 
identity in relation to death. The outcome of his concern, however, is that he finds himself 
exploring not only the nature of Christian identity but, ultimately, the nature of identity 
itself.
In much the same way that narratives or works of art tend to escape formal identification 
with any theory which the critic may introduce, MacDonald’s experience of Christianity is 
that it functions not as a fixed viewpoint, but rather as a continually reinterpreted 
narrative, discovering, in its course, the identity of the interpreter. Such an experience, 
for MacDonald, raises in his theology and fiction many of the questions which will be 
later asked of texts: How is it that things; people; texts seem to have an identity so unique 
as to render them non-communicable, and yet demand to be interpreted, connected, 
formed and given meaning and identity in the context of communities? And what is the 
true nature of the relationship (or conflict) between a community and an individual?1
In the first section, the study considers briefly the cultural context of MacDonald’s work -  
Romanticism -  in terms of his approach to the text of the Bible. This is because the 
question of the groundedness of identity becomes particularly pertinent in Romanticism, 
especially in relation to the question of authority; such authority having been previously 
attributed to the written text of the Bible, frequently without a conscious attempt to 
explore why that should be. We then move to consider his treatment of nihilism, as it is 
encountered in that context, and read by Lilith. The section ends with a consideration of 
MacDonald’s thinking about ethics in relation to nihilism. His move is - surprisingly - to 
delimit the didacticism which emerged in the Victorian church’s response to nihilism, and 
to address the outcome as it occurs2. He neither directly attacks the nihilist stance, nor
1 He says (A Dish ofOrts, p7) “...for how shall two agree together what nam e they shall give 
to a thought or a feeling. How shall the one show the other that which is invisible?”
2Disparagers of MacDonald frequently take his didacticism a s  being typically Victorian. My 
proposal is that he takes such a tendency in his time and experim ents with it to its logical - 
rather than acceptable - conclusion, in order to expose the nature of moral choices
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does he seek to embrace it into an Hegelian whole, and so simply submerge the question. 
This section includes a consideration of Gavin Hyman’s essay ‘John Milbank and 
Nihilism: A metaphysical (mis)reading?’ , and how a ‘fictional’ approach to nihilism -  
such as that undertaken by MacDonald -  may be achieved in a Christian context, without 
the background of an implied metaphysics, especially since MacDonald seems concerned 
to avoid such a background in his symbolic theology.
The second section considers the nature of MacDonald’s symbolism, considering his use 
of scientific controversy -  specifically Goethe’s colour theory -  as the means by which he 
explores difficult questions in theology. We then look at Lilith herself, relating the 
ancient myths to MacDonald’s own symbolic theology, going on to see how MacDonald 
considers that female character in terms of his own experience of the patriarchal church, 
and considering precisely her significance in his exploration of the nature of Christian 
identity.
The third section uses the themes previously explored in order to suggest some links 
between MacDonald’s writing and that of theologians, philosophers and writers on 
hermeneutics. Specifically, the study considers The Nature o f the Atonement by the 
Scottish theologian and contemporary of MacDonald, McLeod Campbell, also relating 
Lilith in this context to the work of the German theologian, Bonhoeffer. Then moves on to 
a much more recent essay by the modem theologian Graham Ward, ‘The Displaced Body 
of Jesus Christ’. Thirdly, we consider how MacDonald’s thinking upon the nature of 
identity and being in relation to his symbolic understanding addresses the eschatological 
‘sense’ of reality, found in Jurgen Moltmann’s, book The Theology o f Hope. The last part 
of the section considers the relationship between MacDonald’s thoughts and some of those 
found in Caputo’s More Radical hermeneutics, on the ‘end’ of ethics, and then Derrida’s 
thoughts on the gift, the nature of responsibility, historicity and identity in his work The 
Gift o f Death. This section concludes the study by considering the implications of 
MacDonald’s approach to Christian identity for the individual, whether religious or not, 
bearing in mind the continuing desire for a fuller sense of meaning in the concepts of 
identity and community in the twenty-first century.
them selves. For him, their importance does not lie in issues of social control, but rather in 
that they connect to the question of the nature of identity.
3 Literature and Theology, Vol. 14, No 4, D ecem ber 2000
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Brief Introduction to George MacDonald
George MacDonald was bom in Huntly, Aberdeenshire in 1824. His mother died when he 
was eight, and he spent his childhood on the farm which was leased to the MacDonald 
family by the Duke of Gordon. The religion of the family was that of the Missionar Kirk, 
a fiercely evangelical movement of the kind which led to the dismption of 1843, and the 
formation of the Free Church. MacDonald left Huntly to attend the university at King’s 
College in Aberdeen in 1840. There he took a four year MA course, which included 
Mathematics, Physics, Logic and Moral Philosophy. He was, in addition, taught a year of 
Chemistry by William Gregory, “a chemist of real stature”4. Such was his interest in the 
subject that his ambition to go to Germany to study under the famous Chemist, Liebig, 
almost overtook his desire to enter the ministry. He trained for the Congregational 
ministry but never settled down to preaching in any one church or denomination. Rather, 
he established contacts during his time in England; friends, and like minds here and there 
who secured for him preaching or lecturing engagements, enabling him to bring in some 
income for his large family, while yet remaining true to his own convictions about the 
nature of religious truth. Such friends included people like A J Scott, the principal of 
Owen’s college, Manchester; the writer Margaret Oliphant; and Lady Byron.
However, MacDonald never entered a time of financial rest, relying mainly upon the 
goodwill of others and on bits of income from work whenever possible. He and his family 
spent a life characterised by financial insecurity, instability and movement (as well as his 
own bouts of serious illness) up until nearly the very end, when he spent his final years in 
Italy. His writing was his life in the sense of a ‘calling’; he wrote not only for a living, but 
as it seemed to him the best way to communicate truth, in the sense that he saw deeply the 
connection between beauty and truth. His work includes fiction, poetry, essays and 
sermons, although he was known mainly in his time as a novelist. He has recently been 
recently recognised as one of the greatest writers of fairy tales in the English language5. In 
all of his works, critics have noted the same sense of mystery; of a vision too large to 
encompass which saturates his writing, whether one considers his fantasy works
4 S ee  Robb, (George MacDonald, p10). Also George MacDonald and His Wife for more 
detailed information on his life.
5 Times Literary Supplement, quoted in new est edition of Lilith (see  bibliography): “...the man 
who did one sort of work better than anyone e lse has ever done it... .the writing of what are 
commonly called his fairy ta le s ...”
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(.Phantastes or Lilith), or his many ‘realistic’ novels of fiction, or his poems or essays or
sermons. G K Chesterton puts it very well, in his introduction to the biography by
Greville MacDonald6:
...this is the very important difference between his sort of mystery and mere 
allegory. The commonplace allegory takes what it regards as the commonplaces or 
conventions necessary to ordinary men and women, and tries to make them pleasant 
or picturesque by dressing them up as princesses or goblins or good fairies. But 
George MacDonald did really believe that people were princesses and goblins and 
good fairies, and he dressed them up as ordinary men and women. The fairy-tale 
was the inside of the ordinary story and not the outside...it will be found, I fancy 
that he stands for a rather important turning-point in the history of Christendom...
He retained a singularity of focus, which, the broader his range of writing became, grew to
become all the more intense7. William Geddes wrote this about him towards the end of
his life, in Blackwood's Magazine (March 1891):
.. .to be one of those whose heart has kept pure the holy forms of young imagination, 
is the prerogative of genius: and to none has this...been given in our age more 
largely than to George MacDonald...
If the fairy-tale is the “inside”, as Chesterton puts it, then it would seem to be that 
MacDonald’s principal works of fantasy -  Lilith and Phantastes -  are seeking after a way 
of communicating this inside sense in ways which transform outer notions of existence 
and of materiality, wherever they are in danger of being taken ‘as read’; as ‘things in 
themselves’. He is taking as far as he can the mysteriously ‘inner’ notions of beauty and 
truth which impart meaning to the ‘outer’ realities and is seeking to expose the process to 
others, often by paradoxically disguising it. He notes, in his essay on the imagination that 
(A Dish o f Orts, p9):
...the world is...the human being turned inside out...all that moves in the mind is 
symbolized in Nature.
He bases his method upon the way in which wisdom is perceived in the Bible in this essay,
quoting Ecclesiastes (p42):
.. .also he hath set the world in their heart, so that no man can find out the work that 
God maketh from the beginning to the end....
6 George MacDonald and His Wife, p11, p13
7 Consider his letter to a  friend, near the end of his life (George MacDonald and His Wife, 
p528): “...there is a live heart at the centre....all my life, I might nearly say, I have been trying 
to find that one Being, and to know him consciously p resen t... hope grows and grows with the 
y ea rs ...”
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Lilith, the work upon which this study will focus, seems to have had a special significance 
for MacDonald in terms of the relationship between his writing and his working out of his
oChristian faith. His son writes in his biography that :
He was possessed by a feeling.. .that it was a mandate direct from God, for which he 
himself was to find form and clothing....Its first writing is unlike anything else he 
ever did...it runs from page to page, with few breaks...five years intervened 
between the initial writing and the final book; but in both the same note of present 
sadness echoes throughout -  a note, however, in no way out of harmony with the 
far-calling chimes of an unfathomable faith.
8 George MacDonald and His Wife, p548
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When one man dies, one chapter is not torn out of the book, but translated into a better 
language; and every chapter must be so translated; God employs several translators; some 
pieces are translated by age, some by sickness, some by war, some by justice; but God’s 
hand is in every translation, and his hand shall bind up all our scattered leaves again for 
that library where every book shall lie open to one another... .So this bell calls us all; but 
how much more me, who am brought so near the door...
John Donne, Devotions
I started to my feet, hurried across the room to the masked door, where the mutilated 
volume...appeared to beckon me...went down on my knees and opened it as far as its 
position would permit, but could see nothing....I could not carry discovery and was unable,
in what I could read, to make any guess at the sense the door opened, the hand let mine
go, and pushed me gently through. I turned quickly, and saw the board of a large book in 





The aim of the study, as stated, is to attempt an intertextual reading of George 
MacDonald’s religious thought, as it is expressed in his fiction, and most particularly in 
chapter 39 of his last work of fiction, Lilith, entitled ‘That Night’. In this chapter Lilith 
passes through various stages and definitions of death, whilst staying in the house of 
suffering, where she is required to let go of Nothing, which she holds in her right hand; an 
action of which she is incapable. What is required is to help her to gain a true death -  
which in Lilith is referred to as “sleeping” -  a word which to MacDonald is no 
euphemism, but which denotes the gift of death, and of true life9. That is, the discovery -  
and with it the restfulness - of the givenness of one’s own identity.10 To work our way 
towards a reading of this chapter involves not only linking MacDonald’s thought to that of 
other writers in various disciplines -  but also reflecting upon the personal journey 
undergone by MacDonald, as it is encountered in his writings. All of his work represents 
an attempt to interpret religious tradition in the light of his inner experience11, and Lilith 
may be seen as both the culmination and the encapsulation of that search for identity. A 
clue as to how it is that Lilith requires such a many-sided approach in the search for a 
reading may be discerned in the movement of his thought in general, such movement 
being illustrated by this extract from his essay ‘Browning’s “Christmas Eve “’(A Dish o f  
Orts, p213):
The love of God is the soul of Christianity. Christ is the body of that truth. The 
love of God is the creating and redeeming, the forming and satisfying power of the 
universe.
The interesting thing about this statement is its movement. That is, MacDonald’s writing, 
like his thinking, seems to begin with a personal perception (the love of God); to move out 
towards its incarnation (“Christ is the body of that truth”) and then returns, not to its own 
self-affirmation, but towards a transforming of the universal (“....the universe”). He 
seems initially to be projecting his own sense of identity from an inner experience of
9 Lilith, p31: “Sleep is too fine a  thing ever to be earned ,” said the sexton, “it m ust be given 
and accepted, for it is a necessity.”
10 The way in which MacDonald em phasises the restfulness of this givenness in term s of 
death may be addressed  by contrast to the anxiety concerning the very nature of life - of 
existence - which is em phasised in twentieth century existentialist writings.
11 Which is why “As matter of fact, G eorge MacDonald had expressed  a  hope that his Life 
would not be written: his m essag e  w as all in his books, and no biography could add to it.” 
(p2, George MacDonald and His Wife)
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wholeness onto that which he describes12. Yet the process by which he does this cannot be 
described as projection -  somewhere along the line there is a calling into question of his 
own ‘groundedness’, for his writing is more frequently than not radically questioning in its 
projection; it does not simply use the preconception of God’s love to establish itself, rather 
MacDonald changes and grows as a result of the symbolic form of understanding to which 
his work attains; he is alongside the reader, often, rather than looking down upon the 
reader. Such love as he describes cannot be easily treated by the critic as purely 
theoretical or psychological. MacDonald holds with neither a Platonic ideal, nor a 
pragmatic religion.
Like the above-quoted statement, the movement of his fiction, from Phantastes to Lilith, if
one is looking for a movement, is that the apocalyptic nature of the formation of Christian
identity begins to gain prominence over a preconceived quest to master the apocalyptic 
• • 1vision itself. While Phantastes emphasises the experience of the quest itself, and more 
clearly designates the waking and dreaming world (at the beginning and end of the novel), 
Lilith will tend to emphasise the ambiguity of existence, the confusion as to personal 
identity and its implications for the perception of reality, the mystery of the quest, its 
incommunicable aspect, and the notion of a secret14. Vane’s name itself is an allusion to 
the book of Ecclesiastes in the Bible (amongst other things) and suggests a final 
concentration upon the very notion of what it is to learn (one’s own identity), and of what 
history is, both in terms of one’s own historicity, through a sense of a place in time gained 
through book learning, and through the exercise of the imagination in its relation to God15.
12 David Robb (George MacDonald, p40), notes his tendency to project his personality into 
the novel, in such a way that he does not give the impression of his own omniscience, but 
nevertheless functions a s  a  positive interpreting presence, while yet still causing writer, reader 
and character to seem  to be inhabiting the sam e, constantly unfolding, puzzling world, 
together.
13 Again, this corresponds with what is noted by Robb (George MacDonald, p32) “In many of 
the later novels, the triumph of the Christ-principle is not so  much a  m atter of growth 
internal...but...the eventual establishm ent in a  position of social authority.” That is, he tends 
more and more in his later writing towards outward forms of incarnation of the truth, rather 
than the personal accumulation of knowledge about the truth. Yet in Lilith the nearer he 
com es to insisting upon such incarnation in reality, the more reality and identity a s  ‘taken’ 
rather than ‘given’ is called into question. The apocalyptic m ode is not a representative one, 
but consum es the narrative itself.
14 Although these  issues are found in Phantastes, they are  not so  very insistent, so  intense 
and nowhere near becoming the central issue, a s  they are in Lilith.
15 Ecclesiastes bears the main them e of Vanity, beginning: “Vanity of vanities, all is vanity 
(says the preacher). W hat profit has a  man from all his labour in which he toils under the sun. 
One generation p a sse s  away, and another generation com es; but the earth ab ides forever. 
The sun also rises, and the sun goes dow n...m an cannot express it...” (Ch1. w 2 -5 ) . This
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It is to Ecclesiastes that MacDonald refers as well, in his essay on the imagination (A Dish 
o f Orts, p40)
..as setting forth both the necessity we are under to imagine, and the comfort that our
imagining cannot outstrip God’s making.
The manner in which this relationship unfolds in MacDonald’s mind to shape one’s 
identity remains ultimately a mystery, although Lilith is the work which allows us finally 
an insight into the uncomfortable and often confusing way in which MacDonald comes to 
experience such imaginative ‘harmony’. The fact that there is a progression made in his 
writing along these lines is our main concern for the time being, when many critics note 
the similarities between Phantastes and Lilith, but have preferred not to consider the huge 
amount of time between them, and any theological reasons for their differences16.
This very nature of the secret, of the mysterious aspect of the uncovering of one’s identity, 
is something which occurs elsewhere, frequently, in his writing. In Lilith (p39), the Raven 
states that “There are no such things as wilful secrets.” And in The Flight o f the Shadow 
(pi), Mrs Day states:
I would that not God only but all good men and women might see me through and 
through.. .but my very nature would shudder at the thought of letting one person that loved 
a secret see into it. Such a one never sees things as they are -  would not indeed see what 
was there, but something shaped and coloured after his own likeness. No-one who loves 
and chooses a secret can be of the pure in heart that shall see God.
We should note from this that MacDonald does not use the issue of mystery in religion in 
order to avoid difficult questions. The love of secrecy as being a form of the mastery of 
the unknown is seen as evil here; something which distorts vision. He had a painful
puts us in mind of the way in which Vane struggles to find language to describe what he is 
experiencing at the beginning of Lilith. Interestingly, it also puts us in mind of the great 
Scottish work, Sunset Song, with its notion of the land abiding forever, while m an’s  history 
fluctuates. The end of Ecclesiastes represents a  highly ambivalent approach to learning, and 
to the historicity of man, for “the words of the w ise...and of scholars are  like well-driven nails, 
given by one Shepherd" - and yet - “of making of many books there is no end, and much 
study is w earisom e to the flesh.” (Ch. 12 vv11-12). Raised here are  two notions of history. 
Firstly, that of books and language, and, secondly, that of a  more perm anent wisdom which 
both informs and evades the mind of the scholar. Perhaps it is seen  in MacDonald’s  notion of 
language and history a s  they are represented symbolically to the imagination - inscribed into 
the very landscape of the world by God, who inscribes, in turn, that world into “m en’s  hearts”, 
a s  he says in his essay  on imagination.
16 Eg Muirhead, in ‘M eta-Phantastes: A self-referential faerie rom ance for men and wom en’, 
sp eak s of MacDonald’s  old age a t the time of writing Lilith, (Scottish Literary Journal, vol 19, 
no 2, Nov. 1992, p47). Or Wolff notes that Lilith seem s more clearly Christian in outlook, 
having been possibly freer of the Germ an influence, but does not go into any more detail. 
(‘David Lindsay and G eorge MacDonald’, Studies in Scottish Literature, p139)
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awareness (evident in his novels) of the way in which Federal Calvinism had sought to 
master and so had distorted the mystery of religious experience (particularly with regard to 
its view of atonement) in an attempt to cope with, and to dominate the rationality of the 
age. In seeking such mastery of the secret through metaphysics, Lilith indicates that the 
church enters the realm of the demonic, because its primary interest is sidetracked by a 
struggle for power. Rather, what is truly mysterious, while it is precisely what must be 
struggled with to the limits of one’s intellect and imagination, must submit neither to 
despair, nor to an inflated sense of its own understanding, if it is not to submit to the realm 
of the demonic.
This is what makes MacDonald such a very interesting writer; he believes thoroughly in 
exercising his mind in search of truths; yet he does not ultimately believe in the autonomy 
of the human mind. He believes thoroughly in imagining all he is capable of imagining, 
yet does not use that faculty to retreat from logical difficulties. Therefore he does not 
tend to make of his art a substitute religion (as did a good few romantic artists), for neither 
does he believe in the autonomy of the human imagination. His striving for purity of 
thought shies away from all notions of secrecy, while he is yet ultimately forced to witness 
a vision of human experience (precisely because of his thoroughness) which has at its 
heart a great and painful mystery17. The acknowledgment of this mystery -  allowing its 
coherence or harmony to emerge in one’s life or in one’s fiction -  cannot in actual fact be 
attained; neither is it a matter of assent, but rather seems to be given at the end of one’s 
struggle. For, while the final sentence of Phantastes seems to assert the necessary 
optimism for that struggle,
Good is always coming...what we call evil, is the only and best shape, which, for the 
person and his condition at the time, could be assumed by the best good. And so, 
Farewell.
Lilith is a witness to the strenuousness; groundlessness (and yet mysterious coherence) of 
true faith (as opposed to theoretical faith, which is merely an easily communicated
1 ftoptimism) in the light of what seems to be a vain (Vane) personal struggle . Yet Lilith is
17 Like Novalis, whom he quotes a t the beginning of Phantastes, he believed that 
“...everything m ust be wonderful, secret and coheren t...” (my italics)
18 in 'Browning’s  “Christmas Eve”’, p215, he notes “...to the one who sym pathises not with the 
thought of the Maker... who understands not the design of the Artist... when the confusion to 
him is caused  by the order's being greater than he can com prehend ...because he stands
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also bound to become (by its very textuality) a witness to the necessity to communicate 
that which seems incommunicable. The necessity for death is unavoidable. It therefore 
deals head on with a paradox. Lilith's intensity, its darkness, and the final and utter 
confusion of the protagonist, are both brought on by, and yet can also be interpreted by, its 
insistence upon the historic and textual communication of faith19.
MacDonald’s assertion that no-one who is pure in heart can actively choose a secret 
relates to the idea that a mystery is a paradoxical gift; given almost against the will to one 
who has striven to expose the secret (such as the artist or scholar, who strives to discover 
or uncover). The notion that what is secret cannot be kept secret, but becomes that which 
one strives to expose, is hard to comprehend in our age, when experience and identity tend 
to be measured in terms of the idea that they are cumulatively acquired in the individual’s 
search for identity. In this economy, the secret becomes an exchangeable commodity, so 
that identity is defined by a philosophical materialism, rather than as an understanding 
which reinterprets ‘taken for granted’ notions of materiality. MacDonald, in particular, 
fought materialist philosophies, and so his notions of individual striving must be carefully 
distinguished from our own understanding of what constitutes individualism. We can see 
from his son’s biography that MacDonald’s personal life reflected a great struggle with a 
materialistic culture which tended to consume notions of identity20, while replacing them 
with the individualistic notion of getting on:
outside and not within, he se e s  an entangled m aze of forces w here there is in truth an 
intertwining dance of harm ony....there is... no solution of the world’s  mystery, except he be 
able to say  ‘I have looked to T h ee ...’”. In Lilith, the achievem ent of such sympathy, however, 
is the incompleted work of a lifetime.
19 Since MacDonald w as true to his assertion that man m ust take moral laws into the 
imaginary world, he could not, by definition, construct an e scap e  from, or provide fictional 
solutions to, evil, despite the fact that -  a s  a highly imaginative artist -  he would, above all 
people, have been tempted and able to do so. He is bound (in order to be true) to throw the 
question out to the reader; and to ultimately leave the reader alone and aw are of their own 
insufficiency of imagination or thought on this subject. All the writing in the world is ultimately 
no help a t all to the reader, any more than it is to Vane himself, the author of Ecclesiastes (or 
Lilith), who se ts  out to discover from history the good, only to find so  much evil a s  to 
overwhelm him. The gift of seeing the good, is therefore ultimately shown to be indeed a  gift, 
not to be taken for granted, or seized upon for the purpose of inhabiting any world which the 
artist may choose to construct. Lilith m akes it clear that this seeing of the good cannot be 
taken for granted.
20 The logic of his approach to the material world is theologically informed, yet he allows his 
theology to expand imaginatively to reinterpret reality. Later in the study, this will bring us to 
consider how closely he may be allied to a modern theologian, Graham  Ward, who -  on this 
question of the interpretation of reality, of physicality - notes of Christ that “The paternity of 
God is formal, rather than material. But this formality informs substance, such that our 
notions of ‘materiality’ itself becom e unstable...T he material orders are  inseparable from the
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...my father’s work had to be apprised rather by some law of spiritual economics than 
condemned on the score of his not getting on... on market value... a few, like Lady Byron, 
understood that21.
We will also consider whether MacDonald’s cultural heritage -  his childhood in the 
eastern highlands -  may have played a part in his conception of the way in which identity 
is formed and given. For in this culture, identity tends to be relational, as opposed to 
individualistic, and yet, paradoxically, is thought to create the more radically original 
characters. This may have played a part both in MacDonald’s interpretation of
•  •  99Romanticism and in his ecclesiology . His ecclesiology, because the relationship 
between the individual and the community is most clearly seen in his view of the nature of 
the church’s identity. Here, some relevant extracts on the nature of the church from 
Robert Falconer (pp361-415) are placed together, in order to illustrate the model we will 
be thinking of when we later come to his criticisms and vision of the church in Lilith:
“.. .are you a society, then?” I asked at length
“No. At least we don’t use the word. And certainly no other society would 
acknowledge us.”
“What are you, then?”
“Why should we be anything, so long as we do our work?”
“Don’t you think there is some affectation in refusing a name?”
“Yes, if the name belongs to you. Not otherwise.”
“Do you lay claim to no epithet of any sort?”
“We are a church, if you like. There!”
“Who is your clergyman?”
“Nobody”
“Where do you meet?”
“Nowhere”
“What are your rules, then?”
“We have none.”
“What makes you a church?”
“Divine Service”
“What do you mean by that?”
“The sort of think you have seen to-night”
“What is your creed?”
symbolic and transcendent orders, the orders of m ystery...the logic here is theological...” 
(‘The Displaced Body of Je su s  Christ’, Radical Orthodoxy, pp164-165).
George MacDonald and His Wife, p272.
22 His son also writes (George MacDonald and his Wife, p77), that he w as “in habit of mind, 
and in swift brilliance of fancy, radically a  Gael”. In addition, since Robb notes (George 
MacDonald, p34), that Scotland w as seen  by the Victorians a s  “the domain of untold 
eccentricities. Colourful behaviour could be located there without straining the reader’s  sen se  
of credibility...”, so, too, in the fantastic world of Lilith, moving further along the sam e lines, he 
is freer to deal with questions of identity in new ways begun in his Scottish novels, not 
constrained by social expectations which might cloud this complex issue of identity.
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“Christ Jesus”
“But what do you believe about him?”
“What we can. We count any belief in Him -  the smallest -  better than any belief 
about him -  the greatest -  but we exclude no one.. .we are an undefined company of 
people, who have grown into human relations with each other naturally, through one 
attractive force -  love for human beings, regarding them as human beings only in 
virtue of the divine.. .it is our work that binds us together...”
“Then when that stops you drop to pieces”
“yes, thank God. We shall then die.. .we are not the life of the world. God is. And 
when we fail, he can and will send out more and better labourers into his harvest- 
field. It is a divine accident by which we are thus associated.”
“But surely the church must be otherwise constituted.”
“My dear sir, you forget: I said we were a church, not the church.”
“Do you belong to the Church of England?”
“Yes, some of us. Why should we not? In as much as she has faithfully preserved 
the holy records and traditions, our obligations to her are infinite. And to leave her 
would be to quarrel.. .1 have no time for that.”
“Then you count the Church of England the Church?”
“Of England, yes; of the universe, no; that is constituted just like ours, with the 
living working Lord for the heart of it.”
“Will you take me for a member?”
“No”
“Will you not, i f - “
“You may make yourself one if you will.. .do something...
...(415) ...if God must help ere a man can be saved, can the help of man go too far 
towards the same end? Let God solve the mystery... .he will do his part, which is no 
part but the all in all...if man could do what in his wildest self-worship he can 
imagine, the grand result would be that he would be his own God which is the Hell 
of Hells.”
We should note that MacDonald is here advocating both action, and yet the futility of 
action without the life of God. Further, he is hinting at what he will enlarge upon in Lilith 
-  self-creation in relation to the imagination, as a means of identity -  “which is the Hell of 
Hells.” This community is bound together mysteriously, while at the same time, this 
member does his best to uncover that mystery, rather than hiding behind it. Further, 
MacDonald’s belief is that all true communities find their identities in this mysterious 
way. There is an element to the struggle for identity which overcomes constructed 
boundaries, not just between different notions of church, but between traditional notions of 
the difference between the religious and the secular. For MacDonald, there was no such 
divide. How divisions are broken down, and false mysteries uncovered, during the search 
for Christian identity, is our concern in studying Lilith. Again, in a quotation from Robert 
Falconer, we find that MacDonald’s theology emerges from a concern with the process of 
revelation, rather than seeking to define in advance the content of such a revelation.
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Rather than revelation becoming a form of secret knowledge to be passed from one to the
other, it becomes a spur to further action. A construction of whispered secrets is based on
privileged knowledge as opposed to true revelation. It does not make a true community,
according to MacDonald {Robert Falconer, p352):
...the Jungfrau withdrew into its Holy of Holies...but from the mind it glorified it 
has never vanished... to have beheld a truth is an apotheosis. What the truth was I  
could not tell; but I  had seen something which raised me above my former self and 
made me long to rise higher yet. (my italics)23
We cannot ultimately locate MacDonald’s loyalty as being either to the community as 
such, nor to the self as such. The responsibility he feels does not make his concept of 
ethics easy, and we will consider it both in the first section, and in the third, in the light of 
some of Caputo’s and Derrida’s comments on the relationship between a sense of 
giftedness and a sense of responsibility, and how easily one slides from the true notion of 
mystery in religious communities, into the formation of a demonic secret (as Lilith shows) 
which absolves one from all responsibility. The concept of morality or responsibility in 
MacDonald’s work is easy to misunderstand, being placed too firmly within some brief 
outline of an accepted Christian or Victorian sense of duty.
Much of his thinking on ethics seems to correspond with the Danish philosopher, 
Kierkegaard. His work Either/Or explores and contrasts in turn the aesthetic, dutiful and 
religious concepts of identity and action. Kierkegaard represents the religious conception 
of life as being one which is leeched upon by the aesthetic and dutiful ideals, in order that 
the individual may extract an autonomous identity and sense of self-worth. The truly 
religious, however, when followed through on its own terms is paradoxical, deeply 
problematic, and involves what seems to be a complete negation or abandonment of both 
the aesthetic and dutiful selves -  a kind of death -  or a gift of death. For the issue in 
Either/Or is not merely that one has done wrong, but that one is, essentially, wrong. This 
realization significantly comes late -  at the end of Kierkegaard’s book, itself behaving like 
a stumbled-upon gift, just as Lilith will struggle until her hand may finally be severed, so 
that she is able to receive this gift of death.
23 Derrida, to be looked at later, notes in The Gift of Death (p80): “To share a  sec re t is not to 
know or to reveal the secret. It is to share we know not what.”
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This will bring us in turn, in the study, to consider MacDonald’s treatment of nihilism in 
Lilith, and will also cause us to wonder which aspects of Calvinism he retains in his 
theology. For Calvinism, too, has an element in its negative assessment of the human 
condition which looks quite like the negative method of the discovery of the “Christ- 
self’24 in Lilith.
Today, the Victorian sense of duty takes the form of a feeling of responsibility to the self 
or to the small group of one’s friends or family or work, and seems, likewise, to shield us 
from the more fundamental questions of what is actually required in order for identity as 
responsibility to come into being in the fullest sense. These are not, therefore, theological 
questions which are, by definition, irrelevant to modem thought but, rather, mean that 
MacDonald’s thinking and writing focus upon issues which are of universal concern. It is 
significant that Lilith is opened by a quotation from Thoreau’s Walking, a writer who is
•yc
seen today as a “champion of individualism” , and whose work is considered to be the 
epitome of the Romantic desire to escape the natural world through the individual’s 
communion with nature. Yet MacDonald chooses to use a passage from this work which 
speaks of a hidden community, living amongst the trees. From the outset, then, 
MacDonald contextualises the anxious individualism depicted in Lilith’s opening chapters 
in an anticipation of community. Perhaps, too, in his reference to Thoreau, we can see 
how MacDonald is anticipating Nietzsche’s Zarathustra in his comment: “Can it indeed 
be possible? This old saint in his forest hath not yet heard that God is dead!”, and is 
already seeking to uncover a certain emphasis in the Biblical interpretation of Christian 
identity for a future generation, who may function from a psychology grounded in 
metaphysics or materialism, and who will indeed feel that God is dead.
In Lilith, we find many failures in the attempts to build communities and cities, perhaps 
anticipated in the destruction of the city in The Princess and Curdie27. The failures of
24 As Robb quotes it from MacDonald’s  own words in Diary of an Old Soul, in George 
MacDonald, p 5 4 .
25 Cambridge Biographical Encyclopaedia
26 Caputo, in More Radical Hermeneutics, translates the “God is d ead ” m ovem ent in theology 
a s  a  parallel m ovem ent to that of the delimiting of ethics, with which MacDonald is concerned, 
a s  we shall se e  in the section on ethics and T h e  Giant’s  Heart’.
27 One day a t noon, when life w as at its highest, the whole city fell with a roaring 
crash ...W here the mighty rock once towered, crowded with hom es and crowned with a 
palace, now rushes and raves a stone-obstructed rapid of the river...and the very nam e of 
Gwyntystorm has ceased  from the lips of men {The Princess and Curdie, p221)
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both Vane and Lilith to understand themselves and to understand one another are linked 
by this general background of disastrous city-building. So, too, we find ourselves heirs of 
a system of ethics which tends towards competitive values and which encourages city- 
building. self-protection or self-justification. MacDonald does his best to outline the price 
of accepting from this background our notions of ethical responsibility, where it began to 
manifest itself in his lifetime, in the mercantile Victorian mind. Here, he has many 
Scottish contemporaries, who examine the same issues. However, such examination tends 
to be dualistic. The House with the Green Shutters comes immediately to mind, 
portraying the battle between an unworldly, Romanticism and a materialistic work-ethic, 
in the characters of John Gourlay and his son. John MacDougall Hay’s Gillespie also 
deals with the effects of capitalism and of the ethical foundations of communities.
However, it seems that MacDonald is addressing the more fundamental questions: What 
is a community? What is an individual? He does so from within the position of a man 
caught between various interpretations of selfhood, rather than from the standpoint of a 
theoretical dualism. For while Vane and Lilith seem for a time (as Vane would have it), 
to be on opposing sides, ultimately, no such simple story emerges. Lilith’s story is also 
the story of Vane and of the community who are with her. And Vane’s story places the 
reader within the narrative in a state of lostness so profound, that we require a certain 
amount of faith to continue the quest to make sense as we read. Like the method of the 
parable, this story allows for no privileged position of power, all such concepts being 
alien. Not even within the mind of the reader can there be any place of permanent rest28. 
Whenever such rhetoric occurs, it is ruthlessly exposed. Vane’s explanations and 
reasonings are continually confounded, and along with them the reader’s own 
expectations. MacDonald’s work centres the issue of identity wholly upon the 
interpretation of Christ’s identity and requires us, as does the twelfth century theologian 
Anselm, to believe in order to understand.
As already mentioned in the Abstract, in the third section we shall look in more detail at 
the work of McLeod Campbell, who takes up the problems of ecclesiology and Christian 
identity in the modem context of individualism. His work on the subject of atonement 
was in its time -  as was Lilith -  misunderstood in its attempt to lift the question of
28 “For repose is not the end of education; its end is a noble unrest”, (p1, A Dish of Orts). The
“sleep” of identity, then, is not achieved through education.
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salvation out of an anxious, subject-centred attempt to appropriate salvation or Christian
identity, and into a more thoroughly Christological, object-centred focus for Christian
identity. Like Campbell, MacDonald was mistakenly labelled a universalist29. Both
Campbell and MacDonald were too radical in their thinking for their time, yet also subtle
enough to escape the attention they deserve today, as thinkers who dealt with issues which
are still easily misunderstood, or mis-imagined, by all of us. John MacQuarrie, a
twentieth century Scottish theologian, famous for his work linking Biblical theology to
Existentialism in An Existentialist Theology, notes in another book that
.. .corrections in Christian theology are usually best made not by violent innovations 
but by recovering corrective tendencies within the tradition itself.. .30
MacDonald felt that truth itself was betrayed in some theologies, by the form which they 
took. This seems a radical complaint, yet it is important to note that he is not offering an 
alternative religion, but seeking a more truthful form of that truth which he discerns hidden 
behind the theologies he has come into contact with. He tries to explain this to his father 
in a letter31:
...does not all history teach us that the forms in which truth has been taught, after 
being held heartily for a time, have by degrees come to be held merely traditionally 
and have died out and other forms arisen? Which new forms have always been 
abused at first...there are some in every age who can see the essential truth through 
the form, and hold by that, and who are not alarmed at a change; but others, and they 
the most by far.. .think all is rejected by one who rejects the form of truth which they 
count essential, while he sees that it teaches error as well as truth, and is less fitted 
for men now than it was at another period of history. Paul, I think, could trust in 
God in these things and cared very little about orthodoxy...
It is the form, then, to which we should pay attention -  his use of symbolism; his 
interpretation and imaginative treatment of the Biblical literature; and the direction he 
takes wherever a similarity can be shown to other, later and contemporary, thinkers.
29 Even though his son s ta tes  that Lilith w as “written, I do think, in view of the increasingly 
easy  tendencies in universalists, who, because they had now discarded everlasting retribution 
a s  a popular superstition, were dismissing hell-fire altogether, and with it the need for 
repentance...w ith hell incarnate...all about and within, we are prone to find comfort in 
declaring that Evil is but shadow  cas t by the Light...” (George Macdonald and His Wife, 
pp551-552)
Mary for all Christians, p23
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A. Brief outline of the relationship between Lilith and Romanticism
To start with, we must try to understand what MacDonald’s purpose was in creating Lilith; 
to study some of the perceived problems of his time which are being addressed. In order 
to do this it is important to recognise how Lilith might address the issues which had arisen 
in Romanticism, and which had begun to settle into the wider consciousness during 
MacDonald’s lifetime. Of particular interest at this time was the identity of the artist in 
relation to the notion of a divinely created world, in which God was seen as the ultimate 
and originating artist. With the question raised about man’s origin in the light of science, 
came also the instability of the artist’s role.
In Creature and Creator, Myth Making and English Romanticism, Paul Cantor draws 
attention to the way in which Romantic art, taking up this challenge, sought to provide 
new myths of creation in order to replace the oft-repeated story of creaturely fall and 
divine grace, which had been interpreted by the church in a way which asserted the power 
of the Christian church over its subjects, and led to the belief that human beings have no 
responsibility with regard to forming their own selves. Cantor points out that the 
Romantics were seeking to provide through their art both a counterpart to the growing 
panic created by the feeling that the human being was in control of his or her destiny; and 
also to provide a remedy to the problems which that feeling in itself created in the search 
for an alternative basis for society. Either it was despair, or a god-like demand for the 
power which would reflect such self-origination.
The Romantic remedy often took the form of a return; of the apocalyptic transformation of 
society into an harmonious Eden. However, the secularization of the story of the fall 
(notably by Rousseau) meant that there seemed no objective grounds (ie a good God) for 
such a hope for humanity. Inevitably this leads to the darker vision of apocalypse -  
Shelley’s Frankenstein being a notable example. Cantor speaks also of Blake’s vision of 
the demonic creator as being another attempt to find -  through possibly Gnostic roots -  an 
alternative to the traditional and limiting -  interpretation of the Bible by the church which 
sought to control that literature. In these alternative visions, however, we frequently come 
up against the problem of dualism, and Cantor does not deeply question the Biblical 
literature itself as to how it seeks to remedy such dualism. What is interesting about Lilith 
is that it is a story about such attempts to create alternative myths and apocalypses -  a
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meta-Romantic novel. In it MacDonald directly draws on Biblical sources as well as 
others -  notably Boehme and Novalis -  addressing both Gnostic and mainstream dualistic 
views and deconstructing them through the vision he presents. For Lilith is more vision 
than myth, resisting the temptation to end; to draw a line under; to round off or to subdue 
history. In this he remains true to his assertion that his only purpose as a writer is to allow 
whatever light he discovers to shine for itself (he is a discoverer and not a metaphysician), 
trying hard never to attempt to convince another by argument of what he saw as truth.32
Interestingly, Cantor is not concerned in his analysis to recognise the vast array of
interpretations which the Biblical literature inspires, choosing instead to portray the
‘accepted message’ of the Bible that man should be viewed as a “finished product” (p7) as
its actual message. The representative text that he chooses for his preface to his study of
Romanticism reveals his own interpretation of Deism: “.. .shall the work say of Him that
made it, He made me not?” {Isaiah 29:16). A simple ethical choice between obedience
and rebellion. However, because of his Christological interpretation, MacDonald certainly
does not view man as a “finished product”, yet considers himself deeply Biblical in his
theology. He instead asks if we really understand what this work (ourselves) is without
reference to any relationship to a creator. At first glance Lilith seems to indicate precisely
the static, dualistic approach caricatured by Cantor:
“Why did he make me such?” gasped Lilith “I would have made myself oh, so 
different! I am glad it was he that made me and not I myself! He alone is to blame 
for what I am...” {Lilith, p202)
The first thing we can note about this is that Lilith is referring to the accepted notion (and 
the one which Cantor accepts) of (some) traditional interpretations of identity in religion. 
However, MacDonald is also showing how easily such an interpretation is turned on its 
head in order to absolve the person from all responsibility to such a creator; a movement 
which happens in both extreme Calvinism -  in the form of antinomianism - and in 
nihilism. Such is the outcome of a religion which denies all mystery; which seeks to
32 “The reality of Christ’s  nature is not to be proved by argument. He m ust be beheld.” 
(‘Browning’s “Christm as Eve’”, A Dish ofOrts, p 2 0 7 ,)
3 In 'A Serm on’, what he says of opinion is true in general of his view of human nature: “...to 
be of true value it m ust have in it not only the possibility but the necessity of change; it m ust 
change in every man who is alive with that life which, in the New Testam ent, is alone treated 
a s  life at all.”
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explain from its own standpoint of closed logic the notion of the Creator and the created34. 
Cantor perceives Rousseau as breaking free from this notion in his secularisation, while 
MacDonald perceives the ‘breaking free’ from such an originally misconceived notion as 
remaining, essentially, bound to it in that it is simply a reaction to a reality misconceived, 
just as surely as the Calvinist is bound fatefully to their own perversion, in the darkness of 
the God who is divorced entirely from the imagination, and rendered merely a logical 
‘necessity’.
MacDonald goes deeper with his exploration, addressing the issue in terms of freedom of
imagination, and relating it to perverted concepts of the self-made man. Lilith has earlier
stated in response to Mara’s comment (“You are not the self you imagine”), and in
contradiction to her own (previously quoted) statement:
“So long as I feel myself what it pleases me to think myself, I care not. I am content 
to be to myself what I would be. What I choose to seem to myself makes me what I 
am. My own thought makes me, my own thought of myself is me. Another shall 
not make me!” (Lilith, ppl99-200)35
Out of this process of thought, Lilith has fallen back into the more childlike trap of 
demonising God, or annihilating her own identity, in the need to escape the evil she finds 
within herself. She shows herself incapable of precisely the free choice for good when 
faced with the knowledge of good and evil; a choice which is expected of her according to 
the secularised moral scheme. Here is Rousseau’s picture of the self-made man or 
woman, bom out of the stmggle between reason and passion -  the “limitless” progress 
which Cantor discerns in the movement toward a secular psychology. But in Lilith’s 
experience, the stmggle results in a similar attitude of reaction to, or acceptance of the 
negation of one’s identity, and with it, of one’s responsibility, when one faces the question 
of identity in isolation. That is, the instinct towards self-making exists both in religious 
and secular thinking, and both result in the same negative end -  the loss of the self. For 
MacDonald, therefore, the issue must be preceded by a reinterpretation of the entire 
concept of selfhood and identity, otherwise the negative results emerging in Calvinist
34 His essay  on the imagination gives us an idea of the way in which Lilith may represent a 
perversion of the religious intellect arising from the suppression of the imagination (A Dish of 
Orts, p26): “That evil may spring from the im agination...cannot be denied. But infinitely 
w orse evils would be the result of its absence. Selfishness, avarice, sensuality, cruelty would 
flourish...and the power of Satan would be well established...d isastrous consequences would 
soon appear in the intellect which they... worship.”
35 Perhaps she echoes both Descartes: “I think, therefore I am ” but also thus com es to see  
herself a s  the divine “I AM”; a perversion of D escartes’ thinking (see  more detail on p43).
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theology re-emerge on the secular level. And, in any case, to MacDonald, any distinction 
between the religious and secular is simply a matter of such mistaken self-making in the 
first place.
I do not think, then, that it is MacDonald’s aim simply to pull down either Rousseau’s or
the Romantic attempts to tackle the issue of human freedom outwith the bounds of
religious language, since it is the form, of such religious language which has helped to
bring about the crisis of Christian identity. He is, however, striking at one precious part of
it in his portrayal of Lilith; what Cantor calls (p24)
...the heart of the romantic ideal of autonomy. Total self-determination ultimately 
requires total self-creation...
Neither is it MacDonald’s intention to show merely that the problem existed before in 
religious thought, as being part of a linear history of ideas. For the novel plays with time, 
counteracting any notion that a final historical perspective can be applied in dealing with 
issues such as identity. Instead, MacDonald identifies the struggle for self-determination 
as being part of all searches for identity, whether religious or secular. For the issues he 
raises in Lilith’s character are reflected in all of the various characters of the novel, most 
of whom have a counterpart in his own society (Vane, the little ones, the skeletons); all of 
whom are engaged in finding out the significance of the lives in which they find 
themselves. He presents the idea that lives are themselves signifying, not of a separate 
preconception of some other ‘thing’ which they signify analogically, but in the connection 
between the individual ‘live’ imagination and that which presents itself as gifted -  beauty, 
truth, goodness, in feeding and informing its ‘liveliness’ . This is a mystenous 
connection in that it defies appropriation. Identity is then informed from outwith its own 
limits (whatever they may be). MacDonald’s conception of the imagination in relation to 
the world addresses in new ways the sense of objective groundlessness which will later 
characterise the existential search for meaning. Along the way, almost as a by-product of
36 For his essay  on individual developm ent notes the growth in identity in the child a s  coming 
from the realisation that the world is “around and not within”, while his work on the imagination 
is directly connected by him to the Biblical notion, found in Ecclesiastes, that “he (God) has 
put the world in their heart, so  that no man can find out from beginning to en d ...” T hese 
notions m ust be taken together, and show that the formation of identity entails a  continual 
movement outward which re-informs and in turn feeds the inward ‘heart’. The ‘live’ 
connection between the outer and inner asp ec ts  of growth depends neither on an inner 
expansion, nor a losing of the self in the ‘outer’ world. Identity is all in the relationship which 
takes place in the m ovement betw een the ‘inner1 sen se  and the ‘outer’ sense , such m ovement 
defined by MacDonald a s  ‘true life’. At all levels, grace precedes its working out, but that 
working out requires the willing of the individual to move in line with the direction of the ‘life’.
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this, he provides a close psychological study of the effects of the breaking down of 
organized religion upon his own society. He also addresses the postmodern aspect of 
Romanticism which comes from the notion that autonomy exists prior to community, as 
opposed to its being grounded in community, and thus linked to the concept of 
responsibility. However, MacDonald always leads the reader away from the position of 
the impartial investigator and back to this crucial question of identity, whichever angle we 
take, demanding that we first look more closely at the Biblical text itself. His blurring of 
the distinction between anti-Christian sentiments; and attitudes found within established 
Christianity means that he requires of us, firstly, a more imaginative reading of the 
tradition itself, for he has identified the suppression of imagination in that tradition to be 
the vehicle of much evil.
So where Cantor, and many writers on this theme, provide us with a simple polarization 
between the religious and secular attitudes, identifying the latter with the beginnings of 
freedom, MacDonald is constantly critical of any static position (the idol) -  either 
religious or secular -  portraying the making of such idols as being a generic expression of 
slavery (of a lack of identity), and of a lack of imagination, in all cultures. He portrays a 
mistaken concept of freedom and self-imagining in its exposed identity as slavery to the 
needs of the self. Indeed, in his novels he has already begun to portray the mistranslation 
of freedom (as self-making) within the context of the religious and political problems of 
his native Scotland37. In Lilith, he is broadening the context, even while returning to re­
examine the Christian tradition of identity.
Similarly, his attitude towards ethics is not a simple one. As we have noted, the difference 
between his approach and that of Cantor can be illustrated by referring to their use of the 
Biblical text. Where Cantor chooses as his preface text for his book on Romanticism 
Isaiah 29:16, the image of the potter and clay, as representative of religious epistemology, 
and sets it against Nietzsche’s conflation of creature and creature (“In man creature and 
creator are united” (ref)), MacDonald’s point of reference is not a conceptual one; not one 
of external ideals inwardly applied, but a concern to interpret the deeper issues of the 
imaginative nature of art, which already exist in the text of Isaiah. The issue is reflected
37 Consider the way in which he shows, in AlecForbes of Howglen, that ideal of Scottish 
freedom, Robert the Bruce, a s  greatly reduced in stature, by the confusion between true 
identity and mercantile allegiance.
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within Lilith’s own psychology, but the solution is neither conflation, nor theoretical 
atonement, but as to how exactly she may be helped to do something, in order to become 
herself. She holds within her right hand Nothing and -  alone - is unable to let go of it 
{Lilith, p202):
She was what God could not have created...her right hand also was now 
clenched.. .upon existent Nothing -  her inheritance!
In Lilith there is another allusion to Isaiah which complicates Cantor’s choice of the 
simple image of potter and clay as representative of the biblical treatment of human 
identity {Isaiah 44:20):
And he cannot deliver his soul, nor say: “is there not a lie in my right hand?”
The context of this Biblical passage, towards which MacDonald has drawn our attention, 
is extremely interesting. Like the verse which Cantor chooses, it is set within the 
conceptual framework of God as creator but, from verses 9-17, deals with the issue of man 
as independent creator (rather than assisting creator); and yet in this new assumption of the 
divine role, the artist finds an ensuing and paradoxical compulsion to build idols, things 
which are metaphorically dead, lacking the life-source in their conception. This is a 
favourite subject of MacDonald’s. The Biblical passage describes the way in which the 
craftsmen of different trades lovingly create objects. MacDonald, like the writer, thinks
•  *10that this ability is a God-like and God-given attribute. The writer of Isaiah, like 
MacDonald, is a poet; an artist considering the role of art. . Artists, like theologians, 
have the additional temptation to worship their creation as their own, as opposed to the 
creator from whom they receive this gift of interpretation, so cutting off all basis for its 
coherence; effectively rendering it dead. This is one context in which to raise the image 
of Lilith’s killing of her children. Here, however, MacDonald is addressing the 
autonomous tendencies of theology and of art, as being one and the same, rich in their 
own conception, representing all the stages of self-satisfaction; of stasis. In this self­
reference he is typically Romantic40, but is approaching the issue more thoroughly. From
“Here, the man may imagine greatly like God who created him” (from ‘On the Imagination’,
A Dish o f Orts.
39 This issue also em erges in St Paul’s theology, for example, in Romans 1v25: “Who 
exchanged the truth of God for the lie, and worshipped and served the creature rather than 
the C reator...” W e should also note that Paul himself, like the writer of Isaiah, on 
MacDonald’s  thinking, fulfils the role of the artist, in that he may be seen  a s  an interpreter of 
discovered truth, rather than a  creator of new truth.
40 Perhaps it is because Derrida is also aw are of this wonderful and dangerous capability in 
the artist or thinker, that we can see  so much in common in their preoccupations. Caputo
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an interpretative standpoint, consistent with the tradition of divine wisdom in the Bible, he 
re-imagines the meaning of this tradition (which meaning remains in itself, the same), 
rather than seeking to create a new tradition or a new meaning. And because he 
emphasises form so much, we should at this point mark the ‘living’ relationship between 
form and meaning; meaning being a gift which attaches itself to different forms in 
different ages; as the Spirit of God breathes life/meaning -  or not -  into it. He also reveals 
that it is only by freeing the tradition from its habitual forms, that the tradition of divine 
wisdom truly discovers or uncovers this new life in every generation.
Cantor notes how the problems which arise from secularisation lead to the search for 
apocalypse. But MacDonald’s treatment of apocalypse is always tied to this central notion 
of autonomy as it exists. It is like a form which will not let go of itself. For him, 
autonomy is not set ultimately against the tyranny of the ideal church; the ideal man or 
state, but in its inability to form for itself a community, because of its associated need for 
self-justification, which competitive stance leads both to moralising, and ultimately to a 
nihilism which undermines all moral stances and, indeed, existence itself.
So MacDonald’s apocalypse, after all, is the result of a gift; a divinely gifted ability to 
cooperate; to communicate; to imagine. It is not a negotiated end, but emerges from a 
sense of how the fate of one is bound up with the fate of all. This relationship is reflected 
in the novel. It is Vane himself who will be sent to bury Lilith’s hand, and he cannot sleep 
himself until this is done. Vane’s own mother has a wounded hand which identifies her 
with Lilith (the mother church perhaps). Paradoxically, Vane must take the fate of Lilith 
upon himself; must even see her as himself. This cannot be done until he has given up the 
need to place a boundary upon his own existence and identity, and has ceased to attempt to 
justify his own actions.
Cantor identifies the movement to build community as taking place only once secular 
autonomy has been established. But MacDonald’s Christian community which emerges 
subsequent to the failure of such autonomous action remains essentially mysterious. There 
is a ‘gifted’ aspect to the establishment of community in his thinking which is not a
speaks of Derrida a s  “a  m aster of self-creation...a genius of au tonom y...com poses...”(like 
MacDonald)”...rich, lush, over-full texts that allude to philosophers, psychoanalysts, poets and 
novelists in a way that sends his readers scurrying to the library...” {More Radical 
Hermeneutics, p90)
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question of obvious duty, as opposed to the city or utilitarian construct of which Rousseau
speaks. This mystery cannot be claimed, however, by particularly religious constructs,
which also build their cities upon a rhetoric of power, only to be tom down. This mystery
does not make such a ‘gifted’ community incoherent; it is simply that it can set itself no
tangible borders, being bound to lack any rhetoric of power or of protectionism41. This
tendency to define boundaries is something with which MacDonald has struggled in terms
of the nature of his own beliefs and perceptions:
...we ought never to wish to overcome because WE are the fighters, never feel 
THAT IS MY TRUTH...Every higher stage of Truth brings with it its own 
temptation like that in the Wilderness, and if one overcomes not in that, he 
overcomes not at all.. .42
The greater the art, the nearer the truth, the more complete the vision, then, the greater 
becomes the danger of ensuing evil and destruction, for power only truly resides in truth. 
The corresponding beauty which speaks of that truth (or ‘life’; they are the same in 
MacDonald’s thought) will turn back upon itself all the more fiercely, when the individual 
artist or interpreter seeks to appropriate such a power or life, which never originally 
belonged to him or her. Such a turning back, then, since it is a turning away from life, will 
take the form of a death, or deaths, which are defined in terms of the degree of life (or 
truth) which they have attempted to appropriate. Lilith, therefore, is likely, upon 
MacDonald’s own thinking, to represent an evil of the Christian or the artistic variety43.
Isaiah, in its description of the apocalyptic provides a similarly non-protectionist, non-
appropriative vision of community, in which artists exist not in competition, not as human
gods build dead gods, in order retain a worthless autonomy, but where
Everyone helped his neighbour, and said to his brother “be of good courage!” So the 
craftsman encouraged the goldsmith. He who smooths with the hammer inspired 
him who strikes the anvil. (Isaiah 41:6)
41 This m akes it remarkably like MacDonald’s  Fairyland, the borders of which are stumbled 
upon, and remain secret - for example, in T h e  Golden Key’. W e will also consider this notion 
of the borders of a land in the study of T h e  Giant’s  Heart’.
42Letter quoted in George MacDonald and His Wife, p204
43 W e can se e  also the appropriateness of MacDonald’s  u se  of the mythology of Lilith, S atan ’s 
wife, for this them e, Satan being a  m ost beautiful fallen angel, guilty of the sin of pride, 
because he becam e jealous of that power and glory which belongs to God alone.
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Such a community could not conceivably exist, were the notion of the artist that of the 
creator of separate, self-sufficient worlds, as MacDonald insists cannot be the case44. 
Apocalyptic revelation of one’s identity and any sense of transformation is seen as 
possible only in the context of such a community, for only there can one begin to 
appreciate identity itself, in the form of the ‘other’; one who may be known only through a 
kind of not-knowing, in a mystical, yet outward-looking sense. This is the admission of 
the mystery of identity in one another, rather than a knowing which is merely an 
acknowledgment of one about whose views or past we know (a ‘dead’, objectifying 
knowledge, which bears a relation to the ‘dead’ art of idol-making). This is neither the 
compromise community which, according to Cantor, Rousseau cannot avoid arriving at; 
one of a joyless and necessary civic duty. Neither is it an isolated community of Lilith’s 
“little ones”, built upon and limited by unthinking assent to -  rather than active 
imagination of - a proposition. But MacDonald’s vision of community cannot really be 
understood in its fullness by reference to an opposition with any other concept of 
community because, by definition, it may not exist in terms o f an opposition with 
anything, steadfastly resisting as much as it can any rhetoric of difference or power in its 
concept of its own identity. Indeed it only continues to live insofar as it avoids such self- 
awareness. The community of unique individuals is a gift which confounds all 
description.
Lilith, in representing MacDonald’s own development of thinking, shows, too, how the 
individual ‘quest’ for selfhood is translated into a recognition of the reality of the ‘other’ 
towards whom one is drawn, and from whom, in the process, one uniquely receives a 
sense of identity. MacDonald has used this concept of the ‘other’ in much of his work, 
such as in his story, Photogen and Nycteris (‘The day boy and the night girl’); or in the 
way in which the Princess must gaze upon the face of the ‘other’; the Prince in ‘The Light 
Princess’. His treatment of seeing and sight in general almost always involves such a 
corresponding ‘other’. This will be explored in the second section, with reference to ‘The 
Golden Key’. However, we have noted, for now, that he comes to this place from a 
background in which dualistic thinking of all kinds has surrounded him -  in Romanticism 
and its tendency towards gnosis; in Calvinism, and in the temptations of the artist himself, 
from the need to create a sense of coherence in the post-enlightenment world. We need to
44 A Dish of Orts, p20: “Is not the Poet, the Maker, a less suitable nam e for him than the
Trouv6re, the Finder?”
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be careful, too, in studying his work, that we do not allow common dualisms 
(secularism/religion; reality/fantasy; spirituality/materiality) to define and condition our 
thinking when trying to understand the nature of his work. This would be to negate his 
entire struggle against the effect of such oppositions. They are like vast relics of the 
ancient struggle for autonomy which overshadow the human psyche and lie strewn about 
the philosophical landscape.
Especially in relation to the standard Victorian Christian interpretations of good and evil, 
Lilith is designed to challenge; and it is worth noting that MacDonald’s exit from formal 
preaching was linked to an apocalyptic issue -  a refusal to be limited in his religious 
vision by cultural standards. He refused to dismiss the idea that the renewal of creation 
might include the salvation of animals. Further, he has often been described as a 
universalist. However, his theology cannot be defined by the common usage of such 
terms. He insisted that the notion of hell must itself be interpreted with reference to God’s 
love. The thing to keep in mind, when we are considering the historical context for Lilith, 
is that MacDonald does not have any alternative plan available, which is being offered 
through his works of fiction. Rather, such works are designed to enable the reader to step 
out o f  a world which has been constantly confusing itself with notions of categories and 
boundaries which can easily define this or that view in terms of dualisms; with the rhetoric 
of power. He can be clearly seen in Lilith to be addressing the concerns of Romanticism; 
not from any position which he defines as his own, in which he seeks an autonomous 
refuge; but in an effort to reinterpret and rediscover the apocalyptic nature of the world 
and body in which he finds himself.
The first thing to consider is how it is that the novel Lilith moves through such nihilism 
and concern with duty, towards a more fully grown ethics; a sense of identity and 
community. What is the nature of this apocalypse, and in what way does MacDonald 
allow us to interpret, discover, or uncover this mysterious happening?
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B. MacDonald’s approach to nihilism in Lilith
What is his concept of nihilism?
A horrible Nothingness, a negation positive infolded her, the border of its being that 
was yet no being, touched me, and for one ghastly instant I seemed alone with Death 
Absolute. It was not the absence of everything I felt, but the presence of 
Nothing... it was the recoil of Being from Annihilation... then came the most fearful 
thing of all. I did not know what it was, I knew myself unable to imagine it, I knew 
only that it was Life in Death -  life dead, yet existent, and I knew that Lilith had had 
glimpses, but only glimpses of it before; it had never been with her until 
now...something began to depart from me...the lamp of life and the eternal fire 
seemed dying together. And I about to be left with naught but the consciousness 
that I had been alive.. .she was in the outer darkness, we present with her who was in 
it. We were not in the outer darkness, had we been, we could not have been with 
her...the darkness knows neither the light nor itself, only the light knows itself and 
the darkness also. None but God hates evil and understands it...She knew life only 
to know that it was dead, and that, in her death lived...she had killed her life, and 
was dead...she had tried her hardest to unmake herself, and could not...she could 
not cease....her right hand also was now clenched -  upon existent Nothing...’!  
yield” said the princess. “I cannot hold out. I am defeated -  Not the less, I cannot 
open my hand.. .”1 will take you to my father...” “How can he help me?” “He will 
forgive you” “Ah, if he would but help me to cease! Not even that am I capable of!
I am a slave.. .Let me die...” “Verily, thou shalt die, but not as thou thinkest. Thou 
shalt die out of death into life.. ,45
The entire novel has been a circling; a disorientating wander through the mires of 
unthinking obedience and thoughtful mistakenness, from Vane’s first encounter with the 
‘other’ world, which seems to operate according to an entirely unknown set of laws. This 
has been no Pilgrim’s Progress46. From the start of the novel, Vane has wandered in a 
mist, circling back upon himself, in search of a horizon from which to gain his bearings. 
The novel has been a spiralling Vane’s encounter with nihilism, which takes the outward 
form of Lilith’s desire for death. Hell and death are notably here not physical places apart 
from other physical places, but neither are they interpretable merely as psychological 
constructs47. In this, MacDonald echoes James Hogg’s The Private Memoirs and
45 Extracts concerning the concepts of death and non-being, taken from Lilith, chapter 39.
46Despite the fact that Pilgrim’s Progress w as one of MacDonald’s  favourites, often performed 
by the entire family, in Lilith, he seem s concerned to explore the wider implications for the 
formation of identity in term s of the nature of reality. Robb notes (p100, George MacDonald), 
that "In Lilith, more is a t stake than V ane’s  inner growth...his action can be decisive in aiding 
or retarding the spread of evil a s  a  w hole... ”. The apocalyptic asp ec t of direct confrontation 
with the nature of evil is borne out by his son, who notes that MacDonald w as happy for it to 
be described a s  “the Revelation of St G eorge” (George MacDonald and His Wife, p548).
47 Although this is a  m atter of perception, for his son also notes that he quotes Marlowe’s 
Faust in Salted with Fire(p123): “All places shall be hell that are not heaven” (George 
MacDonald and His Wife, p551), we m ust also rem em ber - such is the importance placed 
upon the relation between perception and reality - that it may not be term ed psychological,
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Confessions o f a Justified Sinner in his refusal to grant a location for the reader from 
which they may judge their position. He draws us in to the experience outlined above. 
For while Lilith’s experience may be interpreted psychologically, the fact that she is 
connected with Vane’s desires and fears means that we must ourselves deal with the 
nihilistic possibilities which emerge on all levels, from the experience of self- 
consciousness, since they are present in a form which relates ‘being’ to history - the 
narrative form itself48.
MacDonald’s method of universal but indirect representation of Christian apocalypse in 
Lilith is concentrated mainly in the negative terms of Lilith’s existence. This indirect 
method can be partly attributed to his assertion that the case for faith cannot be argued 
through logic.49 And his son recalls the one time at which he encountered his father’s 
anger:
“Father” said I, tapping the table with a finger, “can you tell me that you know the 
God exists whom Jesus proclaimed? Can you tell it me with the same certainty
according to MacDonald’s  thinking. Materiality itself is a  m atter of interpretation. This is, 
therefore, a real hell, capable of affecting the material world, for all that it is also a  question of 
perception.
As we noted on page 20, Lilith w as written in response to universalism, to the idea that 
darkness is not real; being but a shadow  cast by light, and his treatm ent of shadow s in 
Phantastes suggests that he has formerly held, or at least considered, this view in term s of 
subjectivity. Here, however, we can se e  from this p assag e  that darkness has reality; 
tangibility; and yet it does not seem  real to those who are in it, for “the darkness knows 
neither the light nor itself, only the light knows itself and the darkness also ... ”. Here, 
interpretation does not even becom e an issue until the reality of evil; the nature of reality apart 
from God is acknowledged. In this, we find a  Calvinistic strain of the thought that one’s 
intrinsic sinfulness -  this experience of nihilism - m ust be acknowledged. However, it is also 
clear that because  “only light can truly know darkness”, that light m ust in som e way be first 
involved in this apprehension of our own darkness, for: "If the dark portion of our own being 
w ere the origin of our imaginations, we might well fe a r...” (‘On the imagination...’, A Dish of 
Orts, p25). So the scene  is se t in the novel against this pre-existent background of the 
question of the relation between ‘inner’ and ‘outer’ light, rather than through any se n se  of 
dogm a asserted . For “God sits in that cham ber of our being in which the candle of our 
consciousness goes out in darkness...and  sends forth...wonderful gifts into the light” (sam e 
essay, p25). This is consistent with MacDonald’s  view of the nature of truth; which is that it ii 
discerned in movement; the m ovement of ‘true’ life. His interpretation of darkness in relation 
to light shows that Calvinism lies in paradoxically killing a  living truth by seeking to tell it, by 
attem pt to equate it with the dogmatic form which it produces; while paradoxically seeking to 
tell it. S ee  George MacDonald and His Wife, p309, w here he quotes: “ Calvinism is the only 
Theology that m akes out a  perfect system, but that does not establish it a s  truth.” While 
universalism also seek s  to represent truth (the universal love of God) but distorts it in order to 
contain its meaning in logical term s (by psychologizing the nature of perception) to becom e a  
lie. Both fail where they separa te  the inner and outer aspects  of darkness or light, through 
their imaginative lack, in the attem pt to gain som e metaphysical ground of defence.
49 “I believe that Je su s  is the eternal Son of the eternal Father...I believe...though not for a 
moment would I endeavour by argum ent to convince another of this, my opinion. If it be true, 
it is God’s  work to show it, for logic cannot.” (A Dish of Orts, ‘A Serm on’, p292)
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that I can vouch for this table I am touching?” A look of spiritual indignation -  
almost of momentary anger at my stupidity -  flashed across his face. “Of course 
not!” he exclaimed. “Do you think I could believe in a God demonstrated, proved by 
weight, resistance, inevitability?”....what is the extent of our merely rational 
horizon? But for faith and imagination it were in truth a narrow one!50
If he cannot express his belief in a positive manner, what he can do is to convince the 
reader of the reality of darkness so thoroughly, that such a reader will come to long for the 
reality of light, and through such longing be granted -  through paying attention to ‘inner’ 
light - a perception of the nature of this darkness in terms of its estrangement from light 
for him or herself51. Such a perception, however, exists not as an isolated fact, but in 
relation to ‘outer’ light, and so cannot claim a metaphysical proof.
This negative approach to the expression of Christian belief is also reflected in a literary 
phenomenon - the tradition of reductive irony in Scottish Literature. Reductive irony is 
interpreted as the method which communicates what is valuable at times when its direct 
expression is simply not possible, because of the ‘hijacking’ of a language from those for 
whom it formerly expressed a living reality and identity. In and through its exposure of 
the nature of evil, it seeks the good, which it can no longer directly express. In 
Christianity, this happens with the Biblical literature where it begins to find attached to it 
connotations of power or religious self-justification, instead of encouraging the individual 
relation between word and mind, in which the individual or community can find itself 
addressed -  reinterpreted the reader in the act o f interpretation. MacDonald constantly 
refers not only to the content, but -  more importantly -  to the form of Biblical literature, 
seeking new ways of presenting interpretation which can defamiliarise the text, free it 
from the abuse of its use, and direct the reader towards this ‘live’ aspect of meaning. The 
link between irony and Christianity was also a preoccupation of Kierkegaard’s , who as 
we have noted, has other interests in common with MacDonald. Reductive irony, 
however, is a modification of radical irony. It can find its expression in nihilism; and can 
reinterpret that nihilism . A radical disorientation; a corresponding loss of inferior
50 George MacDonald and His Wife, p336.
51 The negative way never, however, becom es more important than the truth underlying it, 
never hardens into a  negative system of truth-finding, which is precisely what he hated the 
term ‘Protestant’ for, stating that “You cannot...m ake a  belief out of a denial” (From a 
Northern Window, p86)
“ Kierkegaard’s  The Concept of Irony, with constant reference to Socrates
53 in his Theology of Hope, p336, Moltmann sp eak s of irony: “In W estern social 
philosophy... .we repeatedly find attem pts to retain the idea of estrangem ent and regain the 
human nature of man by m eans of transcendental reflection. ‘I no longer coincide with my
34
conceptions of goodness (as duty, as fearful obedience) is required. However this way of 
darkness is often likely to result in such fear as closes down the imagination. It is a 
venture into the unknown, with no clear guarantees, but which should prove to itself its 
utter dependence on its creator rather than on metaphysical beliefs about the creator. 
Unlike Anodos, who in Phantastes, is required to “put forth on the open deep with but one 
ship... his tiny craft.”, Vane is denied even that safeguard; but is himself plunged into the 
water54.
Because of MacDonald’s insistence upon the perceptual nature of reality, and yet the
objectively gifted nature of such perception by God, he seems to bridge the gap between
the commonsense, Scottish tradition of enlightenment philosophy, which emphasises a
kind of self-evident perception of reality by the thinker55, and the “radical pietist”
tradition, characterised by, for example, Kierkegaard, which challenges the notion of
autonomous reason, but often comes to posit faith as a substitute for knowledge, laying
faith open to abuse. The twentieth-century theologian, Milbank sees such pietism as an
... influence... subterranean and concealed... yet... obj ectively traceable... if
philosophy determines what it is to be and to know, then will it not pre-determine 
how we know even Christ to be, unless we allow that the structure of this event re­
social “I”...I can now ....be conscious of the role...I s e e  myself and my roles falling apart. By 
m eans of such reflections, the self-consciousness of man withdraws itself from the 
compromising, confusing, social reality...in reflection, in irony....it regains that detachm ent in 
which it thinks to find its infinite possibilities, its freedom and superiority... .but this...turns man 
into a  man without attributes in a  world of attributes without m an.” W e se e  in Lilith, that 
MacDonald is using such irony a s  a  ‘fiction’, however, showing that it serves a  purpose in 
exposing false ideas about selfhood, illustrating in a  negative fashion the nature of ‘human 
being’, in the ca se  of Lilith. The use  of irony against itself, in relation to the different roles in 
which Lilith and Vane are encountered, and encounter one another, exposes the ‘lack’ in such 
self-conscious irony. And yet, while showing the manifestation of this ironic form of 
knowledge, MacDonald resists the temptation to m ake of such ‘lack’ a  ‘sec ret’ language for 
the oppressed. Nihilism in itself does not ground us, just a s  MacDonald objects to the 
negative form ‘protestant’ in the formation of the Christian faith, even while he also resists its 
positivistic verification.
Lilith, p35: “I w as lost in a space  larger than imagination”
55 Thom as Reid, for example, Professor of Philosophy a t MacDonald’s  own King’s  College, 
Aberdeen, in 1752 stated: “I shall take it for granted, that I think, that I remember, that I 
reason, and, in general, that I perform all the operations of mind of which I am  conscious.”
( The Tradition of Scottish Philosophy, p107). There are  things which Reid says of the notion 
of ‘ideas’ which possibly trigger MacDonald’s  thinking on the relationship between ‘inner’ and 
‘outer’ a s  well: (p112): “Ideas stand in two distinct relations to their external causes. First, the 
ideas represent their external causes, and secondly they resem ble them. Reid does not like 
this. If the direct object of knowledge is an idea and the external object is no more than an 
indirect object of knowledge, it follows that we are never in a  position to test the 
hypothesis...to test it...we should have to have equally direct a c cess  to both the external 
object and the internal one.” MacDonald seem s to be saying that imagination grants us such 
access, in relating the inner to the outer, but only occurs a s  a  divine gift, and cannot be 
treated a s  an intellectual assumption.
35
organises also our ordinary sense of what is and what we can know, in such a way 
that the autonomy of philosophy is violated.. .56
Yet MacDonald does allow such predetermination in Lilith, and instead of violating the
autonomy of philosophy, helps it to pass through its logical conclusion, until the need for
light becomes more pressing than the need for autonomy, and so has to be reinterpreted by
the nature of its own desirein a non-autonomous fashion. There is no use in punishing
philosophy since it is grace, not punishment, which causes the repentance of Lilith; her
‘reinterpretation’ by light. Light provides its own interpretation. Once the horror of
darkness is entered into, the light alone can reach and understand Lilith, bringing its own
interpretation of what appeared to be punishment, interpreting the darkness in retrospect,
changing history by such reinterpretation57. MacDonald is therefore able to interpret
nihilism without needing to prescribe the way in which it sees itself at any given moment.
This is because, as we have already noted, like John MacQuarrie, he is subtle, and does
not favour violent innovations but would rather speak through -  and so reinterpret - the
nihilism which is the inevitable conclusion of Romantic individualism58. The dialogue we
discern between him and Reid demonstrates this. He could be speaking to Reid’s worry
about ‘ideas’ when he says (‘On the Imagination....’, A Dish o f Orts, p2):
“Are there not facts?” say they “Why forsake them for fancies? Is there not that 
which may be known? Why forsake it for inventions? What God hath made, into 
that let me inquire.” We answer: To inquire into what God has made is the main 
function of the imagination...the word itself means an imaging or a making of 
likeness.
This is neither a theory of ‘ideas’ in the sense that worries Reid, nor a taking for granted of 
the appearance of reality, but a legitimisation of the artistic operation, which requires faith 
(the ‘live’ connection) in order to perceive and to image the effects of light and darkness. 
Broadie notes that {The Tradition o f Scottish Philosophy, pi 18)
56 Radical Orthodoxy, p
57 Indeed, he seem s to take the approach to nihilism advocated by Gavin Hyman in an essay  
entitled 'John Milbank and Nihilism: A metaphysical (mis)reading? (Literature and Theology, 
Vol 14, No. 4, Dec 2000), in which he advocates a  ‘fictional’ reading of nihilism. MacDonald’s  
approach, I think, because  of his understanding of the nature of fiction, is similar, although 
with important differences, owing to the way in which he links faith and imagination.
58 He takes a similar line in his Miracles of Our Lord (p437) speaking of the transfiguration: 
“Like the other miracles, I regard it a s  simply a rare manifestation of the perfect working of 
nature ...” C S Lewis, deeply influenced by MacDonald, seem s to have applied this thinking to 
his study of miracles, w here he attem pts to show that J e s u s ’s  miracles need not be 
interpreted a s  a violation of natural laws, but a s  a sign of their fulfilment in realm s outside of 
our conceiving (Miracles, p64). In the third section the study will consider that this thinking 
com es from a refusal to conceive of grace and nature a s  logical opposites.
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Reid appears to have held that the truth of common sense beliefs is underpinned by a 
benevolent God who created us with such a nature as to find those beliefs 
irresistable.
It seems that MacDonald is returning to Reid’s assertion in his positing of the ‘inner’ light,
but that his starting point is designed to ensure that the work of the imagination remains
central in the working of the intellect. For we can see how Reid’s logic of inner light is
easily capable of translation into a theology which is closed, owing everything to
philosophical necessity, and sharing none of the wonder inherent in MacDonald’s
insistence that coherence and inner light must be primarily conceived as a gift; and the
intellect conditional upon it, rather than making such an imaginatively conceived ‘gift’ or
inner light a necessary object in the mind. His high view of faith as ‘substance’, and his
corresponding vision allow him to do this apparently without fear of the objective loss of
such a gift of coherence, primarily because of his refusal to think of Christ in terms of the
opposition between grace and nature, as he says in this letter:
.. .1 think the law of the spirit is really the law of the universe; that as, when the Lord 
vanished from the sight of his friends, they found him in their hearts, far nearer than 
before...
Lilith, however, is a clue that there may be a long and distressing road between the 
vanishing of Christ from sight, and his reappearance in the heart. We find that the 
necessity of recognising this ‘disappearance’; this occurrence and reality of nihilism as a 
universally defining experience is also considered by the twentieth century theologian, 
Jurgen Moltmann59:
...but it is a fact that the God of the resurrection is in some sort an atheistic 
God.. .the God who is with us is the God who forsakes us...
However Moltmann goes on to note that
...the romantic nihilism of the ‘death of God’, like the methodical atheism of 
science...is an element that has been isolated from the dialectic process to which it 
belongs...
That is, the nihilistic experience of hopelessness in the Christian tradition which 
previously informed philosophy, conceives of it in terms of a loss, which encourages a 
healing process of ‘mourning’, which serves a purpose in bringing the thinker to search for 
the grounds of his or her reality in God. The search or process, then, has a purpose; there
59 Theology of Hope, p171
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is some meaning in it. However, in post-enlightenment philosophy which ends or limits 
concepts to those of human reason, such a loss is an end of everything, and therefore 
cannot be conceived of as a loss at all. MacDonald comes to this philosophy, not armed 
with a metaphysic of grace, but with a demonstration that grace may yet inhabit this 
search, even where such an ‘end’ has seemed final. He cannot go back and re- 
philosophise; but he can demonstrate that writing and living have a faith-based process 
which implies the existence of meaning apart from its metaphysical expression. In this 
emphasis on ‘process’ he anticipates future hermeneutic and literary emphases, where they 
approach the question of meaning.
So perhaps, in Lilith, MacDonald is trying to reintroduce that dialectic where he
anticipates the effect of its loss in late Romantic nihilism, but in new ways. These are not
based on metaphysical logic, although they may well have such an aspect in their
translation or interpretation. For, interestingly, Moltmann, in the same passage, identifies
the possible origination of the modem ‘death of God’ theology in the phrase of an early
Romantic poet, Jean Paul, where “...the message ‘there is no God’ is proclaimed in terms
of despair of the hope of resurrection”60, and that
Modem atheism and nihilism, which causes the disappearance of all dogmatic 
philosophies and the nature religions to disappear...is a universalising of the god­
forsakenness of Jesus... only then does resurrection... as a resurrection of the totality 
of being out of nothing.. .become a prospect necessary for all that is....
We can see how natural it is for MacDonald, whose conviction is that “the law of the spirit 
is really the law of the universe”, to conceive the the reception of the loss of knowledge of 
the resurrection may be seen in terms of an utter despair; an utter incoherence; a final and 
necessary sense that all that is is dead, “Life in Death” as he puts it in the passage quoted 
from Lilith. Hence his recurring emphasis on a reinterpretation of ‘being’ or reality. It is 
also possible that his interpretation of nihilism grows directly out of that of Jean-Paul, or 
at least finds in it some direction for, in Robert Falconer, he pays the highest tribute to that 
poet’s ability, p i09:
I know but one writer whose pen would have been able worthily to set forth the 
delights... .Jean Paul...
60 Theology of Hope, p168: “The early romantic poet Jean  Paul in his nightmare vision placed 
this statem ent (‘God is dead ’) on the lips of the risen and returning Christ. He himself wished 
only to give an idea of how it would feel if atheism  were true -  yet he had a greater effect than 
any other upon the romanticist nihilism of modern tim es....it is plain that for Jean  Paul the 




We should return then to Milbank’s comments, and see how MacDonald is subtly 
different, expressing his theology not in terms of an “influence”, a kind of backdrop of 
hope or faith, but by noting how faith is inexplicably found in the midst of hopelessness. 
Lilith involves not the concept of influence, but of reinterpreting. Such interpreting is not 
a violation of the autonomy of philosophy, but necessarily cannot grow anywhere but out 
of the experience of nihilism which comes from such autonomy. In this process, nihilism 
is enabled to interpret its own nature.
It is also a participatory theology in the fullest sense: “we were with her, we could not 
have been with her if we had also been in the outer darkness”. We can read this statement 
in many ways. We could read it as stating that one must keep oneself away from evil in 
order to save another; and therefore keep a distance. In doing so one is paradoxically 
nearer to the person (Lilith) one wishes to help. This is the safe reading. However, we 
must consider how very important is motivation in this novel. For, if theology is not 
‘with’ in the first place, in being willing to enter such darkness, it, too, by definition, is in 
the outer darkness, which is defined by isolation (non-knowledge of the light or of itself). 
But an imaginative theology may willingly enter such outer darkness, and in this very act, 
find itself “with”, thereby challenging the isolation which characterises outer darkness, 
and so its reality. In other words, Lilith’s position is an inner one; though real to her. It 
only remains limited, however, to that innemess and subjectivity, inasmuch as it is 
perceived to be an ‘outer’ reality; because one which must be entered into and shared by 
all. Hell becomes real in the moment that truth takes the form of a denial, on the basis of a 
metaphysics or in the natural light of reason, of its reality. It also becomes real in the 
moment that the instinct for self-protection (isolation of the self) becomes of greater 
concern than the faith in, and interpretation of, light.
It is clear that MacDonald felt that the experience of the nihilistic route was much closer to 
his own coming to an experience of Christ’s presence, than was a triumphalist or 
simplistic concept of belief in God’s presence as being self-evident rather than ‘gifted’
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(even when such a perception comes through the seemingly ‘evident’ works in nature).
He said in a letter to his son that61:
...existence is a splendid thing...but for my hope in God, I should have no wish for its 
continuance, and should feel it but a phantasmagoria.. .rather than believe in the 
popular God, I would believe in none...
Nihilism and theology
In his essay on Milbank and fictional nihilism , Hyman says:
It has often been assumed that nihilism is the antithesis of theology. Indeed, such an 
opposition may be traced back to Friedrich Nietzsche, who saw his own nihilism as 
a direct inversion of Christian faith. Much of his virulent anit-Christian rhetoric 
reinforced the conception of theology and nihilism as rival combatants which 
‘squabble over creation as jealous rivals fight over a shared lover....I argue...that 
Nietzsche would be better viewed as a ‘perspectivist’ or ‘fictionalist’, and also that 
only a ‘narrative’ or ‘fictional’ nihilism can be a thoroughly accomplished 
nihilism....then the confrontation between theology and nihilism begins to 
subside....at this point...a reconciliation between a fictional theology and a fictional 
nihilism begins to emerge.....
Hyman quotes Kermode, who distinguishes between myths and fictions, noting that a 
fiction is self-reflexive in that it is aware of its own fictive status, whereas it may 
degenerate into myth whenever it seeks to repress or ‘forget’ its status. Here, we can see 
in MacDonald’s emphasis upon books, upon the self-consciousness of the narrator, and 
upon the attention he pays to the questioning of Vane’s eschatological dreams, that he is 
aware of the self-reflexive nature of fiction. Hyman says that ‘fictions’ are for finding 
things out, and they change as the needs of sense-making change. Certainly here, we can 
see also in MacDonald’s emphasis on the need for new forms of truth, which do not seek 
to claim to be truth themselves, also the notion of the ‘change’, which in the New 
Testament is defined as life at all. Hyman goes on: “myths are the agents of stability, 
fictions the agents of change..”. He notes also in Freud the referral to his own narrations 
as ‘fictions’, and MacDonald anticipates Freud, particularly in his essay on human 
development. Hyman goes on to state that if nihilism is metaphysical, then it is clearly 
making positivist claims about the ‘real’. It claims that the real is really nihilistic: “.. .the 
result... is a metaphysics of the nothing, the nothing that is.” (in the style of the ‘negation 
positive’ which enfolds Lilith). However, Hyman notes how this nihilism is not 
thoroughly nihilistic, exempting itself from the nihilism that it attributes to everything
61 George MacDonald and His Wife, p535
62 Literature and Theology, Vol. 14, No4.
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else. We see, too, how on the other hand, a thoroughly positivistic religious attitude 
cannot itself be truly positive.
Milbank, however, Hyman notes, poses Christianity as unfounded mythos in opposition to 
a metaphysical nihilism, stating that truths are merely assumptions, takings up from 
previous linguistic arrangements, and opposes nihilism on the grounds that Christianity 
tells a much better story. This is different to MacDonald’s treatment of truth as a secret 
which must not be allowed to live -  or to be entombed within myth; since God is the living 
I AM, whose life not only demands the strenuous and endless telling and reading of many 
stories or fictions, but who also supplies the means of interpretation of these stories, by 
voluntarily inhabiting them with (gifted) meaning, as opposed to being their static 
explanation.
Hyman also criticises Milbank’s treatment of Nietzsche in that he ‘names’ him once, 
whereas “was not Nietzsche one of the few great thinkers who multiplied his names and 
played with signatures, identities and masks?” (very like Lilith, it seems). The difficulty 
with Milbank’s approach, he suggests, is that it “represses Nietzsche’s resistance to any 
unifying and totalising gesture.” On the contrary, MacDonald takes Lilith’s resistance 
further -  her hand is cut off -  a healing gesture which further fissures her identity, 
revealing that ‘naming’ is itself an act which God alone may undertake (for only the light 
understands and can therefore name the darkness and itself).
Further, Hyman notes the tendency of any attempt to systematise Nietzsche’s thought as 
leaving out a huge quantity of ‘artistic’ material in order to fund a dualistic approach 
inconsistent with Nietzsche style. This, too, illustrates the significance of Lilith as 
representing the corruption of the artistic and the theological endeavour, where it holds 
onto dualism within the rhetoric of power. In bringing together the artistic and theological 
pursuit of truth, MacDonald shows an awareness of this tendency in both. Like Nietzsche, 
MacDonald is also concerned not to come to the early metaphysical conclusion that 
“essence of things is not to have an essence”, in deciding what reality is like outside of our 
conceptual framework. Vane undergoes this temptation when the ground of his 
conceptual framework is removed, at the beginning of the novel. MacDonald tries, 
perhaps though, harder than Nietzsche, to understand the nature of the working of that
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conceptual framework in terms of the imagination, perception and intellect as interrelated, 
in the growth towards one’s participation in the divine ‘body’ of identity.
Further, Hyman quotes Nietzsche as saying that “we must journey through the land of
morality with new questions and as it were with new eyes” and, indeed, this seems to be
what MacDonald’s fictions, as we shall see in the next section on ethics, suggest. Again,
Nietzsche also sounds remarkably like MacDonald’s Vane in this:
“..the great triumph is to renounce faith in one’s own ego and to deny one’s own 
reality. This is a triumph not only over the senses but also over appearance...” 
However, Nietzsche perceives it as “an act of violation and cruelty inflicted on 
reason: a voluptuousness which reaches its peak when the ascetic self-contempt and 
self-ridicule of reason decrees: “there is a realm of truth and being, but reason is 
firmly excluded from it”...we are warned against such contradictory concepts as 
‘pure reason’, ‘absolute spirituality’, ‘knowledge as such’...to think such concepts is 
to “think an eye which cannot be thought at all, an eye turned in no direction at all, 
an eye where the active and interpretative powers are to be suppressed...but through 
which seeing still becomes a seeing-something, so it is an absurdity and non-concept 
of eye that is demanded...”
In his writing MacDonald relates the notion of an eyeless eye to the need for the individual 
to believe that God is thinking them, and not only dreaming them; the terrible need to 
ground one’s existence in something which is not a fiction or dreaming, whenever identity 
is conceived o f in terms o f selfhood. However, he does not relate this dreaming in 
opposition to reason, but only to its autonomous self-conception.
Hyman tells how Nietzsche suggests that both science and asceticism are on the same 
foundation in that they both overestimate truth, which is to say that they share the same 
faith that truth cannot be assessed or criticised. MacDonald is different to Nietzsche here, 
however, in that he carefully distinguishes between knowledge and truth in Lilith and 
elsewhere, reserving the term truth as a personal noun -  Truth -  in line with the vast 
difference between Jesus’s statement “I am the Truth, the Way and the Life”, and Pilate’s 
question: “What is truth?” In this question, Pilate takes himself too seriously, he is 
looking for a grounds on which to establish; to justify himself in relation to Truth on the 
basis of knowledge. As Hyman observes, fictional nihilism opens the way to a
63 S een  in the torture of Robert Falconer’s Morison who w ishes God to be thinking him, and in 
which the symbol of a terrible blind eye in the appearance of the moon, and then later in 
Vane, who finally ‘waits’ within the dream  in which he is enfolded by God. Both of th ese  are 
p assa g es  in his writing to which we will later return in more detail.
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reconciliation with Christianity through “a reduction and weakening of its own ontological
status.” In this way, he says
“Christian theology can only achieve non-mastery...” (the desired fictional status) 
...”if, after Nietzsche, it acknowledges its own Activity, playfulness and lightness of 
touch.”
There is a difference here, however, between Hyman’s approach and that of MacDonald -  
perhaps because of the difference MacDonald makes between truth and knowledge. In the 
sense that theology is seeking after knowledge of its own status in regard to Truth (like 
Pilate), such a playfulness and lightness are to be recommended, in order to avoid the 
rhetoric of power. If, however, it claims that its identity stands or falls with the person of 
Christ -  Truth -  as a personal name, then it needs also to adopt the idea that its own status 
is less important than the final granting of that Name which is its identity. This lack of 
concentration upon status is the true route to the ‘playfulness’ of theology, whose burden 
should be light, once it has learned the nature of such a death.
In this sense, the reconciliation which Hyman hopes for can be made on no other grounds 
than that which comes about through the future hope of identity which is eschatologically 
grounded. For, instead of a cosy relationship of playfulness existing between Lilth and 
Vane, both Lilith and Vane face an initial severing of any form of identity which takes the 
form of a self-preservation; even if it should masquerade as a harmless story. While 
Lilith’s hand is severed, Vane faces the prospect of the loss of all knowledge, and the 
manner of Nietzsche’s death implies that not all stories have happy endings, just because 
they are fictions. Lilith however, submits to the playfulness of its “endless ending”, 
characterised also in MacDonald’s life by his ‘waiting’ at the end. We cannot judge the 
lightness of Nietzsche’s fiction, and we do not need to. Not because he took that burden 
of judgment upon himself, but because truth - unlike knowledge -  may be harmonious 
with, but is not grounded within, human judgment.
The church’s identity in relation to nihilism
MacDonald’s challenge is that in seeking merely to act as an external influence, as 
Milbank suggests, the church places herself outside of the very experience which she must 
suffer -  and herself precisely in that inner darkness which she hoped to avoid, merely by 
considering that any aspect of life can remain outwith the scope (and therefore, the
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suffering), of divine love, which the church is called to witness to. Were she to claim the 
autonomy from Lilith suggested by the separating term ‘influence’, she would be claiming 
for herself the autonomy which cuts her off from the light she seeks. Neither does she 
have the right to explain its existence; or to preach against such darkness (for “only God 
himself can hate evil and understand it”). Nihilism, then, is not seen as the ultimate evil 
(despite the vivid description of it in those introductory extracts from Lilith), but rather the 
striving for autonomy; even for the autonomy of the church, where it seeks to transcend its 
own corporeal nature.
What is positive in this impossible challenge which is set for Vane, for the reader and for 
the church? What is truly innovative, as we see from MacDonald’s thoughts in his essay 
‘On the Imagination’ provides new life out of such darkness only in the sense that love is 
both ever-present and constantly new. Not in the sense that the next design for a car 
engine is new, because it replaces the previous one. For that simply relativises the value 
of car engines. (We shall come back to various interpretations of progress, and how some 
of them lead to a relativising of values, with reference to C S Lewis, on p66). For now, we 
note that in response to this problem of Christian identity, MacDonald’s thinking about the 
movement from Romanticism to nihilism is not to re-design the church, but to re-imagine 
Christian belief, from the conviction that Christian belief, because of its symbolic 
expression, must retain the poetic aspect of truth which involves the imagination. This is 
not a modem concept of progress for the church to grasp hold of; but a perspective which 
is itself part of a living and alternative history of a continual transformation or 
transfiguration of truth and of its historical expression64.
For the purpose of the study, then, we should note that the identity of the church is formed 
through the church’s inner involvement with the Spirit of Life which extends to all 
creation and cannot be claimed as its own property. Such formation of identity seems to 
require an apocalyptic rediscovery of its nature in relation to God. However, we must also 
be true to MacDonald’s thinking, and he has a sound reason for not generalising the 
theological into the philosophical or pantheistic as a result of this conviction. This is the 
very danger of systematisation from which the church has to be rescued:
64 And the vision which precipitates such reinterpretations of truth may be dark, initially, for a s  
he notes in a letter to his father “Increase of Truth will always in greater or less degree look 
like error at first... “(George MacDonald and His Wife, p198)
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Will you allow me to tell you one thing founded on the deepest conviction -  that in 
Scotland especially...a thousand times too much is said about faith...I would never 
speak about faith, but speak about the Lord himself...not as to the why and 
wherefore of his death -  but as he showed himself...full of grace, love, beauty, 
tenderness, and truth. Then the needy heart cannot help hoping and trusting...and 
having faith, without ever thinking about faith...how a human heart with human 
feelings and necessities is ever to put confidence in the theological phantom which is 
commonly called Christ in our pulpits I do not know. It is commonly a miserable 
representation of him who spent thirty-three years on our earth, living himself into 
the hearts and souls of men and thus manifesting God to them.. ,65
It is also the completion of systems which witnesses to their emptiness of the element of
the divine in their conception of God. Frequently, MacDonald reminds us that the Biblical
writers themselves never claimed this for their own writings, and in Robert Falconer, the
words of Falconer (a type of Christ) are that (p352):
“If we could thoroughly understand anything, that would be enough to prove it 
undivine...”
How do these quotations relate to the nihilistic descriptions of chapter 39? First of all we 
should note that, despite the seeming fatefulness of Lilith’s experience, there are elements 
of free will. The experience of nihilism is not in or o f itself a necessary precondition of 
authentic life, any more than is that positive violation of philosophy which Milbank 
advocates. Everything is referred back to “that Life that is for you” {Lilith, ch39), and is 
not secured by means of any one-off transaction, but by a slow and painful process of 
interaction between the various characters in the novel66. The significance of nihilism lies 
in an imaginative apprehension of its truly conditional nature (rather than in the enabling 
of a theoretical challenge to the philosophy behind it). Nihilism is therefore related 
strangely to the most violent reaction against it, both being conditional and capable of 
change; both being related to the idea of a “gift” of life or death, which may also be 
interpreted as a punishment. It is the nature of MacDonald’s working towards their being 
interpreted as gift which needs to be examined. Such an interpretation seems to take place 
in the light of the subsequent recognition that life, rather than death, is ultimately 
definitive. For such a leap to take place, to be grounded (which is what the act of 
recognition implies in seeing the truth through the form) seems to require the reversal of
65 Letter to his father, Feb 8th 1855, reproduced in George MacDonald and His Wife, p222
66 In fact, the idea of an external transaction in theology; a  theoretical substitutionary concept 
of atonem ent is referred to in Robert Falconer a s  a  “wicked lie”. MacDonald felt that salvation 
w as an inner process, substantially related to a  universal reality, som etim es evident in history; 
som etim es not.
45
time itself -  a retrospective re-creation67 of the intellect. It demands the willing 
participation of nihilism in its own death. It is like Lilith at last asking for her hand to be 
cut off.
Lilith’s predicament and the forgiveness granted to her seem to be an illustration of this 
logical impossibility, while Vane’s journey itself functions as an illustration of the 
giftedness -  not the necessity - of the relationship between a Christ-inspired imagination 
and the experience of truth as life. The forgiver and forgiven do not conspire to deny or to 
forget history as though it were merely a psychological transaction. Neither do they come 
to the philosophical conclusion that forgiveness is logical. Rather the one who is forgiven 
is relieved of the burden of such history, while the forgiver must take the burden of 
historicity upon himself (we do not forget what we have forgiven). The closer Vane 
becomes to Lilith, the more he must learn to forgive, and so the more aware of the reality 
of evil and of historicity does he become, placing him in ever more danger of succumbing 
to the burden of evil. It follows that the more one needs, and is gifted the ability to 
forgive, the greater does the temptation become to judge the world as evil from our own 
experience.
This burden is taken from Vane, only to the degree that he allows that his own ability to 
forgive is itself a gift from Christ, the originator of forgiveness. For Christ is the only one 
able to fully bear both the evil weight of historicity, and the capacity for its transformation 
into a forgiven and truly conditional, rather than necessary, history. The playfulness or 
lightness of fiction of which Hyman speaks then, is not the same as that of an 
irresponsible, cavalier or antinomian playfulness in relation to forgiveness, exposed in 
James Hogg’s Wringhim, for example. It is not freedom from responsibility, but freedom 
from guilt, which freedom enables responsibility. Instead, the playfulness is a sign of 
childlikeness; of a likeness with God, as the relation of children to their father. It is 
marked also by obedience which is not careful or self-conscious, but trusting. One does
67 It is important here to note that the issue of such re-creation is related in the p assag e  of 
Lilith, to the issue of forgiveness, by MacDonald, (“will he help m e?” “he will forgive you”).
R ecent philosophers have also identified in the notion of forgiveness the implication that 
history itself is rem ade. Forgiveness, in its strongest conception, is not a conspiracy to forget, 
or an external transaction, but a real gift of an entirely new history to the wrongdoer, which 
has a  material effect on future history, (see  Hare: The Moral Gap) (p227): “Swinburne’s  
analysis reveals the centrally m ysterious ingredient of forgiveness, which is that it seem s like 
an attem pt to do the impossible, namely to bring it about that for both parties something which 
did happen did not happen.”
46
not trust in the mode of playfulness itself, it is itself symbolic of the anticipation of our 
identity as children. Vane cannot alone rid himself of the burden of Lilith’s evil, but 
rather must, through that experience, acknowledge his own historicity; the contingent 
nature of his own reality. One’s relationship with others is therefore utterly bound up with 
one’s relationship with God. This relationship therefore constantly redefines itself in 
terms of an increasing awareness of the importance of its connection with Christ as being
Aftessential to the manner of its connection with reality (or realities) . It is also consistent 
with the logic of forgiveness found in the New Testament, which incidentally makes it 
crucial to the formation of Christian identity69. In the process, however, we cannot deny 
that such an expansion is bound to increase the risk that evil will become defining of 
reality for us. And so the continual increase of faith is a prerequisite for this experience 
of growth.
Both life and death become witnesses in this expansion, not to an abstract truth which 
would grant them their respective and polarised places in some larger scheme, but to 
Light, which bears witness to itself j through life and death, in challenging the notion of 
history; of what is knowable: “Now is the Life for, that never was against thee!” (.Lilith, 
p207). MacDonald does not, then, bring any new, external solution to the problems raised 
by autonomy, but allows us to enter into the inner coherence of the logic of forgiveness by 
granting it an alternative, imaginary setting, as opposed to his making a theoretical 
contribution to Christian doctrine. Although his son, in his biography, sees his symbolic
70use of light and darkness in Lilith as intent upon illustrating the reality of evil , 
MacDonald has come to realise that the awareness of such vivid darkness must encourage 
the perception of the value of light, in order to participate in light’s relation to, and 
perception of,darkness.
68 This also has coherence with what is noted above, in that Christ’s  life, in granting life to the 
world, does so  through a gift of death, which does not merely undo, but which rem akes 
history. Here, MacDonald is showing that this new history also challenges our concept of 
death. The implacable, unforgiving nature of time is itself challenged in the novel.
69 Eg Matthew 5v44-45 “bless those who curse you, do good to those who hate you and pray 
for those who spitefully use you and persecute you, that you may be sons of your Father in 
heaven, or Mark 11 v25 “...if you have anything against anyone, forgive him, that your Father 
in heaven may also forgive you.... Or Ephesians 4v32: "...be kind to one another, 
tenderhearted, forgiving one another, even a s  God in Christ forgave you.
70 “..we are  prone to find comfort in declaring that Evil is but shadow  cast by the Light, the 
devil but an imagined symbol of the d istress caused  by d ark n ess ....” George MacDonald and 
His Wife, p552
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He does not supply the cheap comfort of which his son speaks, however. Even if his 
intention was to communicate the reality of evil, the reader’s lostness - while itself an 
illustration of the way in which darkness validates its own reality - also cannot help but 
validate the light as necessary for its own existence (for only the Light can help Lilith 
cease to be, and so grant her true existence). By contrast, while the darkness calls for the 
light in order to understand itself, the light bears witness to itself os, in its excess, it 
acknowledges the darkness, which acknowledgement constitutes a gift of reciprocity, not a 
relationship of mutual dependence. In this, he seems to remains true to his resistance to 
dualism, even portraying dualism itself as the illusion of philosophies which would imply 
that the light cannot bear witness to itself, requiring some objective intellectual 
verification, as opposed to being characterised by an inner coherence.
Summary - nihilism
We have considered briefly the way in which nihilism is translated to become part of the 
inner coherence of the logic of forgiveness, with respect to the way in which Vane’s 
identity is formed by forgiveness. In this, MacDonald has not denied the nihilistic impulse 
its historicity, but has allowed it to run its course, until the point at which its helplessness 
to form identity becomes clear. He has left the light to bear witness to itself, in remaking 
Vane’s history; Vane’s sense of self, until his great burden of historicity and death is so far 
retranslated by this gift of understanding and forgiveness that it -  what seemed to be his 
own life - becomes a dream to him, in the light of a new perception of identity.
We will now go on to consider MacDonald’s short story, ‘The Giant’s Heart’ as providing 
another angle from which to consider the way in which MacDonald similarly delimits 
ethics, as he does nihilism, in order to allow a sense of reality to disappear, and to 
reemerge, translated; reinterpreted by the logic of the Divine imagination71. Again, we
71 W e can see , from the following statem ent, too, that this imaginative ability is w hat gives the 
human true identity, inasmuch a s  it em erges out of the divine identity, giving itself freely, and 
by such outward m ovement testifying to its divine nature: “... MacDonald is even more 
extrem e and explicit than Coleridge in underlining the divine source of this faculty. W here, for 
Coleridge, the primary imagination w as 'a  repetition in the finite mind of the eternal act of 
creation in the infinite I AM’, and the secondary imagination a  power seeking unity and striving 
to enliven that which is dead, MacDonald displaces the notion of m ere resem blance to God 
with that of identity with G od ...” (George MacDonald, p53). W e should also be careful to note 
the distinction between the analogical relation of “like God” and the familial identity “with God” 
a s  one of quality and not m ere quantity. It is not the autonom ous “god-likeness” of the 
autonom ous artist which we examined in relation to MacDonald’s reference to Isaiah, but a 
familial connection with God through the self-interpretation of Christ; so  that all are  gifted with
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should note that we cannot restrict this experience to literary or psychological categories. 
In his work, the imagination of the reader is made to work not only analogically, in 
relation to faith, but in terms of a substantial participation in a Divine economy as follows: 
the autonomy of ethics is violated or lost, as the ethical demands are intensified and 
elevated in the story. Finally, the original ethical position of the reader is rendered 
groundless, by reference to the nature of the narrative itself. Finding that its autonomous 
nature - the ability to judge - is temporary, the reader must give way to a concept of 
virtuous action which is specific, freely willed and courageous in being externally 
groundless. That is, the text or person must deny the notion that it is its textuality or self- 
consciousness which makes it complete. (Just as Vane must give up the notion that he can 
judge reality from an autonomous standpoint). It cannot achieve this without the help of 
the reader perceiving their own role as assisting in the perception of a wider, divine and
77unbound textual identity .
In breaking down its own logic, the story throws the question onto the reader, where its 
interpretation becomes a matter of free choice . The reader can see him or herself as 
becoming part of a larger text, written by a divine Author; an open history, continually 
rewritten or reinterpreted through the act of forgiveness. Or the reader may choose to play 
God, to be god-like in Coleridge’s sense, replicating the mistakes of both the human 
author, and the characters within the narrative, so creating (instead of an open historicity,
God’s image, in that they are adopted m em bers of the divine family, rather than miniature 
gods.
In this, it may be accurately described a s  “meta-fiction”, a s  G raem e Muirhead puts it when 
considering Phantastes: “fictional writing which self-consciously and systematically draws 
attention to its status a s  artefact in order to pose questions about the relationship between 
fiction and reality” (‘M eta-Phantastes: A self-referential faerie rom ance for men and w om en’, 
Scottish Literary Journal, Vol 19, No 2, Nov 1992, pp36-49). W e should note a s  well one 
other thing about the kind of reading enabled by such work, which is that of (sam e article, 
p37, quoting Fjellestad): “the critical reader, w hose aw areness of the incompatibility of the 
naive and self-reflexive readings leads him to consider the act of interpretation itself: The 
critical reader’s  aim is not to zero in on one meaning and thus to m aster the text, but rather to 
notice how meaning can never be fixed, to see how the emerging sense is provisional’ (my 
italics). This issue of provisionality m akes us think both of what we noted about the 
conditional nature of our history, in speaking of nihilism and forgiveness; and also what 
MacDonald noted in his letter to his father about the way in which forms of truth change from 
ag e  to age. W e should, however, note that while MacDonald thinks that our own emerging 
sen se  is conditional, being a  gift of God, inasmuch a s  it is a  product of divine imagining it 
nevertheless is bound to retain a familial connection to meaning in its deeper se n se  -  divine 
meaning -  even if such meaning cannot be fixed at the human level of understanding.
73 As Robb notes: “MacDonald’s  reader...m ust develop ‘the power to read the hieroglyphic 
aspect of things’, for he is dealing with an author who believes that literature ought to have a s  
much conscious meaning cram m ed into it a s  possible and that, furthermore, any worthwhile 
piece of literature m ust have within it much more meaning still, far beyond what the author 
w as conscious of devising.” (George MacDonald, pp54-5)
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as Derrida puts it74) an endless ending which does not indicates openness to the future, but 
remains nightmarishly locked in upon itself by its own - god-like - judgement. And here 
we see why it is that the analogical attempt to establish identity (“like”), is not sufficient 
for MacDonald’s need to describe the human relationship to the divine, tending to fall 
back upon itself by reason of the illusory sense of self-sufficiency of the analogical form, 
and so to remove the crucial sense of dependence upon the forgiveness of God which is 
vital to the familial connection between one’s identity and the ‘I AM’ of the divine 
identity of Christ. This explains why it is that MacDonald insists that his work cannot be 
treated allegorically; since allegory hinges on the logic of analogy. Anyway, we shall 
consider ‘The Giant’s Heart’, and the way in which it represents MacDonald’s thinking on 
these things; coming back to his view of the imagination in the second section.
74 The Gift of Death, p5
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C. The end of ethics and the beginning of community in Lilith
*The Giant’s Heart* and Lilith 
Moralism
Roderick McGillis, in his introduction to For the Childlike, is keen to demonstrate that
MacDonald’s stories, particularly his fairy stories and works of fantasy, tend, on closer
inspection, to deconstruct the reader’s sense of morality. Particularly, he cannot be pinned
down allegorically by his work to a system of belief. Critics’ comments often focus on the
way in which MacDonald seems to subvert such traditional religious teaching, and seek to
show how delightfully he undermines the ground beneath the self-appointed judge. There
is truth in all of this, but often such truth as misses the exact target of MacDonald’s
narrative. We cannot forget that MacDonald was speaking to readers in probably the last
days of an era when theological issues, and the philosophical problems that they raised,
were almost universally spoken about, and at the very least well known. The picture of
the ploughman conversing intelligently with the clergyman is not a false one. But
familiarity had bred misunderstanding. MacDonald’s view is that a doctrinal religion
based on a theology divorced from philosophy simply talks itself to death. Both become
philosophies -  and both unwillingly nihilist -  as we discussed in the chapter on nihilism.
Yet this nihilism is interpreted as the symptom of a universally gifted death, so that
MacDonald is not saying that philosophy or ethics are useless. And neither does he think
that deconstruction is the only aim of the text. This writer wants his reader to find what he
believes to be true light. In Alec Forbes, the narrator notes this (p385):
Mr Cupples tried to lead Alec into philosophical ways of regarding things; for he 
had just enough of religion to get some good of philosophy -  which itself is the 
religion of skeletons (for) “ye see....it’s pairt o’ the machine...”
This reminds us of the skeletons in Lilith (one of the many repeated symbols in 
MacDonald’s work), who are still learning to communicate with one another at a better 
level. They are not, however, abandoned in the novel. MacDonald abandons nothing; 
condemns nothing.75 Instead we meet those skeletons, as they exist, in the process of 
being redeemed. Dogma in and of itself (as a belief about something) is revealed as a
75 Taking literally, in all of his fiction, J e s u s ’s  words: “I am  not com e to judge the world but to 
save the world...” John 12: 47-48
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skeletal experience, denying its adherents the very life and humanity which they think they
have been pursuing. Therefore, when the writer in Scotland’s Beloved Storyteller (pi79),
quotes, in order to reassure the reader that MacDonald’s theology is orthodox, that...
...his war was upon the faithlessness of the officially faithful, and incidentally only 
upon dogmas exaggerated out of all proportion...
...we must also remember that underlying this is MacDonald’s belief that it is only in the 
absence o f an imaginative, therefore living, understanding, that the faithlessness which 
ensues from a merely dogmatic understanding can flourish in the first place. He can 
forgive the preacher almost any dogmatic aberration76, if he displays that imaginative life 
{Malcolm, p46):
(though the preacher)...set himself to frighten the sheep into the fold by wolfish 
cries...his imagination was sensitive enough to be roused by the words of scripture 
themselves, and was not dependent for stimulus upon those of Virgil, Dante, or 
Milton...
MacDonald is signalling here that he is interpreting biblical literature in a way which
77might not be expected . His point is that ‘God works in mysterious ways’, and that he 
will not be drawn into identifying one method or denomination over another as in or o f 
itself good or bad. His faith in the power of the divine imagination is sufficient for him to 
believe that any evil element can be overcome by that imaginative working, even if it is 
communicated by means of the fear inculcated by ‘wolves’. In Lilith, we note that Mara
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herself, who symbolises both wisdom and suffering , is the one who sends out wolves to 
gather in the sheep, so translating good out of the appearance of evil. Robb has noted 
{George MacDonald, p i06), that
76 Consider his letter to his father (George MacDonald and His Wife, p185): ... rather would I 
be such a Unitarian a s  Dr Channing that such a  Christian a s  by far the greater num ber of 
those, that talk about his Divinity, are. The former truly believes in Christ -  believes in him far 
more than the so-called orthodox.”
77 In referring to John 10, he does not liken the preacher to the hireling (as is suggested  in the 
p assag e  itself) but rather to the wolf, who may frighten away the hireling, suggesting perhaps 
that the role of hireling falls to the liberal, ‘official’ church, while this renegade preacher 
unwittingly fulfils God’s will in being the wolf who sen d s the sheep  back to Christ out of the 
despair of human attem pts to accurately replace Christ with dogma. W hat is m ost important 
in his reference to this p assag e  is the fact that no human preacher can fulfil the role of 
shepherd, but only Christ. Therefore, it is unfair to expect a  human preacher or writer to be 
able to replace the Christ-like imagination in the individual, the m ost he may do is to arouse 
what is already there. He is, by implication, insisting upon the irreplaceable nature of Christ 
himself, and rendering religious d isputes irrelevant.
78 Mara (or ‘b itte rnesses also the nam e given by Naomi to herself, in the book of Ruth, a 
woman exiled to a foreign country, following the death of her sons, and who yet finds new life 
and hope, not from a restoring of what is lost, but through a  new family which will represent 
the ancestry of the line of King David.
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it was open to MacDonald to make a point about good being brought about from 
evil... (but)... his heart is with the broad implication of the narrative, that Vane, with 
all his imperfection, is the necessary agent for the eventual triumph of good...the 
conflict...is really a reflection of how MacDonald’s creed of the virtue of action 
essentially conflicts with his belief that God is all in all and human effort, considered 
as a thing itself, vain... The lesson of Lilith seems to be that righteous action should 
not be undertaken until the self is utterly dead, but such an impossible condition was 
of no use to an author who was, in his son’s words, ‘always a fighter’.
However, because we are more interested here in how MacDonald went about defining 
this ‘self, we should note that although the outer logic of the story seems to be that of the 
grace of God working through the mistakes of human behaviour, it also allows us to see 
how the issue of good and evil, as we have stated, is neither that of a dualistic ‘battle’ 
between them, nor of a universally contrived scheme whereby good comes from evil, thus 
conveniently explaining it. Further, MacDonald himself is aware of the danger -  as we 
have quoted -  of perceiving that WE are the fighters79. But imaginatively conceived, the 
impossible logic of this conflict between the necessity for human action and the belief in 
God as the author of all good reorients the mind toward the necessity and therefore the 
ultimate reality, of light; of Christ alone, while at the same time conceiving of it as a 
priceless gift, not to be fully realised until all logical objections or solutions lose their 
tendency to claim independent validity. Hence the way in which what formerly seemed 
real in Vane’s mind recedes from Vane, the more he realises that his being is contingent 
upon God’s being, rather than being, of itself, necessary. Ultimately, in our common 
concept of selfhood, he seems required to lose himself.
However, we must focus where MacDonald himself focuses. MacDonald’s point is that 
our sense of self -  like our sense of the role of logic - is mistaken. We are in the process 
of being given selves unimaginable, in proportion to the amount that we hold back our 
autonomous selves (which are not, in actual fact, true selves) from divine change, through 
fear of the unknown; fear that we shall lose them. This again reminds us that divine 
selfhood -  like philosophy - must first be construed as a unique gift from one self to 
another, notwithstanding that we must battle with the terrible power of our own instinct for 
autonomy (or survival) - and with philosophy’s own instinct for autonomous logic - in 
order to receive it. It is worth noting here that the philosopher, Descartes, based his belief
79 George MacDonald and His Wife, p204.
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in the conscious thought of the human mind -  in the validity of that “I” - ultimately upon
his faith in God. Descartes says that
I  must not imagine that I do not conceive the infinite by means of a true idea, but 
only by the negation of the finite, in the same way as I comprehend rest and 
darkness by the negation of movement and light...on the contrary I see manifestly 
that there is more reality in the infinite substance than in the finite. (And he goes 
on) ..I am aware in myself of a certain power of judgment which undoubtedly I have 
received from God.80 (my italics)
In Vane’s and Lilith’s nihilistic experience, MacDonald is also thinking of the loss of this
“gifted” ability, as Descartes describes it (pi33):
I observe that it is not only a real and positive idea of God.. .which presents itself to 
my mind, but also, so to speak, a certain negative idea of nothing...that I am, as it 
were, midway between God and nothing...placed so that there is nothing in me 
which can lead me into error in so far as a sovereign being has produced me; but that 
if I consider my self... insofar as I am not myself the sovereign being, I find myself 
exposed to an infinity of deficiencies...
Philosophy and logic tend to lose their inner coherence when they lose faith, hence the 
move to nihilism. MacDonald anticipates that loss, in identifying it as the religion of 
skeletons, but translates such an experience as an illustration of the contingency of all 
identity upon Christ’s identity with us, and ours with his. More than ever before, in this 
novel, he is striving to remember for himself and to communicate to the reader, that sense 
of contingency of ‘being’, which extends even to the notion of morality. For, even though 
he insists that moral laws are absolute in themselves, he means by this that they are gifted. 
That is, even though they may be absolute, our experience of them is contingent and
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limited by our own imaginative ability to conceive of them . They, too, lose their validity 
when conceived of in the abstract, that is, as things in themselves to be grasped whole and 
applied at will, without reference to the divine imagination from which they come.
For now, we should note that, with regard to issues of morality, the picture is not one of a 
simple externalised battle between good and evil. Neither is MacDonald’s criticism of the 
church a case of social comment, or of a hatred of hypocrisy. Rather, it has philosophical 
depth, and is based upon a particular theology which has at its heart the notion that divine
80 D escartes, Discourse on the Method and the Meditations, p124, p133
81 As he says in T h e  Imagination....” (A Dish ofOrts, p22): “No man is capable of seeing for 
himself the whole of any truth; he needs it echoed back to him from every soul in the 
universe; and still its centre is hid in the Father of Lights.” Note here how the need for 
obedience in morality is not conceived of a s  a m atter of fear or assent, but a s  informed (to a  
degree) trust.
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Light interprets itself to itself in the imagination, imparting identity and therefore value to 
everything that it touches. In ‘The Giant’s Heart’, however, he first encourages the stages 
of thought and judgment which falter, when taken to exist prior to this notion, before he 
encourages the reader to look within for the divine light of imagination. He does this by 
means of certain themes:
Lostness
Invariably, MacDonald’s best work is characterised by his disorientation of the reader
through the presentation of conflicting standpoints, none of which represent truly solid
ground. This is reflected in many of his writings, in the lostness of the protagonists. In
Lilith and in ‘The Giant’s Heart’ landscapes in particular change, recede and are
transformed (Lilith, ppl 1-12):
I turned and looked behind me; all was vague and uncertain, as when one cannot 
distinguish between fog and field, between cloud and mountain-side. One fact only 
was plain -  that I saw nothing I knew.. .might a man at any moment step beyond the 
realm of order, and become the sport of the lawless?... I was in a world, or call it a 
state of things, an economy of conditions, an idea of existence, so little 
correspondent with the ways and modes of this world -  which we are apt to think the 
only world, that the best choice I can make of word or phrase is but an adumbration 
of what I would convey.
...and so on...there are doors in and doors out, staircases which appear and 
disappear....and undecipherable books. In all of these ways, MacDonald links for us the 
nature of reality and the nature of ethical judgement. ‘The Giant’s Heart’ begins with 
such lostness, anticipating the lack of closure which the reader will experience and the 
ethical problems ensuing. ‘The Giant’s Heart’ will contain the abrupt killing of a giant by
82 Note, too, how in this p assag e  the issue is linked to the insufficiency of language. In his 
excellent essay, ‘Language and secret Knowledge’ in At the Back of the North WincF, McGillis 
notes (For the Childlike, p149) “...w e realize the importance of language to MacDonald. Its 
effect on the reader is intended neither to suspend  intellect nor to direct intellect, but rather to 
motivate it. M etaphor is that aspect of language that exp resses the ineffable by envisaging 
an impossibility”. However, in Lilith, it seem s that MacDonald is m ore extreme. Poetic 
language fails entirely, and is replaced by characters who struggle in dialogue with one 
another against a  kind of mental fog, which consum es the poetic impulse along with moral 
clarity. Perhaps this is to do with the nature of Lilith. MacDonald’s  description of a  poet “is a 
man who is glad of something, and tries to m ake others glad of it too.” (Unspoken Sermons, 
p20) Lilith is not such a  work; possibly because  it is an intensely personal expression of the 
author’s  own relation to the mystery itself, concerning his own questions about the nature of 
language and textuality. He felt, a s  we saw, that it w as different to his other work, in being 
written, inspirationally, like a prayer in that it looks entirely towards God. Rather than being 
an attem pt to m ake us glad, it is more consistent with the role of the wolf -  to send  us out lost 
and looking for God himself. W e shall consider th ese  things relating to language in greater 
detail in the chapter on T h e  Golden Key’
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an initially passive child and a confusing picture of a mild and well meaning woman who
assists in the murder of small children. The story is a forest of such miniature encounters;
tableaux of seeming revelation which become incomprehensible, the moment any one of
them is taken as definitive of the place from which to assess events. The lostness of the
children in the landscape is related to this deconstruction. And yet, paradoxically, the
attempt to superimpose a sensible moral structure is yet still a symptom o f the reader ’s
praiseworthy loss o f him or herself in the events o f the story. We must lose ourselves
ethically in the Biblical sense by becoming involved, as does Tricksey-Wee in this tale
(“Whoever loses his life for My sake will find it” (Matthew 16:25)). There is no neutral,
readerly, privileged ground; and therefore suspension of disbelief or belief is not an
adequate response to the story. For in order for us to understand that we do not
understand, we must begin from some honest viewpoint o f our own and become, ourselves,
lost. The story works effectively as a parable only if we allow ourselves to become
involved. A distanced interpretation is simply not possible -  it must be abandoned in
favour of an active pursuit of truth. Further, the existence of stories or writing, is an
intrinsic part of the necessary struggle against evil, and itself is parasitic upon such a
struggle with evil, without which nothing will have meaning83. The story cannot, then, as
it were, by its very nature, take a superior position to that of the evil with which it must
deal. It cannot replace light. In Mary Marston, p67, MacDonald writes:
For nobody can make a story without somebody wicked to set things wrong in it, 
and then all the work lies in setting them right again, and as soon as they are set 
right, then the story stops.
We see how ‘The Giant’s Heart’, then, as does Phantasies, functions as “meta-fiction”84.
83 W e m ust not, however, confuse that struggle with the gift of self-interpreting light which is 
given in its course; for that gift is not dependent upon anything. The story, by its very nature 
of requiring this sen se  of battle, is a  w itness to its own imperfection; and to the notion that 
history is not yet fulfilled by light. Paradoxically, it is this admission which creates the gap 
through which we may be granted a  self-explanatory vision of the light, and a  transformed 
perception of the true nature of the situation in which we find ourselves.
This view of the place and role of 'stories’ can be seen  to be emerging from his belief about 
the Bible (George MacDonald and His Wife, p373): “But the common theory of the inspiration 
of the words, instead of the breathing of God’s  truth into the hearts and souls of those who 
wrote it, and who then did their best with it, is degrading and evil; and they who hold it are in 
danger...o f being idolaters of the Bible instead of disciples of Jesu s ...it is Je su s  who is the 
Revelation of God, not the Bible...the book is indeed sen t us by God, but it nowhere claims to 
be his very word... Je su s  alone is The Word of God.”
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Lostness and Language
One further thing to note is that this sense of lostness has itself had a long history before
we as readers enter the story. In this, MacDonald is indicating a struggle which may take
different forms in different ages, but which is essentially ancient. For it is at the very
beginning of the story that (p64)
...at last she ran into the wood, although there was more chance of losing herself 
than of finding him.
MacDonald is not only giving us clues as to the parabolic nature of the story (parables 
which relate to losing and finding are numerous in the New Testament), but also warning 
the alert reader against quick judgement by hinting that there is more information involved 
here than we will have access to. The story does not function as an accumulation of 
information but, like a truly Christian concept of ethics, as an ability to move alongside; to 
identify with. The movement of ethics is neither linear nor inexorable, for “...only God’s
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love is inexorable...” . So morality is defined by its relation to faith, as those who are
lost believe both against and by means of experience, that they may be found. In turn,
faith relates to a new kind of understanding, for we find in Hebrews 11: 1-3:
now faith is the substance...by faith we understand that the worlds were framed by 
the word of God...
Here, not only does ‘The Giant’s Heart’ represent “metafiction”, it is also anticipating 
Lilith', dealing with the idea of a metalanguage - the language of faith, which apprehends 
as it gazes upon what it cannot comprehend . Language itself functions in a paradoxical 
manner, as does lostness in the story; finding through losing; finding not meaning itself, 
but the promise of meaning, not the boundaries of the world in which it is lost; but a vision 
and experience of a world without boundaries, informed by the realisation that boundaries 
are not defining of reality but of unreality. Poetry itself is not a defining presence; but a 
reaching out of language towards what is unknown; a participation through faith, in what 
is unknown. The use of language is itself, dependent upon a ‘religious’ experience, then. 
As such, it may, equally, signal not only the presence of the divine, but, should it deny its 
own nature, as does Lilith, is bound to experience an utter loss of its ability to 
communicate divine coherence; signalling even then, however - through its very tendency 
to chaos and confusion - its own contingency. Again, we have a sense in which language
85 S ee  MacDonald’s  essay  T h e  Consuming Fire’ in Unspoken Sermons.
86 This, too, is noted by McGillis (p158-9, For the Childlike), w here he speaks of the 
“difference between “thinking” and “knowing” “ in “At the Back of the North Wind”. However 
he seem s more positive about the role of poetry a s  a  thing in itself than does MacDonald.
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is bound to testify to light, even against its own will, as we discussed earlier, in relation to 
nihilism.
Landscape
The framing of this landscape in ‘The Giant’s Heart’ works in contrast to that neat framing
practised by Victorians, who would take picture frames out on trips to the countryside, in
order to create a manageable piece of nature for abstraction and assimilation within a
comfortable frame of reference. Here, however {The Complete Fairy Tales, p81),
...running on without looking, she at length found herself in a valley she knew 
nothing about. And no wonder; for what she thought was a valley with round, rocky 
sides, was no other than the space between two of the roots of a great tree that grew 
on the borders of Giantland...
In the passage which follows, MacDonald will convey a dizzying sense of movement,
changing perspective and space, and yet he also believes that there is an absolute light; an
absolute truth. His essay on the Imagination gives us a clue as to what morality might be
like in relation to this kind of landscape: “
What can be known must be known severely (but)...there are those infinite lands of 
uncertainty...(where) the man may learn to imagine greatly like God who made 
him...87
And because, while the imagination is formed in order to seek (the good), it is not to be
equated with good as a ‘thing in itself, so he goes on...
If the whole power of pedantry should rise against her, the imagination will yet 
work; and if not for good, then for evil.
This relates back to what we noted at the end of the last paragraph on ‘Lostness’ and the 
function of the story. Notably, MacDonald here gives to imagination a female gender, 
perhaps equating her with the personification of wisdom, found in the Hebrew poetry of 
the Old Testament books -  Sophia -  a female figure who was present with God when the 
worlds were framed, according to the writer of Proverbs {Proverbs 3, w  13-20), and 
possibly also in the mind of the writer of Hebrews, who equates faith and wisdom. 
MacDonald is working from within the intertextual tradition of Biblical poetry in order to 
suggest that reason -  that enlightenment method of making man divine -  may also, as is
87 W e might be tem pted to take the word “like" a s  indicating that the analogical connection is 
the important one. However the s tress  of the meaning in this sentence, I think, depends more 
upon the fact that it is God (the divine Maker) who, a s  m an’s  maker, has a  substantial 
connection to the imagination. The m eans may be analogical at times, but that analogical 
connection is itself only m ade possible by the fact that it rests upon a  substantial reality.
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the case with imagination, create in its isolation of self-making the monster that is 
Sophia’s sister, Satan’s bride; Lilith. The following passage, taken from chapter 28 of 
Lilith, shows that MacDonald’s aim is not an Eden-like state of pre-reason (unlike the 
typically Romantic visions we alluded to earlier); not a pre-ethical stage, but a divine 
sisterhood of reason and imagination:
“Is not a little knowledge a dangerous thing?”
“That is one of the pet falsehoods of your world! The fancy that knowledge is in 
itself a great thing, would make any degree of knowledge more dangerous than any 
amount of ignorance. To know all things would not be greatness...” (my italics)
The idea of ‘absolute’ light or truth, then, is not related to quantity of knowledge, but to its
direction of growth. Here, his notion of the hidden grounds and direction of absolute laws
is similar to that of McLeod Campbell. In The Nature o f the Atonement, his major - and
controversial - work of Christian theology, Campbell says that (pp31-2):
We do not know enough to say as to anything that transcends our knowledge of the 
reign of the law, in which way we are to view it, whether as belonging to the system 
of law, but to a region of it out of our sight, or as outside of it.
The accumulation of knowledge, therefore, can o f itself never bring us closer to the 
‘absolute’ nature of things. So the ‘absolute’ nature of moral laws has nothing at all to do 
with rigidity or quantity; with the kind of limited morality he presents as inadequate, given 
the dizzying landscape of ‘The Giant’s Heart’, but rather takes its notion of ‘absolute’ 
from those experiences of blinding light; moments of illumination which reveal merely the 
height and depth of landscape we encounter in allowing ourselves to become lost outside
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of our own conceptions, while yet remaining within the unseen vision of divine love.
This sense of limitlessness in relation to God comes up time and again in MacDonald’s
work, and in his private correspondence. In a poem to his wife, we find these lines:
For all behind the starry sky 
Behind the world so broad
88 This also relates to what Derrida describes a s  (The Gift of Death, p6) “the breadth or abyss 
of this experience” when noting that “responsibility and faith go together, however paradoxical 
that might seem  to som e”, he describes the experience of the sacrificial gift a s  “This trembling 
(which) seizes one at the moment of becoming a person, and the person can becom e...only 
in being paralysed, in its very singularity, by the gaze of God. Then it s e e s  itself seen  by the 
gaze of another, “a suprem e, absolute and inaccessible being who holds us in his hand not by 
exterior but by interior force.” In this description we should note how faith, ethical 
responsibility and identity -  the issue of ‘becoming’ a  person, which MacDonald w as also 
concerned with - are all one issue in this experience. Further, the question of boundaries 
d isappears in the aw areness of this ‘absolute’, for w e are not held ‘in’; but held from within, 
relating also to MacDonald’s  thinking about the nature of seeing in his essay  on the 
imagination a s  being seen  -  being “thought by God” - from within.
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Behind men’s hearts and souls doth lie 
The Infinite of God...
.. .And so I sit in thy wide space
And in the accompanying letter he says: “Oh, the great fact of God shooting up into great
O Q
heights of space, grand indisputable Reality...”
This is an illumination from within the imagination which in turn expands the ‘without’ of 
existence beyond what would be deemed ‘reasonable’, but which is connected to a realm 
of reason beyond logical comprehension, of which we have but glimpses which allow a 
sense of coherence to emerge. This expansion turns our world upside-down, just as the 
tables of the money-lenders at the temple are turned upside-down by Christ in the New 
Testament, showing how far apart from self-created, autonomous systems of ethics this 
‘economy’ of light truly is.
His philosophy is not only like that of McLeod Campbell in having a broader -  and an
entirely different quality - of vision of the ‘absolute’. Also, in his approach to reason in
relation to morality, MacDonald is similar to a fellow Scot, the poet John Davidson, in not
allowing that we may impose any ‘reasonable’ limits upon a love which operates in an
economy unknown in its entirety. While John Davidson seemingly came to utterly
different conclusions about the Christian God than did MacDonald, the two are very
similar in their attitude to what passes as Christianity in much of Victorian culture. They
both abandoned any concept of ‘reasonable’ or socially conditioned ethics, in their search
for a better expression of their own belief that sacrificial -  utterly unreasonable and
passionate -  love is the heart and soul of authentic faith. This is Davidson’s scathing
description of a more limited vision, where it occurs within the church, in his poem, ‘The
Rev. E Kirk’:
And naught to do, the truth to speak,
Save sit and sip my toddy,
And write a sermon once a week,
And bury anybody
Some half-dozen marriages 
Come in the pairing season;
I visit sick folk if they please -  
Or anything in reason
89 George MacDonald and His Wife, pp199, 201.
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Delimiting the borders
In MacDonald’s work we also find the demand that love, ethics and reason must be 
delimited to avoid such a travesty of religion. We find that our only relation to reason in 
his fairytales is that we experience it as inner coherence, looking outwards. When we do 
see limits they are merely those of our own sight, melting into the horizon of a greater 
landscape, an as yet incomprehensible reason. This does not destroy, but elevates reason 
until it goes well beyond the limits of Kant’s confinement of moral reason. It is also more 
like the New Testament interpretation of Jewish law, echoing the intensification of that 
law by Christ beyond any possible reasonable interpretation that could be placed on it 
within the existing religious tradition90. It also echoes the concentration on the notion of 
sin as being primarily an “inner” state of being.
Yet such intensification is not ultimately perceived to be a burden, but a gift, in 
MacDonald’s thinking. This is because he interprets divine holiness as being an 
expression, in another form, of divine love91. Frequently, however, the theology of his 
time interpreted the separate characteristics of God in terms of abstract concepts which 
must inevitably conflict, as is the case with the Westminster Confession. MacDonald 
instead allows for the concepts themselves to be reinformed, rather than using the concepts 
to inform his conception of God. This, possibly, is the main difference which 
distinguishes his -  and McLeod Campbell’s -  approach to the question of atonement from 
that of the Westminster Confession, where the concept of divine wrath is treated as a 
philosophical proposition, set logically against the love of Christ, instead of allowing the 
Biblical writings to inform intertextually the concept of the atonement . Campbell and 
MacDonald are looking to the intertextual tradition of interpretation found within the Bible 
for the corrective ‘life’ when they seek the meaning to which the text alludes, rather than
90 For example, “You have heard it said to those of old, You shall not commit adultery. But I 
say to you that whoever looks at a woman to lust for her has already committed adultery...."
911 John 4:8 “He who does not love does not know God, for God is love, in this is love, not 
that we loved God, but that He loved us.” W e should note that the philosophical implication of 
the sentence, in its context, is that our concepts (of love, of wrath, of justice, of ethics) can 
only be informed by their grounding in the identity of God. W e cannot take these  concepts a s  
existing in themselves, and then apply them in order to supply som e anthropomorphic 
concept of Gods attributes.
92 In ‘Browning’s  “Christmas Eve’”, MacDonald notes the “errors...of old tim e...they 
speculated on what a thing m ust be, instead of observing what it was; this must be having for 
its foundation not self-evident truth, but notions w hose chief strength lay in their 
preconception.. (Orts, p207)
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attempting to force it into a prearranged system. And so it emerges that they are truer to 
the text than are those dogmaticians who also tend most ardently to propose its inspiration.
Corresponding with this, the hand that is taken from Lilith -  the hand that has attempted to
reign over itself autonomously and is buried -  reappears in the novel as the hand of God at
the end of the novel, reinterpreted as gift rather than as punishment, consistent with
MacDonald’s interpretation of hell as an expression of God’s love93. We note that this
hand at the end of the novel pushes Vane back into the life of the world he has sought to
leave, but this time with a renewed perspective upon its nature (p250):
A hand, warm and strong, laid hold of mine.. .the door opened, the hand let mine go, 
and pushed me gently through.. .94
We should note that this disembodied hand indicates an incompletion; a healing not yet
complete, despite the fact that the moment of apocalypse (the appearance of Christ to the
little ones) seems already to have taken place. Apocalypse for Vane means an unveiling
of his own sight rather than a revealing of what is in general, or what might be seen in the
future. It is not a sight which the reader may receive ‘head on’ as it were, but a seeing
which ‘has’ us. We note this also in Alec Forbes, where (pi47):
Alec felt as if he had got to the borders of fairyland, and something was going to 
happen. A door would open and admit him into the secret of the world. But the 
door into life generally opens behind us, and a hand is put forth which draws us in 
backwards95.
93 It is also consistent with the picture used in Salted with Fire (ch16, p203), w here he says 
that “The outer darkness is but the m ost dreadful form of the consuming fire...his face is 
turned away, but His hand is laid upon him still..." There is a tradition of this question of the 
interpretation of hell, found in the writings of the mystic, Meister Eckhart, who thought that 
angels and devils may be different interpretations of the sam e beings, our perception 
depending on the sta te  of one’s  attitude to death, either torturing or freeing the soul, only 
Christ providing the interpretation of death to which our perception should hold.
94 W e should note, however, in this description, that the key plays no part, although the door 
has “a  golden lock”. Lilith is not a  story which functions a s  a  key, unlike T h e  Golden Key’, but 
seem s instead to indicate the nature of this last work of fiction a s  being about the nature of 
the quest for identity itself, rather than a  following of an account of its progress. It is of a 
different order of literature, a s  MacDonald himself felt. In it, he is perhaps expressing for 
himself the eschatological sen se  which has informed his imagination all along, rather than 
trying to replicate it in the reader’s  mind. It is not a  creative ‘replication’, then of the divine 
imagination; but the testam ent of his own ‘given’ vision of the way in which the imagination 
works for him. If symbolism is reciprocal, it is less about the ‘going out’ of MacDonald’s 
writing, and more about what he finds coming back to him. This m akes it more rigid in the 
varieties of interpretation available to us; but also more attractive a s  a  way of perceiving the 
complex depth and nature of MacDonald’s  concerns in the rest of his writing.
95 This description also corresponds with something written to G eorge by his brother, John 
MacDonald (George MacDonald and His Wife, p173): “I feel like one who is perpetually on 
the edge of vision but who is destined to be a s  perpetually snatched backwards by invisible 
hands.” Greville goes on to say that (p175) "John, the philosopher and dream er, found his 
theorizing and his visioning a s  constantly in conflect a s  were the terror and beauty of the
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This apocalypse transforms the more severe reading of Mark 9:43 as it stands alone “If
your hand causes you to sin cut it off. It is better for you to enter life maimed...”. The
words of Christ are interpreted by his actions. The interpretation of God by His own
nature (of light by light) does not lead Vane to protest that this is not necessary; or to meet
it head-on as an understandable necessity, but it leads him to see the nature of the act. The
act of self-discipline is, essentially, an act of faith, otherwise it cannot be truly ethical
either. As such it is perceived as an act preceded and reinterpreted by the hand o f God,
who cuts off his own life to save us, so that the cut of our own is now experienced as a
gain, rather than a loss. Lilith, p219:
The sword gleamed once, there was one little gush of blood, and he laid the severed 
hand in Mara’s lap. “Will you not dress that wound?” I said. “A wound from that 
sword,” answered Adam, “needs no dressing. It is healing and not hurt.”
Further, this is an interpretation of one Biblical statement by another. Jesus’s words in
Matthew 34, “I did not come to bring peace but a sword” are, first of all presented in terms
of that which does not divide from without but from within (Lilith, p201)
....the creature had passed in by the centre of the blade’s point and was piercing 
through the joint and marrow to the thoughts and intents of the heart.
This is an allusion to Hebrews 4:12:
For the word of God is living and powerful, and sharper than any two-edge sword, 
piercing even to the vision of soul and spirit, and of joints and marrow, and is a 
discemer of the thoughts and intents of the heart.
But in turn MacDonald is intertextually interpreting the apocalyptic vision of Revelation 
19:13,15:
And His name is called The Word of God...Now out of His mouth goes a sharp 
sword.. .and He Himself will rule them with a rod of iron.
We should note, however, that this universal power is not conceived as force, but in terms 
of a ruling from within. Because we should note that this in turn is an intertext with Isaiah 
60, with regard to the promise of “the little ones” of Lilith “ruling the nations with a rod 
of iron”, which renders that text free of the rhetoric of power. There is no sense in which 
such a ruling can be appropriated by the one who is subject to such an apocalypse.
universe...his honesty of mind so  often overwhelmed his imagination that his faith never got 
beyond that of a g reat and uplifting hope ...”. It is interesting to think that George MacDonald 
may have been thinking not only of himself, but of his dead brother, when he began to think 
about V ane’s  character, and to reinterpret the meaning of faith in relation to philosophy.
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Instead, it takes the form of a promise that the inner cut represents a truth about the nature 
of reality. For Vane himself in Lilith is told of the little ones that “you were not a rod to 
measure them with.” Ethics, like the concept of atonement, is not established by means 
of a projection of the concepts of right and wrong onto a situation, but by reference to a 
vision of the incomprehensible love of God, expressed in the self-sacrifice of Christ. An 
apocalyptic event which radically (and it cannot be expressed how so very radically) alters 
the outlook of the individual from within.
We move now to consider how the idea of such an infinite landscape; an immeasurable 
inner excess in relation to morality, touches upon MacDonald’s treatment of time, and its 
relationship to the concept of progress in modernity.
Modernity and Progress in Giantland
In ‘The Giant’s Heart’ we come across various groups of people who dwell in the limited
philosophical world of modernism -  no matter how large it at first appears. For at first
Tricksey-Wee sees so much, but now there is so much more that can be disappointing
when its limits are discovered:
You would have thought you saw the whole earth through the door when he opened 
it, so wide was it.. .(but).. .when he closed it, it was like nightfall...
Here MacDonald anticipates the failure of modernity. But we should also note that even
though the failure seems dark, it was not really nightfall. Such worlds are built around a
measurable and therefore finite understanding of the concept of progress, therefore their
failure does not really make one bit of difference to one’s actual progress. As we have
already noted, MacDonald’s Lilith presents a dark vision of the world, and yet is pervaded
with a hopefulness which indicates that his frame of reference is outwith the reader’s view.
Where other Scottish writers may have been left disillusioned, MacDonald’s darkness is
not a defining experience for him, for his horizon has not depended upon a particular -
modem -  understanding of progress. For this reason, he has often been misunderstood as
shallow; an unfair accusation, given his grasp and personal experience of misery. Rather,
his experience of reality seems to be that of Browning, whom he quotes in his essay on
that poet96:
O struggling with the darkness all the night 
and visited all night by troops of stars
96 A Dish of Orts, p212.
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So just as Vane, himself the modem ‘giant’ man, is told of his assessment of the little ones 
“you were not a rod to measure them with”, the Giant and his wife also have the attributes 
of largeness of soul -  great voices, great movements and gestures -  and yet they are 
pictured as having a materialist, inward-looking ethic, fixed mainly upon the provision of 
food, ignorant of the reason for their vast appetite. Here, progress has been translated into 
acquisition, they have swollen up into giants in their effort to inhabit this new, huge world 
upon their own terms. The tone of their dialogue puts one in mind of the blustering 
religion of the upright Victorian capitalist, caricatured in so many Victorian novels. 
However, the giants’ cruelty is that of a lack of imagination, rather than the evil of an 
imagination perverted (as is the case with Lilith). MacDonald’s portrayal of them betrays 
a sympathy for their lack. The Giant wills to be himself, since his imagination conceives 
of nothing that is not in terms of appropriation.
The Lark, however, wills to be Christ. He could be perceived as being worse off, being 
beyond dialogue. His progress consists of a denial of experienced reality. But 
MacDonald never encourages such comparisons, simply presenting various extremes of 
the same problem: all closed philosophies or theologies behave like answers, whereas true 
theology or philosophy is characterised by lostness; a questioning which leads us beyond 
the borders we had previously constructed. Its expectancy is seen as the outfolding and 
growth of an inquisitive nature, when it reaches beyond the stage of mere acquisition of 
knowledge in its search for wisdom. It has a childlike nature, needing some other, some 
twofoldedness, to emerge. Significantly, in his essay on Browning, MacDonald quotes 
Novalis:
Philosophy is really home-sickness, an impulse to be a home everywhere...
Without acknowledging that, it becomes merely the religion of bones. It is not enough, 
however, to acknowledge this fact in an academic sense. To do that without experiencing 
the terror of ‘homesickness’ is a denial of its own nature.
Within this landscape of our lostness, we see that we are like children trying to impose our 
values upon some great borderless country. In an effort to make ourselves feel at home, 
we convince ourselves that we are at home. Here, MacDonald even addresses the 
movement of deconstruction which sometimes insists upon being at home in the
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wilderness. But Giantland is not that home -  and I am suggesting a reading of Giantland
as the post-enlightened, modem mind. For Giantland does have borders, which
“touch.. .at the roots of a great tree” -  the tree of the knowledge of good and evil perhaps;
a representation of the main theme of the story -  of the se/^conscious nature of much
modem ethical thinking. But in Fairyland, within and without are inseparable -  there are
no borders. C S Lewis’s thoughts are helpful here -  and he was a writer greatly influenced
by MacDonald. For Lewis, this question of how to describe the nature of progress is vital.
It is something which he suggests has been better understood in past epistemes. Worlds of
thought which, imaginatively entered, can help to free us from “an eternal present”. He
says in ‘De Descriptione Temporum’.97:
...the image of old machines being superseded by new and better ones...are...the 
stages of our pilgrimage...the thing that separates us most sharply from our 
ancestors...our assumption that everything is provisional and soon to be 
superseded.. .is.. .the greatest change in the history of Western Man.
A particular sense of a measurable notion of morality abandoned in the Biblical
•  Qfiliterature links into the modem concept of biological evolution, which continually needs 
to compare itself with what has gone before. Both morality and evolution are often 
perceived as emerging to provide some linear order of progress which may be taken ‘as 
read’ and so measured as a sign of our superiority. The title of Nietzsche’s Genealogy o f  
Morals itself bears witness to, and ironically undermines this mood. However, 
MacDonald’s characters -  thinking of Lina in The Princess and Cur die or the skeletons of 
Lilith -  often have the appearance of regression in evolutionary terms. What to the 
modem mind looks like a step backwards is precisely the route towards true progression in 
this strange economy of ethics. MacDonald took a keen interest in scientific discoveries 
and, far from shunning them, seems often determined to show how constructs which claim 
to have at their basis scientific truths are in fact merely using those facts to cover up social 
conventions which rely upon comparative notions of ethics. MacDonald himself seemed 
keen to show how a more imaginative treatment could illuminate and free scientific facts.
MacDonald does not hide from scientific discovery, but he regrets its assimilation -  and 
perversion -  as it is translated into the social conventions of moral thinking, as though it
97E ssay in They Asked for a Paper, p21.
98 It is the notion of comparative morality, the s tance comically taken by every character in 
M acDonald’s story, which is rejected in 2 Corinthians 10v12: “for we dare not class ourselves 
or com pare ourselves with those who com m end them selves. But they, measuring 
them selves by them selves, and comparing them selves am ong them selves, are  not wise.
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were a replacement for meaning. The sense of some inevitable growth of machinery as
defining progress denies the giftedness of meaning, which values and encourages growth,
and so takes away the foundation for its own contingent coherence. The city of The
Princess and Curdie, has its downfall precisely at the height of its own success, in its
temptation to philosophical self-sufficiency". MacDonald does not seek the past (unlike
C S Lewis), but he does frequently in his narratives -  as in ‘The Giant’s Heart’ - abandon
us in amoral space-time. Perhaps this is so that we might realise the implications of our
assumptions about the nature of ourselves in relation to history. He is acutely aware of the
way in which modernity is going to impose its interpretation upon the world, anticipating
writers like Edwin Muir. Consider this extract of Ranald Bannerman (p51):
If there had been a steam-engine to plough my father’s fields, how could we have 
ridden home on its back in the evening? What more machines are there now? 
Strange wild-looking mad-like machines....are growling and snapping and clinking 
and clattering over our fields...
Then Muir’s ‘Horses’100:
... we had sold our horses in our fathers’ time 
To buy new tractors. Now they were strange to us 
As fabulous steeds set on an ancient shield
In MacDonald’s lifetime, these things are still within the memory of a generation, but 
nevertheless, he anticipates the tone of bewildered estrangement from a sense of one’s 
own historicity which will accompany this later writing. He also defines the tone which 
will inform Sunset Song’s criticism of man’s ideas about the nature of progress towards 
utopia (p252):
...the land changes...great machines come soon...Nothing, it has been said, is true 
but change, nothing abides...lest we shame them, let us believe that the new 
oppressions and foolish greeds are no more than mists that pass. They died for a 
world that is past, these men, but they did not die for this that we seem to inherit. 
Beyond it and us there shines a greater hope and a newer world, undreamt...
99 In addressing the central and related concerns of dependency and philosophical 
contingency in Lilith, MacDonald is perhaps especially speaking to himself, for we find this in 
a  letter to his father (George MacDonald and His Wife, p283): “May the one Father...w ake us 
out of this sleep into the new world.... I for my part would not go without one of my troubles -  
the only one I fret at is being dependent...” For m ost of his life MacDonald struggled with the 
constant need to depend upon charity, jobs here and there, goodwill...to accept his role a s  
dependent within a  community, rather than financially independent enough to do exactly what 
he wanted. This is likely to have caused  him to exam ine deeply exactly what it is in the 
human psyche which cau ses  such intense need for security through independence.
100 Selected Poems, p85.
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Like Grassic Gibbon’s minister, MacDonald does not lament modernity; does not wish for 
the kailyard and the small world to come back, but does show how the space of such a 
new, huge country is, of itself, as it is paid for in the greater grief of men and women, 
being interpreted as a witness to the need for an entirely new notion of progress; a 
different kind of wisdom than that which merely disowns its parents or murders its 
children. Here, the link between the way in which time must be reinterpreted against the 
trend of certain ideas about progress also translates MacDonald’s treatment of 
eschatology; the notion of the transformation or delimitation of time, rather than of an 
inevitable progress towards an ‘end’. Where Gibbon leaves us with the sense of the 
infinite pain of hope, moving only forward in time, MacDonald goes on to introduce us to 
Fairyland, a world in which not only space, but the notion of time, is transformed by hope 
and desire.
Fairyland
“Can that be true which mocks at forms?” said the King 
“Truth rides abroad in shapeless storms.” Answered the Shadow101.
Contrasting with the image of Giantland’s horizons, Fairyland is that which involves a
moving deeper into life; an apprehension of that which is covered over and over (instead
of expressed) by illusory forms, or by self-delusion, in very much the same way in which
Derrida treats the issue of responsibility. Speaking of the subordination of the orgiastic to
responsibility, he notes that {The Gift o f Death, pi 1):
This subordination takes the form of an “incorporation” whether that be understood 
in its psychoanalytic sense or in the wider sense of an integration that assimilates or 
retains within itself that which it exceeds, surpasses, or supersedes. The 
incorporation of one mystery by the other also amounts to an incorporation of one 
immortality within another, of one eternity within another. This enveloping of 
immortality also corresponds to a transaction between two negations or two 
disavowals of death... it will be marked by an internalisation; by an individualization 
or subjectification, the soul’s relation to itself as it falls back on itself in the very 
movement of incorporation.. .102
This passage is a part of a description of the difference between Plato’s cave allegory in 
the way it involves a subordination of the orgiastic in the notion of mystery; and an
101 T h e  Shadow s’, The Complete Fairy Tales, p97.
102 C S Lewis is also concerned in his writing to point out the difference between a  conscious 
self-discipline; a  reinterpretation of the orgiastic secret, and the Freudian interpretation of the 
suppression of unconscious desire.
68
interpretation which reads either a dualistic alliance with, or confrontation between, the 
notions of orgiastic secrecy and religious responsibility. Frank Riga has written an 
interesting essay on the correspondence of MacDonald’s imagery with that of Plato’s 
allegory of the cave, entitled ‘The Platonic Imagery of George MacDonald and C S Lewis, 
The Allegory of the Cave Transfigured’ (in For the Childlike). He notes how such 
interpretations must be accompanied by an awareness of how the Christian nature of 
MacDonald’s thought will temper the notion of transcendence of the material world, into a 
sense that the material world must have substantial unity with its creator, through the 
notion of incarnation. He tends to look mainly at the outward emphasis of MacDonald’s 
fairyland, however, looking more at concepts of spiritual worlds, rather than at the 
implications of this sense of envelopment of one world within another in terms of 
language, morality or identity.
Derrida’s description seems to describe the characteristic treatment of Fairyland, which 
has generally been treated in a Freudian manner, by reference to MacDonald’s individual 
symbols. However, it is the way in which he layers symbol upon symbol, literary and 
scientific allusion on top of one another, to discourage the individual interpretation of one 
symbol out of its context, which ultimately makes this movement of “enveloping” 
meanings which define his narratives. Lilith is a grand example of the way in which 
coherence emerges between levels, rather than from any one of them. Vane and the reader 
are likewise enveloped, such that the nature of reality is brought into question. In the 
novel, we move further away from the self as we move further into the actions and 
experiences of the narrator. The revelation is that there is an immortal depth to this 
experience, so that even while seeming to move further from himself, Vane expresses the 
growing faith that he is in the process of finding identity; finding a ‘home’, as MacDonald 
puts it. The Freudian interpretation, in attempting to ground the individual in himself, 
actually parts the unconscious and conscious in practice, by seeking to make all conscious, 
all self-knowing, while MacDonald insists that neither of them has a claim upon the notion 
of identity which is not mysteriously connected to the other. Vane’s reasoning begins as a 
consciousness of what he feels to be himself, but will end in his being grounded in the 
identity of an ‘other’, even while Derrida’s ‘internalization’ is characteristic of the inner 
aspect of Fairyland. For, radically, MacDonald believes that our deeper identity is God
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within us, so that we only come into ‘being’ as we grow into God’s being: “God sits in
our very being, deeper than we are in ourselves”:103 {Lilith, p i 4):
Indeed, who was I?...then I understood that I did not know myself, did not know 
who I was, had no grounds on which to determine that I was one and not another...I 
was a stranger in a strange land....’’What right have you to treat me so” I said “Am 
I, or am I not, a free agent?” “A man is as free as he chooses to make himself...” 
“you have no right to make me do things against my will!” “When you have a will, 
you will find that no one can” “You wrong me in the very essence of my 
individuality!” I persisted. “If you were an individual I could not, therefore now I 
do not. You are but beginning to become an individual”.
We see a counterpart to this state of being in his comments on ‘Browning’s “Christmas 
Eve””:
The life of a man here, if life it be, and not the vain image of what might be a life, is 
a continual attempt to find his place, his centre of recipiency and active agency. He 
wants to know where he is, and where he ought to be, and can be; for rightly 
considered, the position a man ought to occupy is the only one he can occupy
Fairyland and Identity
Fairyland is not a ‘concept’, humanly conceived -  whether geographic, psychological, 
social or religious, but a divine sense of ‘place’ unlike any place we can conceive of -  
outside of space or time, not ‘located’ in the brain, but transforming the imagination, in 
turn reinforming all of our concepts from a different economy of knowledge; granting an 
identity which is not locational or psychological, but which may be translated as such, in 
an attempt at description. It is the true mystery of the soul’s relation to God. It does not 
demand utopian projection; although it may take that form mistakenly in its expression. It 
demands ultimately an acknowledgment of the delimiting of any interpretation we may 
place upon it; a space in which we can grow and change into our relationship to truth, 
rather than expand within our own selves. And the idea of growth for MacDonald is 
always specifically related to the notion of faith. The concept of faith is not posed as a 
challenge to the intellect, but has this mysterious enveloping movement. It is very 
important here not to equate this enveloping as being a suppression through necessity.
103 W e can also see , from this quote, how MacDonald both ag rees and d isagrees with 
Calvinism on the m atter of the w ickedness of the 'self. Such a  self may be wicked, he might 
say, but that is not the true self in any case. The cutting off and the relegation of this false 
self to fire com es to be deeply desirable, w hereas the Calvinist tends to se e  hell merely a s  a 
place for the self to avoid. Rather than to com e to love goodness so  much that hell is seen  a s  
greatly preferable to the hurting of goodness. In this, the power of hell over the imagination 
is really lost, rather than being merely subordinated. The true self is the developm ent of God 
from even deeper within our consciousness. W e can se e  this belief applied practically to Lilith 
in every detail.
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For, were the main thing in identity coherence for its own sake, then faith and the 
imagination would themselves have no meaning. As he says at the beginning of his essay 
on the imagination: “repose is not the end of education.. .rather a noble unrest”. The gift 
of faith, the identity, is formed in the process of unrest, rather than being a goal achieved 
at its end. However, it seems that it is only towards the end of Lilith that Vane starts to be 
able to accept the notion that his nature consists of a number of ‘gifted’ aspects. 
MacDonald says this in his essay on Browning, in relation to the way in which the ‘gift’ 
may function:
A contradiction, or a thing unrelated, is foreign and painful...even as the rocky 
particle in the gelatinous substance of the oyster; and, like the latter, he can only rid 
himself of it by encasing it in the pearl-like enclosure of faith; believing that hidden 
there lies the necessity for a higher theory of the universe than has yet been 
generated in his soul. The quest for this home-centre...
It is important here to note how inferior concepts of “faith” will result in us treating it as a 
“theory” itself, in relation to the construction of identity. It is not, however, for we saw 
how carefully in Robert Falconer, MacDonald distinguishes belief about God (the theory) 
from faith in God. In his imagery of the pearl, MacDonald is also using the imagery of 
‘the kingdom of heaven’ (or the kingdom of fairyland), for in Matthew 13:46, Jesus refers 
to the kingdom of heaven as “one pearl of great price”. We should also consider how 
MacDonald uses the imagery of the young girl’s globe in Phantastes, implying that there 
are many self-constructed worlds or theories which are not solid, as is the pearl, in 
representing a true process of growth towards identity, but which are hollow, such as is the 
one which Anodos shatters. Such ‘practice’ globes perhaps prepare one for the difficulties 
of an identity built solely through faith. The pearl; one’s identity; is made up of many 
layers, painfully grown -  with the seed of faith at its heart, itself a divine gift which comes 
in the form of “a contradiction”. A pearl cannot shatter, being solid. Like the symbol, it 
has substance. Perhaps this is the way in which to visualise the “worlds” of MacDonald; 
as many translucent layers and depths in the perception of reality, the self grows outward, 
not in the sense of being blown up, but through a slow process of solidification, which is 
not perceived in terms of ‘material’ solidity as a thing in itself, but whose substantiality 
remains mysterious and endlessly interpretable, being based upon these inner 
contradictions.
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Reactions to modernity; Transcendence or transfiguration?
Jesus also describes elsewhere the kingdom of heaven as being ‘within you’ -  it is both
within and without. There is also a connection then, in this coincidence between
MacDonald’s pearl and the pearl of the kingdom of heaven, in the inner and outer aspects
of Fairyland, which exposes the mistaken boundaries of modernity and the mistaken
notions of transcendence in the figure of the Lark, by noting their limits. We see how the
Lark attempts (in a Platonic manner) to transcend the material world, assuming that it is
inferior (p77):
So he flew, with the strength of a lark he flew,
But as he rose the cloud rose too...
Till, weary with flying, with sighing sore,
The strong sun-seeker could do no more...
So he quivered and sighed, and dropped like a stone 
And there on his nest, where he left her alone 
Sat his little wife...
Did I say alone? Ah, no such thing!
Full in her face was shining the King
This transformation of the material world is contrasted to the Lark’s attempt to transcend 
the physical world104. MacDonald is portraying the nature of the ‘home-centre’. The 
description of the shining face of the Lark’s wife parallels what is described by Graham 
Ward, in his essay ‘The Displaced Body of Jesus Christ’ {Radical Orthodoxy, ppl66, 
176):
.. .what is glimpsed.. .is the trace of the uncreated in the created.. .the transfiguration 
does not simply portray a resurrection hope, it performs it, it solicits it...not having 
the body of Christ is not a negative because Christ’s withdrawal of his body makes 
possible a greater identification with that body... Notice how...we focus upon the 
face of Christ. It is a face full of light and energy...he writes of Jesus’s face 
“shining like the sun”.. .his corporeality becomes iconic...
It seems that MacDonald’s work is seeking this solicitation. Like McLeod Campbell, it is 
a seeking for a substantial participation through faith. Faith is a substance and not a belief. 
Rather than tracing a picture which it would be possible for us to interpret, the profusion 
of possible interpretations makes the ‘substantial’ nature of his language clear. It is 
symbolically participating in the transfiguration. The search for concrete identity is bound 
to encounter the search for a ‘concrete’ set of morals, if it is participating and
104 As McGillis says, the function of MacDonald's writing “is to enhance, not dismiss, material 
reality” {For the Childlike, p114). In the third section, with reference to G raham  Ward, we 
shall exam ine how he is transfiguring notions of materiality.
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reinterpreting the ‘substantial’ world. But the search gradually becomes concerned with a
transfiguration of all the world, not only with one’s own spiritual holiness (unlike the
Lark’s). Therefore MacDonald also notes in his essay on ‘Browning’s “Christmas Eve’”
the correspondence between true identity and true community:
What central position can he gain, which, while it answers best the necessities of his 
own soul with regard to God, will enable him to feel himself connected with the 
whole Christian world, and to sympathize with all, so that he may not be alone, but 
one of the whole. Certainly the position necessary for both requirements is one and 
the same
Notice how MacDonald rejects the notion of a competition between the concerns of the
world as he finds it, and the notion of personal, spiritual growth. The difference of which
Ward speaks, then, is not the difference which seeks to define itself through a concept of
borders. It is not the competitive, comparative morality of the Giant who boasts in having
cleaner socks than anyone else; or the Lark’s attempt to separate himself from the physical
world in order to find himself. These are pointed out by MacDonald as being the traits of
a vain (Vane) attempt at identity. The notion of “difference” should not be treated as an
economy of ‘lack’; working from a Freudian concept of wholeness as being a taking into
oneself. Rather the sense of the unique difference of Christ results from an
acknowledgement of the utter sense of non-identity which exists without him. But such a
sense comes from a recognition of the all-encompassing identity of Christ. We do not take
him into ourselves; we have no selves to start with. Our identity is all in its becoming
‘like’ Christ105. To do this, we must see how radically different Christ is from us.
Paradoxically, we only do this by seeing how, materially, he is the same, and only thus can
his difference inform our very concept o f materiality (‘Browning’s “Christmas Eve’”):
...so Christ must prove himself to the human soul through being beheld. The only 
proof of Christ’s divinity is his humanity. Because his humanity is not 
comprehended, his divinity is doubted....for a man to ..neglect the gazing on 
him...is to bring on himself...such errors as the expounders of nature in old time 
brought on themselves, when they speculated on what a thing must be, instead of 
observing what it was...
The sudden drop of the self (of the Lark or of Satan), from its own concept of comparative 
greatness into its true glory of beholding its source of identity both exposes and erases a 
line; the invisible border which separates the outward notions of appearances and
105 As we noted on p21, he gets this concept of identity from the New Testam ent w here “...it 
m ust change with that life, which in the New T estam ent is alone treated a s  life a t all...”
73
comparisons from the inner illusion of selfhood against those outward standards. Such a 
drop and such an exposure is both nightmare and gift.
The desire for identity is transformed by a vision which itself transforms the nature of
desire. Ward goes on in his essay to note:
The structure of Christian desire is...twofold...not only my desire, but God’s desire 
for me. It is this twofoldedness which characterizes participation...the self...never 
had the unity of the Hegelian and Freudian ego living in and for itself.. .the lack, and 
the mourning.. .feed a positive regeneration.
The desire, however, may have dissymmetry...
...the dissymmetry of the gaze...is...what is identified in Christian mystery as the 
frightening, terrifying mystery....the gift of something that remains 
inaccessible.. .the gift is the secret itself, if the secret itself can be told106.
Like the secret of fairyland, the perception of this gift is ‘stumbled upon’, is not within our 
control, though we may seek for it. There remains a nihilistic possibility in its 
interpretation, because of the dissymmetry; because faith, like the secret, remains a gift, no 
matter how long it may characterize the life of the one who is given it, or how quickly they
107may perceive things. For, in this story, the Sun is no worse off for the children’s not 
seeing him first; and we note how the perspective changes from the desire of the subject to 
the nature of the object.
In approaching the issue of apocalypse in MacDonald’s Lilith, we see that he is aware of
the notion that the dissymmetry or contingency inherent in the experience retains the
possibility that apocalypse may be taken as the notion that destruction is, of itself, defining
of the experience. Especially in the absence of a provable connection or a symmetrical
concept which grants one any power over the object of desire or sight. Indeed, on only
pl2 of Lilith, the narrator is saying:
I begin indeed to fear that I have undertaken an impossibility, undertaken to tell 
what I cannot tell.. .1 find myself in danger of losing the things themselves...
106 The Gift of Death, p27.
107 Here, we may refer to the essay  by Cynthia Marshall, (For the Childlike, p99) who discerns 
the parable of the labourers in T h e  Golden Key’, noting how MacDonald, in making Tangle’s 
story central, although she is the last to achieve the supposed ‘goal’, does not apply a 
m easurable concept of justice to the story, but rather the idea that ‘the last may be first and 
the first last’. This is consistent with what we noted about the idea of the ‘gift’, in that he 
allows it to inform the logic of his writings, consistent with his stating in his e ssay s  that truth 
cannot be found by applying pre-conceived concepts to divine material.
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We should note as well that this difficulty of contingency is characteristic of the nature of 
language itself. Meaning is left open in a way which, if it is not quite a hermeneutic circle, 
seems to represent more of a hermeneutic spiral (or perhaps a hermeneutic pearl), having 
at its centre a faith which reaches ever outwards in search of meaning. We will come back 
to this difficulty with language in the third section. The terrifying mystery or 
uncontrollable desire, which is dangerous, causing the lark to fall like a stone, is 
nevertheless not content with a definition of the experience in and of itself. An endless 
falling merely contains that demonic aspect of which Derrida speaks108. It may be 
characterised, though not necessarily (which is what makes it so terrifying) by change, 
deferment and transfiguration. That is, we do not know before we leap, whether our leap 
is a leap of faith. Similarly, we cannot know what Fairyland is until we enter it. However, 
authentic life or Christian responsibility -  as opposed to a frightened moralism -  are not 
possible until after such a fall.
Fairyland as a means of deconstruction and recreation
In his landscapes, MacDonald deconstructs ethical structures; and unpacks common 
theological forms in his stories by using unfamiliar patterns and strangely positioned 
wording so as to render obscure what seems to have been revealed, remaining true to the 
fact that the gaze of God remains unseen, as Derrida says109. But he does this so as to re­
reveal this gaze of desire at the moment of recognition. He feels that the role of the writer 
is to provide as much space as possible for many such moments to emerge for the 
reader110. And each moment is different for each reader of his stories. This obscures all 
systematic attempts to link him to one single ethical or philosophical mode of thought. 
Which may be why, at one moment he is being described in The Theology o f Modern 
Fiction (p i36) as a “benign determinist”, while his son describes him in George 
MacDonald and His Wife (p341) as “primarily and splendidly inductive”. Induction runs 
into trouble when it starts to generalise into theory, while determinism prevents the 
movement required for authentic (fallen) interpretation.
108 “The demonic is to be related to responsibility; in the beginning such a  relation did not 
exist.” (my italics), ( The Gift of Death, p3)
109 And to his words in 'On the Imagination....” (A Dish of Orts, p6): “...for it is not the things 
we se e  the m ost clearly that influence us the m ost powerfully; undefined, yet vivid visions of 
something beyond...have far more influence..."
110 “He may, indeed, in rare instances foresee that something is coming and m ake ready the 
place for its birth; but that is the utmost relation of consciousness and will he can bear to the 
dawning idea.” ('On the Imagination, A Dish of Orts, p5)
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But in the course of his writing, MacDonald has seen this contradiction himself and 
considered its implications for the formation of Christian identity. Quite clearly, he has 
moved some distance from his earliest work, Phantastes, in which Anodos is shattering 
other people’s worlds (that crystal globe held by the girl he encounters). Instead, he is 
speaking from a transformed sense of the world in relation to himself, and like Shelley, 
whom he quotes (in A Dish o f Orts, p6), sees life
like a dome of many coloured glass
Stains the white radiance of eternity
Until death tramples it to fragments.
Mortality and Modernity
This sense of looking outwards is peculiarly strong for MacDonald. It does not translate 
into a worship of death, but a sense of life so strong that the concept of death is 
transformed in his hands. This simply cannot be emphasised enough for its importance to 
his approach, and is true in many of his works; At the Back o f the North Wind being an 
especially noteworthy example. He has died to death, “a double death”, as Derrida puts it 
in The Gift o f Death. This looking outwards is frequently characterised by the appearance 
of rainbows in his work, as in ‘The Golden Key’ for example, as an integral part of his 
light and colour symbolism. We will look at this in detail in the second section. His 
presentation of the problem of evil, likewise, has changed significantly as a result of this 
attention to light, by the time we reach Lilith. The novel seems somehow to have a more 
colourless; more black and white, light and shade tone than do some of his other works, 
and this perhaps has led some critics to treat it as a more straightforward allegory, 
concentrating as it does more upon the notion of language, and its Biblical allusions. 
However, the sense of mystery has deepened; and it is almost as though MacDonald is 
already looking through death; through the rainbow, and anticipating a light so blinding 
that his own, hugely sensitive, appreciation of colour will be transformed.
The concentration upon language and Biblical literature is in fact what has originally 
informed his notion of symbolism, and fed his imagination as we have seen and shall see. 
Instead of treating Lilith as a return to allegory; it should be treated as a recognition that 
the imagination, when very close to its source, like that of the preacher in Malcolm, needs 
less stimulation, once aware of the dazzling nature of the black and white print of the text,
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of the rainbows which may emerge from the greyness between reader and text. We have 
an anticipation of this sense of buried or disguised treasure in Diamond’s vision in At The 
Back o f the North Wind, where Diamond is “quite dazzled” at the blaze of golden or bluish 
light of the stars which are dug up out of the ground; and also in the concept of a light so 
bright in ‘The Shadows’ that angels are interpreted as “white shadows cast in heaven from 
the Light of Light’.
Light and mortality in relation to Lilith
The light which is in the face of the Lark’s face which is the transfiguration of her 
mortality may be linked now to what we will study in the second section in regard to 
Goethe’s Theory of Colour. As in ‘The Golden Key’, and in Lilith, the vision of Diamond 
accompanies the notion of as-yet undiscovered colours, which seem to signify a renewed 
sight after the moment of earthly death. Indeed, MacDonald, in his essay on the 
imagination, describes death as the “revealer of secrets” (A Dish o f Orts, p6) and 
specifically relates that sense to lines by Shelley which speak of life as the colours of 
glass, interpreting “the white radiance of eternity.”
In ‘The Shadows’, too, we find that the sight of the mortal king is characterised by a 
“shadowy” sense -  he himself hovers between life and death -  it is indeed the only way he 
can be ‘crowned’ and be granted the ability to see the shadows for what they are. Perhaps 
it is the case that, near the end of his own life, MacDonald’s vision, while more intense in 
terms of what he senses, is less easily communicated in the decorative and rich colours 
which have informed so many of his previous works. As the light becomes more brightly 
apocalyptic, shadows and darknesses become more intense before finally ceasing. The 
light which was only within -  a transfiguring light -  now perceives light emanating from 
the ‘outer’ world all around. The natural world is lit with grace. That reasonable light 
which has “lit” as much as we can understand of the novel is seen to be replaced by a light 
which emerges from within. It is the replacement of translucence with a kind of substance 
which itself emits light, in a manner reminiscent of Revelation; where the lamb is the light 
and “they have no need of the sun” (and where the poet’s language is fulfilled in the idea 
of a ‘heavenly’ language), (.Lilith, p219):
...a wondrous change had passed upon the world -  or was it us? Without light 
enough in the sky or the air to reveal anything, every heath-bush, every small shrub, 
every blade of grass was perfectly visible -  either by light that went out from it, as
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fire from the bush Moses saw in the dessert, or by light that went out of our eyes. 
Nothing cast a shadow, all things interchanged a little light....
Vane has moved this far, then, from the role of the objective subjectivity of Phantastes,
who comments upon the problem of evil as though it were merely a thing which acted
upon a person, towards a sense that he himself is the one who is being thought or dreamt;
and that his substantiality is far different from any sense of substantiality that he has
hitherto understood. Vane, as a human being, occupies, as it were, equal ground with
concepts which have themselves become tangible ‘things’ as opposed to ‘ideas’ contained
within the author’s head (Lilith, last sentences):
...when most awake, I am only dreaming the more! But when I wake at last into 
that life which, as a mother her child, carries this life in its bosom, I shall know that I 
wake, and shall doubt no more. I wait, asleep or awake, I wait.
Novalis says, “Our life is no dream, but it should and will perhaps become one.”
Although the novel seems to deconstruct our material senses, we should note that it sees 
itself as enabling a new creation; a new conception to take place over which it has 
absolutely no control, and but a very shadowy, apocalyptic sense of, but in which it has 
faith that the senses will be re-awakened in a more real, sensible, tangible way than before. 
It is in fact the strength of MacDonald’s faith which has not only driven his imaginative 
power in the first place, but which has ultimately led him, in Lilith, to deconstruct that 
power (and with it our natural sense of the material world). Lilith breaks down the self- 
sufficiency of the narrative for the reader in a most consciously deconstructive way. Not 
only is he enacting that breaking-down, he is attempting the impossible in envisaging the 
breaking down of even what we have understood as being the symbolic potential of 
earthly language. Everything is ultimately relinquished and existence made to depend on 
the trust that there does exist ‘that life which, as mother her child, carries this life’. The 
‘Endless Ending’ of the last chapter, like the hermeneutic circle, and like Lilith’s 
immortality, is a curse only without the existence of the trust that defines and shapes the 
nature of authentic life. Trust is all in all for MacDonald, and trust is often characterised 
in his stories by an active expectancy or ‘waiting’, which denotes neither belief in its 
weaker sense, nor objective certainty.
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Waiting, Time and Morality
‘The Giant’s Heart’ points towards the fact of this waiting in that it represents an ethical 
position which is also characteristic of the kingdom of heaven of the New Testament, 
where a sense of time is distorted, so that we see in the present what is clear; but that what 
we see has not actually happened yet and cannot be forced to happen. Justice remains 
outside of time, while our human conception of it is imperfectly enacted inside of time. 
What is particularly important for this section of the study is to remember that this 
‘waiting’ in Fairyland (which land in Lilith has itself proved to be entirely dependent upon 
a yet greater notion of life outwith even the poet’s imagination) resists the notion that there 
can be any final assessment of the characters’ morals. MacDonald emphasises the human 
fallibility of the Giant, while also displaying the coldness of the Lark. There is not the 
sense of being let down by the hypocrisy of either, but rather a note of general 
humorousness, which betrays the fact that the fulfilment of justice was never expected to 
come from within the logic of the story. There is a subtle comment too on the notion of 
permanence, in much the same way that Peter’s idea of building tabernacles upon the 
mountain of transfiguration is tactfully ignored by Jesus, who is waiting for something 
else111. The Giant’s home, a huge structure, yet becomes a prison for the children, and the 
home of the Lark seems to be an endless, transcendent sky of religious experience, yet his 
glory lies in the opposite direction. Just as both Diamond and Mossy and Tangle seem to 
have to go down in their stories in order to get up. As in ‘The Golden Key’ we are often 
not quite sure what it is we are searching for when we are making moral judgements:
“And what is the key for?” the boy would ask. “What is it the key of? What will it
open?”
“That nobody knows,” his aunt would reply, “He has to find that out.”
This conversation is descriptive of the way in which Macdonald’s own narratives work, in 
that they do not define moral behaviour, but only behave like keys to a structure 
anticipated, inhabited, but unknown. The narratives are not doors but keys. Similarly, 
true morals do not behave like ends or structures in themselves, but work in relation to the 
mystery of the ‘other’. They are keys to a yet greater world, and they will disappear when 
the time of their fulfilment comes, just as the key does in ‘The Golden Key’. But their 
temporal nature must embrace its own transience in order to find fulfilment. For it is that
111 Matthew 17v4. As Je su s  em phasises constantly, it is not in the nature of the kingdom to
express a desire for material perm anence of the kind that Peter envisages initially.
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sense of transience which contains the hope from which it draws its own meaning. 
Morality has no meaning o f its own, as we understand it. We must, as MacDonald insists, 
take our morals with us in our imaginings, but only in the sense that they are keys to guide 
us towards their fulfilment in altogether huger concepts of righteousness or justice from 
those with which we started out.
Morality and Obedience
So in ‘The Giant’s Heart’ we are kept reading, kept moving. A notion of self-contained 
objectivity is revealed as illusion. No matter the hugeness of the worlds to which we are 
introduced, they discover themselves in us as relative -  a matter greatly relevant to a post­
enlightenment search for a basis for morality. Like Anselm, we find ourselves in relation 
to true morality as we are in relation to God -  as “that than which nothing greater can be
119thought” . MacDonald leads us in this way to see how the question of ethics is related to 
the nature of reality, and finally to the location of authority, the ground of reality. This is 
why our gaze is shifted in the last page of the story from the questionable motives of 
Tricksey-Wee, who
believing it would be good for his morals insisted... 
to the question of an author who allows such needless killing to take place. For Tricksey- 
Wee
.. .could not help being sorry for him, after all.
Ethical questions are referred back to this problem of the temporary and finite aspect of all 
such judgments which rely upon a formulaic notion of morality. After all, why should the 
author, being human, have a better solution than the characters. We can see why it is that 
so many Victorian critics had a problem with MacDonald’s stories, where he actively 
encourages the reader not to take him as an example, but to learn wisely from the fact that 
- no matter how imaginative the writer - morality, thought of as a thing in itself merely 
detracts from the direction in which he invites his readers to look -  within to the divine 
light, without which morality is meaningless. In this, MacDonald seems to represent the 
Romantic approach which will inform later existential interpretations of morality or, for 
example, Bonhoeffer’s rigorous questioning of ethics. However, this inner light is 
exceeded in his work by the emphasis upon the relationship between the inner and outer
112 Proslog ion, p
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light, where he follows up on that interpretation, to question notions of materiality. We 
will see later, in relation to Graham Ward’s thinking, where this will lead him.
Abstraction and judgment
So MacDonald initially moves the question from the abstract to the existential. Once 
released from the confines of the children’s moral ‘bag’, the giant’s heart “expanded to the 
size of a bullock.” Now this happening is related to the fact that it is while the giant and 
his heart are so separated that he, with “...rage and vengeance, rushed on the two 
children.” Caught between the evil of a man separated from his heart, and the threat of the 
heart itself, the boy chooses to kill the heart itself. One is left wondering whether simply 
restoring the heart to its owner would have helped more. Perhaps MacDonald is making a 
point about the way we tend to think of morality in the abstract, treating it as a means of 
social control rather than a method of navigation; of an increase of desire, and its direction 
towards an unlimited world. This makes his concept of ethics remarkably like that of 
Jesus, as we saw, and, by implication subversive, in that it will certainly come in its course 
to demand more than social conventions allow.
McGillis also points out how MacDonald states in the text that “gentlemen do not tell 
stories”113, placing his own moral superiority in question. However, we have seen that all 
forms of moral superiority are inherently mistaken; the very idea that there can be 
‘guardians of morals’ such as Tricksey-Wee is being challenged. And we, the readers, 
also have to take responsibility for placing that burden upon her. Quite often, MacDonald 
questions the social conventions which afford superior moral or intellectual status to 
certain groups. His novels are full of instances of a reversal of roles, in which exiles -  
Scots in positions of servitude, usually -  cause their ‘betters’ to think twice about their 
own position. David Elginbrod is one such example, as is The Marquis o f Lossie, where 
Malcolm the groom reads Epictetus (p85), and Clementina wonders (p314):
.. .for anything she knew.. .they might all be philosophers.. .more than in the society
to which she herself belonged....
113 For the Childlike, p13
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Ethics and society
Ethical questions are also contextualised in terms of the problems inherent in forming 
hierarchical societies. Further, the theme of this novel is one of Malcolm’s secret identity, 
and MacDonald specifically subverts the notion of identity, relating the replacement of 
authentic identity by social status exactly to the empty nature of social morals -  as 
opposed to those which are truly ‘aristocratic’, in the sense that they ground their authority 
and identity in Christ. It has been said that MacDonald fails by using the hierarchy which 
he subverts as a measurement of Malcolm’s identity. However, Malcolm’s enduring 
ability to hide his secret status throughout the novels is MacDonald’s most powerful 
evidence of the fact that he does not acquire identity from his status, his identity being the 
same, whether or not it is recognised in society114. Rather he plays on the eagerness of the 
reader’s wish for Malcolm’s status to be known, revealing the way in which we tend to 
conflate identity and status. Here, we see also how the issue of community is important to 
MacDonald. He is not making a point about ‘noble savages’, but rather attempting to 
cause the reader to rethink their concept of the constitution -  the identity - of an informed, 
moral community.
We find, ultimately, that injustice is not a symptom of too much involvement in the 
actions of others, but of too little. There is a gap in the abstract formulation of morality 
which allows the mundane, autonomous comparison with the other to be made. It is not 
the deconstructive gap within the sense of self (which he encourages), but the idea of a 
demarcation between the self and others. This is reflected in the Giant’s own moral self- 
consciousness: “he always said to himself that he wore whiter stockings on Sunday than 
any other giant in all giantland...”. It is not an amoral universe which is demanded by 
MacDonald’s imagination, but a closer, more intense, identification with, rather than 
judgement of, another; the relinquishing of common notions of self-containment as 
identity. The narrative of the story fails for us, but succeeds in its aim as we, the readers, 
find ourselves falling short of the required identification, but nevertheless too involved to 
pretend moral indifference. That is, MacDonald leaves us at the point of
114 This is m ade quite clear, in the Marquis ofLossie, for example, where (of Clementina), the 
narrator notes (p50) “Her rank had already grown to seem  to her so identified with herself that 
she  w as hardly...capable of the analysis that should show it distinct from her being... .social 
standing...w as the Satan of unrighteousness worshipped all around....how  could it be 
otherwise with the offspring of generations of pride and falsely conscious superiority.”
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...the rupture that functions in the mode of, and within the limits of, a repression; 
between the metaphysics, ethics, and politics of the Platonic Good (that is, the 
“incorporated” orgiastic mystery) and the mysterium tremendum of Christian 
responsibility.115
MacDonald’s great talent as a writer is that he finds richly imaginative ways to help the 
reader to acknowledge (having fallen into) the abyss created by this rupture.
Ethics and Identity
The scientific pose of judge or reader allows for no distinction between persons, no 
difference (only comparison, which is not difference), and therefore no true 
communication (or community) between the observed and the observer. It depersonalises 
the question, so denying the ‘mystery’ of identity. As MacDonald notes in Alec Forbes 
(pl48):
For to no mere onlooker will Life anymore than Fairyland open its secret. A man 
must become an actor before he can be a true spectator.
...just as Vane cannot ‘wait’ until he has acted (even wrongly). Such a distance denies, 
but intensely represents, the acceptance of fatal distance for MacDonald; the distance 
which separates the giant from his heart, the lark from his family, and the morality of the 
children from their compassion. What he recreates in the reader is the means of 
recognizing this same duality, which encourages us to distance our judgement from our 
humanity. The laughter, which McGillis notes116 that the story encourages, and which he 
also has seen as involved in the establishment of community, reminds us of our humanity. 
It is this sense of dualism -  of seeing the world as a battleground between beliefs -  which 
is revealed as being problematic in the formation of identity and of community. 
MacDonald, however, is thoroughly apocalyptic in his rejection of much of the dualism 
inherent in ‘religious’ ideals and ethics. For the New Testament Christ is the hidden 
revelation of the true nature of things, according to MacDonald. A revelation who cannot 
be watched or assessed, but who holds us in his gaze. Richard Hays notes how 
apocalyptic literature expresses the outcome of the revelation of the apocalyptic nature of 
morality117:
115 The Gift of Death, p31
116 For the Childlike, p13-14
117 The Moral Vision of the New Testament, p38
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...God’s justice will necessarily bring radical reversal. A major purpose of the 
revelatory prophecy is to disclose the truth about the world from God’s perspective 
and thereby to remake the community’s understanding of reality... the moral strategy 
of the Apocalypse, therefore, is to destroy common sense as a guide for life...the 
ethical staying power of the Apocalypse is a product of its imaginative richness...118
‘The Giant’s Heart’ is a sophisticated description of the impulse to form a rational 
morality, by which we attempt to assert our autonomy. Such autonomy demands self- 
defence in the form of a detachment which seeks to judge others, according to its own 
reduced (common, general or abstract) sense. In doing this, we assist in the 
dehumanisation of those whom we judge (we separate the giant from his heart). To accept 
this state of affairs as the final word is to deny that all are fully human, because “all are 
one in Christ Jesus”119.
Hume
Here MacDonald is accepting his fellow Scot, Hume’s description of our reaction to evil 
as being prior to its expression, but does not leave it at that. Hume suggests that our 
instinctive reactions place identification with the victim first120. However, because 
MacDonald believes that God is deeper in us that we are in our own ‘selves’, this 
immediate reaction of identification with the victim is not a truly unconscious 
identification, but a masking -  through a false concept of selfhood - of the deeper 
realization that -  through our common humanity - our identity is also related to the 
identity of the offender. This would imply a common guilt, which the retreat into 
identification with the victim, as representing the false self, allows us to ignore. And it is 
also only by so separating ourselves in adopting the false self (the role of judge) that we 
develop the ability to judge at all. In identifying only with the victim, we seem to place
118 This imaginative richness is frequently hinted at (‘the Shadow s’, p103): “But if the stories 
that the Shadow s told were printed, they would m ake a  book that no publisher could produce 
fast enough to satisfy the buyers.” Which is practically a  paraphrase of John (21:25): “And 
there are  many other things that Je su s  did, which if they w ere written one by one, I suppose 
that even the world itself could not contain the books that would be written.” Perhaps, for 
MacDonald, the apocalyptic sight of Je su s  a s  the truth of the imagination, m eans that all 
honest quests for interpretation of the divine Word and the meaning of the world, tend 
towards his person. And also that the forms of this will be limitless
119 This is also why the wartime theologian, Dietrich Bonhoeffer so  fully rejects dualistic 
notions in his Ethics, stating (p1): The knowledge of good and evil seem s to be the aim of all 
ethical reflection. The first task  of Christian ethics is to invalidate this knowledge.”
120 He also suggests (Treatise, p624, quoted by Broadie)that “Belief consists merely in a 
certain feeling or sentiment; in something, that depends not on the will, but m ust arise from 
certain determ inate cau ses .” In sharp contrast to this MacDonald thinks that to believe and to 
will what God wills is the gift which com es through faith; the m ost powerful elem ent in the 
working of the will, which he places above everything else.
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ourselves in the position of Christ, but we exclude the offender, betraying that fact that the 
Christ-self is not truly present in such a judgement.
It is therefore a sign of our own guilt and lack of true humanity (in so separating ourselves 
from one another) that we can judge. It is also a major theme in the New Testament that it
• 191is a divine law that to judge another brings judgement upon the self . MacDonald’s 
notion of identity therefore sees guilt and judgement as a sign of separation from one’s 
humanity, being symptomatic of our self-consciousness, and lack of identity with God, 
precisely at the point where we succumb to the ‘religious’ impulse to be Tike’ God in the 
analogical sense only. The main problem for Lilith, indeed, is that she is presented as 
separate from God, and therefore separate from her true ‘Christ-self, and therefore 
separate from others. She does not need to be judged in addition to this; this is her 
judgement (“caught afar off in the hell of her self-consciousness”). Indeed it is the 
judgement of all the characters within the novel whenever they act, not as part of the 
apocalyptic community, but in self-defence. A defence which implies, in fact, the lack of 
self, as we see in Vane’s introductory conversation with the Raven. We find that we are 
moving towards the notion of the identity of the church as being that of the apocalyptic 
community, and we shall return to it shortly.
At the moment, however, we are mainly concerned with the psychological depth of 
George MacDonald’s thinking on this issue of ethics and identity, as to how self- 
consciousness and judgement are related in this ‘interim’ ethical stance. He does not settle 
for a primitive notion of a pre-ethical stage, but encourages a process of natural growth 
towards a deeper sense of the unconscious, a moving through that inevitable stage of self- 
conscious separation. He anticipates Freud in his essay ‘Individual Development’, (A 
Dish o f Ortst p45):
The child knows nothing of growth...by slow, inappreciable, indivisible accretion 
and outfolding, he is lifted, floated, drifted on towards the face of the awful mirro in 
which he must encounter his first foe -  must front himself. By degrees he has 
learned that the world is around, and not within him -  that he is part, and that is 
apart.. .then first the possibility of a real life commences
We can read Lilith’s progress towards identity in relation to this description: (p204):
121 eg Luke 6:37: Judge not, and you shall not be judged. Condemn not, and you shall not 
be condem ned. Forgive, and you will be forgiven...
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I looked, and saw before her, cast from unseen heavenly mirror, stood the reflection 
of herself, and beside it a form of splendent beauty. She trembled, and sank again 
on the floor helpless. She knew the one that God had intended her to be, the other 
that she had made herself.
Lilith’s Identity as the Giant and the church
Lilith, then, is stunted (childish) in her growth, which accords with the emotions Vane 
feels on caring for her while she is asleep, sensing her as vulnerable. The novel seems to 
imply that childishness (rather than childlikeness), as in the case of the Giant, may be 
funny, but it may also be terrifying. Especially if the childish one has great power; great 
self-consciousness. Lilith may be Vane’s self-conscious, struggling against the notion 
that this dream of himself as a woman can be the reality of him. (we shall come back to 
the implications for this loss (or fulfilment) of gender in relation to Graham Ward’s 
writing). There is also another reading, given that the ‘speculation and dreaming’ required 
for growth have been singularly absent from the church with which MacDonald is 
acquainted, thus stunting its growth. The Giant goes to church and Lark is religious, 
identifying the nature of this manifestation of wrong growth.
Since Vane’s own destiny seems tied up with Lilith’s salvation, we must ask whether it is 
not Lilith herself who represents many aspects of the church herself -  a bride not yet
197ready . Indeed, to be true to MacDonald’s own sense of what identity is, we should not 
be able to separate Vane’s identity from that of the apocalyptic church, their being bound 
together in Christ’s identity. There is justification for this interpretation, given 
MacDonald’s great love -  and great criticism -  of the church. His groundless hope for it, 
and Vane’s for Lilith. For Vane may also be vain -  one who gazes in a mirror; and 
MacDonald also tends to portray the mirror as being not a very good revealer of true
122 Indeed, there is a  hint that MacDonald’s treatm ent of the church in term s of the 
developm ent of the character of a  woman is found in Robert Falconer, for on p353, Falconer 
speaks of the very primitive stage at which the church finds herself: “Time is a s  cheap a s  
space  and matter. W hat we call the church militant is only a t drill y e t . . . A n d  the 
conversation m oves on a s  the characters encounter, on the next page, a woman who seem s 
to have no hope of finding goodness. The very sam e notions of time and developm ent are 
employed; a  comparison is implicit: “Shall it take less time to m ake a  woman than to m ake a 
w orld...she may have her ag e s  of chaos, her centuries of crawling slime, yet rise a  woman at 
last...” Perhaps it is during the writing of this novel, that the idea for Lilith begins to 
germinate.
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1 T 'Sselfhood, but rather a confirmation of its lack . There is, in Lilith a recognition of a
terrible beauty. We should consider carefully this extract (pi09):
...had all my despairing hope gone to redeem only ingratitude? “No”, I answered 
myself, “beauty must have a heart! However profoundly hidden, it must be there!
The deeper buried, the stronger and truer will it wake at last in its beautiful 
grave!”.. .her paleness was not a pallor, but a pure whiteness, her breathing was slow 
and deep. Her eyes seemed to fill the heavens, and give light to the world. It was 
nearly noon, but the sense was upon me as of a great night in which an invisible dew 
makes the stars look large
It is also noteworthy that this is a dark reflection of the earlier description of Eve on p28:
The life of her face and her whole person was gathered and concentrated in her 
eyes...the eyes had life in them for a nation -  large and dark... A whole night- 
heaven lay condensed in each pupil; all the stars were in its blackness and flashed...
And of Mara on p80:
Her face; it was lovely as a night of stars. Her great grey eyes looked up to 
heaven...something in the very eyes that wept seemed to say, “Weeping may endure 
for a night, but joy cometh in the morning...”
In all of these descriptions is an anticipation of the imagery of the woman of Revelation
12:1, the church, described as the bride of Christ; as
...a woman clothed with the sun, with the moon under her feet, and on her head a 
garland of twelve stars
This woman is in labour and a dragon waits to devour her child. Lilith kills her own child. 
Later the beast of John’s Revelation will take the form of a Leopard, while in 
MacDonald’s vision, Lilith herself at times takes the form of a Leopard, seeming to refer 
to the text of Jeremiah 13:23 (“.. .can a leopard change its spots...?). As before, however, 
it is the way in which MacDonald conflates the references in apocalyptic literature, such as 
Revelation and Jeremiah which gives a particular slant to his treatment of the issue of the 
church’s identity in the character of Lilith. His answer seems to be that a Leopard can
123 T h e  Shadow s’, The Complete Fairytales, p75: “W hen she  took her last look a t the 
phantom in the glass, sh e  half smiled to it -  But we do not like those creatures that com e into 
the mirrors at all...they are dreadful to u s ...” The notion that we find a  dark image of 
ourselves in a mirror also com es to us in Biblical literature. In particular 1 Corinthians 13 
com bines the notion of ‘becoming’ and forming identity; the notion of the breakdown of 
language; and the illustration of the mirror, in envisaging a  time when love itself will be both 
language and identity: “Love never fails. W hether there are prophecies, they will fail; 
whether there are  tongues, they will cease; whether there is knowledge, it will vanish 
aw ay...w hen that which is perfect has come, then that which is in part will be done away.
When I w as a child, I spoke a s  a child, I understood a s  a  child... For now we s e e  in a  mirror, 
dimly, but then face to face. Now I know in part, but then I shall know just a s  I also am 
known.” It seem s that this p assag e  com bines together the sam e them es a s  Lilith.
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impossibly change its spots. Richard Hays has noted how the apocalyptic literature tends 
to be abused at times when it is used in a dualistic fashion to further the need for power, 
for the group which feels threatened124. This use betrays the very nature of apocalyptic 
literature, if it is supposed to be an overturning of the concept of power, and of the dualism 
which accompanies such a rhetoric of power.
It seems that MacDonald, aware of the way in which the figures of the Harlot and the
Bride in Revelation, have been abused in a dualistic fashion, in order to support the
rhetoric of sides in religious debates, has chosen to show the similarity between Mara, Eve
and Lilith, possibly even to hint that they may represent different corruptions of the
church. If this is the case then MacDonald’s vision is frequently a dark one; suggesting
that she behaves like the whore of Babylon at times. However, he is consistent with the
presentation of apocalypse in Revelation as being concerned with the judgement of the
churches and, as we have seen, that vision of the ‘sword’ is one which does not divide the
‘inner’ concept of individuality from the ‘outer’ concept of the church125, but rather
divides one within -  a healing cut which causes an apocalypse of the self:
...I heard behind me a loud voice....saying “I am the Alpha and Omega, the First 
and the Last.” And “What you see, write it in a book and send it to the seven 
churches... .He had in His right hand seven stars, out of His mouth went a sharp two- 
edged sword...” (Revelation lw  10,11,16)
If it were not for the great and paradoxical hope of apocalyptic vision -  a hope which
overwhelms and retranslates the sense of darkness which it finds all around, then the novel
would be simply a condemnation of the church. However, in this apocalypse, as we noted
earlier, the sword which cuts off Lilith’s hand has a healing effect (Lilith, p219)
“A wound from that sword” said Adam “needs no dressing. It is healing and not 
hurt.”
We saw earlier how the sword penetrates the inner senses in the novel’s description. In 
the light of this vision, we see also how the separating effect of ethical judgement is not
124 The Moral Vision of the New Testament, p183: “Something very strange happens when 
this text is appropriated by readers in a comfortable, powerful, majority community; it 
becom es a  gold mine for paranoid fantasies and for those who want to preach revenge and 
destruction.”
125MacDonald also perceives, with som e humour, that the mistaken notion of this ‘division’ 
into categories of theoretical knowledge is a  problem which has arisen again in the philosophy 
of knowledge out of a theological question which arises from the issue of how the atonem ent 
of Christ can or should affect the individual: T h e  Light Princess’, p23: “For the condition of 
the princess afforded delightful scope for the discussion of every question arising from the 
division of thought -  in fact, of all the Metaphysics of the Chinese Empire.”
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that cut; such a separation signifying a dualism which denotes an incompletion. Ethical 
judgment takes place in the space of a deferment between the cut and its healing (opening 
up the discrepancy between the inner experience of apocalypse and the world as it is often 
experienced) albeit a deferment which may be characterised by hope. MacDonald is most 
concerned that the church should not find its rest in this state of deferment, a state which is 
utterly dark when accepted upon its own merits -for it has none of its own. This is perhaps 
why apocalyptic literature is of necessity so utterly dark and so completely hopeful.
This dualistic notion of good and evil, respectable and whorelike, sexual and spiritual, 
indicates a complete satisfaction with ‘interim’ ethics suggests a notion of opposites which 
the Westminster Confession falls into, in making use of pre-conceived logic, in seeking to 
explain the ‘plan’ of the atonement.126 Such oppositions are always, to MacDonald, signs 
that a complete theory is lurking and, as he says in Malcolm (p58) “A complete theory is a 
vault of stone around the theorist.” MacDonald must unsettle the idea that the church can 
retain some equilibrium of form; for as we noted earlier, it is in the nature of truth that 
forms must change, “.. .with the life, that in the New Testament is life at all...”.
Relationship between pragmatic and legalistic religion
In pursuing its apocalypse the church cannot afford to be pragmatic, like the Giant who, 
like Lilith, eats children. Or rationalistic like the Giantess, who conveniently dehumanises 
the victims of her need, comforting herself (p83)
126 Unfortunately, m ost of MacDonald’s  present-day critics seem  to fall into this sam e trap of 
oppositional thinking. Knoepflmacher, for example, in his introduction to The Complete Fairy 
Tales, describes T h e  Light Princess’ a s  a mix of “carnivalesque levity...absurdism, parody 
and extended punning with a spiritual seriousness that befits Protestant symbolists such a s  
S penser....B ut that mix also creates deliberate tonal discordancies betw een the story’s  two 
halves...” However, it is not that mix which cau ses  the story to seem to have two halves. W e 
find on closer reading, that the ‘religious’ sen se  has been there all along. W hen it is read with 
MacDonald’s  own interpretation of the term ‘Christian’; one which do es not oppose the sexual 
and spiritual; one which considers not only specific events to be sacred; but all true humour; 
emotion and experience, then there is no discord -  the tones blend together with a 
complementary harmony; "for the end of the imagination is harmony” (A Dish of Orts, p35).
The discordancies his stories cau se  are designed to em erge only to the precise extent that 
the reader brings to the text a  preconceived notion of a  ‘spiritual’ tone. Time and again, 
MacDonald is trying to encourage the notion that theology m ust not be treated a s  a  separate  
discipline; that it com es in many literary forms, not only the traditional ones. W herever he 
finds truth, it is divine truth, causing no disharmony. B ecause his conception of theology is so  
far ahead  of his time, in that it cau ses  him to em brace the material world, without reservation, 
a s  a  divine gift, there is an excuse for his contem poraries. There is, however, no excuse for 
us to divide the ‘magical’ and ‘spiritual’ elem ents of his work; the theological and imaginary 
any longer. They are, to him, obviously the sam e. In The Marquis ofLossie he s ta tes  (p310) 
“W hoever thinks of life a s  a  something that could be without religion, is in deathly ignorance of 
both.”
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.. .with thinking that they were not real boys and girls, but only little pigs pretending 
to be boys and girls.
We have here some of the themes of self-delusion which will characterise the author’s 
approach in Lilith.
Opposing the pragmatic, rationalising, yet childish religion of the giants comes an equally 
faulty reaction of fear and of legalism, in the actions of the children. Their morality, while 
masquerading as a sense of justice, has more to do with self-protection; and finally 
destroys what good there is in the giants because, in the notion that good may be forced 
upon them from outside, genuine morality is replaced with control; trust in God with fear 
of others127:
“now,” said Tricksey-Wee to the giant, “will you promise to carry off no more 
children...” “Yes, yes! I promise” answered Thunderthump, sobbing. “And you 
will never cross the borders of Giantland?” “Never” “And you shall never again 
wear white stockings on a Sunday...?” The giant hesitated at this...
In Robert Falconer (pi67), MacDonald states that
...it is the half-Christianness of the clergy of every denomination that are the main 
cause of the so-called failure of the Church of Christ...
As we considered earlier, his main concern is not simply the eradication of hypocrisy, but 
an examination of the all-too-human motives of fear which lie behind much of this ‘half- 
Christianness’ and hypocrisy. In both the children and the giants we see a portrayal of 
good intentions which fall short, being founded on an interim, dualistic and competitive 
sense of identity and morality. The birds of the story offer yet more cameos of this ‘half- 
Christianness’; of people in the process of becoming. Yet we are, as Knoflmacher says, 
finally encouraged to laugh, rather than to judge, (an activity which banishes fear) since it 
cannot be denied that all are equally ridiculous in this story of human failing; author, 
reader and fictional characters alike.
The Birds
The birds seem to offer a particular picture of the church, rather than of the more general 
human instinct to moralise, but clearly all grow out of the same instinct. The central 
passage of the story describes the way in which the children seek the help of the birds.
127 A noteworthy anticipation of the main them e of B urgess’s  A Clockwork Orange, it being an 
illustration of the way in which all social attem pts to impose ethical order are  corrupted by the 
sam e distorted religious impulse to protect the self by controlling others.
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But the owl will not reveal his secret; and we noted how MacDonald believes that the pure
in heart cannot love a secret. The nightingale sings prettily, but causes them to forget why
they came (perhaps a comment upon the conception of what is truly aesthetic). The lark
who, as we have seen, while he holds to abstract notions of transcendence, also presents
the consequences of such ‘spirituality’ as it affects, and appears to, others; a selfish means
of escape; a meditative detachment:
“Poor little things! You can’t fly” said the lark,
“No; but we can look up,” said Tricksey
“Ah, you don’t know what it is to see the very first of the sun.”
“But we know what it is to wait till he comes. He’s no worse off for your seeing 
him first, is he?”
“Oh no, certainly not.” Answered the Lark, with condescension; and then, bursting 
into his Jubilate, he sprang aloft, clapping his wings like a clock running down.
“Tell us where -  “ began Buffy-Bob. But the lark was out of sight. His song was all 
that was left of him. That was everywhere, and he was nowhere. “Selfish bird!” 
said Buffy “It’s all very well for larks to go hunting the sun...the lark’s 
wife...stayed at home with the young larks while her husband went to church...she 
looked up after him into the sky, whence his song was still falling like a shower of 
musical hailstones.
This last description of “musical hailstones” illustrates very well MacDonald’s genius in
making perfect descriptions of things (for that is exactly what a lark’s song is like, as it
falls down toward the listener) work as fitting illustrations of ideas (that of the harshness
of religious celebration unaccompanied by compassion). He is, of course, doing exactly
what he describes in his essay on the imagination, in finding forms in nature which
function perfectly as symbols -  even revealers - of something seen and unnamed in the
mind. With all of this clear-sightedness about moral and religious motivations,
MacDonald’s hope in the beauty of the future church is indeed amazing; illustrating how
obviously it is not based on any merit intrinsic to human nature when it functions apart
from its divine source. Despite his clear ability to deconstruct what passes for ‘the
church’, we find these words in The Marquis o f Lossie:
No worst thing ever done in the name of Christianity, no vilest corruption of the 
church, can ever destroy the eternal fact that the core of it is the heart of Jesus. 
Branches innumerable may have to be lopped off and cast into the fire, yet the word 
‘I am the Vine’ remaineth.
128 For MacDonald notes that the true teacher of art “will not forget the builder while he 
adm ires the architect” (A Dish of Orts, p38)
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Here also is a further clue about the nature of the ‘lopping off of Lilith’s hand!
MacDonald is quite clear about the danger of scepticism -  which all too easily occurs
when one takes things at their ‘face’ value; but for him it has no excuse, because of that
light within. He constructs in the same movement with which he deconstructs.
Scepticism is entertainingly described in The Princess and Cur die (pi 80)
.. .this difference between the growth of some human being and that of others; in the 
one case it is a continuous dying, in the other a continuous resurrection. One of the 
latter sort comes at length to know at once whether a thing is true....one of the 
former class grows more and more afraid of being taken in, so afraid of it that he 
takes himself in altogether, and comes at length to believe in nothing but his 
dinner...129
This view in Lilith is clearly balanced, however, by the obvious pitfalls that emerge when
one hopefully assumes that one’s dying is a resurrection, and so mistakes truth for illusion.
He represents the process towards identity as being a precarious business, which risks -
and almost certainly entails - our being one or another of his caricatures at any given time.
There never can be any scientific certainty about the rightness of our decisions, for
MacDonald, but a tendency to courage - inspired by faith rather than self-confidence; an
inner sense of reality, rather than a judgement by appearances. Appearance and reality are
also major themes in MacDonald’s treatment of ethics, and Lilith is probably the most
extreme example of this, if we do take her to represent the preparatory ‘incarnations’ -
mis-conceptions - of the church in history. There is, perhaps, a preliminary vision of the
church of Lilith in The Marquis o f Lossie (p238)
...men who, professing to gather their fellows together in the name of Christ, 
conducted the affairs of the church on the principles of hell...men who sought gain 
first, safety next, and the will of God not at all...whose presentation of Christianity 
was enough to drive the world to a preferable infidelity
Appearance and Reality
MacDonald’s consistent complaint, as we have just seen, is that the divine creator is 
betrayed by the capitulation of the church (either way) in response to the tension between 
ethics as it is experienced (often illusory and always temporary) and the absolute vision of 
Christ which can define its existence, and light up what has been only partly discerned. 
This capitulation seems to occur in MacDonald’s novels when the church (in its imperfect
129 W e could apply this, interestingly, in relation to theories of interpretation, which often seem  
characterised by a resignation to m eaninglessness, rather than a  concern with the act of 
interpretation.
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incarnation) loses its vision of its own source of reality -  the body of Christ. In The
Marquis o f Lossie, we find this comment: (p242):
The church of England....is the most arrant respecter of persons I know, and her 
Christianity is worse than a farce.” Clementina saw that if what this man said was 
true, then the gospel was represented by men who knew nothing of its real nature.
(my italics)
We can see how far MacDonald is from the sentimentality he has been accused of, it being
defined as “a tendency to indulge the emotions”. He clearly does not allow his emotions
to unduly influence his assessment of the facts. We also see how true morality and pure
goodness has to be, for him, a truly magical thing; a thing “impossible with men but 
• 110possible with God” , on his own assessment. This magical thing does not fit into either 
the Calvinist or liberal traditions (the legalistic Tittle ones’ and the pragmatic ‘giants’), 
which react upon and limit one another; the one by a limiting of reason through a denial of 
experienced reality, so as to elevate a God misconceived, the other in its reaction of a 
subsuming of God within the human ego. In ‘The Giant’s Heart’ we see, then, a narrative 
strategy which anticipates Lilith, telling the stories of both childishly egotistical giants, 
and stunted Tittle ones’. Behind the story resides the way in which they interrelate, itself 
telling a ‘secret’ story about the hidden nature of things like morality, which lies behind 
their first appearances.
To conclude, MacDonald subtly, but inextricably weaves together the issues of ethics, 
identity and community so thoroughly in the experiences of the characters that they cannot 
be treated separately. He does this by an exposure of the psychology behind such attempts 
at separation in the reader’s mind. This is a kind of negative theology; such an experience 
taking away any secure ground upon which we may build our own peculiar tabernacles 
and forcing us to concede the death of ‘textual’ authority, as soon as it is taken and used to 
enforce a preconceived notion of anything. This is not to apply the text in terms of the 
‘gift’ of interpretation, but to use it as a weapon to protect ourselves. At the point at which 
we are willing to concede this about his writing, his work reveals to us another aspect, 
behaving like a holographic image; changing as the angle of view changes. In this way, 
the body of the text behaves rather like the body of Christ -  the church - revealing a very 
different face. In this, he senses a ‘magical’ effect, which links together concerns of
130 A statem ent attributed to Christ in the New Testam ent, in relation to the possibility that 
human beings might enter the ‘kingdom of heaven’, but also used of Lilith in MacDonald’s 
novel (chapter thirty-nine).
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• • •  •  1^1literary criticism with his theological treatment of issues like morality. It is no 
coincidence that the words of the text themselves operate like symbols which become an 
illustration of the church, constructed of the ‘living stones’ of human lives132, participating 
in a growing narrative or living body of truth which we are all writing. Because of his 
concern with words as divine symbols133, literary theories may be reinterpreted, such that 
the reader who becomes ethically ‘lost’ in the process of building meaning, mirrors the 
character in Lilith who must die a death134 -  allows that they must be given death -  in their 
search for identity . Each word and stone, like each reader or life, is different, for
everyone....who feels the story, will read its meaning after his own nature and
development; one man will read one thing....
Summary of section one
Lilith comes at the end of the life of a poet, whose use of the ‘living’ symbols around him
is beginning to be replaced by a sense of greyness, which is not interpreted by him as a
symbol of twilight, but as if it were the grey light of a dawn. One which lies beyond the
colours -  and colourful metaphors and symbols - of a present ‘rainbow’, and which will
soon be truly illuminated by the gift of death. In the passage upon which he comments on
Shelley’s poem in his essay on the imagination (quoted in part earlier), he goes on to
describe the poet’s vision:
And last, he shows us Death as the destroying revealer, walking aloft through the 
upper region, treading out this life-bubble of colours, that the man may look beyond 
it and behold the true, the uncoloured, the all-coloured.136
We have attempted to discern through his writing, in this section, the way in which 
MacDonald deconstructs the rhetorics of philosophy, ethics and identity, through the
131 For example, the ideas employed in Wolfgang Ise fs  The Implied Reader (p274), T h e  
Reading Process: A Phenomenological Approach’: “The work is more than the text, for the 
text only takes on life when it is realized... .it is the virtuality of the work that gives rise to its 
dynamic nature.”
This, also, is linked to the ‘becoming’ of the church: "..having been built on the 
foundation... J e su s  Christ himself being the chief cornerstone, in whom the whole building, 
being fitted together, grows into a  holy tem ple in the Lord, in whom you also a re  being built 
together for a dwelling place of God in the Spirit...” (Ephesians 2w 20-21)
“Every word so employed with a new meaning is henceforth, in its new character, born of 
the spirit and not of the flesh, born of the imagination and not of the understanding, and is 
henceforth submitted to new laws of growth... (A Dish of Orts, p6)
134 “death a s  the destroying revealer...” (A Dish of Orts, p6)
135 W e should note- the difference between the ‘magical’ death of the imaginative reader or 
liver, and the stultifying death, where it is the imagination itself which dies, wherein 
“...thousands of words which were originally poetic lose their vitality, and harden into 
mummies of p ro se ...” (A Dish of Orts, p7)
136 ‘On the imagination....’, A Dish of Orts, p6
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nihilistic impulse which accompanies their existence as ‘things in themselves’, examining 
how it is that these issues are intertwined for him by the notion that their meaning is only 
fulfilled in a sense of their giftedness or contingency. Such an impulse expose a radical 
instability within these concepts, when treated as things in themselves, which testifies to 
their utter dependence upon their being divinely imagined by God. He does not, however, 
present this belief as a closed philosophy of deconstruction in order to clear the way for 
the reinstatement of a positivistic religion, but feels that it is only remedied by the 
development of a ‘magical’ sense of meaning, which has at its heart the notion that faith 
must not treated as dogma, but as the substantial means by which text (the body) and 
belief connect symbolically with the reality of their object and which represents the 
foundation of their (provisional) existence in time and space. He sees individuals, the 
church and the world straining for a sense of identity with which to define themselves.
All of MacDonald’s treatments seem to represent interpretations of reality and experience 
found within the Biblical literature itself and which have, mainly, been left unexplored in 
the critical literature so far. Finally, death itself has become the gift in Lilith, anticipated 
to a degree in some of his other works, but not ‘enacted’ in the way it appears to be here, 
in involving so fully the author, that his final gift to the reader seems to be that he ‘gives’ “ 
the reader death, as he himself receives it as a writer. The ‘Endless Ending’ leaves the 
reader in a position of choice, as to whether or not he will take the novel on ‘faith’. To do 
so treats the tension between faith and death as an enactment of the vital relationship 
between reader and writer, and also enables the reader to consider Macdonald’s work in a
1 ^ 7new light, as an enactment, rather than expression, of his theology . Or the reader may 
take Lilith at face value, consider literature to be entirely dreamlike, the symbol to be only 
a literary device and, with the numerous options available from the sense of contingency 
that MacDonald deliberately creates, so decide to separate author and work. My
137 It seem s that MacDonald has attem pted to go further in his self-conscious treatm ent of 
death a s  a  writer than alm ost any other. W e find Joseph  Brodsky (John Givens, ‘Art and 
R em em brance....’, Essays in Poetics, Autumn 1998, Vol 23) stating that “In the final analysis 
every writer strives for the sam e thing; to regain or hold back time past or current...(to 
w rite)....m eans no less than to grapple with dea th ....one  could say  that writing poetry....is an 
exercise in dying....” It seem s that because  of his deep  consideration of the role of the 
imagination in theology, MacDonald com es to se e  that they are concerned with the sam e 
thing, and find hope in the sam e place -  the reinterpretation of death and of history, such that 
he achieves (or is granted) what few writers or theologians receive - a s  opposed to raging 
against the dying of the light -  the end of him self. That is for him, and no other, however, 
and does not prove anything (as if it could or should) apart from in the sen se  that Lilith 
w itnesses to its own apocalypse, and so  grants hope to the searching reader.
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contention so far is that a fuller appreciation of his work is gained by taking the former 
approach -  that of faith, or a sense of ‘giftedness’. It seems to me that it immeasurably 
deepens the interpretation of MacDonald’s work, by granting a great excess of meaning to 
the imaginative power of writing, especially in the parabolic, poetic and fairytale modes of 
writing, in that such meaning may be treated as symbol and not only sign; reflecting more 
accurately MacDonald’s sense of the poetic nature of both language and religion, when 
they are both truly alive, allowing them to address one another. A reestablishment of this 
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A. MacDonald’s interpretation of New Testament symbolism in Lilith
Introduction
As an introduction to the way in which MacDonald attempts to articulate the nature of
truth and meaning, we should consider how his reading of Biblical literature has informed
the way in which he approaches representation. In particular, we should allow his view to
1 '12inform our understanding of what has been called his mysticism , since he relates it 
directly to his use of the symbol. This is an extract taken from his essay ‘The New Name’:
I use the word mysticism as representing a certain mode of embodying truth, 
common, in various degrees, to almost all, if not all, the writers of the New 
Testament. A mystical mind is one which, having perceived that the highest 
expression of which the truth admits, lies in the symbolism of nature and...human 
necessities, prosecutes thought about truth so embodied by dealing with the symbols 
themselves after logical forms. This is the highest mode of conveying the deepest 
truth; and the Lord himself often employed it, as, for instance, in the whole passage 
ending with the words, “If therefore the light that is in thee be darkness, how great is 
the darkness!”
Having considered how problematic are standard didactic readings of Lilith, which rely on 
a straightforward confrontation between good and evil, because of the ambiguity of its 
symbolism -  especially in relation to the character of Lilith herself -  we should return, 
before studying the character of Lilith, to think about how the vast array of symbols which 
he uses operates for MacDonald. Night; the shadow; the rainbow; light and colour; the 
forest; the staircase...all of these are used frequently in his writing and are linked by the 
common theme of vision or sight. Ultimately, they find their source in the symbolism of 
Biblical literature; a symbolism which requires a symbolic grounding for theological 
questions. In Lilith, MacDonald gives us some particular clues as to how he sees the 
relationship between the “worlds” of the symbolic and divine, and the “world” of the
1 TOsenses, as they perceive reality (pp25,26):
“I see a pigeon!” I said. “Of course you see a pigeon,” rejoined the raven, “for there 
is the pigeon! I see a prayer on its way...” “How can a pigeon be a prayer?” I said.
“I understand, of course, how it should be a fit symbol or likeness for one; but a live 
pigeon to come out of a heart!” “It must puzzle you! It cannot fail to do so!” “A 
prayer is a thought, a thing spiritual!” I pursued. “Very true! But if you understood
138 By G K Chesterton, for example, in his introduction to the biography by Greville 
MacDonald.
139 An exposition of the way in which the perception of truth occurs may be found also in his 
essay  entitled ‘A Serm on’, in A Dish ofOrts.
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any world besides your own, you would understand your own much better...when a 
heart is really alive, then it is able to think live things...when some pray they lift 
heavy thoughts from the ground, only to drop them on it again, others send up their 
prayers in living shapes...when one says to the great Thinker “Here is one of thy 
thoughts: I am thinking it now!...that is a prayer...” “Could you not teach me to 
know a prayer-flower when I see it?” “I could not. But if I could, what better would 
you be? You would not know it of yourself and itself! Why know the name of a 
thing when the thing itself you do not know?”
In one sense, MacDonald considers all symbolic understanding to fall short of the divine 
communication of God with the human soul (‘True Christian Ministering’, p302, A Dish o f 
Orts):
Use all the symbols that we have....but you can never come up to what God’s 
ministration is...
But he nevertheless believes that symbolic understanding is vital with regard to its being a 
divinely given means of ‘knowing’ the thing itself; a way of escape from the circular, 
anthropocentric theology which ‘names’ facts about God while learning nothings/row him. 
Somehow, symbolism enables us to receive the infinite in the finite, and therefore to make 
Vane know the nature of what he does see, in perceiving some truth which has remained 
invisible, in that it ‘belongs to another world’140. We have here the idea of a ‘blind’ and 
knowing seeing and a wise seeing. Sight itself is reinformed by such an understanding. It 
is not simply that Vane is receiving another explanation of what he sees; but that he must 
learn to see all over again. This, of course, is a well-known theme in the New 
Testament141. And in MacDonald’s own view, the nature of understanding is itself to be
140 It seem s especially that this allusion to ‘other worlds’ has always tended to mislead critics, 
who som etim es take MacDonald to be m essing about with dim ensions in a  kind of religious 
version of science fiction. However, it seem s more likely that his insistence upon the fact that 
Vane does not even understand the nature of his own world without this knowledge of the 
logic of 'other worlds’ strengthens his presentation of symbolism a s  a  kind of divine language, 
having an ability not merely to inform, but to transform the senses; not merely changing what 
we see, but changing we who are the seers. However, because  MacDonald is attempting to 
show the reality of what is seen, and to show how it is capable of transforming the sen se s  
them selves, his own m etaphor of ‘worlds’ needs to be retained, it being deliberately chosen 
to avoid the chance of this symbolic ‘language’ being treated a s  a  psychological category. 
And it cannot be, for since symbolism is not in the order of a  language which can be 
m astered, but is that which m asters us, it is also bound to be in a  different category from the 
language of any science, a s  a  method of understanding. This strengthens MacDonald’s 
contention that symbolism is a s  much a  ca se  of God speaking to us through our physicality 
(or thinking or dreaming us a s  he puts it) a s  it is of us finding suitable w ays of knowing him. 
Symbolism has, then, the attribute of reciprocity. It is in this that his writing seem s to 
represent ‘two worlds’.
14 For example, Matthew 13:13, there are  J e s u s ’ own words “...therefore I speak  to them in 
parables, because  seeing they do not see , and hearing they do not hear, nor do they 
understand” which, incidentally links together the them es of sight and the m ethods of
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“seen” in this way. There is clearly a lot of scope for examining the relationship between 
MacDonald’s ideas and those found in phenomenology, in relation to the nature of 
perception and an examination of what it means to ‘know’ the nature of a thing. However, 
such a discussion needs to be left for another time, since there is not time to do more here 
than to examine how MacDonald’s theology is affected by his views.
There are three things in the above passage from Lilith about prayer which are of interest. 
The first is that symbolism is presented as a divine language, having theological 
significance in understanding such things as prayer. The second is that the symbol does 
not function as a general sign, but as an individual relation which has a triune nature, in 
that the individual, the object, and what they both mean are connected and given life in 
each encounter by the ‘live’ meaning itself, which yet presents itself differently for each 
person. The third thing that this passage tells us is that, to minds which are ‘alive’ to this 
aspect of symbolism, there is involved a substantial connection between the person, the 
object and the shared (but unique) meaning to which they are attracted.
In ‘The Two Worlds of George MacDonald’, Stephen Prickett remarks of this way of 
expressing meaning:
At its simplest it resembles the medieval idea of “correspondences” so prevalent also 
in Dante, but MacDonald’s way of applying them is very unmedieval...(p22, For 
the Childlike).
We shall return to this “medieval” question later. Stephen Prickett also quotes Greville
MacDonald recalling this conversation with his father (p23, For the Childlike):
He would allow that the algebraic symbol...has no substantial relation to the 
unknown quantity; nor the “tree where it falleth” to the man unredeemed...but the 
rose, when it gives some glimmer of the freedom for which a man hungers, does so
parabolic construction already found in MacDonald’s  stories. Also 2 Corinthians 4:8 provides 
a m etaphor for faith a s  sight: “...while we do not look a t the things which are seen , but at the 
things which are not seen ...th e  things which are  not seen  are e ternal...” or Hebrews 11:1 
em phasises the substantial aspect of that metaphor: “... faith... is the substance of things 
hoped for, the evidence of things not seen .” Or John 8:38 m akes a  connection between 
perception and identity “I speak  what I have seen  with my Father, and you do what you have 
seen  with your father.” Or John 9:32, which links the person of Christ “Since the world began 
it has been unheard of that anyone opened the eyes of one who w as born blind...” with the 
perception of Christ (in both se n se s  of the word “of): (39)... I have com e into the world that 
those who do not s e e  may se e  and that those who se e  may be m ade blind...then som e of the 
P harisees...sa id  to Him “Are we blind also?” Je su s  said to them “If you w ere blind, you would 
have no sin; but now you say, ‘we s e e ’, therefore your sin rem ains....”
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because of its substantial unity with the man, each in degree being a signature of 
God’s immanence...so may we also find co-substance between the stairs of a 
cathedral-spire and our own ‘secret Stair’ up to the wider vision...
This leads him to define where it is that MacDonald differs from Coleridge (p24, For the 
Childlike):
....the defining quality of a “symbol” in Coleridge’s sense was that it brought two 
separate world into relationship with one another...(but)...for MacDonald, it is the 
role of the gem not simply to inspire us, but to awaken within us memories that we 
have in some sense always possessed...
Here, this critic points out the Platonic theme of this “recognition”. However, we have
already considered the similarities and differences, of which MacDonald was himself
aware, between his own treatment of truth and the division between the physical and
spiritual ‘worlds’ of Plato. The alternative reading, and the one with which we are
concerned in this thesis, is how this kind of thinking about symbolism is related to the
nature of MacDonald’s theology (for they are inseparable) and, specifically, to his
ecclesiology, regarding the identity of Lilith. For his own Christian interpretation is the
one which gives a fuller reading of the substantial aspect of symbolism. It simply cannot
be avoided that in MacDonald’s treatment of the symbol, his own words apply, as he
stated them in Salted with Fire (quoted in George MacDonald and His Wife (p556):
God is deeper in us that our own life; yes, God’s life is the very centre and creative 
cause of that life which we call ours...
So this ‘awakening’ of meaning of which the critic speaks must be examined in terms of 
the awakening of the “Christ-self’. For MacDonald, all thoughts are related to the “great 
thinker”; words must be related to the Word; life to its life-source. Specifically, 
substantiality implies embodiment; and MacDonald’s thinking on what constitutes the 
body of the church is therefore highly relevant to the way in which he approaches the 
symbol; and that he appears to have a kind of negative theology. In his essay, Stephen 
Prickett does not pay much attention to the effect of MacDonald’s belief on his work or 
the implications of his views on the constitution of the “body” of the church, and therefore 
interprets MacDonald as merely taking part in the shift towards individualism, as opposed 
to examining the way in which his awareness of Christian symbolism reinterprets the 
nature and role of the church and, consequently, the nature of individual identity and the 
concept of symbolism itself in relation to identity. The critic states that (For the Childlike, 
p24):
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Whereas for Plato and Dante alike the perception of spiritual truth was a collective 
process... for MacDonald, living in and belonging to the world of nineteenth-century 
individualism, we climb our own “secret stair” to the wider vision...
Although comments in Lilith such as that of the Raven that he cannot teach Vane; that
Vane must find things out for himself may seem at first to support this reading, the
movement of the novel, and of MacDonald’s work in general, is of a mysterious
collectiveness which begins to emerge through that experience of individual lostness by
means of the emergence of the Christ-self. It is a vision in which the development of
selfhood and of a sense of community are indivisible, neither one comes before the other;
being informed by a New Testament concept of the ‘body’ of the church, in which all parts
are different, yet essential; all growing together towards a whole mysteriously, a
community which behaves as a single body, being divinely put together, and which
undoubtedly informed MacDonald’s view142. In support of this, we find that the
development of his characters generally consists of a paradoxical mixture of individuality
and community; times of solitude and times of an intense closeness with others. And we
find his thinking elucidated in Robert Falconer, (p270), regarding Falconer and Ericson:
Neither was a guide to the other; but the questioning of two may give just the 
needful points by which the parallax of a truth may be gained.
He further states in the novel that it is God who puts Falconer together with the right 
people at the right time. This sense of divine ‘gathering’ as corresponding exactly with the 
progress towards individual identity is seen, likewise, in the final part of ‘The Golden 
Key’, where “Stairs beside stairs wound up together, and beautiful beings of all ages 
climbed along with them.” This movement towards reconciliation gravitates from the 
solitary, Solomon-like search of Vane for wisdom towards a sense of the divine 
community in Lilith, mirroring the dawning of the author’s own perception of the nature of 
identity and community. For in Phantastes, in his early literary career -  as for Vane at the 
beginning of the novel - the individual aspect remains the strongest. It is not that the one
142 For example Romans 12:4,5 “For a s  we have many m em bers in one body, but all the 
m em bers do not have the sam e function, so  we being many, are  one body in Christ, and 
individually m em bers of one another. Also 1 Corinthians 12:27: “Now you are the body of 
Christ, and m em bers individually.” (my italics). W e find also MacDonald’s  notion of “co­
substance” in symbolism also emerging from this theological sen se  of identity; Colossians 
1:15,16,17,18: “He is the image of invisible God, the firstborn...by Him all things were 
created...visible and invisible...And He is before all things, and in Him all things consist. And 
he is the head of the body, the church...you, who once were enem ies in your m ind...yet now 
He has reconciled...in the body of His flesh through d ea th ...” Here is a  picture of the 
universal, the religious, the poetic, the things invisible and visible in the process of 
reconciliation with, growth towards divine identity, in the universal redemption of creation in 
Christ’s death, transforming the nature of being, of identity, even of death.
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leads to the other, but that it gradually dawns upon Vane that his ‘selfhood’ is -  and has 
always been - somehow divinely bound up with the others with whom he comes into 
contact. In exactly the same way the symbol binds together the human being and the rose, 
creating the connection which enables the perception of beauty and of truth in the physical 
beholding of the rose as an ‘other’. Further, MacDonald’s Highland sense of community - 
as opposed to society - complements very well the New Testament emphasis upon the 
symbolic nature of the community, as itself partaking in the divine body in exact 
proportion to its true cohesion143.
This sense is reflected in MacDonald’s construction of literature. For in ‘The Golden 
Key’, while Mossy’s or Tangle’s journey may be unique, the fact is that the reader or 
listener, on ‘entering’ the narrative and engaging in symbolic interpretation, becomes part 
of a unifying symbolism, “co-substantial” with the rose. Thus is the reader linked to the 
text and in being so linked is, by analogy, repeating the way in which the individual is 
linked to the divine body of the church community. Thus, the way in which the symbol of 
the body of the individual is a miniature symbol of the body of the community is also the 
way in which the movement and growth of the reader discerns individually only inasmuch 
as he takes part in an understanding of the text, rather than seeking to master it. Should 
the reader attempt such mastery - because the direction of MacDonald’s writing is all 
directed outwards, towards the symbol of Christ’s body, which encompasses the material 
universe - such a move on the part of the reader actually destroys the sense of the symbol; 
the body or the community; and with it the legitimacy of the unique identity which it 
claims. By substituting the self for Christ, as opposed to taking part in his death, the 
reader destroys the life of the text itself, which exists through a kind of ‘death’ of the 
writing, a death of the perception of it as a thing isolated. Writing dies in two senses, one
143 The thought is frequently found in MacDonald’s  writing, that the entirely wrong vision of the 
church; of the divine community, is evidenced by this lack of cohesion; w hereas the true 
church of Robert Falconer carries on regardless, needs no meetings, social docum ents or 
plans, but works upon the nature of relations already divinely given between individuals. W e 
find this frequently in other Scottish writers, a sen se  of community which contains frequent 
allusions to the breaking of bread; to the sacram ental nature of any true community; thinking 
of Neil G unn’s  work in particular. The ’church’ therefore, is based upon the sam e sacred 
relationship which exists a s  a  ’gift’ wherever it occurs in this way. There is, therefore, a 
‘visible’ church and an ‘invisible’ church; the visible church being so  inasm uch a s  it sh ares  this 
sen se  of 'giftedness’ and also testifies to the source of its cohesion; its giftedness, a s  being 
Je su s  Christ. Such a  testimony is a  revealing of the ‘sac red ’ and gifted nature of all 
community, however, rather than a ‘claim’ to anything -  it therefore functions apocalyptically, 
not perceiving itself a s  ‘different’ in any way, but rather a s  an interpreting presence.
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of them life-giving, one of them life-sucking144. Rather than community being a theory 
for social cohesion, MacDonald does not recognise individuality or community as separate 
issues; and as separate from question of the symbol of the body of Christ, or of his belief 
about symbolism in general.
The nature of progress towards divine ‘sight’
We should consider, thinking of the rainbow that is present in ‘The Golden Key’, how
symbolic understanding of theological issues, and the inherently theo-logical nature of
symbolism are inseparable for MacDonald. As an example we should look at his approach
to a reading of St Paul, in ‘A Sermon’ (A Dish o f Orts, p286):
There is no room here for that unprofitable thing, bare logic: we must look through 
the shifting rainbow of his words, - rather, we must gather all their tints together, 
then turn our backs upon the rainbow, that we may see the glorious light which is the 
soul of it... all who believe... that the perfection of Christ is the sole worthy effort of 
a man’s life...are...even now, not indeed grasping, but in the grasp of, that 
perfection...
The ascent towards participation in the rainbow of meaning in ‘The Golden Key’ is a 
process which involves more than a linguistic agreement to move towards what has 
seemed to be a distant symbol. We as readers are first tempted to look through the 
rainbow of meaning, as though meaning were a thing which could be perceived in the 
distance. Some have a quicker understanding than others, and Mossy appears to reach his 
‘goal’ the quicker. He has followed the rainbow faithfully. In the above passage,
144 There is a  reading of Lilith here which implies that sh e  represents a  monstrosity of 
MacDonald’s  own creating when sh e  is treated in such a  way; divorced from the life that is for 
her. For Lilith herself is seen  to be feeding upon Vane, sucking the life from him, just a s  a 
dead story might direct attention towards its own self - its form. Feeding upon the e sse n ce  of 
poetic meaning -  the divine symbol, the divine Word, it sustains itself upon a  se n se  of 
meaningfulness, which it yet denies in practice through an insistence upon its own 
independent nature. Lilith may yet also, then, represent the ultimate nightmare of an author 
intent upon bringing glory to God, but losing momentarily the faith that his work is so  oriented. 
On such an occasion, the beauty of poetry appears a s  a  nightmarish terror, the author’s  sub­
conscious may em erge to torm ent him with the possibility that his God is instead his ego. In 
the end, a s  Vane himself admits, the very perception of language itself rests upon the 
question of trust. In turn, the responsibility p a sse s  to the reader, who is put in the sam e 
position by the issue of creative interpretation. In support of this suspicion, much earlier, he 
has written to his wife, George MacDonald and His Wife: (p158) “...is not nervousness the 
tap-root of all genuine poetry?” (perhaps a s  faith finds its first expression in doubt, a s  he 
notes in Robert Falconer). In T h e  Light P rincess’, also, there is a vampire-like snake, who 
sucks the w ater from the lake, making the ’atonem ent’ of the Prince necessary. Strangely, 
the theology which is seen  a s  draining the life-force from the lake in the first place, also 
arises, leech-like, in that it continues to feed upon, in its attem pt to interpret the act of 
atonement, the very life of that act. Theology and writing, then, have in common this 
tendency to ‘vampire’ behaviour.
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however, MacDonald suggests that, like Tangle, it may be better, in order to take part 
more deeply in the meaning which the rainbow itself reflects, to turn our backs upon the 
beauty which we are tempted to possess, in exchange for the deeper satisfaction of being 
possessed by...meaning; becoming meaning ourselves145. This, of course, reflects also the 
fact that rainbows are seen against cloud, with the sun behind the observer. In turning 
towards the light one actually becomes blinded (as Paul was on the road to Damascus). 
Thus our life receives the greater significance; the more divine identity, not by means of 
our intellectual possessions, but in proportion to the depth to which we allow ourselves to 
be possessed and blinded by meaning... which is itself to MacDonald nothing less or more 
than possession by the person and identity of Christ.
In her excellent essay in For the Childlike, Cynthia Marshall perceives the parabolic 
nature of ‘The Golden Key’ which ‘leads us to assume a meaning in the process of search 
itself’146, much as Falconer is led into the meaningfulness of his life, as he searches for his 
own goal (the finding of his father). We have already commented upon how the themes of 
sight and parable are linked in the New Testament, as evidence for the direction from 
which MacDonald takes his treatment of the perception of symbolic meaning. We should 
note, too, in Robert Falconer, the Christian connotations of the Christ-type (Falconer) who 
finds connection with his heavenly father by doing his will, while searching for his earthly 
father, in much the same way that Vane begins the search in his father’s library -  perhaps 
for the hidden Father in the church ‘Fathers’ of theology. In doing this, the novel itself 
seems to be intent upon recovering the face of the divine in the distortion of that face in 
the ‘Christian’ theology of the earthly ‘Fathers’ of the church and their theologies. We 
shall come back to this theme in considering the links between MacDonald’s thinking and 
that of McLeod Campbell. We should note here, however, in trying to ascertain the nature 
of MacDonald’s development of symbolic understanding, how it is not at all the medieval 
idea of being lured in a straight line from the lower to the higher love (as though the 
rainbow were merely a lure). For that cheapens the nature of human love. Here, he resists 
the Platonic temptation to ‘transcend’ or to attain the object, and so fall into the Calvinist
145 MacDonald seem s to be thinking of something like this in Robert Falconer, when he s ta tes  
(p109) of the difference between town and country boys that “They are cleverer than country 
boys, but they are less profound; their observation may be quicker; their perception is 
shallow er...” although he goes on to disown this statem ent a s  prejudice, he yet leaves it in, 
for it obviously reflects something which he is trying to express about the nature of 
understanding itself.
146 'Reading “The Golden Key”: Narrative S trategies of Parable’, For the Childlike, p105.
105
trap. Again, in Robert Falconer, we have a portrayal of where this religious philosophy 
leads in its theological expression (p91):
The strife which results from believing that the higher love demands the suppression
of the lower, is the most fearful of all discords, the absolute love slaying love...
It seems again that Macdonald resists corrupting his conception of beauty and of truth 
exactly where he returns to Biblical poetry147. For in notions such as transcendence, there 
is a sense in which the reader or seeker is attempting to ‘suck’ in the beauty and meaning 
which lies, as it were, scattered about, in the quest for selfhood. In this kind of attempt, 
we leave behind the supposedly worthless ‘husks’ of material objects, sucked dry of 
meaning, thus denying the significance of material creation. Instead of this, MacDonald 
grounds his notion of the connection between the idea and the thing in an allusion to 
Ecclesiastes 3:11, where he quotes in his essay upon the imagination (p42)
He hath made everything beautiful in its time...he hath set the world in their heart,
so that no man can find out the work that God maketh from the beginning to the end.
And so MacDonald grounds the imagination, and with it identity and the poetic conception 
of things, not in the notion of the person growing in order to encompass beauty, in the 
sense that the Giant (or the text) swells, but alludes to it as a process by which one is 
turned inside out, finding correspondence between the inside and the out, so losing in a 
sense the self which originally possesses the knowledge of beauty, until the process of this 
turning, and dying to possession of the self, involves a becoming alive, a making exterior 
of that ‘world’ which is in the heart. This corresponds also to his description in his essay, 
‘Individual Development’, of the child ‘becoming’ and realising that the world lies outside 
and not within, that the world ‘within the heart’ is not a self-sufficient one, but one whose 
essential motivation is to journey outwards (to be literally turned inside out, as MacDonald 
was fond of explaining) in order to find the substance and fulfilment of this torturing 
beauty which is placed within the consciousness by God. And because “no-one can find 
out the work” from beginning to end, there remains an incompletion, a necessary and good
147 And it seem s especially important to note that a good proportion of the Bible is poetry, and 
relies on the capacity for poetic understanding. Something which MacDonald w as acutely 
aw are of, when he attem pted to expand upon the Biblical literature, and to portray the nature 
of Christian identity by m eans of taking further the symbolism to which it points. This, in 
particular, led to the accusation that he was attempting to expand upon completed revelation, 
when he w as seeking to be most true to its nature of itself a s  revealed.
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tension, in the notion of what it is to write; to live; to die; and in that to perceive the truth 
about one’s self in relation to God148.
The incompletion of the identity of the ‘body’ and of the symbol
There is, then, despite the sense of everything being informed by the whole, the notion of
incompletion in MacDonald’s treatment of symbolic meaning. While in ‘The Golden
Key’ it is found in the fact that the story still continues, as Mossy and Tangle disappear
out of sight; in Lilith, the Raven himself signifies incompletion; being the bird sent out
from the ark of Noah, who continues to go to and fro over the waters while they yet cover
the earth. MacDonald’s writing always seems to imply that the journey towards
participation in meaning which benefits from the symbol, is itself, in its incompletion, a
symbol of the promise of an excess of meaning; of the incompletion of the world itself149.
Therefore the very concept of symbolism witnesses to its own nature as, we saw in first
section, does light. These are not only signs which help us towards a hope, but their
nature is intrinsically hopeful in such a way that they cannot be appropriated as objects to
support or verify any preconceived utopia, ideal or abstract notion. For as themselves and
in themselves they are contained in hope by the very fact and nature of their existence.
As MacDonald says in his essay ‘The Child in the Midst’:
...the blessing is the perceiving -  the blessing is the truth itself -  the God-known 
truth.
There is something of the negative method in this treatment of the symbol, as in 
MacDonald’s theology, for we are prevented from treating evidence as evidence in the 
strictest scientific usage of the word. Rather, the clues we are given mean that faith and 
understanding are inseparable, being based upon a kind of testifying or witnessing of 
objects as to the endless depth (or inside-outness) of their own existence, just as the 
apostles or disciples witness to the identity of Christ by means of identifying the ‘body’ of 
the church as founded upon the notion of Christ fully dying (the double death), and so 
entirely turning death inside-out, making this process of exteriorising the self possible at
148 This is expressed  in Thomas Wingfold, p135: “...inside the Spirit; outside, the Word. And 
the two are ever trying to m eet in us; and when they meet, then the sign without, and the 
longing within, becom e one in light...”
149 W e find the Raven appearing earlier, in relation to a  com m ent upon Scotland’s  history, in 
Malcolm (p261): “W orst of all, the clan-spirit w as dying out...the patriarchal vanishing in a  low 
form of the feudal...the hour of the Celt w as gone by, and the long-wandering Raven -  
returning a t last, found the ark it had left afloat...” Yet the context of this Biblical allusion -  the 
divine covenant - suggests a background of hopefulness in MacDonald’s  attitude to 
Scotland’s  history which parallels his attitude toward the history of the church; a  way of seeing 
which does not have to be conditioned by present experience.
107
all150. The ability to die is gifted. The receipt of the gift and precedes the perception of 
the new, endless life which reinforms the vision of the world. There is here no guarantee 
of a closure of history, but an anticipation - rather than a visualising - of the sense of 
completion which accompanies every new level of meaning; of a depth in the experience. 
Just as the journeys of Mossy and of Tangle are marked by various “baptisms” in their 
descent/ascent, so too the reader passes through a sensation of meaning151, and emerges, 
having perceived and received an anticipation of wholeness and identity; and of a deeper 
meaning yet.
The ‘baptism’ of the imagination -  death and poetic language
Lilith’s baptism into suffering in chapter thirty-nine is marked by water and by fire, as is 
that of Mossy and Tangle. It is a baptism which signifies an identification with, an 
anticipation of death itself. It is a baptism into the ‘body’ of the church; of Christ. Here, 
too, there is no sense of finality as in of any resurrection vision presented. Although in 
Lilith there is an anticipation of fulfilment in the progress up the river towards the 
heavenly city, as there is anticipation in the sight of the figures in the rainbow of ‘The 
Golden Key’ disappearing out of view. Rather, the author returns us (by means of the 
divine hand, which pushes Vane back into the ‘dreaming’) to the life; the incomplete body 
of the story (or the church) and the ‘night’ of dreaming, having imparted a sense of 
meaning and of hope which is nevertheless not allowed to operate as a ‘proof. Indeed, 
and tellingly, the sense of evil in the novel seems mainly concentrated upon the dangers of 
a premature completion; a grotesque representation of an inadequate vision (this is indeed 
the curse of a ‘death in life’, as Lilith experiences it). Evil is seen to operate through the 
failure of inadequate visions -  and that includes the possibility that the reader may be led 
to interpret the author’s vision as definitive, rather than as testimonial. However a 
testament, as MacDonald will be well aware, requires for its fulfilment the death of the
150 The notion of living through a second death is found in 1 Corinthians 15, a s  is the faith 
upon which Lilith takes part in the life of the church, and by which the notion of em bodim ent 
and of life itself is reinformed: “For since by man com es death, by man also cam e the 
resurrection of the dead ...fo r a s  in Adam all die, even so  in Christ all shall be m ade 
alive...w hat you sow is not m ade alive unless it d ies...you do not sow  that body that shall be, 
but m ere grain ...”
151 For (A Dish ofOrts, p18), “the forms of nature...the man, then, who, in harmony with 
nature, attem pts the discovery of more of her meanings, is just searching out the things of 
God. The d eep est of these are  far too simple for us to understand... let our imagination 
interpretive reveal to us one severed significance...such is the harmony of the whole, that all 
the realm of Nature is o p en ...”
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152 •testator , and so it is that the experience of death becomes the symbol and the hope of
life in Lilith. It is death, therefore, which continues to define the oneness of the church in 
this, George MacDonald’s final work of imagination. He leaves us with the thought that 
the death -  the failure - of this one, particular, imagination of the author -  who will 
imagine no more, is itself his final means of witnessing that what he is seeking to 
communicate is far greater than his own imagination. The imagination retains its divine 
force inasmuch as it is truly divine, in identifying with Christ’s death.
For inasmuch as the death of Christ persists; so does the force of the testament or 
testimony. The testimony of the imagination; of poetry, of the body of the church and of
153 •the text . Conversely, inasmuch as there is such death, divine life emerges, informing 
the church, the imagination and the writing in such a way that it is able constantly to 
relinquish its claim upon the power over (by going through) death which is attendant upon 
its renewed discovery. And perhaps this is why apocalyptic literature seems always to 
overturn the rhetoric of power in anticipation of the fulfilment of its poetry. It is a power 
regretfully experienced; an identity held provisionally until its promised fulfilment is 
found in the gift of the death of death154. And so the imagination works paradoxically 
against itself and therefore does not insist upon nor cling to the visions which it has
152 Hebrews 9vv16,17: “For w here there is a  testam ent, there m ust also of necessity be the 
death of the testator. For a testam ent is in force after men are  dead, since it h as  no power at 
all while the testator lives.
153 All of these require faith - life -  in order to function, so  MacDonald does not equate faith 
with imagination, although linking them (George MacDonald and His Wife, p495): “W e often 
think we believe what we are only presenting to our imagination. The imagination is an 
end less help towards faith, but it is no more faith than a  dream  of food will m ake us strong for 
the next day’s  work.” In particular Lilith seem s to be em phasising the role of faith more, for he 
goes on in the sam e letter with a  them e which will occupy Lilith: “Being then in the light and 
knowing it, the lack of intellectual proof will trouble you no more than would your inability to 
silence a  metaphysician who declared that you had no real existence.” The lack of ground for 
his own being in Vane’s  intellectual and imaginative search  com es to trouble him no more, for 
his search  leads him to ground his existence in hope, in anticipation of “being then in the
i nere is also in his poetry evidence that the rainbow of the imagination -  the ‘old’ covenant
w as a  very important symbol to him in his own search for identity, not only illustrating the
nature of the imagination, but also implying that there is an unfinished nature to faith; it is not
an assertion of ultimate triumph, but a  transformation of the present insofar a s  it is held in
faith:
And when grim Death doth take m e by the throat
Thou wilt have pity on thy handiwork’
Thou wilt not let him on my suffering gloat,
But draw my soul out -  gladder than man or boy
When thy saved creatures from the narrow ark
Rushed out, and leaped and laughed and cried for joy,
And the great rainbow strode across the dark.
(Diary of an Old Soul, October 12)
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discovered. They emerge in their true colours occasionally, as the need arises in the 
imaginative life of the reader or listener.
As we noted at the end of the last section, we may take Lilith in two ways. The lack of
colour -  its starkness - may be seen as a sign of hope, as a literary form o f a willing death j
enacted prior to the physical death o f the author, which represents an imagination ‘gone to
seed’ in the best sense, overturning its own terrible power, lying dormant in anticipation of
its life-source (as the author himself spent his last few years “waiting”)155. Or as the
failure of the author to present a personal vision which has been intended to become a kind
of substitute for religion. In taking the former meaning we can see that in the experience
of the Eucharist - the substantial and imaginative partaking of death - that the dream of
one day waking up begins to become a reality while the imagination yet lives. We can
take this further. The imagination functions for us as a part of what exists through and
beyond death; it is the experience o f death coming back at us from beyond the grave,
testifying through the symbol to the ‘live’ nature of death; bringing with it an illumination
of the nature of this life. With mention of the Eucharist, we come to the heart of
MacDonald’s symbolism. Indeed, his son notes (George MacDonald and His Wife, p481):
...to him a symbol was far more than an arbitrary outward and visible sign of an 
abstract conception: its high virtue lay in a common substance with the idea
presented. Perhaps this accounts for certain Roman Catholics claiming that he was 
never really outside the pale of the Church...
The Christocentricity of his symbolic understanding
Interestingly, MacDonald’s thinking about the imagination brings together two warring 
aspects of theology regarding the Eucharist, in that the Catholic insistence upon the reality 
of the bread as Christ’s body (its substance) and the Protestant insistence upon the 
representative nature (the idea) of the bread are brought entirely together in MacDonald’s 
treatment of the symbol as offering both an imaginative and a substantial relation to truth, 
and in that truth, becoming themselves bound to one another156. Despite this, he has often 
been described as tending towards pantheism.
In her introduction to The Gold Key and the Green Life, for example, notes:
155 George MacDonald and His Wife: p562 (towards the very end of his life), “...h e  w as 
always waiting..”
156 There are many com m ents of his which testify to the notion of writing itself interpreted a s  
sacred, upon this thinking, for example, in The Portent, p82: “..the very outside of a  book had 
a  charm  to me. It w as a kind of sacram ent -  an outward and visible sign of an inward and 
spiritual g race ...”
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...in his fantasy writing what could be considered as elements of pantheism in his 
declared belief that God was the Father of all life, to be found in nature as certainly, 
if not so fully, as in Jesus Christ...
However, this oppositional way of dealing with ‘nature’ and ‘Jesus Christ’ is entirely
opposed to the spirit of MacDonald’s thinking. It is important to note that his Christology
is so radically high that it involves the reinterpretation of every thing in existence, not
through a kind of transcendence of the material, but from a reinforming of the sight. It is
less pantheism and more immanence, but an immanence which remains undeterred by the
lack of apparent divine presence. In this, as well, he will have drawn justification from
New Testament imaginings of the nature of the relation between Christ and creation, as we
saw earlier in Colossians 1, for example (“in Him all things consist...”). In Robert
Falconer we see this being expressed: (p335)
“This is the kind of thing” I said, “that makes me doubt whether there be a God in 
heaven” “That is only because he is down here” answered Falconer...where I saw 
only dreadful darkness, Falconer always would see some glimmer of light...
MacDonald is intent upon insisting that Christ’s death and suffering themselves reinterpret 
our very notions of death and suffering; just as his existence upon earth reinforms and 
redeems all previous notions of earthly existence and substance.
In relation to MacDonald’s symbolism we must use these kinds of comments to help us to 
see how his direction of thinking entails a profound reversal of the usual means of 
‘attaining’ understanding through domination of the object. Rather, it is only as one 
allows the divine thinking to reverse this logic that we begin to see the rose; only as the 
vision of Christ as a human being is allowed to reinform our notion of what it is to be a 
human being, that we begin to see the divine in the apparently mundane. This process 
seems to start with a denial of the ‘real’ world; with the denial of the ‘rose’. It has what 
appears to be a negative face -  in Lilith especially -  as though MacDonald were trying to 
discourage us from all attempts at mastery of meaning. And indeed he is; just as he 
demonstrates the circularity of all ethical judgements (as we saw in the first section).
Such a process, however, ends with an affirmation of a hitherto unsuspected and far 
deeper perception of things in and uniquely as themselves, rather than rendering them a 
pantheistic mass. Clearly it was vital to MacDonald that such an appreciation for the 
uniqueness of everything in nature should not be rendered less meaningful by any
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theology which he might hold, as he says to his father in a letter (George MacDonald and 
His W ife,pm ):
One of my greatest difficulties in consenting to thinking of religion was that I 
thought I should have to give up my beautiful things and my love for the things God 
had made. But I find.. .Nature is tenfold brighter in the sun of Righteousness, and 
my love of Nature more intense since I became a Christian...
The fact remains, however, that he has initially had to abandon all previous expectations 
of theology and notions of beauty before this discovery. The poet, then, as does Vane, 
must, Dante-like, abandon hope (that is hope in the weaker; fearful sense)157, before 
experiencing it as faith; as gift; as an experience operating beyond the prescription of any 
law of nature or assent to belief in a theology.
MacDonald’s ‘medievalism’ and the apocalyptic nature of symbolic meaning
We should emphasise again that views of MacDonald’s work seem to have sometimes
suffered from a simplification of the theological issues themselves with which he was
dealing and consequently have confused the related issue of his use of symbolism and
metaphor. Stephen Prickett notes the false simplicity of viewpoints which158
Decry the passing of the time when it was possible to hold a unified religious “world 
picture” in which all human knowledge could be integrated into a single, coherent 
whole, expressive of the greater glory of God.
There is, however, a notion of symbolic coherence which does not supply a “world
picture” but a sense; a metaphorical ‘sight’ of harmony. Certainly MacDonald never had
such a simple view as the one above, and he can be compared with Scottish writers such as
Robert Henryson or David Lindsay, medieval poets who questioned this view as it existed
then, as much as it does now. He shows that he is himself aware of his own tradition, in
terms of its literary sophistication, stating in Alec Forbes (pi07):
I do not however allow that the Scotch is a patois in the ordinary sense of the word. 
For had not Scotland a living literature, and that a high one, when England could 
produce none, or next to none - 1 mean in the fifteenth century? But old age and the 
introduction of a more polished form of utterance, have given to the Scotch all the 
other advantages of a patois, in addition to its own directness and simplicity.
What is interesting about this statement is that not only is he hinting at the sophistication 
of the Medieval Scottish writing, in terms of its self-awareness, he is also linking the
157 And we shall return for a  description of hope(s), when we attend to Moltmann’s  Theology 
of Hope in the last section.
158 For the Childlike, p28.
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continuation of that advance not to empowerment, but to the enlightening experience of 
powerlessness (in that it is seen as a ‘patois’)159. It learns that it does not have to supply a 
‘world-picture’, and is thus more likely to take the apocalyptic turn towards perceiving the 
nature of reality (and of writing), in reinterpreting the loss of a rhetoric of power. This 
patois is not what it seems; the dominant picture of the world is not what it seems. This 
language has the opportunity for self-awareness; and that opportunity is linked to the 
opportunity for perceiving the apocalyptic nature of things in general; for an undermining 
of the rhetoric of power, along with the unnecessary and illusory claim for linguistic or 
philosophic dominance. It follows that the Scots language is a more suitable creative 
means for communicating the apocalyptic (Christian) vision of reality in MacDonald’s 
time. And indeed this suspicion is upheld by the fact that he reserves those moments of 
especial wisdom or insight into ‘true’, poetic or religious meaning in his novels for the 
speakers of Scots; while footnotes, explanations and the mundane plot are supplied in 
English. If we were looking for an analogy, we might say that English relates to Scots in 
his novels, as scientific knowledge relates to gifted wisdom. We should note, however, 
that such an observation does not confer any special status upon the Scot, since it serves as 
an illustration of something which comes about through a free gift, rather than making the 
gift subject to the form, as though the Scot were intrinsically wise, simply because he were 
a Scot.
However, Stephen Prickett states that
allegory, myth and symbolism are not the media of a unified world picture, but 
rather technical literary devices for coming to terms with its essential 
incompleteness
This seems true to some extent, but it is also misleading, for it depends upon what idea of 
‘completion’ we start with. Firstly, the idea that symbolism is a technical literary device 
seems to fall somewhat short of MacDonald’s view of poetic language. For him, as we 
saw, even more than for Coleridge, a word is not an extra signifying device -  but a ‘thing’
159 This, of course, reminds us of N ietsche’s  chief complaint against Christianity, in that his 
main criticism of the concept of pow erlessness, w as that it w as dishonest, retaining power 
covertly through a continuing use of the concept of power. It is a  legitimate argum ent in 
theory, and one which MacDonald would accept with regard to the behaviour of most of the 
Christian ‘church’. It is only the ‘witnessing’ or enactm ent of the meaning of that 
pow erlessness, a  true and not a  ‘triumphant’ suffering, however, which allows one to perceive 
its honest nature, and one has to do one’s  utmost not to allow that fact in itself to create a 
‘powerful’ sen se  of the secret. One has to strive for exposure; for apocalypse in order to 
counter in practice Nietsche’s  argument; for it cannot be contradicted in a logical fashion; and 
this MacDonald w as aw are of. Derrida is therefore more perceptive (or possibly just has 
more faith) than Nietsche, in conceiving of the worth of the gift of death.
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amongst other things, having many facets apart from its relation to its face value. Its sense 
of incompletion originates in the lust after completion. It would be a poor poet indeed 
who was happy with the notion that language could complete a world quite clearly 
incomplete, even while it might seem by its nature to bring temporary relief160. This is 
why, like his predecessor, the poet Norman MacCaig longs for its ceasing, cherishes the 
gift of death -  even the death of language161:
...if these cold stones
Could be stones only...
...I be unbound
from all the choking folderols of choice.
.. .And all at last would be
Existence without category -  free
Further, on MacDonald’s view, words are fulfilled in the Word, as life is fulfilled in the 
divine Life, and should they be tempted toward any sense of self-sufficiency, they betray 
their own nature. Not only would they not be religious, they would not be poetry.
Secondly, to say that incompleteness is “essential” actually lessens the meaning and 
impact of what the critic notes is the “tensional language of metaphor”. Such tension is 
destroyed just as surely by the acceptance of incompletion as by the illusion of 
completion. It simply functions as a negative form of completion. We find once again 
that symbolic language belongs to a world unaware of dualisms. Rather, participation in 
the symbol involves the creation of meaning through hope. And Prickett does note that “a 
new sort of reality emerges” from this tension, although he does not suggest why this 
might be.
160 This is where MacDonald seem s a  little more sophisticated than Coleridge, who conceives 
of the imagination a s  “living pow er....a repetition.... of the eternal act of creation ...”, in itself a  
creative force, rather than a living faith. Conversely, while this seem s to grant more 
importance to the artist, it ultimately works against itself, perhaps not anticipating the way in 
which it encourages a  confrontation -  a  competition between notions of reality, rather than a 
sen se  of truth which is more true to its own ‘absolute’ nature. It is open to an ab u se  of being 
‘used ’ (which may be partly what Lilith is about), rather than conceiving of power a s  that which 
grasps us, and us alone, turning our own sen se  of power against us. For the self-aware
writer imagines against himself, dying a death in order to com m unicate imaginatively. It is the 
sam e as  the notion of apocalypse in conversion, which MacDonald describes a s  “...Christ’s 
giving testimony...in a  way which spoke to the inner longings of his children, so  that they 
would take a stand against themselves...and confidently cry out to the Spirit within...” (Sir 
Gibbie). Writers, for MacDonald, are not Christ, but they should sh are  his testimony in death 
(the death of the text a s  a ‘thing in itself) and, "take a stand against them selves...” 
from 'Double Life’, Collected Poems, p18.
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We might see why this is if we consider it by comparing metaphor and faith. In Hebrew, 
the root meaning of the words ‘faith’ and ‘hope’ is tautness or tension, something of which 
MacDonald will have been aware from his studies. The act of faith and the act of writing 
share a common element of tension. For MacDonald, symbolism neither proclaims the 
world complete nor essentially incomplete. The poetic and divine Word divides and
• •  1A9 •connects. It divides , not amongst but within, separating us from our preconceptions of 
wholeness. It connects us -  not to a theory -  but to an experience of wholeness (or peace) 
which comes to be able to accept its utter dependence of identity upon an ‘other’ in terms 
of trust163. For MacDonald, the poetic force of language resides in its demonstrating the 
truth of the fact that the divine kingdom exists here and now, and yet, paradoxically, 
remains covered, remains secret, in that poetry (or faith) cannot grasp or hold onto it in 
any firm sense, but can only uncover tantalising glimpses of what it can never prove -  that 
it is held by an ‘other’, and only in so doing does it retain its own identity as poetry.
Yet the poet is bound to seek to uncover what is covered and to attempt to destroy the 
power of the secret, just as faith is bound to testify to what it can never prove. As 
MacDonald says, the poet is a discoverer, and he describes death as “destroying revealer”, 
as we noted earlier. Poetic language is, essentially, apocalyptic in that it seeks to uncover 
and thus destroy the power of the secret, leaving only love (where God is love -  
MacDonald’s major premise). Because, however, such love remains inexhaustible (being 
reciprocal by nature), the notion of the secret remains; as does the necessity for poetry as 
testimony. On Derrida’s thinking, this makes poetry a deeply ‘responsible’ act.
It is noteworthy that the Scots medieval poets, although they seemed to concentrate more 
on form, than on expression; and while it would seem to follow -  upon modem definitions 
of poetry -  that they were less ‘original’ and should therefore be thought to be less 
challenging, by contrast, were deeply responsible -  and effective - in their challenge to 
notions of political, social, or religious ‘reality’, precisely because of such perception of 
their role as ‘uncoverers’ of truth.
162 Matthew 10:34 “Do not think that I cam e to bring p eace on earth. I did not com e to bring 
peace but a  sw ord...”
3 Romans 5:1 “Therefore, having been justified by faith, we have peace with God through 
our Lord Je su s  Christ."
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This brings us to MacDonald’s thinking upon the relationship between form and truth. 
The emergence of new poetic forms testifies to the existence of ‘live’ truth, while their 
translation into prose is a sign that the living truth has passed by and that the form it leaves 
behind is, already, becoming “mummified”, in MacDonald’s own words in his essay ‘On 
the Imagination’. The theologian or theoretician solidifies the poetic form, giving death to 
meaning by explaining it. Nevertheless this frees the divine identity or ‘live’ meaning 
from identity with the poetic form which it has originally informed and driven. In the 
same way, MacDonald sees the poetic impulse also shaping new forms from the truth it 
perceives inhabiting theoretical ‘facts’, in turn freeing that divine truth from the logical 
form of the theology which claimed to represent it. The language of the poet and of the 
theologian, therefore, complement one another in a strange kind of way, conspiring to 
uncover one another -  to give one another death by ensuring the temporality of the form -  
and so enable life to move on. The power which language retains where it resists 
temporality, therefore, is its own testimony to the ‘unfinished’ business of revelation. It 
follows that the need for language -  for the golden key - disappears once the rhetoric of 
power is spent and only love remains. And so we come back to St Paul, one of 
MacDonald’s favourite writers, who knew more about language than most164.
Importance of reciprocity in symbolic understanding
Mossy and Tangle’s journey tells us more about MacDonald’s attitude towards symbolic 
understanding. Throughout the story, critics have remarked on the progressive ‘baptisms’ 
of Mossy and Tangle, which would seem to support a Christian reading. As we noted, the 
idea of individually partaking substantially in something which in turn envelops us and 
confirms our oneness is highly evocative of the experience of the Eucharist or 
‘Communion’. We seem to consume -  to eat -  just as we seem to read and digest; but in 
so doing become part of that bread or body, just as in MacDonald’s stories we become part 
of the writing, in the very moment that we seek to judge (so a curse becomes a blessing; a 
punishment a gift). To take part in language is to be baptised; just as one is baptised into 
Christ’s death. However, while the many names of Christ confirm the many-sided nature 
of identity -  symbolic names and universals; word, water, light - they are yet also proper 
names, which seem to affirm some sense of a unity of identity which is not quite the same
164 1 Corinthians 13:8: Love never fails. But whether there are  prophecies, they will fail;
w hether there are tongues, they will cease; whether there is knowledge, it will vanish
away... when that which is perfect has come, then that which is in part will vanish away”
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as Pantheism. And Jeshua is both a proper name and also means in Hebrew “everything”.
Since, for MacDonald, we are thoughts of God, it is only as we allow the reality of this
divine thinking that we may begin to see where MacDonald is leading us; how it is that we
can re-imagine the rose only inasmuch as we are willing to partake of a shared reality with
the rose; allowing ourselves to be re-made through the communion. This does not
dematerialise the rose or make of it a vehicle for our own spiritual experiences. We
encounter, rather, to the exact degree that we are encountered by. There is reciprocity -
therefore giftedness - implied in the very act of perception. We pierce or perceive reality,
inasmuch as we are ourselves pierced or perceived by it. We see this thought working
itself out all the time in MacDonald’s writing. Here, for example (Lilith, p41):
“Where are the sunrays gone?” I cried “that I cannot tell”, returned Mr Raven, 
“back, perhaps to where they came from first. They now belong, I fancy, to a sense 
not yet developed in us.” He then talked of the relations o f mind to matter, and of 
sense to qualities, in a way I could only a little understand, whence he went on to yet 
stranger things...He spoke much about dimensions...some of which...as yet we 
knew absolutely nothing...
Here is the idea that perception and reality are created within one another; for one another, 
rather than the one being passive and the other acted upon. There is also the notion here of 
realities only partly perceived in relation to the development of the perceiver. We can see 
how well this connects MacDonald’s portrayal of the partially revealed nature of ethics 
(considered earlier) to his view of symbolism, in that both involve the necessity for an 
apocalyptic understanding which is characterised by trust, out of which the imagination 
finds its freedom and scope. The tension characterising both ‘living’ ethics and ‘living’ 
symbolism, characterises also the reciprocal nature of ‘live’ understanding or imagination 
(just as the prayer has the capacity to be seen as a ‘live thing’ according to the Raven in 
Lilith). The deadness or liveliness of things perceived is to do with senses “not yet 
developed”; namely trust and imagination. There is, therefore, a reciprocal, creative 
connection between what is, and what is perceived to be.
The connection between appearance and reality in apocalyptic symbolism
The rainbow in the story of ‘The Golden Key’ seems at first to exist as a kind of lure
towards the encounter with revelation, for which our senses are not yet developed (The
Complete Fairy Tales, p i22):
He drew nearer to the rainbow. It vanished. He started back.. .it was there again, as 
beautiful as ever.
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It seems that there is a so-called ‘other’ world which is immaterial, as Prickett says. But 
there is a reversal of this method of understanding reality involved in the story. The 
rainbow, of course, can be seen as referring to the Biblical promise of God, in the story of 
Noah’s flood in Genesis, a sign of a covenant with the earth, which signifies an interim 
period of waiting -  for the promise to materialise165. Just as the presence of the Raven -  
sent out from the ark before the waters have receded - in Lilith communicates to us the 
sense of a deferment before the promise166. However, in this story, the rainbow does not 
just function as the promise of an ‘other’ reality which comes at us externally; but as a 
symbol of our own deeper and unknown natures. In this dual role is implied the promise 
of a connection to an understanding of the relationship between ‘inner’ and ‘outer’ states 
of being which will translate materiality -  and also translate the nature of words or 
narratives themselves. For eventually this rainbow will become so solid that human 
beings will be able to use it as a staircase. The sense of solidity is emphasised by appeal 
to the senses of sight, sound and touch at the end of the story (The Complete Fairy Tales, 
pi 44):
.. .the same new colour that he had seen in the rainbow when he saw it first.. .on it he 
saw a sparkle of blue. It was the sapphires round the keyhole. He took his key. It 
turned in the lock to the sounds of Aeolian music. A door opened upon slow hinges, 
and disclosed a winding stair within.. .the key vanished from his fingers.
The sapphire, in Castle Warlock (p541) also functions as the symbol of “the unfathomable 
truth”. Here, it is clear that it is the key -  the signifying aspect of symbolism and of the 
rainbow and the surface logic of the narrative - which disappears while what is left -  the 
interpretation, the rainbow, the narrative -  has a solid aspect inasmuch as it can be 
absorbed into this more solid reality, a tangible truth. MacDonald will not make of the 
rainbow a ‘vehicle’ any more than he will render the rose or the text a ‘vehicle’ in his 
concept of symbolic understanding.
165 Genesis 9:14,15: “It shall be, when I bring a  cloud over the earth, that the rainbow shall be 
seen  in the cloud; and I will rem em ber My covenant...! will look on it to rem em ber the 
everlasting covenant between God and every living creature of all flesh that is on the earth .”
It can be noted here, how it is that the rainbow is a  sign for God to remem ber, indicating that, 
just a s  MacDonald feels that it is God who dwells in the imagination; it is also a  sign of the 
‘seeing’ of the divine within us that enab les us to recognise the rainbow for what it is -  the 
gifted nature of its substance. This is significant to bear in mind, when we com e to consider 
the rainbow, in perceiving the relationship between MacDonald’s  imaginative theology and 
G oethe’s  colour theory.
166 Genesis 8:7: “then he sen t out a raven, which kept going to and fro until the w aters had 
dried up from the earth.”
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Interestingly, we find that in the apocalyptic literature of John’s Revelation, there is also, 
despite its introduction as a vision, an emphasis upon solidity; vivid descriptions of stones, 
gems and buildings, which occurs in MacDonald’s writings, and which often seems to 
deliberately contrast with, and to defy, those passages of misty confusion which 
characterise the protagonist’s (and the reader’s) attempts to impose order upon what is 
dimly apprehended. This is a method also used in the telling of traditional folktales. As 
well as this, the apocalyptic literature emphasises the seeing, the involvement of the
1A 7perception of the re-teller of the vision. This, too, is a phenomenon common both to 
many of MacDonald’s novels, in which comments are inserted, which make clear the 
involvement of the author in the progress of the narrative; and which is common, too, to 
the teller of the traditional tales of MacDonald’s childhood. MacDonald is perhaps aware 
of the importance of the aspect of testimony which is involved in the way in which a 
narrative is introduced into the minds of the reader or listener in order to emphasise the 
teller’s identity in relation to the narrative. The teller is one who emphasises their 
humanity in merely passing on the gift, but who in such an emphasis upon their humanity; 
personal relationship with the listener, can draw the listener into the sense of a larger 
community of the ‘story’, granting to the story a solidity -  its occurrence in history as an 
ongoing happening.
We have already considered how testimony is introduced into MacDonald’s theology as a 
somewhat different concept to proof. This personalising of the narrative links also to 
what we noted about his attitude towards ethical judgments in the first section, where he 
seeks to make the reader aware of their own humanity in relation to its expression in the 
implications of interpretation, by means of introducing the question of authorship. 
Perhaps it is significant that this method is found both in the Biblical and apocalyptic 
literature -  the literature of MacDonald’s fathers; and also in the folktale -  the narrative of 
his grandmothers. And here, we reach a point at which his narrative style, the nature of 
apocalyptic perception and the growth of a new kind of theological thinking coincide; to 
explain how he may be seeking to reintroduce into Christian theology an awareness of 
how its own traditions have in the past functioned. This he seems to do by way of 
introducing a vast array of significant female characters.
167 For example, Revelation 1:9: “I, John ...heard  (12) Then I turned to see ....e tc .
119
Male and female as symbols in apocalyptic perception; a new relationship between 
appearance and reality
So this quality of fixing upon objects and of emphasising -  as a kind of testimony -  the 
source of the tale, as though its retelling is a vital aspect of its substance, is shared in 
common between apocalyptic literature, MacDonald’s work, and folktales. And what we 
have in ‘The Golden Key’ is a textual representation of a folktale which has been passed 
down through generations168. This tendency to fix upon physical objects perhaps exists in 
folk literature to compensate for the lack of a physical text.
Here, MacDonald seems to be altering the balance in this way within the literary tradition. 
The male and female aspects of representation in the story co-exist in a way which makes 
of words both less and more than they seem to be. The text seems insubstantial (like the 
rainbow) in that it is picturing, rather than describing what is seen (and we should 
remember that he describes the words of the biblical (Pauline) text as a rainbow). And yet 
it is substantial (also like the rainbow) in that the words so used seem to take part in what 
they are picturing; just as the key disappears into the lock. Somehow, had the key (the 
male text) remained all-important, it would have denied that which it purported to unlock. 
It would have resisted an absorption into the truth by seeking to master it. In doing so it 
also would have denied its own solidarity with the female and folkloric, as that which is 
also addressed by the greater reality which it seeks. Further -  and most importantly of all 
- it would have taken away the ground of its very existence; its genesis in materiality 
which originally emerges from the story told by Mossy’s great aunt, a story which 
precedes and informs the text.
Somehow, this notion of a man wandering around with a meaningless key reminds us of 
MacDonald’s picture of philosophy without religion; theology without imagination; of the 
circular wanderings of Vane as he attempts to navigate in a solid world by means of one-
168 eg “There w as a boy who used to sit in the twilight and listen to his great aunt’s  stories” 
However, we note that this is not an exclusively female happening, for the involvement of the 
male is a t the point at which the “key” is found (which is merely a  part of the greater story, 
although it seem s at first to be its point): “Yes. Your father, I believe, found it.” This might be 
a good point at which to note that Jam es  Hogg, who has been previously alluded to in his 
similar portrayal of the evil of distorted theology, is often noted for his double inheritance: a 
mother who told him endless folktales; a  father whose preaching w as strictly within the realm 
of the proscribed Calvinist view of the Biblical literature.
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dimensional thinking. Critics have already noted MacDonald’s deliberate use of the 
female folkloric tradition in order to make this point169.
Now we could infer -  as Wolff in particular has -  that there is a Freudian element to this
male/female symbolism. This may be true, but there is much more to find, when we
examine how this merging of female and male tradition affects the very notion of
textuality and of the substance of things and words themselves, rather than their mere
fulfilment in any sense of the one-dimensional desire of Tack’. This is why we are first
examine this mixing and reinterpreting of gender in relation to the writing itself, as it
affects the very perception of what a story is. In the type of literature we are dealing with
there is a sense of the vanishing of the writing in the act of writing, through the
anticipation of fulfilment in the rich and multi-sensory nature of ‘things’. Just as the
notion of prayer is linked to the solidity and ‘live’ meaning of the pigeon in Lilith. We
find this in Dunbar, much earlier, especially thinking of The Goldyn Targe, a work which,
incidentally, also intensely merges the waking and dreaming world, just as does Lilith.
And perhaps such a quality of words being both transparent and solid at the same time is
to do with an awareness of the way in which words themselves, when most anticipating
the fulfilment of symbolic understanding, are more easily absorbed into a dimension of
interpretation which is not a question so much of ‘making sense’ -  a reductive logic -  of
what is seen; does not draw attention to the appearance of words, but relates more directly
to the method of understanding by apprehension, rather than comprehension; a poetic
intuition or ‘reading’ which involves all of the senses. This is, of necessity, vague, but it is
upheld by MacDonald’s description of the nature of poetic discovery:
“But the facts of Nature are to be discovered only by observation and experiment.” 
True. But how does the man of science come to think of his experiments? Does 
observation reach to the non-present, the possible, the yet unconceived? Even if it 
showed you the experiments which ought to be made, will observation reveal to you 
the experiments which might be made?. “He hath set the world in man’s heart,” not
169 And it has been present consciously in his writing for a  long time, for example, in 
Phantastes (p5): “But you are not my grandmother," said I. “How do you know that?” she 
retorted. “I dare say you know something of your great-grandfathers a  good deal further back 
than that; but you know very little about your great-grandm others on either side...", or p61, 
"..Now you would hardly credit it, but my wife believes every fairytale that ever w as written. I 
cannot account for it...” “But should not that m ake you treat her belief with something of 
re sp ec t...?” Interestingly, this man himself is part of a  fairytale -  or possibly even a figment of 
Anodos’ imagination, of which narrative reality he is blissfully and ironically unaware; just a s  
Vane inhabits a  world which he cannot m ake sen se  of, and which may also be the dream  of 
another.
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in his understanding....the imagination often gets a glimpse of the law itself long 
before it is or can be ascertained to be a law.170
So the imagination informs the intellect; as the story informs the search; as the female 
grounds the male. Such analogies are, however, misleading; relying as they do upon a 
‘systematic’ method of understanding, which in turn can think only in oppositional terms. 
This is not an interpretation, but a reduction -  even a distortion of the way in which 
MacDonald interprets gender, language and understanding. We need to touch the essence 
of meaning, if we are ever to appreciate the character of substance and identity itself, as 
MacDonald communicates it to us. This possibility we seem to lose when we only treat 
literature and language as self-referential, in terms of what it ‘seems’ or appears to be from 
observing it, as opposed to first paying attention to the direction in which poetic language 
tends to go. Just as the attention of the listeners to a fairytale is preoccupied with the 
deeply personal vision communicated through the storyteller; and through their relation to 
the storyteller, rather than by any straightforward referential logic of the words upon the
171page . It is through this process of ‘seeing’ that the words themselves gain an excess of 
meaning. It is also notably in that ‘twilight’ poetic world of Mossy that things such as 
rainbows are perceived which may not otherwise be seen.
Words themselves, then, seem to have a quality which belongs to rainbows and keys in 
this story, communicating paradoxically, by the nature of their transparency, a hope of 
future solidity; a declaration of present solidity. This can be connected to the way in 
which the idea of the testimony works, for in making apparent the humanity; the fallibility 
of the teller of tales, the listener is freed to put the issue down to a question of trust; to 
‘enter’ the story on a personal level; to look within the story, where it comes to reside in 
the imagination, rather than at the story as it appears, for its proof. This cannot be 
categorised only as a concept or as an idea about language, but is rather a belief about the 
true nature of things -  language being amongst those ‘things’. The concentration of 
attention upon recognising the hidden nature of ‘appearances’ which accompanies the
170 ‘On the Imagination...’, A Dish ofOrts, p12, p13. Later we will s e e  how this “might” relates 
MacDonald thinking upon the nature of imaginative discovery to his treatm ent of the theology 
of Biblical literature, when we consider its relation to the eschatology of Jurgen Moltmann, in 
the third section.
171 In the sam e way that MacDonald tells us that we m ust turns our backs upon the rainbow of 
Paul’s  words -  to hear them, while the eyes of our imagination and faith remain se t upon 
Paul’s  own focus, not upon the words them selves, a s  though they w ere inherently ‘magical’.
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sight of fairyland makes this look like a promising direction to think in. For the narrator 
notes that (pi20, The Complete Fairy Tales):
..in Fairyland, while some of the things that here cannot stand still for a moment,
will not move there.
The restlessness of rainbows and words itself witnesses that they do, indeed, belong to a 
larger notion of reality than that which would attempt to assign them a particular ‘place’. 
The one state of reality (the key) links what seems to be real and fully seen and what 
appears in a partial sense, to what cannot be perceived fully. The end of that reality, the 
absorption of the key, finds a connection within the reader’s mind with what is utterly real 
because it is meaningful. Yet also a poetic sense of what is as yet, not perfectly capable of 
expression. In turn that mystery that accompanies meaning turns again to the notion of 
key to try to discover anew what it has dimly begun to apprehend. The movement is not 
quite circular, because there is a movement into meaning (though meaning can never be 
accumulated). The movement and life of the story seems to take place in the tension 
between meaning and mystery; understanding and intuition. It seems sometimes that the 
latter is represented by women characters, the former by men. Now this linking of the 
female with the intuitive and the male with the logical and then mixing them together to 
provide, as it were, a third perspective, as we have said, is an obvious one, and were it all 
that MacDonald is doing then it would not be very interesting.
However, MacDonald has particular theological themes and aims in mind, and it is not so 
much that he simply is encouraging a dialectic to emerge between male and female ways 
of understanding, although he is doing that. He is also altering the very interpretation of 
sexuality by means of the way in which he constructs that dialectic; reinforming the 
material world with a poetic and theological basis for its substantiality. Lilith is not 
merely Vane’s ‘other’, complementary, intuitive self, she is also interpretable as a part of 
himself, as he exists as a man. Tangle herself experiences a rebirth by means of a male 
child, which is more than a simple sign of baptism, occupying as it does the centre of the 
story, by virtue both of its physical place and the hypnotic intensity of description. We 
shall come back to this issue of gender and sexuality shortly, in relation to Graham Ward 
and Goethe’s colour theory.
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Reinterpretation of reality
In the meantime, if MacDonald’s stories provided us with mere conceptual access to 
another ‘dimension’, we would not move at all. However, they involve us in an intricate 
attempt to define what we mean by what we say -  even by who we are - in new terms of 
gender, and of age, which requires a thoroughly rigorous and alien logic. That logic is 
apocalyptic. The stories return us to ourselves in an altered state of understanding of what 
it is that constitutes reality, and of what we are doing when we use language. Metaphoric 
or symbolic understanding does not allow the logic of parallels to dictate, but involves a 
movement deeper into the notion of reality, which yet does not allow us to exit the 
experience of apparent reality, and so it creates tension. MacDonald’s stories, for all of 
their fantastic imagery and detail, never function as escapist literature precisely because of 
their understanding of the tension of meaning. It is the fundamental difference between 
the utopian and the apocalyptic vision. And this may be what causes such resentment and 
disappointment in readers who generally accuse him of didacticism, because he does not 
allow that entry into another world constitutes an escape from this one, but a 
reinterpretation of it. Mossy and Tangle really do grow old, unlike Peter Pan. (The 
Complete Fairy Tales, p i33):
How long they were in crossing this plain I cannot tell; but before night Mossy’s
hair was streaked with grey, and Tangle had got wrinkles on her forehead
Here, MacDonald, by condensing time, pictures what he describes in Robert Falconer, in 
relation to the development of the church, in which he comments that time is as cheap as
1 n*y
space and matter , while nevertheless not attempting to transcend time through such a 
belief. To him, the reinterpretation of time from a different perspective is a vital aspect of 
his theological imagination; and so it is commonly played with in the fiction through 
which he communicates his thoughts. As with gender, it is the nature of old age which is 
reinterpreted in the sense that it is transfigured, rather than the issue of old age becoming a 
thing from which to escape through interpretation. Interpretation in the fullest sense of 
MacDonald’s meaning is not a vehicle for wish-fulfilment, but a singular, apocalyptic 
‘happening’ which transforms the reader’s preconceptions. He does the same thing with 
time that he does with Calvinism -  not a rushing from or reaction to; but a reinterpretation.
172S ee  note 108. He may find the inspiration for this in 2 Peter 3:8: “But, beloved, do not 
forget this one thing, that with the Lord one day is a s  a thousand years, and a  thousand years 
a s  one day.”
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This is more demanding for the reader173. As we stated earlier, when MacDonald speaks 
of sleeping it is not, for him, a euphemism. And we note in addition that the characters of 
the story themselves demonstrate this reinterpretation of the factual (pl41, The Complete 
Fairy Tales):
“Will you tell me where to find the Old Man of the sea?” “I am the Old Man of the 
Sea,” the figure answered. “I see a strong kingly man of middle age,” returned 
Mossy. Then the Old Man looked at him more intently, and said -  “Your sight, 
young man, is better than that of most who take this way...”
And while Mossy will reach his ‘goal’ more quickly this way (having the key), it is the 
female, folkloric, apocalyptic Tangle, who will meet with the oldest man of all, a man who 
in reality is no more than a child. Here, too, there are similarities to ‘The Giant’s Heart’, 
in which we noted that the Lark seems to feel that understanding is a goal which involves 
him in some race against the clock; his competitive ‘form’ betrays his lack of knowledge 
of the nature of that which he seeks. MacDonald’s generosity, however, allows him to see 
Tangle, to see the Lark attain their goal, for the knowledge of God is, after all, gifted, and 
not merited. Were this not to be, MacDonald would simply fall into the dualistic trap 
(male vs female; rational vs intuitive etc...). He simply shows that there is gifted to us 
the ability to see other, more beautiful, more satisfying, richer and deeper aspects of the 
truth of things; such ‘meaning’ being its own reward. We should also note that Mossy’s 
particular mode of perception does not take him as ‘deep’ as Tangle’s, in the same way 
that Vane’s slow perception of Lilith’s identity -  and of his own nature - is constantly 
changing as his ‘sight’ fluctuates.
What we see emerging, then, is the apocalyptic tendency of the story, which Richard Hays 
notes in relation to ethics (see p84), to overturn preconceived notions of what “is”. Here, 
what “is” and is accepted as such is challenged in relation to time. Further, and very 
importantly the rainbow, as a chief symbol of the presence of another reality, functions in 
his literature in exactly the way that the divine biblical promise (of which the rainbow is 
the main motif) functions in relation to the interpretation of eschatology (the end of times
173 It seem s that MacDonald’s  view of interpretation corresponds to Bonhoeffer’s  notion of 
responsibility in relation to reality (Ethics, p198): “The true meaning of correspondence with 
reality lies neither in this servility towards the factual nor yet in a  principle of opposition to the 
factual, a  principle of revolt against the factual in the nam e of som e higher reality. Both 
extrem es alike are very far removed from the e sse n ce  of the matter. In action which is 
genuinely in accordance with reality there is an indissoluble link between the acknowledgm ent 
and the contradiction of the factual.”
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or time), in the sense that it is perceived in such a way that the “seemingness” of the world 
is reinterpreted by faith in such a promise.
The shadow, the staircase, the forest and the golden thread have all been mentioned at the 
beginning of this section as significant symbols in forming an idea of MacDonald’s 
thinking. The shadow has been briefly considered earlier in relation to the emergence of 
the self in Lilith, as has the mirror. The Golden thread is another symbol which appears in 
one of MacDonald’s best fairytales, The Princess and the Goblin. It leads to a room at the 
top of a secret staircase in which a beautiful and ancient woman sits spinning. In thinking 
of the thread, and of the significance of female characters in his work, we should note how 
in Blake’s poetry, the golden thread leads ultimately to the New Jerusalem, the Holy City 
of the New Testament, where Christ will receive his bride, the church. The thread itself 
joins, as it were, the apocalyptic vision of the Bible to the presence of significant female 
‘others’ in MacDonald’s work, and also further supports the idea that Lilith is some form 
of presentation of the church embodied as female, and is also, in turn a female aspect 
which informs Vane’s own male identity, and has relevance to the way in which 
MacDonald allows that a perception of the nature of the body of Christ may itself inform 
the issue of sexuality in identity, just as symbolic perception overflows predetermined 
limits.
We find, also, in the story of The Princess and Cur die, that the issue of the Holy City of 
apocalyptic literature involves the issue of perception, as one boy can see the thread which 
leads to the city while another cannot, and even within individuals like Vane, sight 
fluctuates. This movement towards the issue of the metaphor of ‘sight’ bring us to 
consider how MacDonald may be making use of Goethe’s colour theory to communicate 
his sense of the apocalyptic way in which symbolism functions, as it does in the 
interpretation of Christ-ian identity.
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B. ‘The Golden Key’ and Goethe’s Colour Theory
In this section we shall try to understand the manner in which MacDonald links together 
the observations of Goethe with his own imaginative exploration of the development of 
Christian identity. Towards the end of the section we will come to analyse ‘The Golden 
Key’ in specific relation to Goethe’s theory of colour.
The Context
First of all we should consider a poem  by Goethe, quoted in MacDonald’s  essay  ‘Browning’s
“Christmas Eve’” (in A Dish of Orts):
Poems are painted window panes
If one looks from the square into the church,
Dusk and dimness are his gains -  
Sir Philistine is left in the lurch!
The sight, so seen, may well enrage him,
Nor anything henceforth assuage him.
But come just inside what conceals;
Cross the holy threshold quite -  
All at once ‘tis rainbow-bright,
Device and story flash to light,
A gracious splendour truth reveals.
This to God’s children is full measure,
It edifies and gives you pleasure!
Then we should consider, with this in mind, a quotation from Goethe, entitled ‘The
Allegorical, Symbolical and Mystical use of colour’ (quoted pp205-6, Goethe’s Theory o f
colour applied by Maria Schindler):
And finally one can well imagine that colour has a mystical significance. For, as 
any diagram that shows the many colours is suggestive of primeval conditions which 
belong equally to man’s perceptions as to Nature, so there can be no doubt that they 
are able to serve us as a language in which to express those primeval things, which 
in themselves are not able to affect the senses powerfully, nor are they so easily 
accessible to them.
In speaking of the above poem in his essay MacDonald clearly shows that he is aware of
Goethe’s attitude to perception in relation to nature and interprets it through his own
emphasis upon the ‘inner’ and ‘outer’ aspects of beauty and truth. He notes that:
...of all the arts it is most applicable to poetry...the others have more that is 
beautiful on the outside....poetry, except its rhythmic melody, and its scattered 
gleams of material imagery... has no attraction on the outside to entice the passer by 




parabolic description; or even to discover a loop-hole, through which...the glories of 
its stained windows are visible; it is well that he should seek to make others 
partakers...174
Now, because in the essay, MacDonald makes clear that he believes that the true - the 
divine truth - is revealed through the beautiful, we can see how he is using colour in ‘The 
Golden Key’ in order to reveal something about its own inner nature; he entices or tricks 
the reader inside of the meaning of the story, where he trusts that the rainbow without, 
those “scattered gleams of material”, will find their correspondence with a rainbow within. 
In this story, as in Goethe’s poem, it seems that its ‘heart’ is our interpretation from 
within, an illustration of ‘innemess’ which is illustrated in that part in which Tangle falls 
down and down -  to the very middle of the earth or the story. The story itself then seems 
to function as an exterior symbol of the way in which beauty and truth are perceived in 
literature. The central point is that beauty is not always apparent from the ‘outside’. The 
story also has clear Christian connotations, which in turn inform and link with his 
observations about poetic perception. It can function doubly as a portrayal of the way in 
which beauty and truth connect in the person of Christ, but only when he is seen ‘from 
within’. The way in which one views the ‘old men’ of the story, like poetry, is a matter of 
perception, and the oldest man of all may be seen to function as a picture of Christ, of 
whom, it is said in the tradition of Christianity
He has no form or comeliness; And when we see Him, There is no beauty that we1 7^should desire Him.
The first thing to concentrate on, then, in observing how the colour theory is applied, is to 
note how Goethe’s comment about the way in which colour relates to the ‘inward’ sense 
of beauty is being applied in MacDonald’s vision of Christian identity, in terms of his 
treatment of ‘sight’ or perception as interpretation of identity.
Eyes and sight - the theological background to MacDonald’s use of Goethe’s colour 
theory
Eyes are a significant part of MacDonald’s treatment of the theme of perception in Lilith. 
Earlier, we noted passages in which the eyes of Eve, Lilith and Mara seem to contain 
worlds, when Vane looks into them. We also noted the reciprocity implied in ‘seeing’ by 
the fact that there is usually an ‘other’ person involved in the act. Behind all of these
'Browning’s  "Christmas Eve’” A Dish ofOrts, p196 
Isaiah 53:2
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‘worlds’ of sight, however, is a particular notion of perception in the fact that Vane conies 
to ‘see’ not exactly what Eve, Lilith or Mara are seeing, by studying their eyes, but to 
understand that there is a reciprocal action in ‘seeing’. Sight itself is dynamically linked 
to that which is seen. We also considered earlier in the section how this links to the 
frequent allusions to sight in the New Testament. It is not that there is a right or a wrong 
sight; but that the senses themselves are changed -  in that those who are blind can see, 
while those who think they see are described as blind. Faith is described as sight, in that it 
is a God-informed seeing; one which transforms the reality of what is seen, challenges 
what is thought to be understood. And so Vane finds his powers of language and logic 
failing dramatically as he stands upon the threshold of this new kind of vision, in which 
the Christ-self can begin to see.
Especially important, when we are considering this, then, is to take seriously MacDonald’s 
thought that God is thinking us when we are thinking in a certain way; and to that it relates 
to the notion that God is seeing us, when we are seeing in this way. We have considered 
how the symbol of the rainbow is especially important to MacDonald’s communication; 
and that the rainbow is, in the Biblical literature, that which is seen by God, as opposed to 
the common misreading, that it is seen by us as a sign o f  God. The significance of this 
cannot be overestimated. Faith and sight are not attributes of the faithful, who grasp the 
symbol as a divine sign; but attributes of God, which operate through the human being, 
who in being baptised, as it were, by the imagination, dies a death to the mundane sight, 
and takes part in a community which sees divinely. In this, faith and imagination are the 
means by which we are able to take part in a literally new creation; one which 
substantially connects to its creator.
MacDonald’s great emphasis on the humanity of Christ, as extending to all creation by 
the transformating of what it means to be human can be seen to be the source of his feeling 
that there is a light -  a rainbow -  within, which enables this seeing. This is important, for 
otherwise it would render his presentation of this truth to be that some alien force has 
taken over the seeing or thinking of the individual -  an alien, transcendent God, acting 
through us, as though we were puppets. This, indeed, is what leads to accusations that free 
will is entirely done away with in MacDonald’s notion of perception. However, far from 
this, his insistence upon the notion that Christ is fully divine, yet entirely and utterly 
human in every natural sense, means that the very essence of authentic humanity depends
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to some extent or another upon this ‘gifted’ capacity; gifted through the transformation of 
human ‘being’ in Christ. And here he remains true to his Bible, for there is great emphasis 
placed on the notion by Paul in the epistles that humanity is remade from the blueprint of 
Christ; and that this new notion of human ‘being’ is recognised through the faith or sight 
o f Christ. So faith or imaginative sight is essentially a gifted, yet also the most truly 
human means of interpreting the nature of the reality with which it is confronted. This 
brings us a sight of the rainbow ‘within’, so that we are no longer merely told about it by 
God, in terms of a story ‘about’, but are enabled to ‘see’ its nature for ourselves by inner 
interpretation. This brings with it the implication that concepts of authority and obedience 
must now be of a different order .
The rainbow seems to divide and to connect between light and darkness, and yet presents 
us with reality in terms of a spectrum. That which is perceived as God’s sight now exists 
also as that capacity for faith or sight within all human beings which is gifted. There now 
corresponds to the rainbow without (the ‘old’ covenant) a rainbow within (the ‘new’ 
covenant). This does not separate the two but rather reconnects the outer and inner aspects 
of divine grace. We shall examine later how it was that much atonement theology of 
MacDonald’s time tended to present the work of Christ as a work ‘without’, for God’s 
benefit, as the Old Testament rainbow was often mistakenly seen to be, rather than as a 
work ‘within’ which can transform the nature of being human. Indeed, in ‘The Light 
Princess’, MacDonald seems to be making just this point about atonement -  it being the 
central theme of the story. The lake functions in the story as the ‘outer’ aspect of 
atonement or the ‘outer’ relationship with God, which is often perceived as an objective 
event in reality which must be ‘appropriated’, as opposed to being that which is to do with 
an inward and universally gifted transformation. The tears of the princess are significant 
of a transformation of the ‘inner’ nature of the person, which substantially links us with 
God and with our truly gifted natures, in the body of Christ and which is seen to be at the 
heart of the rainbow:
And a rain came on, such as had never been seen in that country.. .the palace was in
the heart of a rainbow...the lake would have overflowed...it was full from shore to
176 In ethical terms, it corresponds with the promise m ade in Jeremiah 31:33: “But this is the 
covenant that I will m ake with the house of Israel after those days, says the Lord: I will put My 
law in their minds, and write it on their hearts; and I will be their God, and they shall be My 
people. No more shall every man teach his neighbour, and every man his brother, saying, 
‘Know the Lord’ for they all shall know M e...”
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shore. But the princess did not heed the lake. She lay on the floor and wept. And 
this rain within doors was far more wonderful than the rain out of doors.177
MacDonald goes on, in ‘The Golden Key’ to apply Goethe’s notion of an ‘inner’ sense of
beauty and colour as being related to the discovery of the true aspect and means of
perceiving this universal and general gift of rain, or of colours in general. For in this
instance, the sight which belongs to God -  which finds the sight of his son beautiful -
becomes the sight of every one who chooses to see in this way through faith. We find that
his writing is so constructed that such sight is anticipated in the reader. We are attracted to
the threshold through ‘gleams’, through curiosity, through a drawing of the reader into the
‘secret’ world of Scots (who, as we saw, function in his novels as a form of
communication of this apocalyptic truth). His presentation of the inner beauty found and
yet denied in Calvinism in the person of Falconer’s grandmother is very like this. Indeed,
we often find such personification of a theme in his work, since it is in relation to the new
nature of being human - the open secret - that such an ‘inner’ sight of things occurs178:
Few English readers will like Mrs Falconer; but her grandchild considered her one 
of the noblest women ever God made; and I from his account, am of the same mind.
Perception and Calvinism
Further, such an inward sense is not presented as a subjective, individual creation of the
human mind alone -  it is not another ‘appropriation’, which causes the disconnection of
subject and object. MacDonald’s theology connects with Goethe’s theory about the
connection between colours and the ‘inward’ effect of them. In the same novel,
MacDonald also says that:
There must be truth in the scent of that pine wood; some one must mean it. There must 
be a glory in those heavens that depends not upon our imagination; some power greater 
than they must dwell in them. Some spirit must move in that wind that haunts us with a
• 170kind of human sorrow.. .it must be something human, else not to us divine.
And there is a most important link between the reader’s discernment of beauty and the 
recognition of the nature of Christian identity as both fully divine and fully human in ‘The 
Golden Key’. In Robert Falconer we find that (of the grandmother) it is said that: “There
177 T h e  Light Princess’, The Complete Fairy Tales, p51
178 In this novel there is also a  key to a  secret door, which Falconer finds a s  a  child, which 
significantly and secretly connects the house of his grandm other (Calvinism) to the house 
where resides beauty (Mary S t John’s  hom e -  and her piano).
179 Robert Falconer, p123
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was no smile in her religion.” While in ‘The Golden Key’, Tangle is brought face to face 
with a child:
.. .the child.. .had no smile, but the love in his large grey eyes was deep as the centre.
But the smile never came, and the moonlight lay there unbroken. For the heart of
the child was too deep for any smile to reach from it to his face.180
This child is, incidentally, “the oldest man of all”. The links between them remain 
optional (as MacDonald insisted should be the case) but we can see how we are being 
offered in the novel an internal access to the nature of Calvinism, should we choose to 
read it. A view of Calvinism which relates its worst excesses to its lack of symbolic 
expression. This is the case with Falconer’s grandmother who, to the shallower members 
of the community, appears stem, generally unattractive and unfashionable; while to those 
more discerning, she is tmsted, respected -  and loved. In the novel it is the grandmother 
herself who suffers most through her fearful theology, because her perception of Christ 
conflicts with her Calvinist conception of God.
We see that Calvinism -  at least its development in Scotland -  is itself a victim to this lack 
of expression or symbolism; existing in the form of a love which has not enough faith or 
imagination to move towards its desire; which bums within itself (like hell); unable to 
communicate that which it experiences. It professes belief in the new, ‘inner’ covenant, 
while yet looking all around for the ‘signs’ of redemption in the manner of the old 
‘external’ covenant. This creates a gap, space or painful depth which the reader him or 
herself is required to fill; recreating the imaginative reciprocity of desire, by drawing him 
or herself upon the ‘inner’ sense of beauty. So MacDonald allows the reader space to 
come out towards the character of Falconer’s grandmother and in so doing enacts the 
movement required of the ‘new’ covenant, finding within the knowledge of Christ which 
is despaired of, when one looks merely for outward signs of beauty to be presented 
directly in the text or narrative of Calvinism.
And in ‘The Golden Key’, MacDonald further allows, in the absence of the outer beauty or 
smile of the child, for the imagination of the reader to contribute to the rescuing of this 
theology from its hell of misconception, and to recognise the ‘inner’ nature of beauty as 
we discern it in the poem or in the act of interpretation itself. In the story, we are granted
180 The Complete Fairy Tales, p140
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an ‘inner’ vision -  that of the Christ-child who suffers at the centre of the world; and in 
‘seeing’ that he is at the heart of it, we are able to discern the presence of beauty by 
perceiving the presence of an unseen smile which, if it were to appear to our ‘outward’ 
eyes “would cause the beholder to weep himself to death”181. We are able to perceive the 
true nature of Calvinism, of which many of its followers are unaware. It is the same 
method of ‘inner’ interpretation of beauty which informs both religious identity and an 
understanding of the beauty of ‘The Golden Key’ -  the story itself. Perception and 
interpretation are solidly linked in the idea that the inner ‘vision’ of a thing is one with its 
interpretation, its identity. Indeed, MacDonald states that “To know a thing; to love it, to
1 ROunderstand it, are all one....”
Perception and Interpretation
To provide an historical context for this method of interpretation, we should consider that 
MacDonald might offer an interesting comparison to the Romantic theologian, 
Schleiermacher, who considered style to be the “inner” form of a work, and also 
considered the symbolic nature of art as giving rise to an infinite number of 
interpretations. The “inner” form of the grandmother or of Calvinism is left to us. 
MacDonald makes it clear that he is not going to ‘sell’ this interpretation of Falconer’s 
grandmother. He confesses that he does not expect the reader to like her -  a very cunning 
way of making the reader’s imagination work all the harder to interpret why this should 
be. In such a way he lets the reader in on the ‘open secret’ by enacting a covering up, 
prompting the movement which may precipitate its discovery. He allows the reader to see 
beauty, if beauty is what the reader will choose to see. It is the interpretation which is 
important; and it is the important things which cannot be imposed outwardly. As a writer, 
he cannot give away the secret or the gift itself, but the means by which we may receive it. 
The text in which it is written requires the gift of a certain correspondence between inner 
and outer sense of beauty. And because the gift is given individually, the meaning for 
each varies, as MacDonald is fond of saying, while the truth in its openness remains open, 
yet hidden in its demand for interpretation.
The Christ-like attributes of the child of ‘The Golden Key’ and the fact that he, too, has no 
smile are, then, interpreted by that story optionally -  through the character of Tangle - as
181 The Complete Fairy Tales, p140
182 T h e  Consuming Fire’, Unspoken Sermons, p28.
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testifying to the depth of his love. For those who would rather not consider this, they will 
be more interested in Mossy’s progress; or the descriptive passages; or in constructing a 
system to explain it all. MacDonald’s own interpretation, I think can be discerned by 
means of this intertextual interpretation with Robert Falconer. It is treating the lack of 
symbolism in the text of Calvinism as itself indicating a depth of awareness of the divine 
which is unutterable; of the presence of a religion for which there is no “smile” -  no 
adequate expression of language in the realms of logic or science. Hence it is that Mossy 
with his ‘key’, achieves his goal more quickly, not having adequately discerned the nature 
of the search. There is no ‘right’ or ‘wrong’ way here, but a variety of expressions or 
interpretations which find their own level of accommodation with truth. The truth itself 
never changes and, like light, is only mediated, never grasped. The Calvinism of 
Falconer’s grandmother refuses the symbol in a symbolic way; suffering intensely for its 
lack of expression. For, through a dim awareness of its ‘secret’ nature, it comes to make a 
doctrine of utter transcendence, so closing down the secret entirely through suppression of 
the imagination. In so doing it closes down the given means of transforming rather than 
transcending the ‘factual’ world. However, it is the interpretation of that suffering (as is 
the case with the interpretation of hell) which is important for us, since it defines the way 
in which we will approach the open secret.
MacDonald is not alone here in experiencing an ambivalence towards the religion of his 
elders, in discerning great and hidden passion in the most unlikely places. Many other 
Romantic writers find a truth in the idea of the ‘giftedness’ of selfhood implied in 
Calvinism, resisting the idea of outward pride or the show of self-making. However, in 
examining where Calvinism falters in creating such terrible anxiety, MacDonald seems to 
have found an especially creative and self-conscious interpretation o f  interpretation in 
using Goethe’s theory, which has surprising consistency with perception theories in 
literary studies, and postmodern theologies. Theories which place stress upon interaction, 
upon the nature of the process of understanding. Unlike some of those studies, however, 
he does so without relativising anything. Indeed, his method seems to add excessive value 
to notions of the absolute, as we saw earlier in the section on morality.
MacDonald even seems to take this further in his symbolic treatment of symbolic 
understanding. For such severity as is found in Falconer’s grandmother is seen to cover a 
religious experience so profound; so treasured, as to deny itself expression in the symbol,
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so enacting its own death -  symbolically (for it cannot escape the inescapable nature of its
own faith). It is as though, in the figure of the grandmother of Robert Falconer or in the
child of ‘The Golden Key’, MacDonald re-symbolises and recreates a world forsaken by
language; as the blind man is given sight. He discovers buried treasure -  the poet-
discoverer, and invites us to interpret what is uncovered. Even the most terrible
distortions of belief, held mistakenly through love of truth are described in a way which
does not allow for their judgment by the reader, but emphasises the depth o f their source,
and therefore the huge capacity for distortion in their emergence to the surface. He treats
what seems to be a ‘greyness’ as a rainbow. For example, in Alec Forbes, (speaking of the
dissenting minister pi 13):
. ..one whose opinions -  vague half-monstrous embodiments of truth...helped to give 
him a consciousness of the life which sprung from a source far deeper than his 
consciousness could ever reach...
This treatment of life which is to be discovered emerging from the depths of despair will 
develop towards the treatment of death as the ‘revealer’ of life in Lilith; the last human 
experience to be interpreted. There is always a route downwards that his reader can take, 
if they are not too concerned with premature explanations of MacDonald’s meaning. 
Beauty is seen to be placed in the eye of the beholder, and the best kind of beholder, for 
the reader of MacDonald’s work, is not the aesthete; nor the exegete; nor the philosopher, 
but the blind. His work is designed to reward the reader who approaches his characters 
with humility; with self-confessed ‘blindness’; one who is willing to lay aside all 
preconceptions and judgements and confront the text as it speaks reciprocally, of a self to 
a self. The ‘blind’ reader of MacDonald’s work is like Blind Tibbie in Alec Forbes, 
(P219):
Death and resurrection were the same thing to blind old Tibbie.
With that capacity for blindness comes the scope for as much generosity and imagination 
as lies within the grasp of the reader. And there is a startlingly human quality which 
emerges from the text once this move is made. It is that which comes back at the reader, 
in ‘going down’ to meet with such characters. Again, in Alec Forbes, such sight is both 
‘gifted’ and found in the opposite direction to that which seems promising (p220, Alec 
Forbes)'.
...but was it another kind of brightness...that Moses was unfit to see...until the 
humble son of God went up from the lower earth to meet him there, and talk with 
him face to face as a man with his friend...
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As we noted, the ‘baptisms’ of the characters of the book, are also ‘baptisms’ of the 
readers, who travel down towards death, only to meet life and living understanding 
coming back at them. This may be why C S Lewis states that he learned to love goodness 
-  to be mutually attracted to it - through MacDonald’s work; not that he picked up a sense 
of morality from it.
In MacDonald’s work, the reader is also faced with the thought that while human 
imagination does not itself create reality, the imagination is dynamic, informing and taking 
part in the creation of reality, rather than simply reacting to a reality which is presented in 
its entirety, as Calvinism teaches that we ‘appropriate’ the sacrifice of God. By re- 
symbolising the severe world of Scottish Calvinism, MacDonald makes the ultimate 
gesture of faith in the imagination, and also chooses not to polarise the worlds of science 
and art, imagination and reason, Calvinism and liberalism, where so many of his 
contemporaries made use of their art to attack that lack of imagination which they found in 
so much orthodox religion or science. MacDonald’s readers find that the repression of 
love in a religion, when rationality suppresses what is beautiful through fear of the loss of 
that love, cannot destroy it, but that it becomes buried, kernel-like, at the heart of the most 
extreme attitudes of severity. It is indeed this severity which tells of its passionate nature. 
And it is the great capacity for good in Lilith which is distorted to become the more 
powerful evil.
That evil is redeemed by its destruction through reinterpretation. The idea of a
thdestruction or deconstruction through interpretation is remarkably like that of 20 century 
literary theory, but here it must correspond with the ‘deconstruction’ of the individual’s 
preconceptions by the text. There is reciprocity. It is not that one poses the theoretical 
question about evil, and longs for its ‘outward’ destruction. But that one takes the 
problem of evil as it exists -  in rebellion184 and opposition - and allows such conflict to
183 The quality which had enchanted me in his imaginative works turned out to be the quality 
of the real universe, the divine, magical, terrifying and ecstatic reality in which w e all live....I 
should have been shocked....if anyone had told m e that what I learned to love in Phantastes 
w as g o o d n ess .... That prosaic moralism which confines goodness to the region of Law and 
Duty, which never lets us feel in our face the sw eet air blowing from the land of 
righteousness, never reveals that elusive Form which if once seen  m ust inevitably be 
desired ....the thing....m ore gold than gold. (Introduction to Lilith).
184 Perhaps we should note how different are  rebellion and contradiction, since rebellion 
requires som e external hierarchy against which to se t its challenge and through which to seek
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undermine the rational limitations of the imagination. Where the imagination seeks to be 
‘a world in itself is exactly where it will retain such ‘oppositional’ or dualistic thinking, 
seeking to understand and separate good and evil as concepts.
Sight and light as questions in Lilith
For MacDonald, the role of the imagination, undertaking a path through faith, as it is 
purified, seeks the death of such preconceived knowledge, comes to rely entirely upon its 
connection with God -  becomes blind - and can no longer ‘see’ evil, just as God cannot 
look upon sin. It seems that in this way the existence of evil as a separate concept 
becomes unthinkable; one simply becomes ‘innocent’ -  rather than naive - incapable of 
imagining any existence which is separate from God. The perfection of love sees no evil 
whatever. Therefore not only is evil non-existent as being ‘present’ to pure goodness (in 
human terms), love informs the imagination towards a purification, the end of which is the 
sight of God, a glimpse of love, where only hatred or fear are outwardly apparent.
It seems then that the end of the imagination is also the end of its own necessity. Its 
‘colours’ assist us towards light, through the greyness which encourages the imagination 
to abandon dualism. The attraction towards light through colour depends then upon the 
presence of darkness (although we cannot understand the nature of that darkness). The 
light, however, itself shines through the darkness, knowing both itself and the darkness in 
a way which remains ultimately mysterious to human knowledge. It seems that that is the 
terrifying question about God’s sight, capable of ‘knowing’ darkness in an intimate and 
interacting way, without any change to the nature of light as pure white light. This 
explains the importance of MacDonald’s statement in Lilith that while we can only 
conceive of the destruction of evil within our imagination through interpretation, through 
the ‘colour’ of imagination, that (Lilith, p206):
The darkness knows neither the light nor itself; only the light knows itself and the
darkness also. None but God hates evil and understands it.
Dualism results when we wish to see things from a ‘Godlike’ point of view; when we seek 
to appropriate the place of God in order to see things ‘in black and white’. It is to attempt 
to escape from our humanity, rather than to reflect upon that aspect of goodness which is 
communicated by means o f  our humanity. The imagination, in the greyness which colours
its power, while responsible contradiction implies that a  sen se  of authority exists which is
impartial and implicit.
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it, cannot so separate the knowledge of good and evil, light and darkness, but renews our 
humanity to an association with God which is familial, rather than competitive; one which 
is characterised by trust, rather than by sight or assessment. The ‘childlike’ is that which 
knows God as the ‘father of lights’ through the promise of colour -  the rainbow.
It should be emphasised that this view of evil is seen by MacDonald as a work of divine 
imagination within the individual, and does not in any way solve the philosophical 
problem of evil, as it is treated in an ‘outward’ sense. It is one which concentrates the 
attention of the human imagination upon the appropriate reaction to a sense of evil 
‘within’, and treats the understanding of its nature ‘in itself as that which is beyond our 
character and knowledge. Neither can we hate that which we cannot see. And so all 
hatred of evil is beyond us. We merely become blind in relinquishing the knowledge of 
good and evil. As the imagination draws us towards true light, we are prevented from 
thinking in categories. Conversely, it is only as we are estranged from and blinded by 
light to light, and to the ‘concept’ of evil as evil, that we are in any measure able to resist 
its demand for attention. In his emphasis upon faith as sight, rather than sight as 
appearance or seeming, MacDonald may be thinking of 2 Corinthians 11:14:
For Satan himself transforms himself into an angel of light.
So even although in our experience good may come about through evil, that does not
allow us to draw any general conclusion or perception about the nature of evil as a thing
in itself. MacDonald changes his mind somewhat since the metaphysical assertion of
Phantastes (last sentence): “What we call evil is only.. Indeed, it follows that the more
light is discerned by faith, the less we shall have to say about light or darkness, becoming
more and more completely ‘blind’. It is a characteristic of Lilith, growing out of that stage
near death and blindness, of both the body and the ‘colours’ of the imagination and mind,
that, while it presents us with the most powerful sense of evil of all his work, at the end it
has the very least to say about it in theory, finally reaching a stage in which everything is
perceived solely in terms of Vane’s relation with his creator. This ‘endless ending’ is
preceded by many small deaths, every time the imagination has deepened its perception




In Lilith, as well as in Robert Falconer, we find that MacDonald is making of the nature of
such severity as is found in Calvinism a point about the history of religious consciousness
in Scotland. For, upon burning her grandson’s violin, a symbol of expression, Falconer’s
grandmother is described as standing over the fire “like a Druidess”. There is a fear in
Scottish Calvinism, of the passion in religion which has, in the past, led to horrors in
religious or pagan expression. However, for MacDonald, divine love cannot be
extinguished. When denied the beauty and symbolism which belong to it, it bums
everything else in pursuit of that expression or incarnation. Fear implies a less than
perfect love; and MacDonald describes the love of God as the one thing which is
“inexorable”; working towards its incarnation in the whole of creation. Edwin Muir
1 0^condemns the “iron text” of Calvinism in his poem ‘Scotland 1941’ as that which 
destroys art. MacDonald might see it as that which, mistakenly, has sought to protect the 
very essence of art -  the beauty discerned in the divine - from the rationalistic age by 
hiding it away beyond the reach of humanity and art, in notions of transcendence or
1 8Asecrecy . Such extreme adoptions of Calvinist theology so deny the church in practice 
the incarnation which it knows secretly, does not allow itself to know, and which it claims 
as its theoretical base187. However, such a secret cannot be deliberately kept -  as 
MacDonald tells us in Lilith, and Robert Falconer.
But in ‘The Golden Key’, as in Robert Falconer, MacDonald offers a better option than 
condemnation in our approach to religious distortions of Christian identity. He offers us 
the chance to supply the unknown colour of the rainbow, instead of lamenting its lack of 
colour; to imagine the kind of smile which the child holds deep within his heart, instead of 
doubting its existence. He gives the reader the option of being ‘responsible’ for seeing 
imaginatively instead of reacting through fear of the unknown, in a self-righteous 
separation from and condemnation of this Calvinist ‘other’. In doing this he allows the
185 Selected Poems, p34.
186 Robert Falconer, p87: “It is a  grand thing to obey without asking questions....O nly Grannie 
concealed her reasons without reason; and God makes no sec re ts .”
187lts sim plest followers, however, such a s  Falconer’s grandmother, despite “the evil 
phantasm s of a  theology which would explain all God’s  doings by low conceptions, low I 
m ean for humanity even, of right, and law, and justice....” are  shown in a  different light “And 
this God they said w as love. It w as logically absurd, of course, yet, thank God, they did say 
that God w as love; and many of them succeeded  in believing it, too, and in ordering their 
ways a s  if the first article of their creed had been “I believe in God”... it w as the first in power 
and reality, if not in order; for what are we to say a  man believes, if not what he ac ts  upon?”
(Robert Falconer, p77)
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reader to experience the nature of identity itself through the exercise of the imagination. 
How does his theory of imagination work exactly in relation to identity? We shall look at 
this as an introduction to the angle which MacDonald’s work takes in relation to Goethe’s 
colour theory. We shall start with a more detailed examination of the implications of 
MacDonald’s thinking about the imagination.
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Imagination and Identity
We have looked at how the faculty or notion of Sight9 in a theological context can 
connect with the manner in which colour, darkness and light are conceived within 
the imagination and enable a fully human interpretation which is attracted through 
its humanity and blindness towards the ‘Father of Lights9. In this part we shall try 
to see the beginnings of the theology which is informed by the function of colour 
symbolism in the imagination. This will form the second part of the context against 
which we see how Goethe9s colour theory is adopted by MacDonald.
In his essay on the imagination (in A Dish o f Orts\ MacDonald says this:
....it is that faculty in man which is likest to the prime operation of the power of
God, and has, therefore, been called the creative faculty, and its exercise creation.
Poet means maker (but; however)...it is better to keep the word creation for that
calling out of nothing which is the imagination of God....
We have already noted that this word “likest” implies that imagination provides an 
analogical connection between the human and the divine. However we have also noted 
that there may be a better way of understanding what he means. The character of 
imagination is God-like through family resemblance rather than through analogy. In fact, 
the analogical connection itself, as we have noted, is preceded by the symbolic 
apprehension -  which denotes a substantial connection between the thing and the idea; the 
inner and outer; the subject and the object. For we already quoted MacDonald elsewhere 
as saying that the man may imagine “greatly like the God who made him”, where the 
emphasis is on the connection or relationship, rather than on the property as a thing in 
itself. Imagination connects, and only insofar as it connects, does it empower. It is not a 
licence for power, but a communication of a dynamic power which rests upon its not being 
a property; but upon its being given away -  as the secret is given away.
This makes the work of art an ambivalent gift; liable to turn upon the practitioner as soon 
as the creative exchange ceases. However there is an acceptance of this ceasing of the 
artist’s own making ability which comes through a death, in which the individual 
relinquishes all power and comes to live purely in terms of the symbol or substance. It is 
the end of art, but in a good sense; the end of (this) life in a good sense. Such an end is 
taken up into the realm of life as identified by the death of Christ. The completion of all 
works of art becomes itself a symbol of the death of Christ. This also connects to what we
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noted earlier about the rhetoric of power being challenged by MacDonald’s apocalyptic 
treatment of sight. This is why MacDonald prefers the symbolic (mystical) mode in 
relation to the expression of truth. For in the symbol we have a participatory 
understanding which enables the analogical relation but also disables its claim to closure 
of the issue. Closure is not a true ‘death’, but the death in life of attempted perpetuation. 
MacDonald’s notion of death discourages the autonomy of explanation, which makes of us 
gods; it is the death of philosophy which takes place either in the good sense of its 
relinquishing of the prime position or in its insistence upon autonomy which renders 
nihilism self-explanatory and becomes the end of meaning, in the destructive sense that it 
puts a stop to meaningfulness in art and in life. Earlier we noted how yet even such an 
experience as that, for MacDonald, may yet be a good thing, in that in provides an 
opportunity for a new creative interpretation. It puts to an end to its own ends, the self- 
satisfaction of science or of the logic of analogy.
This means that poetic language -  as a symbol of meaning -  has a substantial relation to
that meaning first, and only secondly a signifying relation which is subsequent to it. How
does this work in relation to ‘The Golden Key’? We are sent down in ‘The Golden Key’
as it were; descend through the failure of the analogical and signifying interpretation - to
death - and re-emerge ‘baptized’ into a new sense of meaningfulness. It has come by way
of the analogy, but on the preceding understanding that this understanding itself rests and
is reinterpreted within a wider picture -  one which involves a certain ‘death’. MacDonald
seems to anticipate Wittgenstein in his approach to meaning, as Wittgenstein is quoted by
John Wisdom in Paradox and Discovery (pp87-88):
.. .in applying the same word to several instances we mark a family resemblance and 
not the possession of something in com m on...^  meaning o f a statement is the 
method o f its verification...
We should note, for future reference, that MacDonald is doing the same thing in ‘The 
Golden Key’ with colour as Wittgenstein does with words, in relation to meaning and 
method. Coleridge, too, is aware of this surplus of meaning, which encircles and 
submerges the analogical relation. However, in his initial attraction to the dynamic 
‘power’ of imagination, Coleridge was tricked into the pantheism which comes from the 
analogical, secondary relation and which attempts to make that meaning or power stand 
still and be observed from the outside. In losing its dynamism it reverts to a systematic 
explanation or passive notion of divine presence - pantheism. Coleridge is quoted,
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speaking of Behmen {The Damnation o f Newton; Goethe’s Colour Theory and Romantic 
Perception p252):
... .Behmen has constructed in his spirit the working of the spirit on the faces of the 
Waters, and of God the word in the creation out of the indistinction...and receives 
this as deity... I was myself intoxicated... from the flowers and fruits of pantheism, 
unaware of its bitter root, pacifying my religious feelings meantime by the 
distinction, the thought that God was=the world, the world was not=god -  as if God 
were a whole composed of parts, of which the world was one.
MacDonald, by concentrating on the familial resemblance, rather than being drawn into 
using the logic of analogy as a preceding logic, does not come to this pantheistic 
conclusion. He does not read out of the world into God’s character in a logical fashion; 
but pays attention to the manner of the imagination’s working (as Goethe does with his 
theory of colour, in observing the manner and conditions of colour perception). He 
remains focussed upon the fact that the nature of the symbol is the method of the 
verification of its meaning. Although it produces a harmony; and secondly, a logical 
sense, it does not explain away the mystery of this relation to meaning. In his thinking, 
there remains an irreducible ‘other’ which retains the concept of the ‘giftedness’ of surplus 
meaning; and with it the identity of God as distinct from the human being in this 
reciprocal working of the imagination. Without this concentration upon identity as 
discovered in action; as ‘in the act o f discovery, the dynamic relation between the divine 
and the human, the power and effectiveness of the imagination which comes about 
through such a dynamic relationship disappears.
This redefining of the imaginative faculty as primarily familial, rather than analogical also
helps to explain why harmony is not the same as the static ‘balanced repose’ (essay on the
imagination, A Dish o f Orts, pi):
...by those who consider a balanced repose the end of culture, the imagination must 
necessarily be regarded as the one faculty before all others to be suppressed.
Colour, symbolism and atonement
We might speculate further that the source of MacDonald’s insistence upon this familial 
relation in the notion of symbolic meaning is to do with his understanding of the depth of 
Christ’s identity with the human being, which as we saw earlier, can easily be taken from 
St Paul’s expression of the rebirth of the human race and the renewal of creation in Christ 
and through Christ. And MacDonald is always quoting Paul. The atonement theology he
143
hits upon then is one in which the person and the work o f Christ are indivisible; as are the 
meaning and method o f verification o f symbolic meaning. It is similar to the holistic 
approach of the atonement theology of the eastern church which had been lost in the
1RR • •  •protestant west . It is also similar to the approach taken by McLeod Campbell, and we 
shall also come back to this in the last section.
And let us also note that this analogy which we have made between theological and poetic
understanding is a secondary analysis of a symbolic relationship which is much greater
than its analogical expression189. We do not draw from this the idea that Christian identity
and the dynamic power of the imaginative faculty can be conflated or are reducible to
conceptual terms; but that they are related through a resemblance, the verification of
which is proved through the working out of that relationship in practice; in creative
interpretation. This connects to what we noted earlier of MacDonald’s statement about
scientific method in his essay on the imagination:
...does observation reach to the non-present, the possible, the yet unconceived?
.. .will observation reveal to you the experiments which might be made?
Here, the poetic understanding of what may be possible precedes its working out into 
hypothesis, and he maintains the distinction, thinking in terms of ‘orders’ of imagination 
and thought. We should be quite clear then, by this time, that this does not amount to a 
logical proof of a connection between, or existence of, God and the divine nature of 
imagination, or their connection in terms of predetermined concepts. Rather, it amounts to 
a creative means of expression; which finds harmony by way of its intrinsic 
meaningfulness (not through its explanation). And perhaps another word which 
resembles meaningfulness is identity. On a conceptual level it looks circular (the 
identity/meaning is all in the action. The action is all in the giving and receiving of 
identity/meaning.) However, through a symbolic, poetic, theo-logical activity the 
reciprocity is creative because it does not have the balanced repose of analogy; it is not an
188 The original resistance of the W est to the Eastern orthodox theology w as on the grounds 
that the concept of atonem ent w as too static, being to do with natures and substances rather 
than action. However the separation of the action of Christ from his person reveals that there 
is a  connection between concepts of ‘being’ -  identity -  and ability to act. Perception theories 
show this to be true. This will be examined later in relation to McLeod Campbell’s  concepts. 
Interestingly, Anodos travels eastw ards on his journey (Phantastes, p15).
189 ‘On the Imagination’, p11: "The work of the Higher m ust be discovered by the search  of 
the Lower in degree which is yet similar in kind... man is not divided when the m anifestations 
of his life are  distinguished...(p12)....the poetic relations them selves in the phenom enon may 
suggest to the imagination the law that rules its scientific life...the imagination often gets a  
glimpse of the law itself long before it is or can be ascertained to be a  law.
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equal exchange, and this, therefore, may distinguish MacDonald’s thought from the more 
dualistic aspects of Goethe’s thinking about colour perception190.
Reason and imagination must work together, inasmuch as they have faith in this familial 
connection. Reason, through the realisation that the familial relationship involves a sense 
o f responsibility precisely because of its ‘living’ relationship with meaning. Here, we find 
that MacDonald’s method of thought is consistent throughout his novels, fantasies and 
essays. For we find an interesting concurrence with the linking of the concepts of power 
and identity in the writings of the New Testament, where we find that Jesus is described as 
speaking with authority because of who he is, rather than because of some rank possessed 
-  an inherent rather than attributed position of power. We saw earlier that MacDonald 
himself makes this distinction between the person and rank; identifying two different 
relations of power or authority in Malcolm. That which is deserved because it is due to the 
‘person’; that which is illusory, because it identifies identity with rank. Obedience is in 
morality, then, as reason is informed by imagination, both relationships are read by 
MacDonald as indicative of familial identity, rather than of passive enslavement, and he 
speaks a great deal about the nature of obedience in his work. He asks the reader, in his 
sermon ‘True Christian Ministering’, this question about Christ:
Do you think that he was less divine than the father when he was obedient?
This in turn helps to clarify what seem to our minds to be the strange words of Jesus:
You are my friends if you do whatever I command you191.
The demand for obedience therefore should not be treated as resting upon the logic of 
power but upon the recognition of identity as being ‘in relationship with’.
190 Although when he w as younger (33), MacDonald admired G oethe’s  fighting spirit saying of 
him: “...I like G oethe...he is....w holehearted, heroic...and in m ost modern writers... there is 
an obvious effort to smother, harm onise and reconcile whatever is d iscrepant...instead ...o f 
doing battle with the Devil....” (George MacDonald and His Wife, p175), even then he w as 
wary about the tendency to take this battle upon ourselves a s  though we were the heroes 
(p204: “w e ought never to wish to overcom e because  WE are the fighters..."). Later, and 
seen  in his fiction, his approach can neither be reduced to this “effort to harm onise”, but 
neither d o es  he look upon spiritual warfare in quite the sam e way. Rather, he adopts a  
particular view of apocalypse which reinterprets the ‘battle’ mentality itself -  an apocalypse of 
common notions of apocalypse. Such an approach lays a  huge em phasis upon faith as 
wisdom in relation to problems of evil, rather than upon meeting them  head-on, on the term s 
in which they initially present them selves. This can be clearly seen  in V ane’s  changing 
attitude to Lilith (as an object of desire, a s  an  enemy, then a s  a  fellow-being, and reflection of 
his own humanity in relation to death). This will be important to rem em ber when we com e in 
this section to examine w here MacDonald differs from Goethe, in his use  of colour and in his 
interpretation of the apocalyptic vision.
191 John 15:14
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Meaning then, as with morality in MacDonald’s thinking, possesses a vitality which 
witnesses to its identity as meaning. It is the meaning which demands explanation from 
us, then, not we who demand an explanation o f meaning. It seems to be that this 
obedience to meaning is involved with a continuing relationship with meaning. We must 
therefore strive to find its correspondence in the ‘outer’ things of nature. And so the 
explanation always remains secondary to the meaning to which we attach it. And the 
same applies to the relationship between aesthetic worth and symbolic meaning. As 
philosophy dies without meaning (betraying its lack of autonomous identity), so does the 
‘sense’ of beauty. MacDonald is not worried about ‘levelling’ the ground, so to speak, by 
dividing them all up and granting them their own ground. Such a power-based division of 
disciplines is the very antithesis of the nature of meaning. In his introduction to his fairy 
tales he relates this imaginary conversation between himself and a reader. The questioner 
asks:
You write as if a fairytale were a thing of importance; must it have a meaning?” To 
which he replies: “It cannot help having some meaning...the beauty in it may be 
plainer than the truth, but without the truth, the beauty could not be, and the fairytale 
would give no delight. Everyone, however, who feels the story, will read its 
meaning after his own nature and development, one man will read one meaning in it, 
another will read another.”
“If so, how am I to assure myself that I am not reading my own meaning into it, but 
yours out of it?”
“Why should you be so assured? It may be better that you should read your 
meaning into it.. .as meaning may be there but it is not for you....
We should note that this apparent ‘subjectivity’ reminds us also of Kierkegaard’s 
comment at the end of his work Either/Or when, having examined the worlds of the judge 
and of the aesthete in their isolation, he finally says: “...only the truth which edifies is 
truth for you...”. Since the notion of meaning is retained, this statement implies not 
endless relativity, but the individual nature of one’s relationship to absolute truth. We 
should note, then, that the apparently contingent nature of morality and beauty does not 
worry MacDonald. By remaining true to their nature (in their relationship to living 
meaning) they are bound to escape the effects of abuse. Just as false moralising 
undermines itself in the story of ‘The Giant’s Heart’, the deflation of his work to didactic 
allegory also takes away the power of the symbol, betraying the fact that explanation 
cannot replace meaning. The seeing of the pigeon in Lilith as a ‘sign’ does not counter its 
vision as a ‘live’ prayer. But Vane’s ‘signifying’ tendency does not get him very far; it is
146
only when he begins to ‘see’ these correspondences between nature and ‘inner’ things that 
he encounters real danger; in that he is dealing with ‘live’ things.
The symbolic nature of the discovery of meaning, then, in the nature of the rainbow or of
colour should be seen as reflected in the entirety of his work, no matter what aspect of it
we examine. Stephen Prickett also notes this (slightly contradicting his notion of
metaphoric understanding as a literary device):
In the face of a predominantly empiricist and scientific culture, concerned to 
rationalize and, where possible, demythologise the long record of man’s awareness 
of the numinous, MacDonald reasserts the value of myth and symbol, not as a 
primitive relic, nor simply as a literary device, but as a vital and irreplaceable 
medium of human consciousness. Religious experience is seen not as something to 
be reduced to psychological or physical terms in order to be articulated, but as itself 
a new kind of articulateness... thus MacDonald’s philosophy is inseparable from his 
theory of symbolism....
We should now go on to note in the context of the preceding observations about 
MacDonald, how -  with more exact reference to the text of ‘The Golden Key’ - he may be 
making use of Goethe’s colour theory or Farbenlehre, and where he may be modifying it.
Goethe’s Theory of Colour
The first English edition of the Theory o f Colour appeared in 1840, although it is possible 
that MacDonald read it in its original German as, because of his interest in Chemistry, he 
was reading a lot of other German science early in his life before it was accessed by any 
other English-speaking writers.192
192 W e should point out at this stage  that, because  of his interest in Chemistry, MacDonald 
would probably have taken particular interest in G oethe’s com m ents upon this. And this may 
be why he decides, from his own observations, that Goethe is possibly wrong in the way in 
which he treats the imagination in relation to that science, for G oethe says that “ I am 
speaking of Chemistry...how many discoveries are shelved...if one knows how easily a 
superficial idea is taken up by the imagination and how the man persuades himself that 
he has grasped some truth with his intellect; if one notices how complacently he thinks 
he understand something which in reality he only knows...it will appear pardonable if 
someone undertakes to examine the documents on which an important theory is 
based..” On the contrary, MacDonald, in his essay  on the imagination says that the 
imagination is involved prior to the idea, it is the m eans by which the original idea com es into 
being, and that, in addition “what can be known must be known severely...but is there, 
therefore, no faculty for the infinite lands of uncertainty...?” He s e e s  the scientific ‘idea’ 
a s  a  gift which com es by m eans of the imagination, from those ‘lands of uncertainty’ to inhabit 
the mind, and which is then to be worked out ‘severely’. And, in addition, because  his primary 
em phasis is upon a  Christ-informed reality he further com m ents in ‘A serm on’ that 
“knowledge is not necessarily light; and it is light, not knowledge, that we have to 
diffuse...beyond all doing of good is the being good.” W here G oethe’s  em phasis is upon
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Brief outline of the two main aspects of the theory apparent in MacDonald’s work.
There are two main characteristics of the theory which are of interest here193. The first is 
to do with the study of colour itself. Newton had imagined colour as a splitting up of 
white light into its component parts, believing that there were seven substances composed 
of corpuscles of different sizes, the smaller ones corresponding to the blue colours, the 
larger to the yellows and reds. He imagined a kind of chemical de-composition of the 
light. Huygens and Euler later undermined this conception, conceiving of light as a 
movement taking place within a particular state of matter. Although the notion of 
movement is involved it is limited to a one-dimensional, mechanical concept of 
movement. There were later developments which concentrated upon the eye itself, for 
example, by Young, speculating upon the activity between the eyes and the brain.
The one thing which these theories have in common is that the perception of colour is 
thought of as being an automatic response of matter, whether external to man, or within 
the eye, or the brain. Science resigns itself to the notion that such phenomena must be 
observed in isolation from any sense of ‘meaningfulness’ which we derive from colour -  
such a sense being an ‘inner’ one which cannot be shared or communicated. It might be 
expected that any reaction to this would be one which would reject observation in favour 
of imagination. However, such an approach produces the same division between what is 
observed and what can be known.
Goethe, however, takes observation much further, and is systematic, but starts with a much 
more optimistic view of what can be known from observation. The first difference is that 
he studies the conditions of the perception of colour more thoroughly, thinking about how 
his observation of ‘inner’ or ‘outer’ perceptions are also related to himself, as one who 
studies. He examines the organ of the eye itself in relation to the way in which we 
perceive colours in different environments of light (reflection, refraction, refraction, etc). 
Schindler notes that (plO):
the activity of the intellect, then, MacDonald’s  is upon the intellect in this wider context of 
activity.
193 T hese two main characteristics are taken from Goethe’s Theory of Colour, as applied by 
Maria Schindler.
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Goethe’s concept does not contradict modem physics. The wave-theory came into 
existence in his lifetime and he saw nothing in it which could not be brought into 
harmony with his conviction concerning the nature of colour...when a colour 
phenomenon takes place it is accompanied by processes in matter, perceptible to the 
sense. Matter, however, can only react to any stimulus with movement...when we 
examine these movements, we do not come to know what is mediated, we only come 
to know in what manner it is brought to us...194
The second difference is that, because of this emphasis on the conditions for perception,
Goethe comes to see the role of light in the perception of colour as slightly different. He
also comes to the conclusion that light is the necessary basis of every colour. Yet, because
of his emphasis upon the conditions of perception of colour, notices that it is modified
light which produces colour. That is, the interplay between darkness and light. It is not,
however, the idea that in each colour both lightness and darkness are physically present.
What meets the eye is a definite shade of colour, but thought itself may distinguish two
conceptual entities in this tangibility -  light and non-light. That is, the relationship
between light and darkness is perceived in terms of colour, but conceived in terms of light
and non-light. This writer on Goethe also notes that
If one understands by light only a mixture of all colours, then any idea of “Light” as 
a concrete entity disappears. But such abstractions were foreign to Goethe. For 
him, every idea must have an actual content. Therefore the ‘concrete’ did not come 
to an end with the physical but, contrary to modem ways of thought, was also 
present in the spiritual.1 5
Unfortunately, this writer on Goethe tends to oppose the ‘physical’ and ‘spiritual’
perceptions, whereas, as we have seen -  and especially in MacDonald’s use - the one
requires the other, they have a reciprocal, inner’ and ‘outer’, aspect. And so the perception
and conception inform one another. However, the writer goes on:
Darkness to him was not the total and actionless absence of light. It is an activity. It 
sets itself in opposition to the light and enters into reciprocal action with it. Modem 
science sees darkness as absolutely non-existent as an entity, and light that streams 
into a dark space has, according to this view, no opposition to overcome. Goethe, on 
the contrary, considered that light and darkness are related to one-another as the 
north and south poles of a magnet.196
Now it would be very easy to infer from this that Goethe has precisely the dualism in his 





between light and darkness as a prerequisite for colour, rather than sensing the perception 
of colour as that which is first presented to the human mind as being its true relation to 
these concepts:
In the colour scale of the rainbow...these powers stand opposed to one another in
battle. Then, like the birth of a new world, radiant colours appear197.
However, because the perception of colour and the concepts of light and darkness are 
related (substantially), we find that in practice, there is not a battle between light and 
darkness going on, but a perceptive reinterpretation of seemingly equal oppositions in the 
very midst of the supposed conceptual battle. For the manifestation of colour is a 
perception which transforms the grey flatness of the conceptual mixture into a beautiful 
spectrum. So the perception of colour itself precedes its conception (both as it appears to 
us, and as it is) Thereafter, it is colour, and not a false appropriation of the concepts of 
darkness and light ‘in themselves’ which must inform and precede such concepts, just as 
the imagination precedes the intellectual action, in MacDonald’s thought. The rainbow 
can therefore be read as a promise about the true nature of this apparent ‘battle’198; a 
promise which is ‘read back’ into a mistakenly preceding metaphysical concepts of 
greyness and of black and white, transforming our view of them199. It transforms, 
apocalyptically, dualism into prism.
197 Schindler, p90.
198 This is Derrida’s  complaint against the Platonic elem ent in Christianity, in that the 
glorification of the ‘front’ or of the battle com es from the idea that the reign of Christian 
responsibility attracts to it a certain glorying in triumph, which retains traces of ‘battle’ 
language (The Gift of Death, p17). Interestingly, Derrida speaks of an alliance, which relies 
on a  certain concept of balanced repose, while MacDonald speaks of harmony. This is why, 
a s  we saw, MacDonald is so insistent that we m ust not perceive ourselves a s  being victors in 
a  certain way, in c a se  we should begin to ‘glory’ in ourselves, and bring back the dualism 
which is conquered by Christ. He is also true to the words of Je su s  in this, which can be seen  
a s  a  warning against this tendency which is noted by Derrida: Luke 10:20: “N evertheless do 
not rejoice in this, that the spirits are  subject to you, but rather rejoice because  your nam es 
are written in heaven.”
199 This also is consistent with MacDonald’s  theological interpretation of the rainbow, a s  God’s 
promise. It is a  promise which we conceive of inside of the limits of time. W e m ust not 
confuse, a s  he say s “that creation out of nothing”, a  concept which lies outside of time, with 
the em ergence of our own perception of the rainbow, because the relation is not necessary  
but contingent, requiring faith in God a s  a  person, not in a  concept. Even so, the imaginative 
interpretation strives after and serves faith and meaning a s  its unknown source. It therefore 
relies entirely upon the promise as promise. In ‘A Serm on’ (p294), he says that “it is 
impossible a  man should hold anything aright. How shall the created em brace the self- 
existent Creator? That Creator, and he alone, is the truth; how, then, shall a  man em brace 
the truth...to him who will live it...the truth will reach down a thousand hands for him to 
grasp.”
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Further, Goethe’s experiments with prisms support this notion of greyness as the more 
accurate condition of the perception of colour. The ‘ greyness ’ which had been previously 
associated with dullness is, by way of Goethe’s experiments, now associated with the 
spectrum of colour -  informing and supporting in a more systematic way seemingly 
colourful and romantic notions of half-light -  such as dusk or dawn - and all of the 
associations of liminality, of the edge of things, with promise; in the sense of the 
imminence of life and death, or of meaning200. We shall shortly look at how MacDonald 
expresses his interpretation of this thinking about colour and half-light -  liminality - in his 
writing and theology. First we will just note some similarities in their approaches to 
concepts of discovery and knowledge about the world.
Similarity between approaches of MacDonald and Goethe
There are various similarities between MacDonald and Goethe in their approach to 
discovery of truth which can be outlined in terms of Goethe’s treatment of the nature of 
colour. The first thing to note is that neither of them sees the need for a division between 
the scientific and poetic goal (although their methods and overall view may be different). 
Goethe, like MacDonald, is systematic in his observation of phenomena, but he yet does 
not allow his imagination to be limited by the ‘reasonable’ explanation of what is 
perceived (since it had no prior place in the perception), but rather allows what is 
perceived to inform the intellect. For, as we noted, meaning demands an explanation. 
Goethe writes “Nature conceals God, but not from everyone.” He believes that this 
concealment is an encouragement to use the imaginative faculty as part of the process of 
‘observation’, just as MacDonald states that there is no imagination without observation. 
MacDonald and Goethe both have an interest in science and poetry, and both have this 
approach to methodology, in insisting upon rendering method itself (the search) 
meaningful. Imagination, then, is not to be thought of as we often think of it often today, 
as a world unto itself, disconnected from the other senses.
MacDonald’s thinking upon the connection between the ‘inner’ and ‘outer’ nature of 
perception, which comes from his noting that “God has placed the world in man’s heart,”
200 Thinking here of the way in which MacDonald’s  brother, John, a s  w e noted earlier, always 
felt a s  if he were on the edge of knowing something; sensed  the promise of meaning, but 
found it withdrawn at the last moment; his faith being different to MacDonald’s, in that it 
existed largely in term s of Hope.
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found in Ecclesiastes, is found in Goethe in the form of a thinking about colour, as
expressed by the artist in this case:
..if we examine the effect of colours upon our feelings, we have to do with an inner 
world whose importance for us is a personal question...What we can feel about 
colours is our own personal possession....If, however, we think about colour purely 
as colour, then our attention is no longer directed to our inner psychological 
experiences nor is it directed towards the outer world...it has an objective 
reality....these differences can be understood by us because, as human beings....we 
can perceive colours in their natural and outer appearance because we possess a 
physical organism. Physiological colours are manifestations o f our own corporeal 
vitality.. .these different levels of being are always both within and around us.. .20i
With this in mind, we should consider MacDonald’s comments, in his essay on the 
imagination, upon the man who is enabled to express a seemingly ‘intangible’ inner 
feeling to his friend, by means of pointing to some ‘outer’ quality of the natural world as 
expressing a ‘spiritual’ thought. Although such an ‘inner thought remains exclusively and 
deeply personal can yet -  paradoxically -  be shared as a thing independent of personal 
ownership. Therefore, he does not quite replicate Goethe’s view of colours as 
manifestations of our own corporeal vitality, but of a vitality which inhabits our corporeal 
world, gifting it with vitality and meaning. It is the miracle of symbolism. It also helps us 
to see the connection between MacDonald’s comments in his essay to this effect, and that 
notion found in ‘The Golden Key’ amongst other works, of a new colour, peculiar to the 
individual (Mossy, in this case), and not yet capable of description for the benefit of the 
reader. It implies, too, the notion of the fact that the imagination discerns a possibility 
inwardly which may connect to an ‘outer’ phenomenon which has not yet been perceived 
in scientific terms, and that it must struggle by intellectual means to do so, rather than 
assume that such a ‘feeling’ belongs to some isolated world of the imagination, which 
would be the very antithesis of MacDonald’s premise in his essay on the imagination.
We can see also how, if we turn this around, it is an expression of the theological 
‘promise’ of the rainbow, in that the rainbow is somehow a physical manifestation of an 
inward spiritual promise, having different meanings in each individual case (as faith is 
individual, and as MacDonald notes that meaning is individual). And yet both the inward 
and outward aspects may be related in this case -  through the incarnation -  to each 
imaginer or believer in a substantial manner. Meaning is shared dynamically by means of 
the outward aspect of the symbol (the rainbow; the bread), and rendered connected
201 pp91-2, Goethe’s Theory of Colour, applied by Maria Schindler.
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inwardly and substantially to individual identity by means of that incarnation. The notion 
of meaning on this interpretation means that as meaning, it wants to be expressed' while 
resisting explanation’s claim to its possession. This ties in to the notion of the poet as the 
‘discoverer’ of the secret; the sharer out of the bread, the ‘colourist’, perceiver, 
transformer or re-interpreter -  of meaning, but not its owner. Here, perhaps, we come to 
the idea of the poet as priest. This is, however, exceeded by the realization that meaning is 
not confinable to any one discipline but emerges wherever the act is not limited by a 
notion that it has some claim of its own upon meaning.
We shall now look at how MacDonald may be interpreting this theory and implementing it 
in ‘The Golden Key, and in his other work, in his interpretation of theology and Biblical 
literature.
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Application of The Theory of Colour
In ‘The Golden Key’, we are told that
There was a boy who used to sit in the twilight and listen to his great-aunt’s stories.
She told him that if he could reach the place where the end of the rainbow stands he 
would find there a golden key.
Already we have here Goethe’s idea of grey (twilight) as the passive surrender of light to
darkness, now known as the Purkinje effect (The Damnation o f Newton, Goethe’s Colour
Theory and Romantic Perception, p77):
At twilight, slower night time (scotopic) vision begins to take over from the faster 
photopic vision...because night time sight is less colour sensitive...where colour is 
still perceived it seems to flicker...the eye may see the same image twice at 
twilight...the ‘flash’ is startlingly perceptible.
In the story MacDonald informs this notion of a dynamic ‘overlap’ with the idea of the 
overlap of the male and female aspects of symbolic understanding, as we noted earlier, 
and moves from this dualistic sense towards a reading of the spectrum which overflows 
simple opposing notions of sexual identity (as it also challenges notions of age and time). 
Further, the notion of quicker and slower vision may also be discerned in the speed with 
which Mossy reaches his ‘goal’, while Tangle’s route is deeper, yet slower. Burwick 
notes (p77) that Coleridge makes use of this ‘overlap’ at the close of his poem ‘Shurton 
Bars’:
In Summer’s evening hour 
Flashes the golden-colour’d flower
MacDonald similarly explores the notion of half-light, using it as a means of symbolising
an overlap; a shared vision. It is the half-light which encourages the connection between
the boy’s vision and the great-aunt’s story. He uses it then as an illustration of the nature
of symbolic meaning. Out of this passive greyness emerges the possibility of the
reciprocity of symbolic understanding which, by its nature, is shared, and breaks down the
traditional boundaries between storytelling and ‘real’ life. This is found too in ‘The
History of Photogen and Nycteris’; the story of the day boy and the night girl.
Interestingly the story is contextualised with reference to a certain witch:
Her name was Watho, and she had a wolf in her mind. She cared for nothing in 
itself -  only for knowing it. She was not naturally cruel, but the wolf had made her 
cruel202.
202 The Complete Fairy Tales, p304.
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One interpretation of this is that of the ‘cruelty’ of the pursuit of theoretical or scientific
knowledge, which does not care for the meaning of colour as a symbol; but only for the
knowledge it encourages, which brings with it the power associated with meaning.
Indeed, the essence of the story, which has told of the isolation of night and day from one
another, is of a cruel duality which is the result of this pursuit of knowledge for its own
sake on the part of the witch Watho. But at the end there is a final coming together:
...if ever two people couldn’t do the one without the other, those two are Nycteris 
and I. She has got to teach me to be a brave man in the dark, and I have got to look 
after her until she can bear the heat of the sun...
The result is that the division fails, Watho is killed when she appears in her true colour, in 
the form of a great red wolf - red being also a very important colour in Goethe’s Faust. 
And so we see how MacDonald uses the theory in relation to his insistence upon the need 
for cooperation between aspects of ‘knowing’; to illustrate the manner in which the 
perception or discovery of truth takes place. And, possibly, this is his criticism of 
Goethe’s pursuit of understanding. He notes in ‘A Sermon’ (A Dish o f Orts p211): 
Unhappy is that man.. .whose perceptions are keener than his faith is strong...
Perhaps he thinks that Goethe’s emphasis comes to rest upon the ‘demand’ of the intellect, 
instead of remaining true to the ‘demand’ of meaning. In a right relationship between 
them the intellect is ‘redeemed’ by the relationship of dependence. In the same way that 
the fulfilment of moral law is demanded by Goodness, rather than being conceived of as 
that which places one in an autonomous place of negotiation in relation to Goodness.
To return to ‘The Golden Key’, we should notice that as twilight turns to night, the 
perception of the rainbow intensifies; in opposition to its expected diminishment. 
MacDonald seems in this to be more optimistic than Coleridge, and more generous to 
Newton. For where Coleridge was critical of Newton (Burwick, p i77): “...a mere
materialist. Mind in his system is always passive....”, MacDonald typically sees the 
opportunity for such passivity to be interpreted as being receptive. The experience of 
perception begins with the receipt of a ‘gift’. Soon after his initial reception of the story -  
the gift -  however, Mossy concentrates upon the pursuit, upon what he can accomplish -
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with a key -  a law, an intellect, or a text; much as Goethe sees the advantages of his colour 
theory203:
...it helps us through the most intricate subterranean labyrinths; it aids us in finding 
our way through difficult country...because it obeys immutably a simple law, which 
applies to the whole of our planet, indicating everywhere a certain Here and There, 
which the human mind grasps....
But there is some other element required in ‘The Golden Key’. In the story, it is Tangle 
who is guided through the labyrinth without such a key, and the certain ‘Here’ and ‘There’ 
of Fairyland is something which never can be ‘grasped’, just as MacDonald believes that 
we are ‘had’ by truth, rather than us having it. In Lilith, it is precisely Vane’s problem that 
his ‘key’ fails him. He is lost and does not know what ‘here’ and ‘there’ are in the first 
place. There is no “simple law”204. This leads us to suspect again that MacDonald is not 
only making use of the colour theory, but commenting upon it in a different way from 
Goethe.
But even greyness for MacDonald is an opportunity for vision, such that those completely 
in the dark may be led to ‘see’, even while they are yet insisting upon the primacy of 
scientific knowledge in their search, as Mossy perhaps does. This again connects to his 
presentation of the religious preacher as one who does not understand the source of his 
life, and is yet drawing on that source, despite his preconceptions about the nature of its 
laws. This shows, too, that he is not using his observation in order to draw conclusions 
about the competitive merits of methods, but to draw attention to the mystery of the 
meaning which lies behind or elicits them, taking the generosity of the giftedness of 
meaning as his lead.
Twilight and Fairyland are linked also as symbols, through the concept of liminality. 
Borders are not quite definable; these are places of greyness or in-betweenness, through 
which the rainbow appears. The spectrum of the rainbow in ‘The Golden Key’ is not 
limited to the seven colours, but seems flexible, limitless in its liminality. The rainbow 
which comes at twilight, as does Fairyland, communicates the concept of a ‘threshold’ at 
which the promise appears as something which is properly discerned only at the edge of
203 Goethe’s Colour Theory applied by Maria Schindler, p160.
204 Lilith, p22 “W here do you think it s tan d s?” “Why there, where you know it is!” “W here is 
there?” ..."Two objects,” I said “cannot exist in the sam e place a t the sam e time" “Can they 
not? I did not know! I rem em ber now they do teach that with you. It is a  great m istake....”
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vision, rather than being fixed upon within the confines of focussed sight. We can see
very well how this ‘unfocussed’ quality complements his thinking in his essay on the
imagination, about the initial poetic ‘suspicion’ or ‘intuition’ about the nature of things
which may precede the scientific discovery of laws. One lives within the promise of
perception, rather than mastering it, for:
...it is perfectly well known that out of fairyland nobody can ever find where the 
rainbow stands 05.
It seems also that MacDonald is not so confrontational as Burwick would imply is the case 
with Goethe and Coleridge. This may be because MacDonald is more confident with 
scientific concepts; more likely to play with them, and to be acquainted with other 
scientific reactions. For where Coleridge simply abandons Newtonian physics as 
‘monstrous fictions’, Engel -  for example - tries to find the source of objections to it, 
which he identifies as a resistance to the notion of the impenetrability of matter: (Burwick, 
p!75):
...if rays of corpuscles, even the most minute, were supposed to be whizzing about 
at immense speed....the manifold impact would riddle and disintegrate all solid 
objects whether opaque or transparent.
It is quite possible that MacDonald has also read Engel, and certainly solidity and 
transparency are great themes in his treatment of Fairyland and of the rainbow. Such 
‘thickness’ and ‘thinness’ are themselves related to perceptual notions. This relates also to 
the “here” and “there” of Lilith. The idea that trees and pianos may coexist in the same 
place is related to the fact that two people may see two different things, which are merely 
aspects of a far greater concept of reality than either of them have. He is using scientific 
concepts to inform a more imaginative treatment of what constitutes reality and the 
perception of it.
Movement and Life in Colour
Another characteristic of MacDonald’s treatment, and which also makes his work difficult 
to ‘pin down’ allegorically, is the way in which he creatively uses Goethe’s concept of the
205 p120, The Complete Fairy Tales.
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interplay between light and darkness, colour being not a state but a representation of 
activity.
The sun, for example, appears in different Tights’ in ‘The Golden Key’. In MacDonald’s 
use of personification or the pathetic fallacy in describing the sun, he achieves an effect of 
moveable meaning. Such a presentation of the symbol encourages a reciprocal 
relationship with that symbol, rather than enabling the reader to draw conclusions from it. 
This reflects the way in which true meaning seems to overwhelm us; to defy explanation; 
to come at us with its own mind. The sun first looks “straight into the wood with his level 
red eye”, here representing perhaps the way in which the ‘enlightenment’ of reason - that 
which claims to swallow all other methods of perception -  may be an aid to perception (as 
the intellect helps the ‘architect’ of the imagination), when it is nearing its dusk or ‘death’.
There is, as we noted, also perhaps a comment on Goethe’s belief that red contains all 
other colours. MacDonald is not so certain about this perhaps, especially since the red 
wolf is killed in ‘Photogen and Nycteris’. This ‘red’ is itself merely one manner of seeing. 
We should note, too, the context of ‘The Golden Key’: a forest in which “the trunks stood 
like rows of red columns in the shine of the red sun.”206 These trees are all waiting for 
Mossy himself; they do not ‘contain’ the perception of colours, but enable them to appear. 
For it is in the context of this forest that Mossy is able to perceive the rainbow. If we 
interpret this intertextually with ‘The Light Princess’, we see how meaning emerges in its 
manageable form, filtered through the forest; the redness of the text, science, or 
methodology:
One day he (the Prince) lost sight of his retinue in a great forest. These forests are 
very useful in delivering princes from their courtiers, like a sieve that keeps back the 
bran.
We have here a complex mixing of different symbols. The ‘courtiers’ of explanation 
perhaps like the theologians or scientists, who seek to ‘explain away’ the arrival of the 
‘Prince’. The forest itself possibly representing the story or text which, while it partly 
conceals, yet enables the revelation to be bearable and not blinding, in its poetic dusk. 
These, of course, are secondary analogies. Mossy is directed through his analogical 
relation to fairyland, for he has the key. But he does not look at the red sun himself, as 
though it did contain all the colours within itself; but only as though it could be a filter,
206 p121, The Complete Fairy Tales.
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enabling the perception of other colours207. And in the impossibility of interpreting the 
forest, the sun, the rainbow as any one phenomenon, of making them ‘stand still’, just as 
fairyland will not stand still, all are rendered more ‘lively’; more like the act of perception 
itself; rather than being merely the portrayal or ‘still shot’ of such an act. In this, 
MacDonald enables the reader to experience the liminality; the feeling of being upon the 
edge of some great discovery which is yet in the process of revealing itself. As we noted 
earlier, his Lilith is also preceded by a quotation from Thoreau about this forest which 
filters sunlight; which also contains a sense of being at the trembling edge of some 
wonderful meaning208.
Life, light and colour
The aspect of the sun changes. In the morning Mossy encounters a different angle to its
manifestation in that it blinds him:
.. .the sun was looking straight into his eyes. He turned away from it, and the same 
moment saw a brilliant little thing.. ..it was the golden key.
This reminds us of MacDonald’s comments upon the way in which the Biblical text 
should be studied, in that we are advised to turn away from the fascinating rainbow of St 
Paul’s words (the ‘key’ of the text), to look in the direction in which he looks. The text or 
the key -  exists as a mediating or filtering of a presence or meaning which it cannot 
contain, but to which it directs our attention (away from itself). And MacDonald is fond 
of quoting often in his writings the idea that all of the books, stories or words, like light, 
cannot contain the life of Christ209. And in his sermon, ‘The Creation in Christ’, 
MacDonald tells us that “light is not enough...we must have life...”. We see how light 
itself in his writing is always related to movement, drawing attention to the ‘mode’ of 
perception instead of creating the illusion that light ‘in itself can be gazed upon.
207 As Vane notes in Lilith (p49) “the staring moon. Though hers w as no primal radiance, it so  
ham pered the evil things, that I walked in safety. For light is yet light, if but the last of a 
countless series of reflectionsF Here it is clear that MacDonald d o es not condem n the 
rational approach, he never underm ines any source of light, a s  long a s  rationality is not 
worshipped a s  though it w ere meaning.
208 Lilith, p3 (from “Walking”): “I saw  the setting sun lighting up the opposite side of a  stately 
pine wood. Its golden rays straggled into the aisles of the wood a s  into som e noble hall...as if 
som e ancient and altogether admirable and shining family had settled there ...to  whom the 
sun w as servant...if it were not for such families a s  this, I think I should move out ”
209 This he seem s to get from John 21 :25: “And there are  also many other things that Je su s  
did, which if they w ere written one by one, I suppose that even the world itself could not 
contain the books that would be written.” This implies that the herm eneutic exercise, like the 
knowledge of Christ, is an unlimited task, incomplete by virtue of its very nature. The text is 
not the source, but the expression of its source, and the self-confessed unfinished expression 
of that source.
159
MacDonald would rather that we gazed upon the face of the ‘Prince’, such a gaze being
reciprocal; as to gaze upon the sun alone cannot be. To gaze upon the sun is perhaps the
analogy for the attempt to gaze directly upon meaning; upon the divine. It blinds us,
turning us back again towards its mediation of itself in colour. This, too, relates to
Goethe’s comments on light:
..we can never think of light as something abstract; we become aware of it as the 
effect of a certain definite thing which exists in space and which by its effects makes 
other objects visible..210
Perhaps, also, MacDonald is familiar with Hegel’s theory of physics, as related by 
Burwick, in the way in which he uses Goethe’s theory. Burwick states (p70) that Hegel 
relates Goethe’s theory of light and colour within a scheme of ‘differenz’, which identifies 
three concerns. The first, physical identity (the object generically conceived); the second 
“in-sich-sein” (specific entity distinguished from totality); the third “an-und-fur-sich-sein” 
(the process through which the individuality comes into being). It seems that MacDonald, 
because of his theological symbolism, interprets the last as ‘life’, the first two as ‘light’. 
In the rainbow, the colours of the first two are informed by the promise of a process 
defined as ‘life’. The process cannot be observed - being in a state of constant movement 
(reciprocity), although some of its colours can be (the colours operating as promises of its 
‘liveliness’); indeed we are within the rainbow. For MacDonald, only the life of Christ is 
life at all (as we have quoted), and it would follow that the creative process itself (although 
it cannot be conflated with the person of Christ), must be dependent upon it. This process 
of lively creation is encouraged in the story, through the intensity of the reader’s pursuit of 
meaning, because of the very resistance of the text to simple analogy. MacDonald creates 
a “subterranean labyrinth” for the reader, which cannot be negotiated by Goethe’s “simple 
law”. Hence each reader ‘feels’ this process of “an-und-fur-sich-sein” in proportion to the 
awakening of meaning or life, as the attempt to reduce the meaning which he senses to an 
explanation fails. MacDonald states himself that he can only attempt to wake meaning. 
Any understanding of the meaning his stories is impossible, inasmuch as it is attempted by 
means of the colourless light of reason or explanation alone.
210 Goethe’s Theory of colour, as applied by Maria Schindler, p129.
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Interpretation of the story by colour 
Light and white
The following is an extract from Goethe’s criticism of Newton’s concept of white211.
... .he does not prove anything... .for who does not see, that the word “white” is used 
here quite arbitrarily and is really useless and superfluous. Indeed....would any 
observer.. .today be permitted to say “white as ash, mortar or dirt!
In Lilith we are told by MacDonald that the darkness does not know itself or the light, 
only the light knows itself and the darkness. So how is one to come out of such darkness 
if it cannot ‘see’ the light. How can one discern white if all is utterly black? One is blind. 
In the Bible, one has to be “called” out of darkness into the light212. One perceives the 
presence of light only once one has begun to walk in it. As in Goethe’s own poem, one 
only discerns the true nature of colour once ‘inside’ the rainbow, not from the outside. We 
can see that MacDonald is adopting Goethe’s insistence that the light bears witness to its 
presence through colour, rather than being posited by us as that which can be seen to 
‘contain’ colour. In the Biblical terms of expression the rainbow is the promise of the 
light, testifying through that promise to its own nature.
However, MacDonald is also different from Goethe on this issue of ‘light’ or ‘whiteness’. 
It also follows that any appearance of the light as light upon which one may gaze -  as pure 
white light - is bound to be illusory. In such a moment, one is instantly blinded into 
another kind of darkness. This testifies to the mistakenness of the idea that one can, 
without help, discern and independently verify the existence of pure light, or pure white 
and so it is that Satan himself appears as an ‘angel of light’ . It follows from this, 
therefore, that Goethe’s criticism of the greyness of Newton’s white in his experiments 
cannot really be sustained except by an abstract notion of pure white -  one which we 
cannot possibly have seen. For if one saw the light or true white, one would be blinded, 
and could not judge or distinguish. Similarly, the Biblical concepts of white in relation to 
purity use phrases such as “whiter than snow”214, discouraging a ‘competitive’ sense of 
whiteness to emerge, as MacDonald does with the reader’s sense of morality in ‘The
211 Goethe’s Theory of Colour, p179
212 eg 1 Peter 2:9
213 2 Corinthians 11:14 “...For Satan himself transform s himself into an angel of light.” It is 
interesting, also, that this is said in the context of the corruption of the simplicity of the good 
news of Christ by religious dem ands; a them e which is always with MacDonald, with regard to 
the tendency of the law to attem pt to outrun grace.
214 Psalm  51:7
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Giant’s Heart’, and the giant’s socks, which are whiter than any other giant’s; showing 
how comical this competitiveness is.
As though to prove this, in his story of ‘The Shadows’ MacDonald takes the purest 
conception we have -  that of angelic white - and makes of those ‘angels’ shadows against 
an inconceivably white white. That is, he takes Goethe’s objection to Newton’s definition 
of white and moves it the other way, so that it becomes clear that even snow itself, 
Goethe’s own notion of white, seems grey. That is, all observation is superfluous on the 
logic o f Goethe’s criticisms, when it is quite clearly subject to relativising to any degree, 
should it have no reference outside o f such observation. And so the role of the imagination 
in perception becomes clear, as that by which we form our concepts of purity. Imaginative 
perception is seen to be that which informs intellectual conception, delimiting the 
conception and freeing it from measurement by intellectual means alone.
Apocalyptic vision, therefore, is that which comes in the midst of an uncomprehending 
darkness. The light communicates in the form of the rainbow, a personal witness to itself 
which tends outward. One is ‘attracted’ to the light, through the beauty of colour. One is 
attracted to goodness because of beauty. Truth and beauty therefore appear in personal 
form, are a matter of perception. But that perception takes place not through observation, 
but through an inner concept, which is possibly similar to Plato’s ‘idea’. With 
MacDonald, however, the idea is concrete, is more real in the sense that it is moving 
towards a real transformation of observation, through the inner ‘light’ or concept. Further, 
colours seen by the eye constitute the ‘language’ by which we communicate the ‘idea’ 
with one other. The ‘idea’ thus mediated does not remain entirely transcendent. The 
‘showing’ is therefore not the role of the writer or preacher; the ‘showing’ is the role of 
God. MacDonald sees his role as one who points to colours which are personal 
testimonies, establishing a reciprocal rather than an impartial relationship to the reader. 
He cannot ‘show’ light, but can point at its effects and mode of operation. As he says, he 
can attempt to awaken the meaning or movement of the ‘inner’ light by outer means which 
correspond to the inner senses.
Even here, then, we find again that light alone -  the ‘showing’- must be informed by a 
personal ‘knowing’, which calls for inner light. In ‘The Golden Key’ there are seven 
columns or colours of the rainbow, which represent “every colour that light can show.”
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However Mossy also sees another colour, which seems to belong just to him -  it is not
described, except as a ‘new’ colour. MacDonald is clearly pointing to the hidden presence
of colours which outward light cannot show. That is he conceives of a spectrum which
exists universally as an ‘open secret’. It is inconceivably larger than we can see, and
varied in its appearance to the individual. In each case there is a ‘new’ colour which,
while impossible to mediate, is mediated inwardly to one alone -  perhaps the individual’s
secret relationship with God. But it is not part of a different rainbow; still being part of the
spectrum, yet it is personally mediated215. The notion that natural light does not contain
seven colours, but reveals a certain part of its spectrum is borne out by the discovery of
infra-red and ultra-violet light. These exist, they do not hide themselves, but simply
cannot be revealed in the same way as the seven colours can. Further, in pursuing the
notion of white which cannot be observed; a ‘new’ colour which is mediated personally,
he is taking a different route to Goethe, who does not depart from the idea of observation
as the ‘uttermost’ means of sight, even when it is clear that this relativises all notions of
colour. For Burwick (p37) notes that
Red for Goethe is the primary colour...it includes all other colours...is the creative 
positive in the emergence of light....
Red, the battle between light and darkness and MacDonald’s rejection of dualistic 
interpretation.
We have already noted earlier in the section how MacDonald -  in his description of Watho
as a red wolf consumed by the pursuit of knowledge - may be critical of Goethe’s use of
red as the ‘primary’ colour, seeing it as a reflection of his tendency to be satisfied with
‘observation’ as a means of perception; to look upon knowledge as desirable for its own
sake. Now we shall move on to see how MacDonald creatively expresses his own feelings
toward the claim of such a “red” upon the imagination.
If we have seen how intensification strives towards red both in yellow and blue, and 
have taken note of our feelings about this, we might suppose that the union would 
really produce final calmness or ideal satisfaction. And this highest of all colours is
215 In Lilith the resistance of colour, like meaning, to ownership is m ade clear (p47) “...the 
creature hovering over my head, radiating the whole chord of light, w ith...som e kinds of 
colour I had never seen  before... I felt a s  if the treasure of the universe w ere giving itself to m e 
-  put out my hand ...bu t the instant I took it, its lights went ou t....a  dead  book...lay cold and 
heavy in my hand.” W e can se e  here that MacDonald is specifically relating the grasping of 
colour to the wresting of meaning from the text, in which instant the text becom es a  dead 
thing. W e behold or receive meaning, we cannot grasp it. Therefore the personal aspect of 
meaning avoids the pitfall of the isolation of the individual, which com es about through a  self- 
satisfaction -  a  ‘having’ of something which se ts  us apart from others in competition.
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produced in physical phenomena by the meeting together of two opposite poles, 
which have gradually prepared themselves for this union.216
Here, Goethe betrays his aim -  a calmness or satisfaction -  where MacDonald has stated 
that harmony differs from such ‘repose’ (which the words “calmness” or “satisfaction” 
imply) in being the aim of the imagination. The “ideal satisfaction” of which Goethe 
speaks is one which comes from treating colour as an access to knowledge of the self. 
However Mossy’s rainbow reveals a colour which is before the red (as well as having 
many colours which are beyond the violet). This is a colour which Mossy alone can 
perceive, perhaps denoting the singularity of his identity. And yet it is not an isolated 
identity, for it is nevertheless perceived to be part of the spectrum of colour; a spectrum 
which is, however, only partly revealed by outward light. We have again, therefore, the 
notion that the process of the individuality coming into being (an-und-fur-sich-sein)
917precedes the red; the life precedes the light; for the light is ‘spoken’ into the darkness . 
Again, we note that MacDonald says that “light is not enough, we must have life”.
Again, too, in the idea of Mossy’s own colour, there is MacDonald’s address to his 
questioning reader that “only the meaning which is revealed is the meaning for you”, and 
also his speaking of Paul’s wisdom, in stating that revelation is not a matter for logical 
persuasion218. Here we have a view of truth which is objective, but subjectively revealed; 
the connection between them is ‘live’ and substantial, but veiled in its symbolic mediation 
and revelation, rather than gazed upon, dissected and examined.
Red itself, preceded as it is by such an understanding, is therefore tempered in its
harshness; in its claim to pre-eminence in the story (The Complete Fairy Tales, pl41):
Tangle followed the serpent; But she could not go far without looking back at the 
marvellous child. He stood alone in the midst of the glowing desert, beside a 
fountain of red flame that had burst forth at his feet, his naked whiteness glimmering 
a pale rosy red in the torrid fire.
216 Goethe, The Moral Effect of Colours 37 (794), Goethe’s Theory of colour applied by Marla 
Schindler, p195
217 Genesis 1: 2,3: “...and  darkness w as on the face of the deep ...T hen  God said “Let there 
be light”; and there w as light” John 1:1 In the beginning w as the Word, and the Word w as 
with God, and the Word w as God. He w as in the beginning with God. All things were m ade 
through Him, and without Him nothing w as m ade that w as made. In Him w as life, and the life 
w as the light of men. And the light shines in the darkness, and the darkness did not 
com prehend it.”
218 T h e  Child in the Midst’, Unspoken Sermons.
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Perhaps MacDonald is thinking of Faust219:
A melancholy light, like the red dawn 
Here the light bums soft as the enkindled air 
Or the illumined dust of golden flowers 
And now it glides like tender colours spreading 
And now bursts forth in fountains from the earth 
And now it winds, one torrent of broad light
By means of his personification and of his introduction of the idea of reciprocity in vision, 
MacDonald tempers the hot reds of Faust in the gaze of the child’s eyes, and the image 
and effect of the child’s white skin. The red is subdued at his feet, as the “red spaces of
99fithe judgment court of God” are confounded by the paradoxical colours of Revelation 
(7:14,17), in which
These are the ones who come out of great tribulation, and washed their robes and 
made them white in the blood of the Lamb...the sun shall not strike them any more, 
nor the heat.. .for the Lamb.. .will.. .lead them to living fountains of water...
And in ‘The Golden Key’ we have a similar deflation of the ‘colours’ of battle and
judgment by the imagery of water and of white.
...the heat was terrible...do not send me out into the great heat again,” prayed 
Tangle. “I will not,” answered the child. And he reached up, and put his little cool 
hand on her heart. “Now,” he said, “you can go. The fire will not bum you. Come.”
The vulnerability of the image, in its very vulnerability, defeats the outward and harsh 
colouring of the ‘red dawn’ . It is not light itself which ‘bums soft’, but the cooling 
touch of the child on Tangle’s skin, which makes the light and heat bearable. MacDonald 
is more true to the colour theory and to the apocalyptic literature than is Goethe, in 
rejecting the stasis implied in notions of a ‘battle’ between darkness and light, which 
requires the outward conception of a ‘mixture’ of concepts, in favour of a notion of 
perception which involves the personal and inward ‘reflective’ tempering, which is able to
999translate the terrible outward light and heat. Perhaps he is following Novalis , who
219 Quoted by Burwick (p268).
220 Com ment by Rudolf Steiner, translator of the colour theory, Goethe’s Theory of Colour,
And this is where critics often stumble at MacDonald, in his introduction a t strange 
m om ents of the childlike, the seemingly foolish and in his indulgent playfulness, which 
som etim es sits oddly with the depth of his them es, and em barrasses the reader. However, 
he is being entirely true to the biblical literature, in which the vulnerable, foolish and odd 
things are seen  to confound and reinterpret the ‘holy, sacred and serious’ things.
222 MacDonald is certainly thought to have adopted som e of the motifs of Novalis’s  
uncompleted work Heinrich von Ofterdingen elsew here, in his novels. He can be seen  here,
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rejected a theory of polarity in relation to colour. Burwick notes (pi 30) how it was that 
Novalis felt, in opposition to Schelling, that
such polarity cheated man of his capacities to reconcile matter and energy; body and
mind.. .he affirms the sexual embrace...
The presence of the serpent in the passage quoted above, as well as the overall theme of 
the reconciliation of male and female in the story suggests that this is the route which 
MacDonald prefers to take. However, the reconciliation and the passage which involves 
the child, suggest an excess of desire which overflows the sexual identity of Tangle and 
re-informs notions of sexuality. His resistance to dualism in his poetic treatment of colour 
has a theological basis. The motifs of baptism, as symbols of union with Christ in death, 
inform the nature of reconciliation itself, and the treatment of apocalypse, and we shall 
come back to this later.
Summary
What we have seen so far in ‘The Golden Key’, is that MacDonald certainly is aware of 
the German tradition, and we have examined just a small section of his ‘fairytale’ 
symbolism to show the manner in which he uses the motifs and research of Goethe’s 
theory of colour in particular. However, we have also seen how he does not borrow the 
ideas themselves wholesale, but alludes to the theory in his own way. MacDonald’s 
notion of perception, in particular, pays particular attention to the ‘mode’ of seeing colour, 
and draws from this conclusions about the nature of artistic discovery or uncovering which 
are leading towards a richly imaginative theology of ‘colour’. After moving on to 
consider the symbolism which surrounds the person of Lilith herself, we shall go on to 
consider in the third section, and in greater relation to Goethe’s work, and MacDonald’s 
own fiction how the way in which he develops the theory can be seen to correspond with 
an essay by Graham Ward.
It is clear so far that MacDonald’s understanding of Christian identity does not come about 
through the dualisms which he resisted -  even when they are present in his sources. He has 
been entirely consistent so far, between his artistic practise and his theological
therefore to be recreating the dialogue between the Germ an writers and the implications of
Christian symbolism and theology.
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observations; leading us to confirm that it is justified and rewarding to treat them as 
connected aspects of the same work. This is not a story of the triumph of light over 
darkness, then, but of the triumph of the life which precedes and informs our relation to 
light. His work concentrates more upon the activity of a many-coloured faith and on the 
promise of the rainbow as an all-embracing mode of perception and growth of identity. 
This does not occur in competition with other notions, or appropriate to itself a claim to 
knowledge o/light, but merely is enabled to move within that light; to “walk in the light as 
he is in the light”. The seemingly obvious and ‘taken-for-granted’ interpretations of light 
and darkness, good and evil are exposed in their insufficiency, in order that we may come 
to see or imagine for ourselves the gifted, excessive ‘colours’ of Christian identity, 
morality and meaning. It seems also that this theme of polarised light is at the back of 
MacDonald’s mind in relation to his exploration of identity in Lilith, where McGillis notes 
that in the manuscript, Lilith A, “The librarian testifies that Fane’s father was interested in 
polarised light.” , perhaps suggesting that Goethe is even seen at one stage as being 
MacDonald’s ‘poetic’ father; the one who has left behind manuscripts as to his 
experiences and experiments. However it may be that this ‘fatherhood’ in Lilith is seen to 
grow into a more clearly apocalyptic sense of selfhood in relation to the ‘Father of Lights’.
Where many Romantic writers may have followed Goethe’s thinking entirely, in placing 
the emphasis upon observation in perception, creating another science out of such creative 
observation, MacDonald is examining the growth and nature of the ‘inner’ meaning which 
enables such observation to develop systematically in the first place. Many Christian and 
Romantic writers detail the appearance of the Christ-self, by giving examples. While he 
does this, MacDonald also draws the reader into the nature of the creative process 
involved in his construction of the text or story, so externalising the process in himself, 
demonstrating how meaning emerges as meaning. For it is only as the Christ-self within 
the reader emerges and becomes responsible in its relation to light that it is enabled to 
discern harmony. He is thorough in confounding any other route by which ‘sense’ may be 
made of symbolic meaning, even ‘colour’ sense. Again, the colour theory, as a ‘thing in 
itself is confounded, wherever it tends to pre-eminence in the mind of the interpreter, 
wherever method becomes autonomous activity instead of tending back -  down - towards
223 T h e  Lilith M anuscripts’, 1975
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its source. In his work, then, it is clear that interpretation is a reciprocal activity, in that it 
gives itself death, as it is itself given life.
We shall now go on to consider Lilith, as one who is in the process of being given this life, 
and becoming enabled to give herself death.
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C. Lilith as a symbol
Lilith as shadow-self
Lilith is considered in relation to ancient myth by Ean Begg in his book The Cult o f the
Black Virgin. On page 35 he notes:
Lilith remains surprisingly little known to the educated public. Alfred de Vegny, 
friend of Nodier’s writes of her as the spirit of night, Adam’s mistress, the rival and 
enemy of Eve and her children. Victor Hugo makes of her Satan’s eldest daughter, 
the black soul of the world, the great woman of the Shadow.
Here, we note that MacDonald makes use of this motif of the shadow as a theme of
enslavement. Lilith is enslaved to herself, as she is enslaved to the shadow, and on p240,
we find this observation:
“You hear his wings now!” said Adam...”It is the great Shadow stirring to depart,” 
he went on “Wretched creature, he has himself within him, and cannot rest!” “But is 
there not in him something deeper yet?” I asked. “Without a substance,” he 
answered, “a shadow cannot be -  yea, or without a light behind the substance!”
Here, we find that MacDonald is linking the presence of evil to enslavement to the self -  
the self which is no self, as Vane is not yet a person (as we saw in his conversation with 
the raven) . This is existence as it is before the Christ-self will emerge . He is also 
using such a motif, however, to denote the presence of light and substance as that without 
which such an insubstantial shadow cannot be. Even in her defiance, Lilith remains 
enslaved to the life that is universally for her; that she will not acknowledge. The clue that 
Lilith’s identity is complex, however, is found in MacDonald’s story of ‘The Shadows’, 
who are presented as much-misunderstood creatures in being treated in terms not of their 
relationship to light or substance, but in terms of darkness. Perhaps this is why 
MacDonald invites us to perceives angels as white shadows; to make unlikely associations 
in our minds between what appears to be sinister and what is good226. Similarly, in ‘The 
Golden Key’, Mossy and Tangle are going up to the country “from whence the shadows 
fall.” Without a shadow-self the journey would be impossible and the light blinding, for it
224 This is consistent with what we noted earlier in that he is no longer attempting to explain 
evil a s  a ‘general’, outer phenom enon, but only in term s of the relation of the dark portion -  
the shadow-self -  to the ‘light’ of God.
225 And McGillis confirms that “MacDonald (on the evidence of the first manuscript -  Lilith A) 
clearly indicates that the spectre of self consciousness, the beast which all Romantic artists 
face, is his them e.” (essay  T h e  Lilith M anuscripts’, 1975)
226 MacDonald’s  fondness for breaking down traditional associations with morality and 
goodness is seen  in the m anner in which the King -  Ralph Rinkelman -  m ust learn a  different 
notion of ‘being’: “But he soon found that am ongst the Shadow s a  man m ust learn never to 
be surprised at anything...” ( The Complete Fairy Tales, p60)
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is from the grey shadow that the rainbow emerges. The shadow witnesses to the presence 
of light, even against its will. Without the acknowledgment of the inner light, its relation 
to the outer light is one of enslavement rather than friendship. The shadow is one to be 
pitied, rather than one to be feared.227 The shadow is ‘the shadow of what it means to be 
human’ as opposed to the embracing of one’s humanity in Christ.
Further, the bodilessness of the shadow in Lilith is linked also to the fact that Lilith has
killed her body in an attempt to gain immortality. Instead of giving herself death, she has
given herself death in life; for the Christ-self is substantial, is that which alone can give
one a true death. In ‘The Shadows’, there seems to be an allusion to Satan and Lilith
(p69). It is told, however, in terms of their lack o f acceptance o f their own nature; the
characteristic of being able to forget the previous day. Here, MacDonald seems to be
envisaging a parallel to the fate of Adam and Eve who rebel against their own humanity
and become ‘unnatural’ humans in seeking to be in control of the nature of their nature228:
I will tell you the awful fate of one Shadow who rebelled against his nature, and 
sought to remember the past...He fought with the genial influences of kindly sleep 
when the sun rose on the awful dead day of light....he never forgot his dream....he 
tempted another Shadow to try it with him....instead of continuing to be Shadows, 
they began to cast shadows.. .They are now condemned to walk the earth a man and 
a woman, with death behind them, and memories within them... Ah, brother Shades!
Let us love one another, for we shall soon forget. We are not men, but Shadows.” 
The king turned away, and pitied the poor Shadows far more than they pitied men.
That is, the shadow seeks substantiality within himself, which is not his true nature. As
Lilith or the human may seek immortality, through their unwillingness to embrace death or
“sleep” as being representative of their own natures:
There was yet a way. ..through the world of the three dimensions, only from that, by 
the slaying of her former body, she had excluded herself.230
The Shadow and the Nothing, which Lilith holds in her right hand are both related to this 
holding on to a notion of selfhood, to the appearance of a counterfeit life which is treated 
as though it were a thing in itself instead of a shadow. Here, MacDonald may be
227 “And Ralph Rinkelmann rejoiced that he w as a man, and not a  Shadow.” (Complete Fairy 
Tales, p79)
228 And interestingly Adam m eans ‘you are m ade from dust’ in confirmation that materiality is 
an essentially human trait, not to be viewed in the neo-platonic m anner a s  a  ‘prison’ for the 
soul.
229 The Complete Fairy Tales, p69.
230 Lilith, p151.
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addressing a concept of Christian selfhood which also disconnects itself -  or attempts to 
disconnect itself from substantiality -  from its humanity or embodiment. This seems 
highly relevant, linking as it does to Platonic perversions of Christianity, and also 
Romantic idealism, in which one attempts (like the Lark in ‘The Giant’s Heart’) to 
transcend the material world and experienced reality; to disembody truth in the hope that it 
will be perpetuated; to distance the body of the Church from the world of substance. The 
image of Plato’s cave seems especially relevant here; where it may be considered, in the 
context of MacDonald’s Lilith, that the shadows exist for a reason; as the sun itself creates 
such shadows. The sun or the light cannot be regarded in the abstract without reference to 
its effects; as we saw in the last section. The emphasis upon the importance of inner light 
in MacDonald’s work means that it is not sufficient to simply leave the cave or to deny the 
meaning of shadows. Rather they represent a truth about our own selves. One cannot give 
oneself immortality; one is bound by the very nature of light to the way in which it is 
mediated. To undertake a downward course, either willingly or unwillingly, to death, and 
to the gift of death which translates itself.
Further, the myth which Begg speaks of - that Lilith is Satan’s daughter -  perhaps may 
also be taken up into the idea that Satan is that which ‘gives birth’ to the idea of self­
making or self-ruling; but also that which denies the truly free will to be oneself. They are 
two sides of the same coin. Faced with free choice, the fall and the original ‘sin’ (not sins) 
of the human represents that which he cannot choose -  a sense of darkness, estrangement 
from God and consequently from himself. However, this ‘sin’ of incapability is precisely 
that which is universally redeemed in Christ, placing the human being in the position of 
being capable of that free choice once again, through the nature of this redemptive ‘gift’ -  
the ability to accept death as a transforming experience. So it is that Lilith’s 
powerlessness may also be seen in the doctrine of double predestination; the terrible 
notion that redemption is not promised to all, but only to some. This makes a mockery of 
the notion that free will -  the ability to receive the divine will freely -  is available to all 
who will choose. The ability to engage on that course is universally gifted; the decision to 
follow it is, at any point, entirely free to be willed by the free will which is only truly free 
in the moment that it sees itself as gifted by God, rather than independent of God. The 
concept o f freedom is found in the concept o f gift. So it is that Lilith, in that she finally 
freely chooses to open her hand, is acknowledging the fact that such redemption of the 
will is universal. In being unable to carry through the action, however, she proves that the
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universal must also become that which is personally asked for and received in order to 
become, to her, the gift. It seems that MacDonald is also trying to show that the ways in 
which doctrine has sometimes been presented have denied its very essence; the joy of the 
gifted ability to freely choose that which seems impossible. He is therefore emphasising 
more the individual process of growing into freedom, in order to place the universal action 
of Christ, which enables such freedom, in its proper context. This we shall come back to 
the third section on McLeod Campbell. But we should note that he is indicating that the 
realms of ‘slavery’ to the shadow-self are found in some “Christian” doctrines themselves. 
And indeed, he makes his view of double predestination as a terrible curse perfectly clear 
throughout his novel, Robert Falconer.
It seems then, that MacDonald is implying that the rebellion of Satan and that of the 
human against his or her ‘gifted’ nature are essentially of the same order. Vane is 
‘educated’ by understanding that Lilith’s fall is another form of his own “fall”. Satan and 
Lilith are pairs who rebel; as are Adam and Eve. And it is this which leads to 
MacDonald’s hope that they also may come to know that they are redeemed, and can grow 
into a right association with the light; with God.
The escape from historicity and the competitive notion of identity
Another characteristic of Lilith is that she seeks to deny her limitations to historicity. 
These limitations frighten her, challenging her desire for escape from her nature, and so 
she is bound to seek a competitive notion of identity, one which is bound to the notion of 
power. This explanation is given for her behaviour towards Lona, Lilith (p i50):
She fears, therefore hates her child... the birth of children is in her eyes the death of^  1
their parents, and every new generation the enemy of the last
This, also, is something which MacDonald discerns, as we have seen, as a characteristic of 
his society. One in which status and identity are built upon our mundane difference from 
others, as opposed to the nature which we share in common -  the fact of our mortality -
231 Begg (p36) “In 7th Century S yria...she w as ...to  be feared a s  a  killer of new born 
infants....in the role best known by the Jew s from 8th BC...also well-known a s  a  seductive and 
destructive nocturnal tem p tress ...." There is also, in Lilith, the notion of the seduction of 
Vane by Lilith, denoting the role of the m isuse of sexuality in the search  for a  power which will 
inform on e’s  identity. Interestingly, MacDonald prom otes the role of women, and implies that 
instead of demonising Lilith a s  the tem ptress, Vane com es to se e  that “...each  one is tem pted 
when he is drawn away by his own desires and en ticed ...” (James 1:14) Lilith is merely the 
outward form which Vane distorts to fit his inner desires. Here, we se e  the negative 
correlation between the 'outer1 and ‘inner’ asp ects  of unreality.
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which is paradoxically the basis for a notion of unique difference. Victorian and modem 
competitive notions of morality as a basis for identity have been dealt with in the first 
section of the study. We should note that this unwillingness to acknowledge one’s 
solidarity with the human race, with one’s own mortality, is another manifestation of the 
competitive notion of identity; another barrier to the gaining of one’s tme identity.
Further, Adam’s attitude towards Lilith also seems to function as a demonstration of the
all-pervasive nature of this tendency to competition. Adam is an ambivalent figure in the
novel. He is also the ‘old’ Adam. And we find him stating this (pi47):
He brought me an angelic splendour to be my wife: there she lies! For her first 
thought was power; she thought it slavery to be one with me...
Perhaps MacDonald is thinking here of the myth in which it is said that the world became
fallen because mortals and demons had sexual intercourse; for Lilith may be taken as the
old Eve; and yet Adam speaks of Lilith as ‘an angelic splendour’; someone not quite
human. Adam’s triumphant note is here ambivalent; not being exactly what we would
expect of the ‘new’ Adam. He perhaps is that part of Vane which rejoices in the notion of
power just a little too much; happy to condemn. It may be that here MacDonald is
thinking of the New Testament advice of Jesus (Luke 10:19,20):
Behold I give you the authority to trample on serpents and scorpions, and over all 
the power of the enemy, and nothing shall by any means hurt you. Nevertheless do 
not rejoice in this, that the spirits are subject to you, but rather rejoice because your 
names are written in heaven.
Here again, MacDonald seems to be pressing a point about the ease with which Adam -  
the human nature -  may stray away from the source of its true identity. A gift of identity 
which does away with the delight of power and the sense that one is ‘different’ and better 
than others, and concentrates upon the notion that only God may write one’s name in a 
book of life. Perhaps this is the book which Vane cannot get at properly in the library232. 
Indeed, Vane is not even sure what his own name is at the beginning of Lilith
232 It also ech o es the ‘scroll’ of Revelation 5:3, 4: “And no one in heaven or on the earth or 
under the earth w as able to open the scroll, or to look at it. So I wept much, because  no one 
w as found worthy to open and read the scroll, or to look at it...” In Revelation, the only one 
permitted to read the scroll, is the Lamb of God, Christ himself.
“Then I understood that I did not know myself, did not know what I was, had no grounds on 
which to determ ine that I w as one and not another. As for the nam e I went by in my own 
world, I had forgotten it...I had indeed almost forgotten that there it w as a custom  for 
everybody to have a n am e...” (Lilith, p14)
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Further, Adam here is seen to be guilty of the same sin as is traditionally assigned to 
Satan; in that he wishes to stand in the place of God: “She thought it slavery to be one 
with me...”. This is secondary, however, to the main problem, which is that she thinks it 
slavery to be subject to God. Adam seems to entirely blame her for all evil, taking no 
responsibility himself, and thinks more of what is due to him than to God. He also 
therefore functions as the patriarchal notion of the church, which may distort the selfhood 
of women, who are encouraged in the thought that their self must come from a partner, 
rather than being similarly gifted. Indeed, Adam may be seen as preventing Lilith’s 
growth, as the little ones are prevented by Vane from growing, because he does not show 
them how to find water. It is the women who provide the large part of the practical ‘help’ 
in the novel. Begg notes in his book, interestingly, the correlations between Lilith and 
Isis, and describes the earliest known portrait of Isis (cl950BCE) is found in the British 
Museum (p36):
.. .a beautiful, winged, naked woman with the feet of a bird.. .this figure has come to 
stand for feminine rebellion against masculine denial of woman’s right to freedom 
and equality.
MacDonald has specifically dealt with the female character Isis, in The Marquis o f Lossie, 
in which Malcolm encourages the artist, Lenorme, not to think of the woman, or of the 
mysterious, as merely a representative object of desire and mystery; to show that she is 
more than she appears to him (pi 18):
“ ... .an air of mystery?”
“That was so much involved in the very idea of Isis, in her especially, they said she 
was always veiled, and no man had ever seen her face.”
“That would greatly interfere with my notion of mystery,” said Malcolm. “There 
must be revelation before mystery. I take it that mystery is what lies behind 
revelation; that which as yet revelation has no reached. You must see something -  a 
part of something, before you can feel any sense of mystery about it. The Isis for 
ever veiled is the absolutely Unknown, not the Mysterious....And can a goddess 
ever reveal all she is and has?”
“Never.”
“Then ought there not to be mystery in the face and form of your Isis on her 
pedestal?”
Hence, when we come to Lilith, we realise that we are dealing with an author who had 
given a great deal of thought to the objectification of women in his literature, and who saw 
mystery, not merely in terms of the effect of mystery, but in terms of the one who is
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‘other’ than the self, never to be appropriated, or shown off, or used as a ‘personal’ 
mystery.
Lilith as metonym rather than metaphor
“What are you helping her to do?”
“To go where she will get more help -  help to open her hand, which has been closed 
for a thousand years.”234 {Lilith, p210)
The great age of Lilith encourages the reader to think of her as a continually recurring 
phenomenon in the search for identity. Being metonymic rather than metaphoric, 
however, encourages a two-sided approach to the issue of identity on the part of the 
reader. Standing for the tendency throughout time, of the attempt to master one’s identity, 
she becomes representative of it. However, because she is presented as a person, the 
reader is more likely to be drawn into an empathy (to feel sorry for Milton’s Satan, as 
Falconer does in Robert Falconer) which makes one recognise the tendency to resistance 
in oneself; the inability to be childlike. That is, the tendency to value our identity in 
relationship to the lack perceived in others, as do Adam and Vane. MacDonald, as ever, is 
leading us away from the abstract problem of evil; or abstract systematic attempts to 
‘locate’ selfhood externally, or pretend an overview within which we may locate 
ourselves, towards the inner darkness and light. It is from that position that he encourages 
us to view our historicity. The method is existential.
Lilith as Vane himself
All of the attitudes of Lilith which are clear to Vane are, then, the ones which he finds
within himself: pride, vanity, the pursuit of power (often in the form of intellectual power
to ‘make sense’ of it all). He confesses this; having pursued her as an adversary (in a
dualistic universe), he comes to see that he has pursued knowledge itself, instead of an
awareness of his own shortcomings (Lilith, p i 58):
But a false sense of power, a sense which had no root and was merely vibrated into 
me from the strength of the horse, had, alas, rendered me too stupid to 
listen...rejoicing in the power of my steed and in the pride of my life, I sat like a 
king...the mighty steed was in the act of clearing a wide shallow channel when we 
were caught in the net of darkness...
234 This also corresponds with the description of Satan in Revelation 20:2 “...tha t serpent of 
old, who is the Devil and Satan, and bound him for a  thousand years..”
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It seems that, possibly subconsciously, MacDonald draws upon the imagery which is 
prevalent in the Psalms in which human power and divine power are contrasted. There are 
horses; the great theme of pride; the coming to a sudden fall; the deception of strength; 
and humbling self-knowledge. The aim of the Psalmist is knowledge of God, through 
which he is in the process of coming to know himself. At times he is seized with the idea 
that he is powerful, that he has God ‘behind him’. At other times the rhetoric of power is 
utterly rejected. It is precisely in times of righteous pursuit, when he seems to be at the 
height of his human powers, that he finds himself falling. The conclusion of the writer of 
one Psalm seems remarkably like the character of Vane, in the notion of the immateriality 
of what is apparently solid, the idea of a shadow-self; and the idea of the vanity of actions 
which emerge from anxiety, Psalm 39: 5,6:
Surely every man at his best state is but vapour. Surely every man walks about like
a shadow; Surely they busy themselves in vain.
MacDonald’s description of Vane is also comical at times. In his confusion, and in his 
great capacity for getting ‘carried away’ by himself - by his shadow-self - he seems to 
echo another character in Scottish literature, Burns’s Tam o ’ Shanter, who also finds 
himself living in a nightmare -  living on a night-mare. The horse who carries him off -  
interestingly -  to church. But a church of his own imaginings, in which dance witches, 
much like the scene in which Vane encounters the skeletons dancing in the ruins. In the 
surreal setting and atmosphere of that poem we seem to have an anticipation of the surreal 
world of Lilith. Bums’s great themes: the corruption of much of what passes for
religious thought; the real seen as becoming surreal; the difficulty of seeing and being 
honest about one’s self. These are all central to MacDonald as well. It seems then that 
MacDonald finds surprising allies. He escapes the traditional limitations which would 
assign his writing as ‘religious’ literature because, paradoxically, his religion has led him 
to pay such close attention to these issues, and to challenge notions of category, boundary, 
morality, and the nature of the ‘real’, where they have distorted his own struggle for 
Christian identity. Like Lilith, Vane comes to experience the dread of self-consciousness 
apart from the consciousness of God (p48):
Then first I knew what an awful thing it was to be awake in the universe: I was, and
could not help it!
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Lilith and God's secret name
Begg notes in his book also (p36) that Lilith and Isis have in common their knowledge of 
the secret name of God in mythology. This seems to correspond with the idea in 
MacDonald’s book that there is a secret knowledge which frustrates Vane, in that he 
cannot ‘make sense’ of it. His attempt to prematurely open the book in the library -  to 
read it - is paralleled to his pursuit of Lilith as one who seems to hold a secret knowledge 
which he desires to ‘have’ as a ‘thing in itself. She is one whom he desires to ‘read’ as 
though she were a thing. This objectification of women also denies the sacredness of the 
secret; a thing which is given freely, as friendship is. It is also -  paradoxically - that 
which we find belongs to the part of our nature which is utterly secret; utterly alone235. 
Vane continues to search for access to this secret as though it were a thing in itself which 
could be ‘told’ in its entirety (just as Mossy looks for the key), despite the fact that he is 
advised, and his father before has been advised (p39)
235 W e have already noted how Vane, early on, loses the nam e he has for himself. There are 
two asp ec ts  of a  ‘nam e’ in the Revelation of John which MacDonald may be thinking of.
There is that ‘secret’ nam e in Revelation 19:12 “His eyes w ere like a  flame of fire, and on His 
head w ere many crowns. He had a  nam e written that no one knew  except Himself. He w as 
clothed with a  robe dipped in blood, and His name is called The Word of God.” This m eans 
that it is one thing to know what a  nam e is called (The Word of God) but it is another to know 
what that nam e is. So the Raven ask s  Vane (p26) “Why know the nam e of a  thing when the 
thing itself you do not know?” W hat is secre t -  what the nam e is -  is an open secre t -  the 
redemption of the world, which only God himself knows the true nature of, while we only know 
the nam e by which it is called. Perhaps Vane is pursuing the knowledge of what this nam e is 
its e lf-  which always remains the open secret. The knowledge of what the nam e is to us - the 
interpretation which is one’s  whole life -  is that which is given freely from Christ to the 
individual self, that which Vane com es to be aw are of. One which is always new, and always 
keeps its nam e secret from the one who has it, because  it is the very basis of one’s  
uniqueness. But it may be read, in turn, by others, who will interpret it them selves .(Revelation 
3:12): “He who overcom es, I will write on him the nam e of My God and the nam e of the city 
of My God...And I will write on him My new name." There is the possibility that, even then, 
one may still not be able to read it. This may be what m akes it terrifying, just a s  Derrida notes 
that the gaze of God is terrifying, because  of this unequal, yet intimate knowledge of the self 
by God. The thing which takes away that fear is the faith -  in the perfect love of Christ - that it 
is Christ’s  nam e which is written; that that is the thing which is read by God.
236 The fact that Vane’s  father has also travelled this route, making the sam e m istakes relates 
to what we noted earlier also, about Lilith’s unwillingness to acknowledge her historicity; the 
sen se  that she  is linked to others and has not the ownership of an ‘own’ self which is not 
touched by this. W e note that sh e  is afraid and therefore hates. V ane is, however, 
encouraged by the notion that he shares this route with others before him (it allows him to feel 
that he might ‘m ake se n se ’ of it. The need for control (as Lilith requires it) is also however 
seen  in his attraction to Lilith and fear of her (this is very Freudian), just a s  sh e  fears her own 
enem ies. However, it is V ane’s  fear which leads him to seek  help, while it is Lilith’s  
knowledge of her lack of control which forces her to seek  help. Interestingly, this corresponds 
with the experiences of Tangle and Mossy in T h e  Golden Key’. For while Mossy puts his 
faith in the key (which is the danger of treating knowledge a s  of utm ost importance), Tangle 
m ust ‘face’ the child alone. The route of men and women towards the knowledge of their 
dependence upon God is treated differently, the m an’s route ca u ses  the nightmarish 
abandonm ent of the ‘fem ale’ imagination. The female imagination, so  abandoned, takes the 
more painful, yet deeper route. Neither is more necessary  than the other, however. Both
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“Would you mind telling me all about that?” I said
“By no means -  as much at least as I am able; there are not such things as wilful 
secrets.”
The distortions of imagination which produce Lilith and entice Vane towards her in his
mind, go hand in hand with the fact that he treasures intellectual knowledge more than
anything, as we have quoted earlier {Lilith, p i42):
The fancy that knowledge is in itself a great thing, would make any degree of 
knowledge more dangerous than any amount of ignorance.
Here, we can see that MacDonald is not using the ‘evil’ imagination of Vane to justify the
religious suppression of the imagination itself, but is demonstrating that which he speaks
of in his essay on the imagination. We will quote it at length, because it is a good context
in which to view the character of Lilith (A Dish o f Orts, p26, p27)
Those (of the class who wish to suppress the imagination) will now say “....we 
were opposed to those wild fancies...in which young people indulge, to the damage 
and loss of the real in the world around them...” You would rectify the matter by 
smoothing the young monster at once -  because he has wings and...flutters them 
about in a way discomposing to your nerves.. .you stop not to inquire whether angel 
or pterodactyle -...as well speak of religion as the mother of cruelty because religion 
has given more occasion of cruelty, as of all dishonesty and devilry.... Are we not to 
worship, because our forefathers burned and stabbed for religion? It is more religion 
we want. It is more imagination we need...that evil may spring from the 
imagination, as from everything except the perfect love of God, cannot be denied. 
But infinitely worse evils would be the result of its absence. Selfishness, avarice, 
sensuality, cruelty, would flourish tenfold; and the power of Satan would be well 
established ere some children had begun to choose. Those who would quell the 
apparently lawless tossing of the spirit, called the youthful imagination, would 
suppress all that is to grow out of it. They fear the enthusiasm they never 
felt...instead of cherishing this divine thing...giving it room and air for healthful 
growth, they would crush and confine it -  with but one result of their victorious 
endeavours -  imposthume, fever, and corruption. And the disastrous consequences 
would soon appear in the intellect likewise which they worship...
So Lilith is not in herself dangerous to Vane; it is the pursuit of her (as a metonym for the 
pursuit of knowledge) which is dangerous both to him and to her, leaving, as it does, the 
imagination in a ‘no-man’s land’, neglected in such a concentration upon knowledge for 
its own sake. And so she also comes to appear perhaps as Vane’s neglected imagination, 
working out her own world in the absence of a relationship with her creator.
Lilith and Vane -  the relationship between male and female
m eet a t the other side, and the male and female (intellect and imagination) are seen  a s  
necessary  to one another, and influencing one another, while yet being equally responsible 
for the nature of them selves.
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Begg notes of Lilith (pp36-7) that:
Her main threat to Orthodox Judaism may have been the recurrent temptation to the 
cult of the goddess.. .in ‘The Alphabet of Ben Sira’.. .the first man and woman were 
created simultaneously from the same substance, with equal rights as the primal 
androgynous being...Lilith resented Adam’s pretensions to superiority...in her 
despair she invoked the ineffable name of Yahweh, and was forthwith granted wings 
with which she flew from the paradise that had become her prison...she was 
sentenced to give birth to innumerable progeny, of which one hundred would perish 
daily. Crushed...she cast herself into the Red Sea, at which the angels, pitying her 
sorrow, accorded her power over all new-born babies...
MacDonald hints at this tale on page 148 of Lilith:
.. .finding that I would love and honour, never obey and worship her, she poured out 
her blood to escape me...and soon had so ensnared the heart of the great 
shadow.. .Then at last I understood that Mr Raven was indeed Adam, the old and the 
new man.
Lilith, then, is one who is caught in the conflict between the old and the new man, as is 
Vane. All are in a state of change. We find, indeed, that Vane has dreamt of himself as 
being in the role of both the old and the new Adam. The new Adam in the New Testament 
is Christ himself, however, not any one man, and not the patriarchal Church. Rather, the 
church is intended to see itself as female. MacDonald is providing then a reversal; a 
mirror image of the traditional story of the fall of the man through woman, and is 
perceiving the results of that fall as being carried out through the denial of the female 
aspect of the church -  the bride of Christ. The old Adam is that which rejoices in the fall 
of woman; seeing her receiving her just desserts; the new Adam is Christ himself, who 
lays down his life for the bride; who voluntarily accepts humiliation237. We find then, that 
we are getting closer to the interpretation of Lilith as being the struggling church; the 
result of such a conflict, caught between the old ways -  the spirit of law, of power and 
patriarchy, and the new ways -  of cooperation and humility. As the church, she is both 
victim and perpetrator of this conflicting state; inasmuch as she represents the body of 
Christ, she is identified with him as the victim of a lack of imagination in the ‘religious’ 
mind. Inasmuch as she resists that identification she is the persecutor of Christ. The 
power (“over new-born babies”) which she is given is misused, while she is wedded to the
237 And McGillis notes that this ambiguity is clearly intended in the previous m anuscripts to act 
in a  parabolic manner, so  that the church cannot identify itself clearly with one or the other; 
cannot escap e  its flawed and human embodim ent other than through the apocalyptic route to 
identity: “Nor will Adam clarify whether he is librarian, sexton, the Old Adam or the new 
man....M acDonald refuses to allegorise” (p48, T h e  Lilith M anuscripts’ Scottish Literary 
Journal 4, Dec 1977 pp40-57)
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“heart of the great shadow”. This shadow seems to be different to the other shadows in
MacDonald’s work, and it is possible that it may be interpreted as the spirit of the law,
where it opposes the spirit of Christ, instead of finding in him its fulfilment and true
identity {Hebrews 9:28, 10:1):
So Christ was offered once to bear the sins of many. To those who eagerly wait for 
Him He will appear a second time, apart from sin, for salvation. For the law, having 
a shadow o f the good things to come, and not the very image o f the things, can never 
with these same sacrifices, which they offer continually year by year, make those 
who approach perfect...
This notion of female vs male, then, is essentially wrong. MacDonald envisages the 
church as often killing her own self, her own body. As Lilith slays her former body in her 
resistance to her nature, so has the ‘male’ church many times also killed its own ‘female’ 
body through the suppression of the imagination and the denial of its humanity. Such 
‘sacrifices’ are mistaken in that they have in them the spirit of the ‘shadow’, not being 
responses to Christ’s humanity but efforts to avoid that humanity.
Legalistic interpretations of religious identity in the church
Lilith’s murdering of her children may also be interpreted as the degree to which those
who consider themselves religious may continue to ‘sacrifice’ unnecessarily, for the sake
of an independent identity. Such sacrifices continue to the extent to which they seek to
understand their religious identities in a competitive sense; in which religion is seen as a
transaction; a demand rather than a gift. Further we note that it is not until Lilith’s gift of
sleep, and the severing of her hand, that Christ is embodied in the narrative -  for such an
embodiment would imply the final uniting of the church with Christ. The interpretation of
Lilith as the “bride not yet ready” is sustained also by the progression of the story in
ancient mythology, for Begg notes (pp37-8) that:
...Lilith from being an abhorred demoness, becomes the bride of Yahweh, the spirit 
of the diaspora, after the destruction of the Temple...Lilith, wife of Samael/Satan, 
changes place with Matronit, consort of Yahweh. In the contrast between Lilith and 
Matronit, we might perhaps see a parallel with the opposing pairs, Mary, Queen of 
Heaven and Mary Magdalene.
There is, however, a biblical allusion which MacDonald makes in Lilith, which suggests 
that -  instead of an opposing pair of women, Lilith may be viewed in two ways, 
representing the stages before and after she has been blinded, or the ways in which Vane
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views her himself, either as a competitor or as a fellow seeker after identity. On p i54, 
Adam states of her:
When she confesses her last hope gone, that it is indeed hard to kick against the 
goad, then will her day begin to dawn.
This seems to be a reference to the experience of Paul, formerly known as Saul, in Acts 
9:1-25:
Saul....came near to Damascus: and suddenly there shined round about him a light 
from heaven: And he fell to the earth, and heard a voice saying unto him “Saul, 
Saul, why persecutest thou me?” And he said, “Who art thou, Lord?” And the Lord 
said “I am Jesus whom thou persecutest: it is hard for thee to kick against the 
goads... ” and he was three days without sight...
This is the account of Paul -  one of MacDonald’s favourite Biblical writers -  who was 
formerly the perfect “religious” man, named Saul; one who could not be faulted with 
regard to his keeping of the law. However, it is his very religious conviction which leads 
him to track down and kill the followers of Christ. His “blinding” experience -  such as 
that which Lilith experiences - is one which convinces him that Jesus is greater than the 
law; that his mistaken legalistic interpretations have led him to commit murder; that he 
must seek his identity in an entirely different direction from this competitive notion of 
religion. It is not hard to see that MacDonald may be drawing a parallel between the 
greatest evil and the most ardent and devoted religious people of his own day. We have 
already seen how Lilith’s appearance may mark the result of what MacDonald sees as the 
dangerous tendency to suppress the imagination, in favour of a rigid code of behaviour. 
Instead of opposing one to the other, though, he has a transformation in mind, such as that 
which happens to Saul, when he becomes Paul. This also is closer to his resistance to 
dualistic modes of thinking.
Male prophecy and the female wisdom tradition
...it is not only in the Jewish esoteric tradition that Lilith sometimes appears in a 
favourable light. The Gnostic Mandaeans, whose origins...stem from John the 
Baptist, and who have practised their religion uninterruptedly for 2000 years...know 
of her from their sacred book, the Ginza. In it Lilith Zahriel is the daughter of the 
King and Queen of the Underworld whom they give in marriage to the King of 
Light....238
238 The Cult of the Black Virgin, p39.
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It is possible that MacDonald knew of this tradition. If not, he certainly links that
prophetic voice of John’s, who announces the arrival of Jesus , to the much older -
female -  voice of prophecy found in the wisdom literature (especially in Proverbs)240.
Mara, who appears in Lilith as a presence of both suffering and wisdom, perhaps
represents a conflation of the suffering of Job (the wisdom literature of protest) and the
sayings of Proverbs (wisdom as established)241. Certainly Vane’s journey might be seen
to represent the mental searchings of another wisdom writer in Ecclesiastes (whose
favourite word is “vain”). This man has sought out knowledge and wisdom, and has come
to have a different view of its place in the mind. The writer of Ecclesiastes introduces the
idea that wisdom and suffering will go together {Ecclesiastes 1:17-18):
I communed with my heart, saying, “look, I have attained greatness, and have gained 
more wisdom than all who were before me in Jerusalem. My heart has understood 
great wisdom and knowledge. And I set my heart to know wisdom and to know 
madness and folly, I perceived that this also in grasping for the wind. For in much 
wisdom is much grief, And he who increases knowledge increases sorrow.
Interestingly, Begg notes that in ancient myth (pi 01) it was Asmodeus, son of Lilith, who
was supposed to have tricked Solomon, reputedly the wisest man in ancient civilisation (to
whom the book of Ecclesiastes was often attributed) out of his ring of wisdom, through
which he knew the language of the birds. In Lilith, it seems that Vane finds what is
missing in current ideas about theological wisdom, in reconnecting with this female voice
of wisdom; yet who is tricked by the beautiful appearance of Lilith. MacDonald seems to
go out of his way to ensure that the ancient female presence is not abandoned, in reaction
to this tendency to be seduced by knowledge, but rather that a right attitude towards this
female ‘Sophia’ or wisdom as present with God is worked into the rather male voices of
prophecy in the New Testament:
(Vane to Mara, Lilith, p239):
“I know you! you are the voice that cried in the wilderness before ever the Baptist 
came. You are the shepherd whose wolves hunt the wandering sheep home.”
239 Matthew  3:1-3: In those days John the Baptist cam e preaching in the w ilderness of Judea 
and saying “repent, for the kingdom of heaven is at hand, for this is he who w as spoken of by 
the prophet Isaiah, saying "The voice of one crying in the w ilderness...”
240 Eg Proverbs 8:1 “Does not wisdom cry out, And understanding lift up her voice... .8:12: I, 
wisdom, dwell with prudence, and find out knowledge and discretion....by m e kings
reign....(8:22)...The Lord p o ssessed  m e at the beginning of His way, before his works of old.
I have been established from everlasting, from the beginning, before there w as ever an 
ea rth ....”
241 Although this is a great simplification of the wisdom traditions, for there are  elem ents of 
each in all.
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“My work will one day be over” she said “and then I shall be glad with the gladness 
of the great shepherd who sent me.”
We noted earlier, how MacDonald describes the renegade preacher as one who frightens 
the flock with wolfish cries. MacDonald is finding consolation in the thought that there 
may be renegade preachers who lead the flock astray -  and seemingly away from the 
church but that, even though they may themselves lack wisdom, there is at the back of the 
confused and divided state of the church, this ancient female voice of wisdom, which still 
is playing a secret part, suffering for the lack of ‘male’ wisdom in the neo-Calvinist 
doctrine; hidden at the heart of the old literature of the faith. Again, we find that 
MacDonald is not introducing new ideas into the theological thinking of his day, but is 
returning to ancient sources which are a part of the tradition itself. The male knowledge or 
‘key’ which Vane wishes to acquire is seen to be a complex matter, involving his 
relationships; costing him great suffering; and forcing him to confront this ‘female’, 
passive aspect of wisdom. We noted how it is that Vane ends his journey by waiting, just 
as MacDonald at the end of his life, waits. If Lilith is coming to represent the church, as 
we think, then MacDonald implies that she should be prepared for great suffering, to the 
extent that she may experience the loss of many things which she feels are essential for her 
‘selfhood’. Her love of self-determination; her pride; her beauty and her independence are 
all things which she must give up as being her own personal property. We find that his 
attention to the Biblical literature makes MacDonald ‘radical’ -  yet radically orthodox. 
Indeed he is far more attentive to it than those who adhere to a tradition of word by word 
inspiration.
Lilith’s identity in Christ
Ean Begg also links Lilith to Inanna (p37) in the writings of the 3rd millennium BC in 
Sumeria:
...when the hero, Gilgamesh, cut down her tree, and the sky-god Enlil, dispossessed 
her, she became a homeless wanderer, like Lilith, the Shekinah of the exile, and like 
Jesus himself, this is noted of her in the literature:
The bird has its nesting place, but I -  my young are dispersed 
The fish lies in calm waters, but I -  my resting place exists not 
The dog kneels at the threshold, but I - 1 have no threshold
This links to Jesus’ description of himself (Matthew 8:20):
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Then a certain scribe came and said to Him “Teacher, I will follow You wherever 
you go” And Jesus said to him, “Foxes have holes and birds of the air have nests, 
but the Son of Man has nowhere to lay his head.”
It is easy to assume that MacDonald is merely trying to inject a little ‘female’ wisdom into 
what has become a very ‘male’ tradition in his day. But what we find, if we think about it 
a little harder, is that it is Vane’s mistaken quest for ‘knowledge’ or ‘wisdom’ as though it 
were a ‘thing in itself is that which has led to his misconception of Lilith in the first place. 
As he seeks for a ‘whereness’, which is denied to Jesus, he is tempted by her, as he is 
tempted by the promise of self-determination through knowledge. But she is that which 
leads him away in search of his own desires. That which he desires for the wrong reason 
or with a wrong conception is that which will overpower or enslave him. It seems that 
Lilith is both the monster of which MacDonald speaks in his essay upon the imagination, 
and the victim of a warped imagination. A demonised woman is one who has lost her 
humanity through her estrangement from the imagination; she therefore becomes 
threatening to it. Dehumanising the concept of wisdom and so taking away the 
personification given to it in the ancient scriptures is, to MacDonald, a deeply meaningful 
tendency. His great argument about the treatment of Christ in the church is that we must 
not dehumanise him in order to emphasise the fact that he is divine; that it is precisely his 
humanity which is able to show his divinity.
Similarly his great argument in his essay upon the imagination is that it is necessary that it 
is given its place in order that the intellect may work correctly. The imagination is that 
which ‘humanises’ the other faculties; and allows us to see one another as human. 
However, Lilith is the monster within us, and whom we project onto others -  ultimately 
distorting the face of Christ himself -  she is the one whom we create out of our desire to 
obtain a selfhood that is manageable; comparable and definable. We note how Vane’s 
sense of self is hugely important to him at the beginning of the novel; at its end he is too 
caught up in what he has caught sight of to worry too much about his ‘groundlessness’, 
even though things are even more unstable at the end than they were at the beginning. 
Indeed, his anxiety about the ‘now’ is not satisfied by knowledge, but has translated into 
an attitude of careful expectancy -  of active ‘waiting’. Wisdom, MacDonald implies, is 
not merely a question of ‘knowing’. Wisdom must be treated as a person upon whom we 
wait and not a thing. It is the person of Christ, who identifies himself as being with the 
female as well as the male; who further identifies himself as being with the suffering and
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sinning women of his time. When the person of Christ is treated as a doctrine; this 
‘female’ interpretation of his character is lost; along with the right notions of wisdom, 
suffering, and any other characteristics which may be treated as ‘things in themselves’.
This loss is not merely the loss of the sight of Christ, but the loss of our contact with every 
form of true meaning that exists for us. The world becomes a nightmare; the self deluded; 
reality questionable. The church itself -  the apparently male church - must find itself 
again identified with that wise suffering, and embrace it instead of rejecting it, or it will 
continue to create monsters such as Lilith; to destroy her as an ‘enemy’ while failing to 
recognise her as a victim; as a mirror of the church’s relationship with Christ. We noted 
how the figure of Mara herself is used in the novel as she who signifies both wisdom and 
suffering. Mara (‘bitter’) is the name given to the waters of Mara from a particular source 
in the desert (which is so bitter that even camels refuse to drink from it); water which is 
turned sweet, so that the children of Israel can drink from it during their time in the 
wilderness242. Mara is also the name given by Naomi to herself in the book of Ruth, 
because of her great bitterness at being in a strange country, and alone. Again, her 
experience is one of sweetness which emerges from suffering. We can see how this 
‘water’ is applied in the case of Lilith, when she stays at Mara’s house of suffering. 
Again, MacDonald is drawing attention to the parallels between the fallenness of women, 
where their suffering (and that of the Israelites, and all who confess themselves as being in 
the desert; outcast, and in a strange land) becomes transformed in its ‘wise’ identity with 
the suffering Christ.
MacDonald is quite prophetic in his Lilith, in seeming to anticipate the horror of a church 
which promotes Christ as a male hero; which fails to see that he is not one who promotes 
himself as a mere ‘solution’ to problems, but one who identifies himself with those 
problems and transforms terrible appearances into divinely informed reality. 
MacDonald’s attention to the Biblical literature again leads him to discern love in its 
appearance as wrath; sweetness in its appearance as bitterness; and to discern the root of 
the problems in the theology of his time as owing much to intellectual attempts or despair 
at resolving a (logically) unresolvable dualism. MacDonald’s attention to the Hebrew 
scriptures makes him aware of the vision of Israel as a fallen woman. The prophetic
242 See Exodus 15
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tradition contains frequent descriptions of the people’s relationship with their God as
being that of an adulterous woman; one who falls and whose shame is apparent243. It is
precisely in that shame that the church in Christ finds begins to find her identity in the
novel; as Vane finds that his ‘homing’ instinct leads him to confront his own failure.
Lilith is described like this by Adam (p213)
“I left her with him who had been her husband -  ashamed indeed of her gaunt 
uncomeliness....”
MacDonald seems to be implying that the church must identify herself with that woman -  
with the idea of herself as Israel -  rather than seeking to distance herself from those she 
perceives as fallen by pronouncing God’s judgment upon them.
The tendency to distance the church from that identification, a few decades after 
MacDonald’s death, will lead to the German churches’ persecution of the Jews, the female 
Israel, in the name of the male ‘hero’, Christ. And it is interesting that among the few 
Christians who stood against that persecution was Dietrich Bonhoeffer244, a theologian 
whose Ethics took exactly the line with regard to the interpretation of Christian ethics as 
does MacDonald in ‘The Giant’s Heart’, and one whose notion of Christian ‘selfhood’ in 
his book Creation and Temptation, is very similar to MacDonald’s in Lilith. We will look 
at this work briefly in the last section, in relation to McLeod Campbell.
Development of female imagery in MacDonald’s writing
There are many other female figures in MacDonald’s writing -  aunts, grandmothers and
fairy godmothers, who tend to be identified with the search for wisdom. In Lilith however
he seems to develop this theme more fully; to find its place of marriage to the Christian
apocalyptic vision. Begg notes links between Lilith and the fairy godmother tradition in
Egyptian mythology (p46):
...figures who were known as Hathas and were associated with the symbol of a 
sycamore -  the Egyptian tree of life. They shared this symbol with Diana of the
243 Indeed, one of the prophets is instructed by God to love a  woman who is a prostitute, in
order to provide a picture of the love of God for Israel: (Hosea 3:1): Then the Lord said to me,
“Go again, love a  woman who is loved by a  lover and is committing adultery, just like the love 
of the Lord for the children of Israel, who look to other gods...
244 Hanged for his protest April 9, 1945 a t FlossenbOrg.
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Ephesians and Zaccheus245. As well as a tree, Hatha was, like Lilith, the ladder on 
which the righteous could ascend to heaven.
Begg goes on to note that the later Troubadours went so far as to suggest that one must 
tend towards heaven through the love of women: “...extra-marital union, undertaken 
freely, was preferable to the conjugal bed.” This, undoubtedly, is not what MacDonald 
had in mind, seeming to represent a distortion which objectifies women, instead of 
humanising them; making of them objects to be used in the ascent towards the divine. 
This is not identifying with, but using, the love of the female. It is possible that he may 
have begun with this ‘idealising’ or objectifying of women, though. Certainly he would 
have been aware of such works as the chivalric poem, the Romance o f the Rose, in which 
one progresses from lower to higher loves. And it is interesting to note how the chivalric 
tradition is guardedly praised by MacDonald in his essay ‘On Obedience’. His The 
Princess and the Goblin has a boy-hero who ascends a secret staircase, at the top of which 
lives a beautiful woman who spins golden thread. His early novel, Phantasies, has links 
between women and trees, and indicates an early ‘worship’ of women, in the way that 
Robert Falconer, early on, ‘worships’ Mary St John, until he comes to see her as his sister. 
Lilith, instead, seems to be about the result of such an objectifying tendency, and it is 
perhaps a deeply personal account of his own mis-imaginings, and a cure for the idealising 
tendency which also afflicted most churches of his day with the tendency to either 
demonise or divinise women; the one being the result of the other.
Lilith as a sign of the nature of the church’s identity
On p i27 of his book, Begg links the figure of Lilith to that of the Black Virgin, whose
history, he states, has been
...traced from the great goddesses of the pre-patriarchal period, especially Inanna 
and her handmaiden, Lilith.
It seems that MacDonald’s development of his thinking about the role of female imagery 
in his own writing, which in turn has been an expression of his Christian faith, has led him 
to discern the development of the church’s attitude towards women. Lilith’s story in the 
novel is a complex one, in which she is seen as desired, as objectified beauty, as the 
struggle for self-determination and the victim of that struggle and, finally, one who is
245ln the Gospels, Z accheus climbs a sycam ore tree in order to be able to s e e  J e su s  more 
clearly.
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given death -  sleep -  not in the sense that she is put to death; is destroyed or conquered, 
but who finds her true end in Christ. She feeds on Vane’s lifeblood at times, she is 
excluded, feared, made homeless and descends into humiliation. MacDonald does not 
make her easy to understand, but seems to put into her a little of everyone. We should 
look first at what Begg himself says about the implications of the reception of this figure 
and its associations in the church tradition.
He quotes, on p i29, the Pistis Sophia, in which Mary tells Jesus of her fear of Peter (Peter
being often taken to represent the rock upon which the church is built):
“Peter makes me hesitate; I am afraid of him, because he hates the female race.” Begg
goes on to speak of the polarity which seems to accompany such writings as defining the
history of the Christian church (pi 29):
If we think of this polarity not in personal terms, but as two traditions within 
Christianity, what we see are the church of Peter, catholic, orthodox, male- 
dominated and victorious, and the rival church of Mary, Gnostic and heretical, 
worshipping a male/female deity and served by priests of both sexes.
Begg, then, sees a history of mutual fear emerging. However, we find that Begg himself
adheres to the polarity which encourages that fear. In speaking of such a division as self-
evident; his notions of male and female identity are themselves taken as self-evident,
rather than allowing themselves to be redefined in the person of Christ246. This is very
important in MacDonald’s theology, and we shall soon come back to see this in the work
of Graham Ward. Begg goes on to note (pi29) that:
...in the Celtic world (women) retained many of their considerable ancient 
freedoms...it was this Celtic Christianity that re-evangelised Europe...in the Dark 
Ages.” (p i31) ...the Black Virgin is a Christian phenomenon as well as a 
perseveration of the ancient goddesses and compensates for the one-sided conscious 
attitudes of the age...against the frenzied fascination for denying, defeating and 
transcending nature, the Black Virgin stands for the healing power of nature, the 
alchemical principle that the work against nature can only proceed in and through 
nature...
246 Galations 3:28: “There is neither Jew  nor Greek, there is neither slave nor free, there is 
neither male nor female; for you are all one in Christ J e su s .” The interpretation of this 
statem ent frequently itself does not take seriously how it is that the body of Christ himself 
becom es both male and female, in that he ‘gives birth’ to the church. Instead, there is a 
tendency to retain the male chivalric, heroic image, and not allow the implications of the 
transformation of life itself, of sexual identity; a s  of all forms of identity, which takes place 
because of the resurrection.
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However, the idea of a “compensation” or a “perseveration” which creates a balance 
between the male and female does not sit well with MacDonald’s resistance to the notion 
that we are after such a balance -  or “fixed repose” as he says in his essay on the 
imagination. Such a balancing ‘act’ remains precisely an act; revealing that this 
‘alchemical principle’ does not quite hit the mark; does not really transform one’s
• • 9 4 7identity . The work, whether ‘against’ or ‘in and through’ nature still has as its 
fundamental principle the notion of a manipulation of forces -  a kind of witchcraft which 
the church itself sometimes seeks to engage in wherever it loses sight of the nature of its 
identity in Christ. Access to power can never in itself change the way in which women are 
viewed, as long as the expression of power is seen as a sign of godlike authority.
We have seen earlier how this notion of what a church is, is addressed in Robert Falconer, 
and MacDonald returns to the New Testament literature itself for guidance. The 
protestant tradition in which he grew up is one whose description of itself he resists248. 
His return to his sources, however, takes one vital part of that tradition -  the close study of 
the Biblical writings themselves -  and uses all of his imaginative power of interpretation 
to uncover that tradition to itself. Begg speaks of the subordinate role of women in the 
New Testament (which is arguable), but fails to see that it is women who discover the fact 
of the resurrection first, that women are constantly asserted and affirmed in the presence of 
Jesus and ultimately that subordination itself (of which the subordination of women is but 
one example) is reinterpreted by the writing as the being the foundation of the Church’s 
identity. However it is not subordination ‘in itself but the subordination of Christ, being 
one who becomes subordinate to the point of death; and who in rising again reinterprets 
the nature of subordination. This reinterpretation of subordination has been frequently 
distorted in the history of the Christian tradition, often in justification of the social order of 
the day, but it is clear that when it is taken literally as being a sign of the presence of a
247 This corresponds interestingly with Derrida’s  thoughts on identity in The Gift o f Death (to 
be looked a t briefly later). On p36, he notes how European civilisation frequently takes its 
concept of personhood from the R enaissance, which is concerned not with persons, but with 
personas. He notes that individualism com es to relate to a  role and not to a  person, and 
consequently being is translated a s  force. Even the seemingly essential male/female 
differences, then, cannot be grounds enough for identity; th ese  differences also relate to roles 
(even if they are biological roles). MacDonald is finding an entirely different notion of identity, 
grounded in relationship, and in an unresolvable tension betw een uniqueness and 
community. It might be interesting a t som e point to examine w hether this is a result of his 
aw areness of the Scottish literary tradition, a s  well a s  of his Christian belief, since the Scottish 
adoption of the R enaissance cam e from different and older sources than the English.
248 His son rem em bers that (From a Northern Window, p86) “He hated, a s  a  designation, the 
word Protestant. You cannot, he would say, m ake a belief out of a  denial.”
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new and entirely foreign order, it offers the ultimate challenge to the location of authority 
and identity, and to any repose of individuals, civilisations (or churches) which is built 
upon the notion of a competitive source of identity249.
Begg offers his own solution to hierarchical notions, suggesting that (p i37)
...once women are free to bestow their favour and affections where they will, the 
whole structure of patriarchal society starts to crumble...
However, this “where they will” is located as being the problem in MacDonald’s Lilith 
The will is the ‘will to power’ of Nietzsche; it is the acceptance of the rhetoric of power, 
which makes one blind to the true identity of the poor, the weak or the demonised. It is 
clear that women, while seemingly faced with a free choice, are equally subject to the need 
to compete, as long as the rhetoric of power (of being as force) is still present. They do not 
find their identities in such a society as being formed in any way which is less harsh, 
destructive or competitive than it was or is in patriarchal societies. This rhetoric of power 
is, however, so powerful that it is hard to conceive of a different measure of identity or 
status without being suspicious that it is itself subject to such a rhetoric of power, only 
covertly. This was Nietsche’s most powerful argument against Christianity, as we noted 
earlier.
Liberation theology -  the assertion of such a new foundation of identity -  came about 
again in the mid-twentieth century, and is a movement which MacDonald comes close to 
anticipating in his Robert Falconer. In that novel, the poor are not objectified or 
romanticised, but are concentrated upon in terms of their intrinsic worth as human beings 
in the fullest sense, and are seen in some cases to improve their material circumstances as 
a result of this new awareness of their identity, while nevertheless not making that their 
aim, or the basis of their identity. And this is where liberation theology itself sometimes 
failed to carry itself forward, once material circumstances had been improved, falling back 
into the old definitions of identity once again . Where the objectification of the poor is
249 MacDonald recognises that Christ’s  kingdom is not of the world, but for the world, being 
both intimately concerned with the world, in asserting that it belongs to God, yet remaining 
unbound to any limitations placed upon it which arise out of the world’s  self-understanding.
The kingdom or ‘fairyland’ of which MacDonald speaks contains an implicit criticism of, and 
serious challenge to, any attem pt to limit its borders to the religious, material, political or 
hierarchical worlds of thought.
250 This is also the problem encountered by many nineteenth century novelists who sought to 
secularise Christianity in the hope that its challenge to society would be clearer by m eans of a 
metaphoric understanding of material reality, by its reframing a s  socialism. It is a  problem
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seen in the novel it is in order, precisely, to shock the reader by the extent to which the
poor are dehumanised. In the novel, their progress involves a challenge and a loss to those
who profit from their existence, such as the property owner who also profits from the
poverty of his tenants by being an undertaker. MacDonald pictures an alternative
community which provides a painful contrast in the novel with the posturing and empty
words of the ‘better’ members of society. It is vitally important to recognise where it is
that this vision comes from, however. His vision is not essentially a vision of protest -  but
is much stronger. It is a vision which asserts itself -  ‘seeing’ things both as they appear to
be -  and as they really are {Robert Falconer, p346):
I...was walking up one of the streets near Covent Garden, when my attention was 
attracted to a woman who came out of a gin shop, carrying a baby. She went to the 
kennel, and bent her head over, ill with the poisonous stuff she had been drinking. 
And while the woman stood in this degrading posture, the poor, white, wasted baby 
was looking over her should with the smile of a seraph, perfectly unconscious of the 
hell around her.
“Children will see things as God sees them,” murmured a voice beside me.
One’s initial reaction is to dismiss this statement as hopeless romanticism -  but it turns out 
in the novel to be more materially successful than all other efforts at social reform have 
been up to now. It would be a mistake to view it as a romanticising of the “hell” of the 
circumstances of poverty (doing so completely ignores MacDonald’s clarity of thought 
and integrity, and a personal experience of misery which most modem critics have never
which MacDonald avoids precisely because  of his insistence upon the symbolic interpretation 
of reality, and his resistance to a  metaphoric language of ‘spirituality’ which merely 
paraphrases the material. Lynne Hapgood, in her essay  T h e  reconceiving of Christianity; 
Secularisation, realism and the religious novel 1888-90’ (p347, Journal of Literature and 
Theology), notes: “The difficulty each writer found in realising the city that w as central to their 
ideas, and the failure of each of their attem pts to a sse rt the material nature of the city in 
spiritual term s is ironic...in fact they promulgate the very ideas they wish to
qualify...Socialism  its own material definiteness becam e leavened with m etaphor”
MacDonald, noted for his insistence upon the ‘fairytale’ and his symbolic language, brings to 
Robert Falconer, twenty years before these  novelists, not a  modern materialism or a  weak 
spiritual metaphor, but a  radical challenge to materialism in its own sen se  of “definiteness” a s  
being allied to the source of such mistaken definiteness in Christian doctrine. It is far more 
than a  spiritual m etaphor for a  material problem, but a challenge to the source of material and 
spiritual interpretations and m easures of reality, a s  they understand them selves. Lynne 
Hapgood also notes how “T hese novels deal with the confusion by transcending it for utopian 
worlds.” Also a  move which MacDonald anticipates (for example, in the Lark of 'The Giant’s  
Heart’). She goes on to state that “The evolution of Christian thought... had moved through 
successive stages of secularisation to em phasise contemporary rather than eschatological 
realities...” MacDonald, of course, knows no distinction, the worlds of Lilith are  in one 
another, challenging theories of time and space, and m ust be understood a s  within one 
another if they are to be understood at all. The dualism of the essay ist reflects the sam e 
problem, expressed differently, by the 19th century novelists, and is precisely what MacDonald 
see k s  to overcome.
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faced). For MacDonald this vision can provide the only true challenge to those 
circumstances, in that it retains the hope necessary in the face such of hopelessness. It is 
not grounded in the circumstances as they appear, but in their interpretation as they really 
are. Action is not possible without hope. Hope is not enduring if it is not founded upon a 
sense of reality which challenges appearances251.
Faced with such a hell, the social reformers, of whom Lady Clementina in the novel is the 
example, can offer only a reaction, which remains enslaved to appearances (to identity as 
social role), and therefore to values which seek to impose themselves upon the poor. 
MacDonald perceives that only the vision which sees on its own terms, and with new 
values, can offer the hope of transforming what appears to be hopeless. MacDonald works 
with the notion that Christ is not only in the church; in middle class respectability, but 
present in the ‘hell’ of life. Where so many well-meaning people are attempting to rescue 
people from this ‘hell’ into a displaced respectability, MacDonald asserts that Christ is in 
that hell, transforming it in anticipation of its conforming to what it truly is. This is a truly 
apocalyptic vision. He anticipates the importance of self-image; of self-determination, not 
in the sense of an independence of will (will to power), which may be allowed to compete 
in the ‘marketplace economy’, nor in a Marxian establishment of material equality of roles 
(although it will have such an equalising effect in its natural outcome), but in the assertion 
of an entirely new foundation of the idea of community, which has the authentic mark of 
identity and meaning which is lacking in ‘marketplace’ economies and competitively 
driven concepts of identity.
This approach retains its relevance, wherever such a society as an ‘underclass’ operates in 
contradiction to the ‘marketplace’ economy, holding onto values such as extravagant 
generosity or unprofitable loyalty, distorted as they may be, as reflecting a more coherent 
notion of identity than those of the ‘wealthy’ classes to whom they are encouraged to look 
as ‘role’ models. The abandonment of participation in the wider ‘society’ (although just as 
often the result of resentment), may also be the result of an understanding that a society in 
which one’s main function is to ‘play’ a ‘role’ does not well express or feed the humanity 
of its participants. Such notions that one’s identity may be gained from one’s career or
251 As he notes in The Seaboard Parish: “...from m ere suffering people will turn 
aw ay....every show of it....only urges them to forget it all...give people hope, if you would 
have them  act a t a ll....”
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from material wealth can be freely rejected by those whose own construction of selfhood 
has been separated from these competitive models. Not being bound to deceive 
themselves in such a way, they may deceive themselves or compete in other ways. But 
frequently the notion of competition (and with it a certain neurotic compulsion to do in 
order to be) is abandoned entirely. Whether conceived as ‘right’ or ‘wrong’, the survival 
of this difference between concepts of selfhood which brings about radical divisions 
within societies is a challenge to the universal validity of any societal model which takes 
‘role’ as being equivalent to identity.
The point here is that MacDonald, early on, sees that the replacement of the patriarchal
society with the mercantile society, will still fail to provide the kind of identity it seeks for
and promises itself. The only society he anticipates is the apocalyptic society; the church
itself, as it is formed in various ways on the basis of the growth of what he calls the Christ-
self, which is driven by selflessness, rather than by a lack of identity. All mistaken forms
of society are seen as the result of forms of enslavement to, or protection of, the ‘self, and
women, in MacDonald’s view, seem to find this slavery easier to escape from than men, in
the time that he writes (Lilith, p228-229):
Every creature must one night yield himself and lie down...he was made for liberty 
and must not be left a slave...”It will be late, I fear, ere all have lain down!” I said. 
“There is no early or late here,” he rejoined “For him the true time then first begins 
who lays himself down. Men are not coming home fast, women are coming 
faster...”
Lilith and apocalypticism
We find, then, that the problem as it exists for women, for the poor, for those who are
demonised, is merely the outward expression of a problem which is within all; within
Vane himself. It is the lack of the ability to lose ‘the self; and the fear of losing oneself is
precisely that slavery which must be overcome if one is to gain one’s soul. In fact, in the
effort to accumulate the whole world as a sign of one’s identity, one loses one’s own soul.
We find that even Vane’s religious and apocalyptic vision is itself tainted with traces of
this ‘self ishness (pi92)
...must not the Little Ones, from a crowd of children, speedily become a youthful 
people, whose government and influence would be all for righteousness? Ruling the 
wicked with a road of iron, would they not be the redemption of the nation? At the 
same time, I have to confess that I was not without views of personal advantage, not 
without ambition in the undertaking... .what might we not do, with such a core to it 
as the Little Ones, for the development of a noble state? I confess also to an
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altogether foolish dream of opening a commerce in gems between the two worlds -  
happily impossible, for it could have done nothing but harm to both.
MacDonald makes it clear that the problem evolves from deep within the religious 
impulse. He anticipates Freud, but sees that it is the distortion and suppression of the 
religious impulse, rather than the sexual (which is its expression), which causes the 
problem, and which must be addressed, rather than ignored. Vital to a right understanding 
of apocalyptic vision, then, is a symbolic form of understanding the meaning of such 
‘sights’ or visions, which we have studied in this section on symbolism. This needs to 
precede the apocalyptic vision, otherwise that sense is tainted with an acquisitive rather 
than participatory notion of sight or perception.
Quite possibly this is a reflection of MacDonald’s own mind, in that he - sometimes
mistakenly -  has sought, prematurely, ways to transform the appearance of things into
what he ‘sees’ apocalyptically in the reality of them as universally redeemed by Christ.
His symbolic ‘seeing’ is therefore aiming towards the purity of the apocalyptic rather than
representing an attempt to claim the apocalyptic vision as that which may be ‘owned’ by
one particular group of interpreters. He may be seen to be following Isaiah’s emphasis on
the notion that such a vision is a matter in which God himself speaks. Such speaking takes
place before the interpretation of those words, which may be why the emphasis in
apocalyptic literature is so much upon the visual aspect of apprehension, rather than upon
the midrashic tradition of interpretation. The apocalypse is that which takes place in an
unmediated fashion, once the effort of interpretation (and all of the ensuing divisions) has
broken down, and yet it has also preceded its interpretation. It is, paradoxically, both the
beginning and end of interpretation, and of the violence and dispute which comes about
through the confusion such interpretations with identity itself {Isaiah 10:17-23):
...instead of iron, I will bring silver...violence shall no longer be heard in your 
land...the sun shall no longer be your light by day, Nor for brightness shall the 
moon give light to you. But the Lord will be to you an everlasting light.. .a little one 
shall become a thousand, and a small one a strong nation. I, the Lord, will hasten it 
in its time.
In Lilith, this ‘sight’ is clearly alluded to, but is hampered and mixed with other notions, 
which relate to Vane’s impatience, his concept of time and his continued ‘self ishness; 
traces of the old Adamic ways of seeing. He wishes to see fulfilled by private 
interpretation the promise of what he ‘sees’ is the true state of being, and yet is told “for
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him the true time first begins who lays himself down”. This infection of the apocalyptic
vision corresponds with MacDonald’s comments in ‘True Christian Ministering’ (A Dish
of Orts, p298) upon the purity of Jesus’s vision of the kingdom in Matthew 20:
Every man would make his neighbour his footstool that he may climb upon him to 
some throne of glory which he has in his own mind....there are known and noble 
exceptions; but still, there it is...we call ourselves “Christians”...and yet this is the 
way in which we go on!...the notion of rank in the world is like a pyramid; the 
higher you go up, the fewer are there who have to serve those above them.. .it is not 
so in the kingdom of heaven...the Son of Man lies at the inverted apex of the 
pyramid; he upholds, and serves, and ministers unto all, and they who would be high 
in his kingdom must go near to him at the bottom...that is the kingdom. The other 
kingdom passes away...it is only there on sufferance....but the man who seeks this 
rank of which I have spoken, must be honest. It will not do to say, “I want to be 
great, and therefore I will serve.”...it is the bad that is in us that makes us think 
about ourselves, but as we go on we think less and less about ourselves, until at 
last.. .we are possessed with the spirit of the kingdom, and live in gladness and in 
peace...
As we saw earlier, the artist must also lay himself down, rather than attempting to fashion 
in advance what he ‘sees’. MacDonald is seeking, then, in Lilith, (amongst other things) 
to understand the artist’s role in this apocalyptic community. The artist must concern 
himself with ‘waking’ this vision in others, rather than in concerning himself with plans 
for its architecture, or with a claim to its interpretation.
Begg outlines the disappointments which frequently condition the thinker, artist or
community, whose apocalyptic sense remains disappointed by the appearance of reality
and the failure of interpretation (pi49):
...the Great Goddess is now unmanifest, save as mother of the outcast 
Egyptians....disappointed apocalypticism is commonly transmuted into 
mysticism...meantime let us hope....as we recall that, to the Sufis, blackness is the 
final stage of the journey of the Soul towards beatitude...
The wonder of MacDonald’s mysticism -  his understanding of the symbolic mode, as 
outlined at the beginning of this section on his symbolism -  is that it is not the result of 
such a disappointed apocalypticism, but a disappointment with the continued existence of 
his own dying ‘self which continually infects such apocalyptic vision. It rather seeks to 
grow out o/its disappointment with itself, to an increasing awareness of the nature of the 
role of the apocalyptic imagination; growing in its intensity in Lilith, to supply us with an 
outline of its working out into and towards the mind of Christ, as it grows out of its despair 
with itself, towards its hope for identity and self-forgetfulness. It remains an action. But
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rather than an anxious action -  which is really only a seeking to acquire identity - it
becomes a waiting action (Lilith, p233: “even in a dream, however, the dreamer must do
something”). It is a waiting for the revelation of Christ’s identity to be given fully to one
who sees what it has seemed to him or her. (end of Lilith)'.
Surely it was a dream of a better waking yet to come, and I have not been the sport 
of a false vision! Such a dream must have yet lovelier truth at the heart of its 
dreaming! In moments of doubt I cry:
“Could God Himself create such lovely things as I dreamed?”
“Whence then came thy dream?” answers Hope
“Out of my dark self, into the light of my consciousness.”
“But whence first into they dark self?” rejoins Hope “.. .when a man dreams his own 
dream, he is the sport of his dream, when Another gives it him, that Other is able to 
fulfil i t . . .”
The presence of doubt is seen as a necessary part of this hope. It is not a crushing
disillusionment, however, but a doubt of the self - which is the strongest indication that
this ‘false’ self is being lost - as it approaches a greater vision of identity: (p235)
“I am trying hard to believe you, father. I do indeed believe you...although I can 
neither see nor feel the truth of what you say...”
“.. .thou doubtest because thou lovest the truth.. .remember the things thou hast seen. 
Truly thou knowest not those things, but thou knowest what they have seemed, what 
they have meant to thee. Remember also the things thou shalt yet see. Truth is all in 
all, and the truth of things lies at once hid and revealed in their seeming....”
The ‘seeming’ is that which cannot be known, yet is in itself also that which challenges 
time, as it need not rely on the acquisitive or cumulative ‘knowing’ of memory or 
experience, but on the knowing of Christ who is still to be fully revealed, but who has 
existed before the effort at interpretation began. It is the idea of God’s interpretation in 
Christ; an apocalyptic interpretation which precedes, fulfils and so reinterprets reality 
itself. It is received not as we understand interpretation, but challenges by reference to the 
nature of symbolism, previous notions of interpretation as being that which ties down the 
text; that which quantifies or categorizes the text.
Here, the ‘rainbow’ promise is of taking part in a reality which both precedes and exceeds 
one’s own reality of being, one’s own memories and expectations. Where that sight of the 
rainbow is temporarily limited by death and mortality, such temporality also enables the 
anticipation and experience of an excess, which in turn makes one live ‘out o f oneself 
towards hope (not in a one-way transcending, but in a manner which reciprocally informs 
life and mortality -  the experience witnessing to its being indicative of true life. This is
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possibly why Vane is oddly advised in the last chapter “remember also the things thou 
shalt yet see...”. It is the apocalyptic aspect of the imagination; its ability to apprehend 
what is not yet known, and what has been known before one’s own existence inside of 
time began. It connects the imagination to grace in that familial sense we spoke of, and 
alerts artists to the need to continually reinterpret the reality in which they find themselves. 
And that effort continually leads to a conceding of the inability to grant a final and 
deciding interpretation, and leads the artist back again to the notion of grace. Where such 
a movement does not occur, the art and the meaning die, fossilized as it were, and become 
empty forms. In this way, all art comes to represent a shell, a form which once, by grace, 
imitated a moment of truth which has entered time, and moved on. In this way, art and 
death are related, being forms which represent the clothing of life in recognisable form in 
time. They are evidence of life past, and of life continuing, in that they have not enclosed 
or killed this kind of life in death, but serve to give some recognisable, shareable form to 
the process. And we all share death as we share the need to interpret.
Conclusion to section two
In this section on symbolism, we have moved from a consideration of the way in which 
MacDonald understands the nature of symbolic ‘seeing’ towards its tendency to an 
apocalyptic conclusion. We have briefly considered its implications for the formation of 
Christian identity or selfhood. The apocalyptic vision is ultimately characterised by hope 
rather than by the assurance of some separate ‘outside’ source, and is seen to address the 
foundations of both individual ‘selfhood’ and the way in which societies see themselves. 
It is deeply challenging to both, addressing, by way of a rigorous questioning of 
perception, their grounds of ‘being’. It is, further, that which recognises its own nature as 
being interpretive, and professes the nature of that interpretation as resting upon its 
relationship with the ‘text’ or Word -  a relationship which can never be taken for granted, 
but in which it is held through faith. Apocalyptic thinking and hermeneutic practice have, 
therefore, very similar themes in common. The apocalyptic method of interpreting reality 
is a deeply challenging one, and we shall now go on to examine how it is that some writers 
on the questions of Christian identity and apocalyptic hope may be standing on common 
ground with George MacDonald. We shall also briefly look at some hermeneutic themes
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which are dealt with in Caputo’s book More Radical Hermeneutics, especially where they 
seem to address the relationship between the questions asked by Derrida and by 
MacDonald. We shall first consider the relationship between MacDonald’s work and that 
of his contemporary, the theologian McLeod Campbell.
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Section Three
What is Christian Identity? George MacDonald and other writers
A. ‘The Light Princess’ and McLeod Campbell’s The Nature o f the 
Atonement.
B. ‘The Golden Key’, Goethe’s Theory of Colour and Graham Ward’s ‘The 
Displaced Body of Jesus Christ’.
C. George MacDonald’s Lilith and Jurgen Moltmann’s Theology o f Hope.
D. Lilith, John Caputo’s More Radical Hermeneutics and Derrida’s The Gift o f  
Death.
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George MacDonald and other writers
This section does not aim to provide a comprehensive link to any area where 
MacDonald’s work may be linked to other writers, but rather to demonstrate briefly 
the similarities which emerge between his thought and the work of a wide range of 
writers, in examining this particular question of Christian identity. It is hoped that it 
provides an example of how his work is helpful in clarifying some similarities in 
approaches to themes found between Romantic fiction and later theological and 
hermeneutical studies. To begin with, however, we consider the links between 
MacDonald’s fiction and the theology of McLeod Campbell, as they were already 
emerging in that era.
A. George MacDonald’s ‘The Light Princess’ and McLeod Campbell’s The Nature o f  
the Atonement
McLeod Campbell lived from 1800 to 1872; being two decades older than MacDonald. 
They had in common their friendship with Thomas Erskine, an advocate, and owner of an 
estate in Angus, who is described in MacDonald’s biography by his son, Greville, as 
(pl 94):
.. .that loving support to all who dared preach universal redemption.
In his introduction to the new edition of Campbell’s book, Torrance notes that (pi)
...during the past two decades theological scholarship has witnessed a resurgence of 
interest in J McLeod Campbell.
Campbell’s thinking touches upon a particular and recurring problem in the church’s
history; that of the nature of the Christian’s perception of their own identity, and
specifically the way in which it is linked to that of Christ. As we have seen, MacDonald’s
work similarly consistently refers to this struggle, and his work has also received an
increase of interest after being left alone for half a century. Torrance’s introduction goes
on to outline more clearly Campbell’s concern (pi):
....from his earliest days in the parish ministry and throughout all his writings was 
so passionately concerned to call the church back to the Triune God of grace in a
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land where he felt so much ‘religion’ was moulded by concepts of God which owed 
more to some ‘light of nature’ where God is conceived primarily as Lawgiver and 
judge, than to the ‘light’ of revelation, where the Father makes himself known in the 
son...
He quotes from Campbell’s Reminiscences and Reflections, pl33:
...my labour was to get them into the mental attitude of looking at God to learn his 
feelings towards them, not at themselves, to consider their feelings towards him...
Torrance notes that he also taught (p3) that
...repentance, faith and love are not conditions of grace, but our response to that 
grace....
McLeod Campbell and MacDonald were both engaged in a struggle to direct the attention 
of the individual and of the church towards the person of Christ, as God’s revelation of 
himself, in opposition to attempts to presuppose the nature of God’s character, or the 
nature of human identity.
Grace252 and nature
The root of the problem which Campbell perceived the corruption of Christian identity 
originated historically in the interpretation of Federal Calvinism, as it developed at the end 
of the 16th century in Holland and New England. Such Calvinism places the concept of 
covenant as central but, in its emphasis upon the ‘Old’ and ‘New’ covenants of religious 
history, leaves it with an interpretation which sees a covenant of ‘works’ and of ‘nature’ as 
preceding the covenant of grace. God’s promise to the people of Israel -  of which the 
rainbow is a central motif -  is representative of the ‘old’, while the ‘new’ covenant is seen 
as a dispensing with the old, in the coming of Christ. That is, the ‘light of nature’ is 
thought to precede the work of grace historically, rather than the revelation of Christ being 
seen as an apocalyptic event which addresses history itself. This Tight of nature’ is used 
to formulate the coming of Christ as part of an overall plan which the human mind can 
understand, and such a plan is adopted as a preceding theological and philosophical 
proposition. In practice, the emphasis on the plan radically divides the world of nature 
and logic from the world of grace since it cannot satisfactorily combine them without 
losing the basis of its own ‘natural’ logic. There is, in addition to this problem of the 
ordering of such covenants within a logical scheme, the perception of a covenant as being 
merely a ‘contract’ between two equal partners -  a definition which itself comes from
252 S ee  p212 for an explanation of what may be understood by ‘grace’ in this context.
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logical deductions which are drawn solely from the ‘light of reason’. There is little room 
for the surprise, wonder, and transforming power of grace to work in this schematization, 
since grace (the coming of Christ) is relegated to being a part of some larger scheme, 
losing the quality of ‘excess’ and of revelation which makes it interpretive o f  reality.
We should note how it is that in MacDonald’s symbolic treatment of the rainbow -  that 
symbol of covenant which we studied in relation to Goethe’s colour theory - he 
emphasises its presence not only as a ‘sign’, but also as a mediation, which has a meaning 
or colour corresponding to the inner working of grace. He subtly shows the ‘substance’ 
of the covenant as relating the spheres of nature (the outward rainbow) to those of grace 
(the inward rainbow), and finally as both mediation and substance. It is sign and symbol 
together which mediate truth -  not the truth about, but Truth as irreducible to fact, living 
beyond and able to inform our conception and perception of what is reasonable. This is 
somewhat different to the notion that reason perceives truth independently and can 
assemble a theory which corresponds to it.
Such a notion is very similar indeed to Newton’s notion that colour as a concept must be 
limited to its existence within a structure which contains and explains it; the pure white 
light of which it is supposedly composed. On the contrary, both MacDonald and 
Campbell say, truth or grace is irreducible to reason, although reason may find harmony 
within it. With regard to writing, MacDonald feels similarly as an artist, that truth or grace 
inhabits writing in the living relationship between reader and word, in the ‘live’ giving and 
receiving of ‘signs’ as symbols. It may allow itself to be passively contained within 
words, but this is itself an act of grace, and does not allow for the conclusion that it can 
therefore be entirely represented by words. We find here another context for 
MacDonald’s allusion to John’s gospel, in which he states that the world could not contain 
the books which would be written; or the comment at the end of Ecclesiastes upon the 
endless books which still do not ‘tell’ comprehensively the truth; do not put an ‘end’ or 
‘finality’ to truth253.
253 It is also the adoption of J e s u s ’s  statem ents which link his ‘being’ to truth, and his advising 
the religious leaders of his day that they search  the scriptures in vain because  they will not 
com e to Him, the living meaning or Word of which the text testifies. It is also the difference 
between Je su s ’s  statem ent “I am  the truth” and Pilate’s  question: “W hat is truth?” This 
relates also to Falconer’s  statem ent about the nature of the church’s  identity a s  related to 
belief ‘in’ rather than belief ‘about’ Jesus.
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On this thinking, Truth is by its very nature a work of grace; continually mediated; 
received from the text or Word as a gift of interpretation and not taken, wrenched or 
‘worked out’ from it254. Truth subjects itself to such abuse by choice passively accepting 
this ‘death’ in the form of writing for the sake of its free mediation of itself to the reader, 
with all the risks of religious and philosophical abuse which that passivity entails. Jesus 
dies not only on the cross, but in submission to crucifixion by the text which seeks to bear 
witness to him. In freely inhabiting and submitting to the ‘textualising’ of his existence, as 
he inhabits history and mortal life, he changes forever the nature of both living and 
reading; writing and death, imparting a meaning to the act of interpretation which it would 
not otherwise have, and which, when taken as an isolated activity, becomes entirely 
meaningless. In relation to Campbell’s findings, Torrance notes that one effect of this 
tendency to ‘take’ meaning meant that “the Federal scheme made a radical dichotomy 
between the sphere of nature and the scheme of grace.”
Interestingly, this separation amounts to a reversion to the pre-reformation medieval view
that grace presupposes nature -  and grace perfects nature; a departure from the great
emphasis of the reformation that nothing is prior to grace255. Torrance, in his
introduction, notes that (p7)
...the doctrine (of the medieval view) implies a loss of the notion of Christ’s 
headship over all creation as mediator, his solidarity with all humanity as the Head 
of the race, as in the theology of Ephesians and Colossians, or as expounded by 
Irenaeus, Athanasius, and the Cappodocian divines as well as by Calvin.
The emphasis is no longer on the person of Christ himself in this doctrine, but only on his 
work as an isolated event. We have seen in MacDonald’s symbolism his emphasis upon
254 T here is a difference between the working out a s  in the solving of a  puzzle, in which one 
uses the text a s  a  thing and the ‘working out’ of one’s  own salvation to which Derrida refers 
(p56, The Gift of Death), in that in the latter one works out the implications of one’s  own 
salvation or interpretation in the context of ‘inner light’ or grace, rather than claiming to 
understand som e ‘general’ plan of salvation or to m aster the text, making of it a  logical work 
and so  emptying it of ‘g race’ and therefore meaning, a s  the Federal Calvinists find in such 
‘working out’ of a  plan. However Derrida has a  rather more bleak view of it, not allowing for 
the reality of Christ’s  spirit a s  present in this working out, while Christ is bodily absent, for he 
is happy to quote Paul “...in my absence...w ork out your own salvation with fear and 
trembling, from Philippians 2:12, he perhaps does not se e  how Paul is calling forth the activity 
of Christ’s  spirit in so  doing, perhaps referring to J e su s ’s  words in John 16:7: N evertheless I 
tell you the truth. It is to your advantage that I go away; for if I do not go away, the Helper will 
not com e to you; but if I depart, I will send Him to you.’’
255 And if ‘nothing’ is prior to grace, we can se e  why all of MacDonald’s  stories lead 
downwards; we can se e  the theological significance of the path through nihilism; the place of 
an interpretation which finds no meaning at the heart of ‘things in them selves’ outside of its 
experience of grace.
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the importance of seeing creation as God sees it; upon an inner light or grace which is
gifted, and which re-informs creation with the meaning of Christ’s presence to it, not
supposing any definition which can precede this perception with conception. Rather, by
reference to the outward moving tendency in the imagination, MacDonald suggests that
the inner grace and truth which precede and inform notions of beauty show by their own
nature their origin and goal in Christ. Behind the depth of MacDonald’s vision of beauty,
colour and form is the perception that these are mediated and interpreted by Christ, the
source and meaning of all interpretation and life, without whom vision and interpretation
remain lifeless and meaningless. This is made clear in his characterization of that belief,
in the person of Mysie in Robert Falconer (p220):
....he had taught his daughter next to nothing. Being his child, he had the vague 
feeling that she inherited his wisdom.. .the result in Mysie’s case would be this -  not 
that she would call evil good and good evil, but that she would take the beautiful for 
the true and the outer shows of goodness for goodness itself -  not the worst result, 
but bad enough, and involving an awful amount of suffering...all will acknowledge 
it of the woman; it is as true of the man...
It is in this way that MacDonald does not become a pantheist256, for ‘grace’ interpreting 
creation is the personal grace of God in Christ, and retains and informs the individual form 
of all things, but without treating them as ‘things in themselves’. While this treating 
things as ‘things in themselves’ seems initially attractive, and a sign that the symbolic 
mode is being followed, it does, however, seem to lead to the loss of the possibility of the 
mediation of Christ as the head of creation, one who mediates beauty and identity, and so 
it results in a loss of meaning of the ‘things in themselves’.
It is in this way that the twin emphases on the aesthetic or doctrinal nature of truth as 
essential and prior to personal ‘grace’ are related to one another. And so it should be clear 
that MacDonald’s theology, like Campbell’s, is not the result of sentimentality, but of a 
firm belief in the priority of grace -  that which is freely given by God to creation.
In MacDonald’s resistance to the protestantism of his day, as is the case with Campbell, he 
is able to escape the loss of this ‘headship’ over creation and solidarity with humanity, 
while yet not reverting back to the medieval separation of grace and nature which had
256 He seem s often to take a s  his lead the kind of ‘picturing’ (that of things observed in nature) 
used by St Athanasius, who in De Incarnatione says: “His being in everything does not m ean 
that he shared the nature of everything...the sun is not defiled by the contact of its rays with 
earthly objects.”
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come to infect the new, Federal Calvinism. It is strange that he is most clearly catholic
when he is most true to the reformation. Indeed, as we noted when thinking about
philosophy, he shows himself to be well aware of this post-Calvinist tendency to
‘presuppose’ in the pre-reformation writers (‘Browning’s “Christmas Eve’” Orts, p207):
For a man to theorize theologically in any form, while he has not so apprehended 
Christ, or to neglect the gazing on him for the attempt to substantiate to himself any 
form of belief respecting him, is to bring on himself, in a matter of divine import, 
such errors as the expounders of nature in old time brought on themselves, when 
they speculated on what a thing must be, instead of observing what it was; this 
“must be” having for its foundation....notions whose chief strength lay in their 
preconception... .there are thoughts and feelings that cannot be called up in the mind 
by any power of will or force of imagination...
This ‘gazing’ is not the observation of Goethe (an assessing look) but the individual 
relation of the mind with the God who sees and gifts his ‘seeing’ as it is mediated in 
Christ. This is what informs and is prior to the working of the imagination (for God to 
“think us” requires submission to, and acknowledgment of, the prior action of God). The 
imagination, then, is not seen as the initial primeval link with God which transcends 
nature. It emerges as a secondary relation but, nevertheless, in its symbolic, ‘covenant’ 
grounding a retains a more substantial affinity with creation through the mediation of the 
humanity and meaning of the Christ-self. That affinity is always and only possible 
through the mediation of Christ, the Meaning of creation. We can see why MacDonald is 
careful then to distinguish the creation of God -  “that calling of things out of nothing” 
from the imagination of the artist, who discovers and presents those things by means of an 
inner work of grace.
When Chesterton sees MacDonald, then, as somehow putting the ‘colour’ back into the 
religion of his day, he has good grounds, yet not the medieval tendency in philosophy 
which is often thought to accompany his work and such colour in literature. We see also, 
then, that MacDonald’s ‘medieval’ tendency is not so old as those “expounders of nature 
in old time” he mentions in his essay, and to whom Chesterton alludes, but is linked more 
to the ‘old’ reformation -  the one in which Luther takes part in his concern with reform of 
the church, rather than with revolt against the church, as becomes the case with later 
‘reformations’. It is also what enables MacDonald to uncover once more the true heart of 
Falconer’s grandmother’s Calvinism, instead of merely revolting against it. We have 
already seen in his comments in his novels how MacDonald remains true to this
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‘reforming’ model, while refusing the term ‘protestant’; never abandoning the church, 
despite his despair about its state.
Fatherhood
The mediation and prior existence of grace, then, as it informs the imagination, is also 
linked to the seeing of God as Father, for Christ’s mediation is one of sonship. This is 
why, although the imagination is entirely grace-informed, it is yet stronger in its familial 
connection than it is in the analogical sense, which does not allow for the role of grace so 
much in its tendency towards self-sufficiency. Both McLeod Campbell and MacDonald 
refer to God as ‘the Father of Lights’. Not a sentimental emotion or euphemism, but one 
which is a deliberate affirmation of the character of God as primarily that of Father. It is 
an expression of the priority of grace; of their free choice of concrete participation in 
Christ’s sonship, which comes through his universal solidarity with and redemption of the 
human race . And, again, this universal redemption is not turned into universal salvation, 
as Greville MacDonald insists was not the case. It is not something which detracts from 
the struggle and demand implicit in believing and acting upon such a relation; but 
nevertheless causes both thinkers to view the entire human race (and in the case of 
MacDonald, even flowers) as brothers and sisters. Like his description of death as 
‘sleeping’, MacDonald is taking care to accurately express what he believes to be true 
about the nature of grace-informed reality. This is borne out by the fact that in Lilith, 
rather than projecting his ‘own’ reality onto an unreal world, Vane comes to doubt the 
nature of his own reality as he has hitherto understood it, but is reassured, by Hope 
personified, of the existence of that which is real because it is informed by grace -  the 
revelatory nature of perception.
Light
Campbell, in speaking of light in the following passage, refers to God’s character as 
mediated through such grace, rather than relying on his own prior definition of light. It is 
somewhat similar to Anselm’s “believing in order to understand”, but differentiates
257 W e can se e  here also the theological context for MacDonald’s  notion of the imagination a s  
being that which bears w itness to a  familial connection to the Father, the familial connection 
being noted a s  that which com m unicates living meaning. This is its primary characteristic, 
and m akes the notion of the power of the imagination and the analogical connection 
secondary.
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between this concept of light as grace and “unreasoning faith” (The Nature o f the 
Atonement, pi 7):
We believe that God is, that God is light, that it is His will that in His light we 
should see light (my italics). We, therefore, cannot recognise, in the questioning and 
controversy which abound, a reason for suspended faith or universal doubt on the 
one hand, or for an unreasoning and blind faith on the other.258
We see here how ‘inner’ and ‘outer’ light correspond because of an act of divine will, 
which we cannot go behind, to find the cause of, but which can be shown to exhibit 
harmony with the rational mind. The issue of “blindness” in relation to light is important 
to define here, for in Alec Forbes Blind Tibbie’s inability to distinguish between death and 
resurrection is not the sign of a blind faith, but of a faith which is informed by God’s light, 
rather than by the natural light of reason or by natural sight (which it does not belittle). 
MacDonald, in his essay on the imagination, makes it clear that he believes that the 
intellect must struggle to be in harmony with such a light; but must not seek to ‘order’ 
grace. Reason -  as we noted -  is perceived here as a working out o f  that grace or light 
rather than a working out from that grace or light in terms of intellect alone. Such an 
approach is bound to conclude with a ‘something’ which posits itself as a thing or end in 
itself and therefore as higher than its purported origin. The light of nature, when taken as 
determinative of what things ‘must be’, tends to a fixed repose which MacDonald avoids 
at all costs; it tends to a paralysing effect on both the imagination and the intellect, in 
denying that grace which is its own vitality -  that which originally brings it into being. It 
cannot ‘go behind’ that grace to something higher259. This attempt to ‘go behind’ grace 
can be seen in Bonhoeffer’s approach to the story of the fall, as dealing essentially with a 
religious impulse which comes about because of the false separation of nature and grace. 
We shall consider it briefly, before considering ‘The Light Princess’ in relation to McLeod 
Campbell’s atonement theology.
258 Campbell, like MacDonald, also speaks frequently of the ‘harmonizing’ gift of light, s e e  The 
Nature of the Atonement, p30, for example.
259Bonhoeffer, in his Creation and Temptation also com es to this tendency to the wish to ‘go 
behind’ grace; it is the questioning of God’s  being from the standpoint of independent being, 
rather than the direct add ress of one’s question to God. It seem s to correlate in literary critical 
term s with a  judgem ent upon the text a s  opposed to the interpretation of its meaning, and this 
would m ake it an interesting comparison with the em ergence and m ethods of historical 
criticism in relation to literary criticism.
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The image of God, Imagination and knowledge of God in Bonhoeffer’s Creation and 
Temptation.
In the chapter entitled ‘The Religious Question’, Bonhoeffer notes the nature of this
‘religious’ temptation, which posits the intellect as higher than God (p66):
The serpent asks: “Did God say, “You shall not eat...?” The serpent does not 
dispute this word but it enables man to catch sight of a hitherto unknown profundity 
in which he would be in the position to establish or dispute whether a word is the 
Word of God...The decisive point is that this question suggests to man that he 
should go behind the Word of God and establish what it is by himself, out of his 
understanding of the being of God... it knows that it only has power where it claims 
to come from God...it is evil only as the religious serpent...but with the first 
religious question in the world evil has come upon the scene.
Since Campbell and MacDonald are dealing with the question of the atonement of Christ, 
God’s living Word and Revelation, any interpretation or plan of salvation which does not 
see Christ as its sole, undisputed source of knowledge of God is making this same move. 
Even that approach which takes the Bible before or instead of the revelation of Christ260. 
And it is the most religious who are tempted to make such a move, as were those sincere 
and agonising Federal Calvinists. The central need to establish independent grounds for 
belief comes about through the lack of trust, not the lack of knowledge. This is what Vane 
is coming to learn about his existence.
Interestingly -  especially in relation to Lilith and notions of life and death - the tree of
knowledge is related to death by the creator, as Bonhoeffer notes in the story of the Fall,
but to life by the serpent. The serpent promises that “You will be like God, knowing good
and evil.” Bonhoeffer goes on (p70):
It is true that man becomes sicut deus (like God) through the Fall, but this very man 
sicut deus can live no longer; he is dead....’’You will not die!” “You shall die!” In 
these two statements the world gapes asunder for Adam.
Bonhoeffer goes on to distinguish between:
Imago dei -  Godlike man in his existence for God and neighbour, in his primitive 
creatureliness and limitation...man bound to the Word of the Creator and living 
from him, and sicut deus...godlike man in his out-of-himself knowledge of good 
and evil, in his limitlessness and his acting out of himself; in his underived 
existence; in his loneliness.
260 John 5:39,40: “You search the Scriptures, for in them you think you have eternal life; and 
these a re  they which testify of Me. But you are not willing to com e to Me that you may have 
life.”
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And he goes on to speak of (p71):
agnus dei -  the One who was sacrificed for man sicut deus, killing man’s false 
divinity in true divinity, the God-Man who restores the image of God.
Here, we clearly see how the giants and children in ‘The Giant’s Heart’, Vane and Lilith 
display this sicut deus tendency in their independent awareness of good and evil, and how 
MacDonald seeks to make the reader aware of this tendency in themselves, in his complication 
of the question, and his relating it to death. The tree of ‘The Giant’s Heart’ also brings home 
the relationship between human fallenness and this godlike ability to judge.
In relation to the imagination, we see how Lilith’s life as the imagination, separated from God 
and grace through its independence, loses its imago dei -  its connection to God as Father -  all 
becoming nightmarish and deathly in the midst of its desire for life. However, the little ones 
of Lilith display the wish to go back into the garden, to become imago dei, without 
acknowledging their sicut deus. They fear knowledge, and so prefer not to grow at all. 
Significantly this is related in Lilith to the eating of forbidden fruit (p65): “We were afraid he 
was growing, for he would not believe anything told him...!”, they say of the boy who has 
been eating apples, and who is destined to grow into a horrible giant. The knowledge of good 
and evil does exist, and the battle between knowledge and trust (or wisdom) cannot be avoided. 
Vane is made to feel that he should have educated these little ones. But such knowledge 
requires retranslation, reinterpretation through growth into the ‘Christ-self, agnus dei, 
exceeding, rather than reducing sicut deus, through the gifted ability to freely will the 
restoration of the imago dei relationship261. Faith and knowledge are required to co-exist. 
Such a co-existence of logic and faith seems impossible. It is this impossibility which requires 
the God-Man.
We can see also how MacDonald’s resistance to dualism as the final word comes about 
through this awareness that godlike discernment conflicts with imago dei. Perhaps he has 
formerly hoped that the imagination itself provides us with imago dei, because of its ‘imaging’ 
nature. However, he later comes to feel that the imagination itself requires the working of 
agnus dei in order to find its true glory. The shadow-self and the dark imagination is seen to
261 The Seaboard Parish: “The highest in man is neither his intellect nor his imagination nor 
his reason; all are inferior to his w ill....dependent upon it....his will m ust m eet God’s  -  a  will 
distinct from God’s  else  were no harmony possible...not the less, therefore, but the more, is 
all G od’s. For God creates in man the power to will His will...”
209
reflect this sicut deus of Bonhoeffer, then, while the emerging Christ-self exists to glorify God 
through its bringing the imagination back to a relationship with its Creator, whom it ‘images’, 
rather than attempting to be like.
Knowledge and Wisdom in Lilith
This ‘new’ wisdom, then, which can no longer be the old, primitive, pre-fallen trust and 
equally cannot be worldly-wisdom, requires a new approach by the artist (who is intimately 
involved with the act of ‘imaging’ the divine) and the theologian who seeks to ensure that 
knowledge is translated and informed by the grace and truth of agnus dei.
On p23 of The Nature o f the Atonement, Campbell says this:
Scientific minds...satisfied to take the facts of existence as they present themselves, 
regarding the contemplation of them as... revelations of a divine mind and as an exercise 
of speculative thought in which we have no sure footing.... it is not too much to say that 
what is thus rejected...is what the laws of thought necessitate...thus to stop short of God
is, we feel, to do violence to a deep instinct of our being it raises our faith to a divine
purpose.. ..to that will as the source of their existence. Here we come to the point at which 
we pass from that in God of which there is an image in man, to that which is distinctive of 
God as God.. .we pass from the relation of a reign of law to thought and design using law, 
to the relation of that reign to thought and design manifested in giving laws their 
existence....that capacity must be traced to wisdom....
He goes on further to say that (p24)
...we cannot lose the living God in the reign of law, if we freely yield ourselves to 
the necessary relations of thought in our meditation on that reign...still less I may 
say is this possible in regard to the moral world, although the tendency to rest in law 
without ascending to God is manifested in relation to moral law also...there is this 
difference between the laws of the moral universe and those of the physical 
universe. That we do not trace the existence of the former to an act of will in God, 
as we do that of the latter.. ..so the differences between the physical universe and the 
moral universe in respect of law is that the former we trace to the will of God, the 
latter to what God is...
It seems that here is a context for MacDonald’s comment about the taking of moral laws 
with us into our imaginary worlds, and for his treatment of this theme in ‘The Giant’s 
Heart’. He allows, as Campbell advises, not that the law tells us about itself as though it 
were a form of the knowledge of good and evil, but rather about its origin in its creator. 
Law is seen as a mediation of God’s will rather than as a method of assessing what is or is 
not God’s will. Here, MacDonald’s endless ‘spectrum’ of colour is seen as a promise 
about the will of God towards the physical universe, as it is mediated. The ‘ outward
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light’ of the physical universe and the deathliness of law as a ‘thing’, finds its true 
mediation in the ‘inner light’ of God’s mediation of his being in the moral law. The two 
are only related in that the ‘inner’ and ‘outer’ are related through the relation of the 
imagination with agnus dei. Hence Goethe’s comments about the ‘moral’ effect of 
colours. And so the fulfilment of the physical ultimately also finds itself in the being of 
God himself, but only through the mediation of God’s love -  this ‘inner light’ which, 
although it cannot be obtained through such outer ‘natural light’, nevertheless enables us 
to see the outward manifestation of those physical and moral laws in a new light not 
unharmonious with the natural light of reason. Imagination, then, has its source and end in 
the ‘new creation’ of grace, and an indissoluble debt to the realm of morality as the 
expression of the being of God, whose will brings us into ‘being’ and into the possibility 
of ‘being in grace’ in agnus dei.
In Lilith, it is the tendency of Vane to appropriate ‘outer light’ as though it would lead him 
to the essence of his own being in a way which would make him master of the physical 
universe. This results in a distortion not only of the imagination in relation to the physical 
universe (for Vane, like Lilith or the fallen shadow, comes to misunderstand his own 
‘being’ or existence, or the nature of his own world) but also in a distortion of the 
relationship between one’s own will and the will of God; one’s being and the being of 
God. Further, such a taking of ‘outer’ light as its own end (the seeking for knowledge as 
an end in itself, or as a ‘power’) results in the inability to find out what it is that the ‘inner’ 
light mediates as to “what God is”, since it is not concerned to be led towards light or 
grace, but merely to master its mystery. It therefore finds God against itself, in the 
absence of a mediation through grace of God’s character as love. Lilith’s will therefore -  
the mastery and subjugation of her inner light or grace -  comes to its natural end in seeing 
God as ‘enemy’; her will works in revolt against her own being, and as sicut deus she lives 
unwillingly in relation to God as the source of her being. We see, then, that MacDonald 
relates the physical to the moral, as does Campbell, and also makes the same distinction 
between them, but describes in Lilith how it is that they may also act upon one another in 
destructive ways.
Campbell’s location of the apprehension of God’s being is characterised as Wisdom, the 
female figure in Lilith represented by Mara, who indicates the link between suffering and 
wisdom. We see how MacDonald’s use of the ancient female figure of ‘wisdom’, as do
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many of his old testament or ‘old’ covenant references, accentuates Campbell’s insistence 
on the equal priority of grace as wisdom in the old covenant and as prior to the ‘natural’ 
light of reason. Further the female personification also differentiates and distances the 
source of wisdom from the intellect or reason alone, by virtue of making them female 
characteristics as opposed to male. MacDonald therefore seems to be ‘imaging’ 
Campbell’s wording. One third effect of this female and suffering image is that he locates 
wisdom in female ‘foolishness’; wisdom in suffering, rather than in mastery, and so 
remains true to ideas of grace found in both the old testament and the new, where the wise 
suffering of Christ is seen as foolishness by sicut deus, but as the expression of God’s 
wisdom by Imago dei. This does not create a dichotomy between such ‘wisdom’ and 
reason itself, but only becomes a ‘stumbling block’ where reason posits itself as the 
location of wisdom, and denies wisdom its primary place as preceding creation itself.
One word which we have been using a lot is ‘grace’, and central to the idea of grace is the 
notion of a gift; a free gift which is implied in the term ‘covenant’ and which, while it 
entails consequences for the receiver (a concern to attain towards this gift of ‘being in 
grace’), remains in itself entirely free. The sense of obligation or ‘duty’ on the part of the 
receiver comes from an apprehension of worth of the gift and does not precede or 
condition the free giving of the gift itself. ‘Duty’ cannot then be sufficient to define the 
essential attitude of the religious believer towards the giver of such a gift. Just as morality 
cannot be taken as a sufficient expression of our relationship to God, when treated as a 
‘thing in itself. The little-considered concept of grace is essential, both to MacDonald 
and to Campbell. Its misunderstanding had led to the related misunderstanding of 




In her book Sacrifice and the death o f Christ, Young looks at the way in which sacrifice 
has been interpreted in ancient and various traditions, and considers the interpretations 
which have affected the Judaic understanding of sacrifice. She calls for understanding of 
the Jewish sacrifice rather than for alienation from it, because of its association with 
corrupted ideas. She begins with an overview of the traditions of sacrifice in general and 
their rationale(s). In pagan religions, she identifies the Votive offering (a form of bribe); 
the idea of a placation or propitiation of an angry god and also thanksgiving sacrifices, 
which reflect a ‘giving back’ to the god of what has been given. There are also aversion 
sacrifices to ward off evil. She discerns that many of these interpretations have been 
imported into the Christian concept of Christ’s death as sacrifice. Further, she notes that 
the prophets of the Old Testament frequently speak of the unsatisfactory nature of such 
attitudes in the offering of sacrifices.
However Young also notes in the Judaic tradition sacrifices which denote a more personal 
relationship: The communion sacrifice -  an early version, which denoted the participation 
of God with the eating of the sacrifice; sin-offerings, which are seen as provided by God 
himself; the Passover, which stressed the saving acts of God as merciful and the Day of 
Atonement -  a kind of ‘super’ sin offering. They are acts which express God’s character 
towards the human being, rather than representing attempts by the human to ‘buy’ God’s 
attention or love. It is the Atonement offering which is most often alluded to in the 
Christian interpretation.
At various times, Young notes, the motives behind sacrificing become confused in the 
histories of religious thought. The most common misunderstanding, she suggests, was the 
result of the importation of pagan imagery in terms of aversion or propitiation, to interpret 
the death of Christ in only one or two verses within the New Testament. When Christ’s 
sacrifice is seen in such a way, it is seen to be ‘changing’ the mind of God, rather than
262 “Let us em phasise the word “gift.” Between on the one hand this denial that involves 
renouncing the self... the generosity of the gift that m ust withdraw, hide, in fact sacrifice itself 
in order to give, and on the other hand the repression that would transform the gift into an 
econom y of sacrifice, is there not a  secre t affinity, an unavoidable risk of contamination of two 
possibilities a s  close one to the other a s  they are  different from each  other?” {The Gift of 
Death, p31). So close, in fact, that the receiving of the one by the Christ-self, and the 
subduing of the ‘shadow -self from its tendency to adopt instead an econom y of sacrifice m ust 
be an act of God every time it occurs.
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representing an attitude which has always remained the same -  the attitude of divine love 
towards the human. The enmity of God comes to be understood as an emotion of God in 
anthropocentric terms, rather than a sad state in the relationship between God and man, 
because of his becoming sicut deus, which God is himself concerned to break down. And 
so the death of Christ comes to be seen as that which changes or placates God’s being, 
rather than as that which represents most fully the concern of God to mediate his true 
being in relation to humanity, and to conquer the state of enmity. For enmity is the 
original false state of being sicut deus.
Young notes that the early Christian church was seen by religions as atheistic because of 
the ending of the concept of sacrifice as being that which changes the attitude of God or 
the gods. We can see, then, how Lilith’s perception of God as enemy is linked to this 
misunderstanding of atonement in the church which has arisen precisely because of the 
reliance on false preconceptions in the human mind (rather than on grace) which 
preconceptions are themselves the result of such a state of enmity.
Misunderstanding of atonement theology
Campbell is especially concerned to correct this ancient confusion as it is inherited by the 
Federal Calvinist tradition, which says that forgiveness is not prior to repentance; that 
Christ is not the mediation of God’s love; but the propitiation of his anger. In such a 
theology the emphasis comes to be upon the anger of God and the attention of the 
individual diverted to a fearful attitude which results in a questioning as to whether 
forgiveness is truly granted. It is one where repentance is sought for in itself as a sign of 
forgiveness, rather than being experienced as a natural response to the gift of forgiveness 
or of grace. And so the need within oneself to feel accepted is caused by and becomes 
overwhelmed by the need for repentance, and psychologically blocks its possibility 
through fear. In such a movement the attention is taken from God’s character and placed 
upon the human character in such a way that it denies in practice the love of God for 
which it seeks, and hides the nature of the atonement as being that which enables such fear 
to be overcome. Campbell argues that what is needed is for the individual to stop looking 
anxiously within for signs and evidences of grace (the assurance of the pagan aversion 
sacrifice), and to begin to see forgiveness as the free gift which makes possible 
repentance; and which makes it therefore a joy rather than a fearful duty.
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The theology of the overview of the ‘plan’ results in an emphasis on looking for ‘the
work’ which Christ has done, instead of a gazing upon the character and death of Christ
himself as testifying to his own identity as the God-man; fully breaking down the enmity
between God and the human being. So the ‘works’ of Christ come to be more important
than Christ himself in such a scheme. The ground of one’s own being is removed through
this concern with ‘selfhood’, rather than being affirmed through the mediation of the
‘Christ-self of whom MacDonald speaks. It is such a ‘shadow-self, however, in his
fiction, which serves some purpose in allowing the person to see that the source of their
inner light does not lie within themselves, but upon the existence of a light beyond and
behind the colours of its promise; colours which are illuminated by this promise and
attract the attention away from the ‘shadow self, for (Lilith, p240):
...without a substance, a shadow cannot be -  yea, or without a light behind the 
substance....
Torrance, in his introduction to Campbell’s book, speaks of Jung’s insights into the
healing of neurosis, in which he speaks of Jesus Christ as functioning “in western society
as the numinous paradigm of wholeness (the integrated self)”. However, the stress which
Jung lays upon the ‘function’ rather than the person of Christ repeats the mistake where it
caused the neurosis emerging from the response to Calvinist doctrine. It seems that this
neurotic tendency is particularly what MacDonald has in mind, in his characterisations of
selfhood distorted, stunted or incomplete, through an inadequate understanding of the
‘grace-informed’ nature of reality and being. Lilith herself is characterised as being in the
hell of knowing only herself, rather than the light. The culmination of this comes in the
moment in which she recognises her self-creation as fictional and yet determining her
character, in contrast to the reality of selfhood as grace, presented as a gift (p204):
....before her, cast from unseen heavenly mirror, stood the reflection of herself, and 
beside it a form of splendent beauty. She trembled.. .she knew the one that God had 
intended her to be, the other that she had made herself.
The same quality of nightmarish existence is found as characteristic of the loss of faith in 
other romantic literature. In The Romantic Period in Germany, the writer notes (p8) that
263 This does not alter the fact that the light is “for her”. Campbell notes (p261) what Lilith 
explores “...the great mystery of combined dependence and independence, a s  presented by 
our relation to God -  the mystery implied in the fact that in God we live, and move, and have 
our being, and yet that we may be the opposite of what God wills us to b e ... .”
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.. .when.. .faith proved unattainable, the world could take on a nightmare quality and 
Romantic heroes could fall prey to a nihilism....
Torrance notes that the model which comes to characterise a mistaken view of Christian 
selfhood is the appropriation-centred model which, like Federal Calvinism, lays stress 
upon the personal benefits and being of the individual in ‘appropriating’ Christ. This 
stands in contrast to the object-centred model, which concentrates upon the ‘other’ in the 
relationship, following St Paul’s summons to be baptized into Christ’s death, and giving 
priority to God’s activity in Christ, the Christ-self as MacDonald might put it. The parallel 
to the appropriation-centred model in religious thought may be found in apparently non­
religious thinking, wherever stress is laid on the idea that selfhood is determined through 
the appropriation of ‘things’ which seem meaningful and contribute to the fictional ‘self. 
It is found also in the medieval, pre-reformation concept of selfhood as presented in poetry 
which uses a ‘listing’ method of concrete things in order to describe and characterise the 
person.
Selfhood and nihilism
Further, in the appropriation-centred model, faith comes to be viewed as a ‘thing in itself, 
as evidence not of things hoped for, but as separate evidence of one’s own standing or 
salvation, and so paradoxically loses its ‘substantial’, relational quality. Rather than as 
“the substance of things hoped for, the evidence of things not seen”264, faith is seen as a 
form of assent, no longer a substantial connection to, and gift of, the person of Christ, 
linking God and the human being. Here McLeod Campbell was also truer to Luther’s 
view of faith as righteousness -  the righteousness communicated by Christ, rather than as 
some separate ‘evidence’ of righteousness. Such a belief in faith as a ‘thing unto or in 
itself parallels the ideas about truth, knowledge, beauty or selfhood as ‘things in 
themselves’ which become separated from one another and distorted in such a process. In 
Robert Falconer, the doctrine of imputed righteousness is also distorted by such a view of 
faith, in that it denies faith its substantial relationship with righteousness, and relies on a 
fictional concept of Christ’s death as being one where God pretends to see Christ’s 
righteousness as ours. It contains the idea that one can ‘hide behind’ Christ’s death
264 Hebrews 11:1
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instead of taking part in it as a real and ‘gifted’ death of false selfhood; (Robert Falconer, 
p298):
...not the imputed righteousness of another... that is a lying doctrine... but their own
righteousness, which God has wrought in them by Christ.
In turn, the ‘giving up’ of one’s fictional selfhood is no longer perceived to be a separate 
sacrifice or a mere duty or obligation, but rather becomes a joyful demonstration that one’s 
selfhood can only be ‘gifted’ in the first place. In the lack of such a conviction, faith 
becomes inward looking, denying its nature, and binds the thinker to its ‘self rather than 
moving outwards to a view of all humanity as re-informed by the grace of Christ. And so 
neurosis develops into loss of the self in this separation of attributes and the killing of 
them by treating them merely as ‘things’ to be mastered en route to the attainment of 
identity -  an identity which loses its own ground and becomes a fictional nihilism. So we 
come also to see the relationship between nihilism and Federal Calvinism as both 
symptomatic of that ‘nothingness’ of ‘things in themselves’ which posit themselves as 
things or as a ‘nothing’ which precedes or succeeds, and so separates itself from the 
influence of grace. The negative way or theology of MacDonald, in Lilith, becomes 
illustrative of the painful route often taken towards grace in the development of religious 
thinking. Not-grace cannot precede grace, ‘nothingness’ becomes simply non-being -  for 
which Lilith longs -  but a fiction which must admit its fictionality and so eventually turn 
towards grace as its origin and ground of being. It must cease to attempt death on its own 
terms or it ‘dies’ as reality. Death as it presents itself as a separate ‘nothingness’ or as the 
end of reality is therefore rendered a fiction, since it must be preceded by grace or lose its 
power of reality. It must become -  by the acceptance of its gifted nature, a good, real and 
gifted death. The alternative is only that it continues to exist as a nightmarish fiction 
which has no ‘being’ and therefore cannot truly die. This is one interpretation of death 
and nihilism in relation to the mistaken development of atonement theology and its 
associated philosophy of knowledge as it is foreseen and looked back on in Lilith.
The tendency to evade grace in religious thought
Vane, however, must also accept the mystery of his relationship to God as the grounds of 
his being as an act of grace mediated through faith. And so, although he becomes aware 
of the fact that death as ‘end’ is challenged by its own nature, resurrection as ‘end’ in 
terms of the final word of history cannot be deduced either as a logical necessity of being,
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but is different from nihilism in that exists in the wisdom of hope as opposed to the denial 
of wisdom through self-knowledge. That female figure, Wisdom, is one who in the 
Biblical literature is present before the world was formed out of ‘nothingness’.
And just as ‘nothingness’ cannot offer a challenge to the wisdom of Mara, who exists 
before it, so ‘being’ as understood by one who is himself created being cannot claim any 
privileged ground o f its own from which to challenge this nihilism. Both are preceded by 
grace. The wisdom which challenges nihilism is itself ‘gift’, but one whose relationship 
with God exists outwith - before -  the existence of the world of self-conscious history in 
the realm of mystery, and is mediated through faith alone. As such, it cannot inform Vane 
or MacDonald in a way which can be appropriated by the imagination to make it work for 
a venture of that being’s own conceiving. We see this in Vane’s failed attempt to adopt 
the vision of Isaiah and make it work in confirmation of his own being. Such a vision 
remains entirely apocalyptic in its challenge to reality. And perhaps this provides the 
most and only appropriate context for MacDonald’s final and apocalyptic sense of the 
direction in which grace-informed reality tends as it is expressed in that novel, in the end 
of the human imagination and the beginning of its own end in the divine265, end of Lilith: 
“Our life is no dream, but it should and will perhaps become one.”
‘The Light Princess’
In this story, in particular, we can see a complete illustration of the attitude which is 
characteristic of exactly the subject-centred atonement theology with which Campbell was 
wrestling. MacDonald provides a psychological illustration of this state of mind, which 
consists in a lack of recognition of identity of, or responsibility towards the ‘other’. In the 
story, we are introduced to a Princess who has no gravity (perhaps this is equated with
265 Perhaps, then, he is changing the em phasis upon what is noted by McGillis, but in more 
theological terms: “...M acDonald’s  prose suggests that Fane has recovered reality, attained 
identity, which -  a s  Frye tells us -  has 'som e connection with a state of existence in which 
there is nothing to write about’. (T he Lilith M anuscripts’, 1975). This is an apprehension of a 
s ta te  of existence in which there is nothing to write about, yet the task  of writing clearly m ust 
go on, beyond and outwith the fulfilment of MacDonald’s  personal vision in its being taken up 
into the realms of apocalyptic vision -  for the task of the reader has only just begun a t the end 
of Lilith -  he is send back to the start -  every new interpretation m ust culminate in an 
apocalypse of identity for the reader, or it becom es locked into the nightmarish cycle of logic, 
and of V ane’s  experience inside of time. This is also borne out by McGillis’s further com m ent 
in the essay  (p51) that in the manuscript Lilith B, “MacDonald s tre sse s  V ane’s  resistance to 
learning” (or perhaps a  better work would be wisdom -  for learning a s  a  ‘thing in itself is 
clearly not the aim.
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responsibility). She discovers, however, that she can relieve the symptoms of this lack of
gravity temporarily by swimming in water. Her ‘lightness’ is not a true happiness because
it does not correspond to a genuine gravity, however, for (p24)
.. .only in her laugh there was something missing. What it was, I find myself unable 
to describe. I think it was a certain tone, depending on the possibility of 
sorrow...she never smiled.
We can note here that this is different to the lack of smile of Falconer’s grandmother; 
which is related to the ‘deepness’ of the smile of the child in ‘The Golden Key’. Here the 
lack is a true lack, that which has not yet apprehended the nature of the Prince’s sacrifice 
and the meaning of the ‘water’ of salvation, rather than reflecting an inability to express 
that reality. Whereas the absence of smiles in these other two characters are portraits of 
something inexpressible or represent the suppression of symbolism with regard to the 
death and life of Christ, the Princess may be more closely aligned to another outcome of 
the same distorted atonement theology, James Hogg’s Wringhim in his The Private 
Memoirs and Confessions o f a Justified Sinner. In the novel, the result of the theology is 
an antinomian tendency to feel that one’s inner state (or gravity) is unimportant. All that 
matters is that, because of Christ’s death and forgiveness, we are free to do exactly what 
we like without conscience. The ‘outer’ world is utterly divorced from the ‘inner’ in this 
tendency.
The Princess’s concentration on her own well-being and utter lack of regard for the
Prince’s suffering which brings it to her seem characteristic of the problems found in the
subject-centred theology:
When the princess heard that a man had offered to die for her, she...danced about 
the room for joy.. .she did not care who the man was; that was nothing to her. The 
hole wanted stopping; and if only a man would do, why, take one.
There are a number of further motifs in the story which confirm that it is the atonement 
theory of ‘imputed righteousness’ found in Robert Falconer which is on MacDonald’s 
mind. The characters of Hum-Drum and Kopy-Keck, the Chinese metaphysicians who are 
called in to solve the princess’s problem are interpreted by the notes as being an allusion 
to Hume and Kant, materialists and metaphysicians alike who try to explain the nature of 
being and whose thinking is reflected in the ‘natural light’ which Federal Calvinism relies 
upon to explain the ‘plan’ of salvation. In Robert Falconer, MacDonald makes his own
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interpretation of such Chinese Puzzlers as are found in ‘The Light Princess’, where the
subject is, specifically, the view of atonement (p99)
...nor was it as the Chinese puzzlers called Scotch metaphysicians, might have 
represented it...
Further on in the story, the allusions become stronger. In the feeding of the bits of biscuit
and wine to the Prince as he is dying, we find a distinct reference to the Eucharist. Then,
in a reference to the Garden of Gethsemane, where Christ asks the disciples to stay awake
with him, the Prince of MacDonald’s story says
...now for your own sake...I cannot let you go to sleep. You must sit and look at 
me....
Finally the Prince dies, “ ...the bubbles of his last breath bubbled up through the water....” 
And the image here is very powerful, and the implications profound, for it is seen that it is 
the distorted religious impulse itself; the concentration upon the ‘water’ of salvation, 
which has caused the death of the Prince...a demand for death which is fed by the self­
ishness and lack of gravity of the Princess and of the wider people of that land; their lack 
of responsibility. No-one from that country volunteers to die and the Prince comes from a 
different country.
It is, however, through an awakened love for the Prince that the Princess at last gains a 
gravity which has more to with “...this rain indoors” which was “far more wonderful than 
the rain out of doors”. Here, MacDonald seems to be presenting us with a more thorough 
link between gravity and an ‘inner’ transformation. It is one which illuminates and 
corresponds with a wider ‘outer’ reality of water in general, but which illustrates an 
atonement theology which concentrates upon the inner growth and gift of grace (the tears), 
rather than upon the appropriation without responsibility of the benefits of this mysterious 
grace266. It is the knowledge of a personal -  and sacrificial love, rather than hearsay about
266 Bearing in mind what we noted earlier about the little ones of Lilith in relation to 
Bonhoeffefs thinking on the impossibility of simply returning (via som e short cut) to the state 
of imago dei of the Garden of Eden without this inner transformation, we should note how 
they, too, have never experienced this 'inner1 water, and are am azed a t V ane’s  tears. 
Perhaps they are associated with the simple trust (still applauded by MacDonald, a s  any 
attitude of trust is), which dares not to radically question itself, and does not grow much from 
asse n t into personal faith, but is ill-equipped to deal with the ‘giants’ of the age. It is 
nevertheless these  little o n es who call forth the tears  from Vane. Interestingly, they have a 
‘general assem bly’, with the allusion, perhaps, to the general assem bly of the Church of 
Scotland here (p63): “now and then they would call a general assem bly to am use m e...on  
one such occasion a moody little fellow sang m e a song that...caused  the tears to run down 
my fa ce ...”
220
the results of a distant sacrifice, which causes the response of love and the gravity (or 
responsibility) in the Princess herself.
McLeod Campbell’s motivation for writing his book about the nature of the atonement 
was mainly to do with the lack of joy he discovered amongst his parishioners, who were 
constantly worrying about whether or not they were elect, and were either forced into 
despair, or into an inflated assurance based on the perception of their own ‘good’ works as 
evidence of their salvation, or into the cavalier attitude of Hogg’s Wringhim (The Private 
Memoirs and Confessions o f a Justified Sinner), treating the atonement as a work to free 
him from guilt, rather than as a statement about the nature of selfhood in relation to God. 
It is this last effect of that theological interpretation which seems to be dealt with in ‘The 
Light Princess’ by MacDonald, as its many other effects are dealt with in Robert Falconer 
and elsewhere in his work.
In 1831 Campbell was deposed from the ministry of the Church of Scotland because of his 
insistence that Christ died for all; a universal expression of God’s love for the entire 
human race. He then continued to preach up until 1870 in an independent church in 
Blackfriars Street. His theology has since been re-adopted by the church as more truly 
reflecting the work of the atonement.
In contrast to the anxious seeking for an assurance of Christian selfhood, both Campbell’s 
and MacDonald’s work was concerned with finding descriptions of the way in which 
Christ’s identity is transforming of all previous notions of selfhood. They did not, 
however, conceive of this transformation in terms of a loss of connection with the material 
world, but rather as a work of grace which is seen as the basis of human ‘being’. 
Accordingly, they affirm identity through familial imagery -  brotherhood, sisterhood, 
fatherhood and sonship - seeing it as primarily relational. Just as the work of the intellect, 
of reason, or of imagination similarly finds the identity ‘being’ its true self only when its 
creaturely, yet divinely connected, nature is mediated to itself from a relationship with 
some, greater ‘other’.
We shall look at the nature of the identity of bodies next in more detail, in terms of 
Graham Ward’s thoughts about Christian identity in relation to the body of Christ as 
illuminating the mediation of Christian identity.
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B. ‘The Golden Key’, Goethe’s Colour Theory and Graham Ward’s ‘The Displaced 
body of Jesus Christ’
Radical Orthodoxy
In their book of essays, having the above title, Ward, Milbank and Pickstock in the 
introduction speak of their return to a certain orthodoxy, and of its avoiding certain pitfalls 
in the wake of secularisation (p2):
...both Protestant biblicism and post-tridentine Catholic positivist authoritarianism 
are seen as aberrant results of theological distortions already dominant even before the 
early modem contemporary theological project, (they argue of their theology that)
...it does not, like liberal theology, transcendentalist theology and even certain styles 
of neo-orthodoxy seek...to shore up universal accounts of immanent human value 
(humanism) nor defences of supposedly objective views. But nor does it indulge...in 
a baptism of nihilism in the name of a misconstmed negative theology...(it) may 
indeed hover close to nihilism, since it, also, refuses a reduction of the
indeterminate... yet distances itself from it in its proposal of the rational possibility
and the faithfully perceived actuality, of an indeterminacy that is no impersonal chaos 
but infinite interpersonal harmonious order, in which time participates
In this section it is argued that MacDonald has such a ‘radical orthodoxy’: also coming 
near to a negative theology; also refusing to reduce the indeterminate; also celebrating an 
harmonious order in which time participates. In particular, we shall look at Ward’s essay 
in relation to the body of Christ, and how such a theology relates to MacDonald’s fiction 
and thinking.
Introduction
Many of MacDonald’s works of fiction seem to take place in an ‘in-between’ time or 
times. For example, in MacDonald’s short story ‘The Shadows’, Ralph Rinkelman is 
enabled to see the shadows only as he nears death, and those tales where the protagonists 
come across the strange new definitions of things in another world occur when they are 
journeying between stages of life and moving into a greater sense of life by means of a 
series of deaths or baptisms. Vane’s journey is also one in which his ideas about ‘ends’ 
and ‘beginnings’, about reality and his own desires and identity are all destabilised. These 
‘in-between’ ventures into fairyland are all about the destabilisation of common 
conceptions of corporeality, time, ethics and identity itself, by way of a gap or space.
This destabilisation should be linked first to MacDonald’s concern about the way in which 
Christian identity is portrayed within the church, and it allies him to McLeod Campbell.
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MacDonald’s feeling, as we have seen repeatedly, is that the church -  both the universal 
church, which finds its identity in the body of Christ; and the churches, which seek to 
grow into that identity -  must come to understand the nature of corporeality and identity in 
terms of this destabilisation and in terms of a certain new understanding of bodiliness.
His fiction, then, does not function as apocalyptic in the sense that the ‘apocalypse’ is to 
do with some distant, eschatological horizon or final revelation, the content of which is 
taken for granted. Instead, by making use of ‘in-between’ time (for example dusk, half- 
light, sleep and dreaming), it helps to reinterpret eschatology in such a way that it cannot 
be taken for granted, for it is also an apocalypse or uncovering of the ‘taken’ reality of 
things like bodies and time as defined by ‘natural light’, wherever they are perceived to be 
functioning -  prior to grace - as the mistaken basis for Christian eschatology. R F 
McGillis notes that in manuscripts B and C of Lilith, MacDonald actually uses the word 
‘eschatology’, but then drops it267. This shows that such things are on his mind, but also 
that he is concerned to distance his interpretation of Christian identity from theories about 
eschatology which are formed by ‘natural light’ and which claim to have some ‘extra’ 
knowledge of the overall plan outwith that which is personally revealed by a grace- 
informed destabilisation. Such an eschatology merely conditions or modifies ideas which 
exist in the present, whereas MacDonald’s interpretation of identity in Christ is that it must 
function as a destabilising symbol which apocalyptically transforms the present; bringing it 
into active conflict with other notions of identity which have at their base such a ‘natural’ 
understanding. He is not seeking to separate nature and grace, as we saw in the last 
section, but to bring this theo-logic of grace to bear on all areas of understanding, 
including theology and logic, so that a new harmony emerges which exceeds and informs 
logical argument. It should be clear by now, then, that we are not arguing that 
MacDonald’s work can only be understood by means of theology, but that theology itself, 
along with all other studies, stands under the judgment of this new economy of grace. We 
saw in the last section how his insistence on the importance of symbolic understanding in 
theological thought relates to his similarity with Campbell in insisting upon the symbol as 
expressing both a universal reordering of the concept of being (not merely an individual 
‘feeling’ or perception) which occurs as a result of Christ’s life and death. And this brings 
them both into conflict with the theology of their own time.
267 p56, T h e  Lilith M anuscripts’
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His fiction may be seen to function as an anticipation of the comments which will be made 
by Graham Ward, in his essay upon the interpretation of the “displaced” body of Christ. 
We will quote fully from its beginning, in order to introduce a basis for discussion of this 
essay:
Karl Barth announced that theology is always a post-resurrection phenomenon 
working within an eschatological horizon. Theology reads Scripture, the traditions 
of the Church and the world in the light of the glory of the Risen Christ in the space 
opened between that resurrection and our own. While not wishing to contradict that,
I want to argue for the place of the ascension in Christianity. This nascent theology 
of the ascension will... attempt to demonstrate, through this approach, how questions 
such as ‘Can a male Saviour save women?’ and modem investigations into the 
sexuality of Jesus, which simply continue the nineteenth century rational search for 
the historical Jesus, fail to discern the nature of corporeality in Christ. For these 
approaches take the human to be a measure o f the Christie... (my italics). I wish 
to argue that, since none of us has access to bodies as such, only to bodies that are 
mediated through the giving and receiving of signs, the series of displacements and 
assumptions of Jesus’s body continually refigures a masculine symbolics until the 
particularities of one sex give way....It traces the economy of the deferred identity 
of the body of the Messiah; an economy which becomes visible in a series of 
displacements.... 269
I wish to argue that the deferment of the presence of Christ’s body is clearly seen in Lilith, 
in relation to its being a novel about such a deferment of meaning which has radically 
destabilised Vane’s previous concepts about identity and sexuality and, indeed, has 
exposed the flaws in his previous apocalyptic ‘hopes’, where they are yet contaminated by 
the old, ‘natural’, interpretations of self-centred thinking and apparently apparent (yet 
preconceived) notions of reality. Further, MacDonald has shown in his essays that he has
• •  • 970paid specific attention to the way in which Christ’s body is presented in scripture .
We should note also that MacDonald himself will be aware of this nineteenth century 
search referred to by Ward, and is also finding that the insufficiency of this approach has
268 C hesterton’s  observation that in MacDonald’s  stories all people becom e kings, queens and 
princesses may be seen  to be emerging from a  vivid sen se  of a  potentially universal 
priesthood bestowed on humanity by Christ, which in turn m akes creation alive a s  it is 
perceived from the gaze  of such a  new humanity.
T h e  displaced body of Je su s  Christ’, Literature and Theology, p163,
270 For example, in his essay  on T h e  Resurrection’ (Miracles of our Lord, p431), he asks 
“Why w as this miracle needful? Perhaps, for one thing, that man should not limit Him, or 
them selves in Him, to the known forms of hum anity...that their instinctive desires....m ight 
thus be infinitely developed.” He says, further, in defence of his concentration upon the 
m anner of Christ’s  bodily appearance (p438): “Som e will object that this is a  too material view 
of life...in my theory, the spiritual both explains and accounts for the material.”
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its root in the distortion of atonement theology, namely the taking of ‘things in 
themselves’ by means of merely accepting them ‘as they appear to be’ in the natural light 
of reason. Both the nineteenth and twentieth century tendencies of thought to take the 
human as a given measure of reality are approaches which alike “take the human to be a 
measure of the Christie”, perhaps in justified reaction to the transcending tendencies of 
religious thought. Destabilisation is the very first movement towards disrupting such 
appearances. R F McGillis has noted that:
MacDonald shows a greater concern for states of being rather than for the more
771theological question of man and God.
However in this context we can see that in MacDonald’s last work of fiction, theological 
questions about apocalyptic vision and eschatology are just some among many which 
cannot be approached until the Christie has first become the measure and source of 
“being” itself, and none of these questions can be treated separately from one another on 
such a view.
Both Ward and MacDonald are looking at the gap, space, or in-between time in symbolic 
terms as indicating that there is something further to say about this reality in which we 
find ourselves.
Liminality and borders
The next concept which occurs in relation to both Ward’s and MacDonald’s thought is that
of liminality. Ward notes in the essay:
Displacement of identity itself, the expansion of the identified Word to embrace all 
that is other, becomes the mark of God within creation. Iconicity transcends 
physicality. It does not erase the physical but overwhelms it, drenching it with 
significance. The maleness of Christ is made complex and ambivalent, in the way 
that all things are made ambivalent as their symbolic possibilities are opened up by 
their liminality.
Ward speaks of the gradual withdrawing of Christ’s body in previously understood terms 
of ‘bodiliness’ as being marked by stages in the biblical narratives: Incarnation,
transfiguration272, crucifixion, resurrection and ascension. At each stage, previously
271 p56, T h e  Lilith M anuscripts’
272 in MacDonald’s  essay  on T h e  transfiguration’ (Miracles of Our Lord, p440) he notes 
particularly how light appears a s  the sign of life; an overflowing of life: “..except by violence I 
do not think the body of Je su s  could have d ied ...the transfiguration of Je su s  w as but the 
visible outbreak of a life so strong a s  to be life-giving, life-restoring. The flesh it could melt
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marked borders which have sought to contain and explain the identity of Christ are lifted 
away until, finally, a complete withdrawal allows for the symbol to be all-embracing, yet 
itself borderless; that which allows the ‘body’ of the church to grow and to identify with 
the body of Christ; and so with the borderless kingdom of heaven.
We can see the tendency in MacDonald’s fiction to move in the same direction. Firstly, in 
the way in which the characters of his stories grow and journey in relation to reality in 
strange ways, which model themselves on the Christie development, as we noted at the 
beginning of the section. Secondly, in the related emphasis on the liminality which 
accompanies such movement and growth into being and meaning. The borders in 
Fairyland are impossible to point to, and we have looked at this in relation to ‘The Giant’s 
Heart’. In ‘The Golden Key’, the rainbow exists as a spectrum whose borders cannot be 
defined by any one colour, there being colours beyond the red and before the violet. In 
Lilith, Vane’s explorations lead him to a delimiting of the familiar borders of time and 
place and of the nature of physical being, even so that he comes to doubt the nature of his 
own existence.
Lilith in particular links this gradual withdrawal of previous notions of ‘being’ to the 
gradual dawning of the appearance of Christ “the beautifullest man”273. However, 
significantly, this appearance is heard about indirectly rather than seen by Vane himself, 
and in this way MacDonald demonstrates the liminality of which he speaks in not making 
of the novel a ‘complete’ vision, drawn in itself by borders or boundaries marked by 
intellectual or imaginative conception. He is thus encouraging the tendency in textuality 
itself towards this Word which is characterised by endless interpretation, which cannot be 
contained in all the books or interpretations which might be written. It indicates that he is 
aware of the nature of writing as a sign functioning only truly in its relation to the 
symbolism granted it by allowing an illimitable presence of meaning or significance.
away and everm ore renew ...a  body thus responsive to and interpenetrative of light, which is 
the visible life...would never have died.” W e should carefully note here that MacDonald is 
not saying that Je su s  w as not human in every way, but that he w as human in the fullest 
sense , a s  God intended all hum ans to be, for this ‘life’, MacDonald attributes to nothing less 




Such liminality can be seen both directly and indirectly in ‘The Golden Key’ in its
allusions to Faust. Burwick notes that Goethe made use in his Faust of the results of his
experiments with prisms. In these he noted the presence of black and white crosses
which, although only viewed in succession by the human eye, seem to exist
simultaneously; the relation between poles remaining outwith the assessment of human
eyesight. Burwick thinks that in Faust, he links this cross to the figure of Christ in the
form of the child Homunculus (p93):
...bom of the positive negative coincidence of entoptic polarity, could represent for 
Goethe, the mercurial liminality of perception...in his final scene he becomes a 
Christ, waiting to be bom again.
Again, we see that Goethe, in particular, concentrates upon the perceptual aspects of
liminality in relation to Christ, which leads him to speculate upon the relationship between
the poles; between light and darkness, where MacDonald concentrates on Christ himself,
as the source of such unfathomable liminality. And such an identification of the
phenomenon with Christ-ian thinking is only perceived as ‘limit’ if one does not allow that
this belief cannot exist academically but is held as a relationship to reality which
undermines all preconceptions of one’s own, in regard to the nature of ‘being’. The very
nature of Christ-centred thought evades and eludes any claim of intellectual ownership or
limit. For MacDonald, liminality is personal, and is related not so much to the
abstractions of the sexes or of the poles, but instead to the reciprocity of desire; of the gaze
with which the child holds Tangle. The “positive negative coincidence” between black
and white is stilled in the grey of the child’s eyes, as Tangle perceives and is informed by
the presence of the child, the Old Man of the Fire (ppl39-140, The Complete Fairy Tales):
She stood looking for a long time, for there was fascination in the sight....for seven 
years she had stood there watching the naked child....and it seemed to her seven 
hours... there was such an awfulness of absolute repose on the face of the child that 
Tangle stood dumb before him. He had no smile, but the love in his large gray eyes 
was deep as the centre. And with the repose there lay on his face a shimmer as of 
moonlight, which seemed as if any moment it might break into such a ravishing 
smile as would cause the beholder to weep himself to death...but the smile never 
came....
The liminality perceived by MacDonald in the person of Christ is, then, one which finds 
itself assured by such liminality rather than perplexed by its inability to see beyond the 
“grey”, or to make black and white stand still. For this greyness, dusk or liminality 
indicates a ‘good’ end and informs also the ‘life’ of natural vision; as opposed to being
227
that which must be overcome by explanation. Harmony, as MacDonald notes, is not the 
same as explanation or repose. The child does not explain anything to Tangle, but his 
presence reassures her and enables her to walk unharmed through the middle of this 
terrible “red” battle between black and white. While MacDonald, in his essay on the 
imagination, has said that what can be known must be known ‘severely’, here we come to 
the excess; to what cannot be known in its entirety. The child, further, is served by the 
serpent, in anticipation of a new relation between the woman and the serpent, previously 
marked by a curse in Genesis274. This allusion has connotations both of sexuality and of 
the knowledge of good and evil, and also can be seen to be alluding to a new order of 
‘being’, which can reinterpret the curse of helplessly knowing good and evil as a blessing 
which brings one to the knowledge of Christ275. Again, such a transformation cannot be 
translated onto a plan or general order, but is that which must be experienced, rather than 
speculated upon. And this is where Hogg’s Wringhim falls foul of a theology which races 
ahead of experience, replacing faith with knowledge.
Desire
Ward himself also interprets the relationship to Christ in terms of desire; a deeply personal 
desire. In speaking of the way in which Christ’s maleness is reinterpreted, he comments 
(pi 66):
The erotic economy propels our desire towards what lies beyond and yet does so in 
and through this man’s particular body. This economy of desire does not deny the 
possibility of a sexual element; it does not prevent or stand in critical judgement of a 
sexual element. It simply overflows the sexual such that we cannot, without creating 
a false and idolatrous picture of Christ, turn this man into an object for our sexual 
appropriation.. .he exceeds appropriation...
In ‘The Light Princess’ especially, we find such elements of desire, in the gaze of the 
Princess, which is commanded by the Prince, and which is exceeded by the transformation 
which takes place ‘in and through’ the Prince and is clearly interpreted by the allusion to 
the Eucharist. It is precisely this clearly sexual element combined with the religious -  this 
non-avoidance of the physical - that made some contemporary religious critics of 
MacDonald nervous about the story. And we have already noted the element of desire in 
the above passage of ‘The Golden Key’. Sexuality is both suggested and overflowed in
274 G enesis 3:14: “So the Lord God said to the serpent...you are cursed more than all 
cattle....And I will put enmity between you and the w om an....he shall bruise your head, and 
you shall bruise his h ee l...”
75 As we saw  in relation to Bonhoeffer’s Creation and Temptation
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this ‘grey’ gaze, in the sensuality and yet coolness of the skin of the child’s body and in
the subduing of the serpent. The smile which might suggest some premature completion
or roundedness “never came”. Greyness is then linked both with the overcoming of
polarity and with the promise of an excess of the male-female; light-dark, understanding
of the concepts of polarity and sexual identity. Mary St John, with her grey eyes and her
male/female name, in Robert Falconer, is also linked to the overflowing of such identity
in terms of colour. In the novel she is initially an object of desire, but the relationship
between Falconer and herself, and his perception of her identity as mere ‘woman’ is
transformed through their mutual attraction to Christ, as it transforms the nature and
perception of their own desires:
Tears had changed her bright-hued hopes into a dove-coloured submission, through 
which her mind was passing towards a rainbow dawn such as she had never dreamed 
of.
In turn, this overflowing of desire is linked by MacDonald to the covenant and its 
‘promise’ of atonement through the common motif of the rainbow in both the novel and 
the story.
The Gaze and Desire
This ‘gaze’ alluded to by both Ward and MacDonald is also recorded in the experiments of 
Goethe himself:
...the entoptic figure reveals something more than reciprocity...the eye looking into 
the tempered glass sees another eye, not its own image, looking back....276
Like the exceeding of polarity or sexual desire, this ‘gaze’ upon Christ is not merely 
reciprocal; there remains an excess, which is both reassuring and frightening to Tangle. As 
Ward notes that Christ exceeds appropriation, we find also the direction from which both 
MacDonald and Campbell resist the appropriation-centred models of atonement, which are 
bound to limit and distort desire. We also examined the gaze of the princess upon the 
Prince in the story of the Light Princess, and noted there, too, how she was lifted out of the 
question of her appropriation of the water for her own good; and how her desire is not 
suppressed or diminished, but increased and given life in this new kind of gaze; of looking 
and wanting. Here, liminality functions as indicative of an excess of meaning; as 
exceeding human desire. And we noted earlier that Derrida alludes to the terrifying nature
276 Burwick, p90
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of this excess of reciprocity, as one is ‘held’ by the gaze of God. This is the gaze of God, 
God’s desire for us, intense, yet mediated in the greyness of the child’s eyes. There is an 
exceeding of reciprocity; of the gaze of desire, in this perception of atonement, because of 
Christ’s identity as God; while the gaze is yet bearable, not only because it is mediated 
through the sympathetic humanity of Christ, but because such a divine humanity is 
enabled to transform the nature of our own desire and concept of bodiliness.
Therefore greyness itself comes to function as an expansion for MacDonald, being the first 
condition for an excess of ‘grace’ which enables light to emerge in the ‘bearable’ colours 
of the rainbow as a promise which transforms past, present and future reality. Whereas for 
Goethe black and white signify the battle between light and darkness itself, in 
MacDonald’s work they tend to be interpreted in grey, by the presence of colours in the 
rainbow as an all-embracing promise; one which reinterprets not only sexuality, but any 
form of a conflict based on opposites. In this, too, he deconstructs the rhetoric of power 
which lies behind the idea of a ‘confrontation’ between sexes or a battle between light and 
darkness.
Desire and meaning
In relating desire to meaning, and thinking back to Goethe’s experiments and the seeming 
simultaneous presence of black and white crosses, we should note Prickett’s quotes
•  277Berggren upon the way in which symbolic understanding itself functions :
...the possibility requires...the ability to entertain two points of view at the same 
time...a new sort of reality is achieved which cannot survive except at the 
intersection of the two perspectives which produced it...
So we can see, too, how this ‘greyness’ of the intersection between the black and white 
crosses of the prism, which cannot be viewed at the same time, represents not a mixing of 
black and white themselves, as though we could objectively view Christ in himself, but 
serves as a metaphor for the nature of symbolism itself in relation to Christ -  both fully 
God and fully man. In the context of this mediation, opposites are reconciled not through 
compromise, but through a new sort of relationship which does not deny differentiation, 
but does not interpret it as ‘being’ in opposition. This ‘fully God and fully Man’ appears 
to us by the natural light of reason as a greyness which confounds black and white logic; 
but it is from this mysterious greyness that all the ‘graceful’ colours of MacDonald’s
277 p27, For the Childlike.
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world emerge. And this is translated into all of his stories. So Photogen and Nycteris are 
united and the result is a new, and fuller, sight, rather than a negotiated sight which must 
concede or compromise its own nature. The symbol, like the colours of interpretation 
which it produces, cannot be ‘explained’ by successive references to black and white; 
male and female, divine and human, as though such forms of being were ‘taken’ as read, 
but only by this new kind of understanding or reading of reality through symbolism; the 
symbolism which MacDonald himself recommends on the basis that it is used in the Bible 
to communicate the ‘highest truths’. And as Ward notes, all identity is transformed or 
refigured by the absence of Christ’s body from sight and rescued from objectification, 
because it imparts a substantial, symbolic understanding to our notions and signs of being 
and identity.
Lust and the desire for meaning
While Tangle seems more passive, Mossy seems to demonstrate more what Burwick
describes as “a lust for light” in Goethe (p87):
Were he not impelled by a lust for light, the “truber Gast” would passively 
await.. .the rainbow caress of the passing day. But impelled as he is.. .the transitory 
is not enough...
This may also be seen as echoed in Lilith (p229), where we are told that “women are 
coming home faster....”. Despite the fact that men -  Mossy -  seem to be racing ahead, the 
destabilising of time and the importance of ‘receiving’ identity as opposed to gaining it for 
Tangle, betray in Mossy a certain concept of desire as ‘lack’ in the pursuit. Mossy’s 
active pursuit of the rainbow, as it parallels Vane’s pursuit of knowledge as a ‘thing in 
itself will bring him eventually into what he seeks, but without the measure of 
understanding granted to Tangle in her more passive instinct to obey while yet “in the 
transitory”, so transforming the transitory. Vane will come to this passive state of waiting 
within the transitory, but only after a long struggle to dominate and appropriate the object 
of his desire, continually losing his end and beginning in the objectifying of that desire. 
For although time seems to stand still for Tangle, and years pass, Mossy finds her in the 
rainbow before him, so reflecting the transformation of time itself. Again, we see 
reflections here of the way in which MacDonald addresses the troubles and pain caused in 
a mistaken ‘appropriation’ of Christ’s person in the theology of atonement. Not allowing 
the Christie to inform one’s own human identity, but seeking to apply the human intellect
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in an attempt to gain a prior understanding of the Christie, without reference to the nature 
of symbolic understanding itself, as given and received; as the bread of life itself.
Freudian interpretations of MacDonald
Ward notes the difference between the structure of Christian desire on this Christie
interpretation, and the structure of the desire of ‘lack’ (pi 72):
...structural function of lack in the economies of desire in Hegel, Freud and 
Lacan...in none of these foundational origins which bring about separations or 
alienation.. .do we ever consciously participate.. .belonging to pre-self, pre-linguistic 
consciousness (whereas)...the structure of Christian desire is, significantly, twofold 
-  not only my desire, but God’s desire for me. It is this twofoldedness which 
characterises participation. The self is fissured in such participation and fissured 
endlessly...
The difference is related specifically to language and meaning. In MacDonald’s use of 
symbolism, Christ is understood as informing the symbolic logic and order of reality. 
Reality is given excessive meaning by such an order, rather than being a ‘something’ 
which exists prelinguistically or prior to the individual’s awareness of Christ. While the 
Federal Calvinists refer to a natural ‘something’ which precedes the informing of the 
world with grace in the symbol of Christ’s death and resurrection, MacDonald, again, in 
his emphasis on symbolic understanding, in his essay ‘Individual Development’ does not 
conceive of a state of being which is outside of that symbol. For even though the child 
comes into an awareness of being through the symbol’s mediation of itself in signs of 
language, he has always remained inside of the reality which it signifies, although not 
aware of it; for meaning exceeds the awareness of it. This is because, in MacDonald’s 
atonement theology, the emphasis is not upon the appropriation of the symbolic. The 
‘pre-linguistic’ stage becomes, then, not a stage of ‘pre-being’ but merely pre-awareness 
of being. For MacDonald grounds “being” in Christ, who precedes and informs being, as 
the symbol, informs the substance of reality even when that reality it is not capable of 
articulating itself278. Meaning does not reside in self-consciousness, which to MacDonald 
is “the hell of hells”. Self-consciousness, which also emerges with the grasp of language, 
forms itself as existing against or in opposition to the mediation of ‘being’ in Christ. With 
language comes self-consciousness and therefore choice, not ‘being’. As seen in Lilith,
278 And this may be why he becam e known a s  a  universalist, holding the view, like Campbell, 
that all creation is brought universally into a  new relationship with God and with reality 
through the atonem ent of Christ; the only difference being whether such a  relationship is 
unconscious, consciously opposed or consciously willing.
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self-consciousness may take the form of a refusal to acknowledge the nature of being. 
With that comes the taking away from language of the source of its meaning, and causes it 
to experience meaninglessness.
And so in MacDonald’s thought, different forms of linguistic consciousness are reflected 
in different concepts of responsibility -  which he perceives as primarily emerging through 
trusting relationships, rather than through the modem anxiety of the ‘law’ of being which 
characterises self-consciousness. We can note here the emphasis which MacDonald lays 
on obedience in his essay on individual development, then, as an expression of 
consciousness as relationship, rather than as the self-consciousness which questions that 
relationship, by positing the self in relation to the law as an abstraction.
MacDonald, then, shows himself as anticipating, and aware of exceeding, the grounds of 
Freudian constructs of desire in their concentration upon the structural ‘lack’ in concepts 
of pre-linguistic selfhood, which think of the ‘sign’ but do not take account of the 
substantial nature of the symbol, where this has manifested itself in the religious anxiety 
surrounding atonement theology. And so he reinterprets in advance those Freudian 
interpretations which have been taken from his work, notably by Robert Lee Wolff.
The dead gaze
In the structural ‘lack’ of subject or appropriation-centred thought, the anxiety which 
emerges about the grounds of the self or being in relation to reality is seen in the ‘dead
270
gaze’, alluded to in the writing of both MacDonald and Coleridge :
“Look there” said Ericson, Robert looked up. Close about the moon were a few 
white clouds. Upon these white clouds, right over the moon, and near as the 
eyebrow to an eye, hung part of an opalescent halo...the full moon, half formed the 
white pupil; the whole was a perfect eye of ghastly death...
This is set in connection with the character of Morison, one who is described as looking
“...to himself, and not to the atonement”. It also seems to be a reference to Coleridge’s
‘Limbo’, quoted by Burwick in relation to the thinking of Goethe (p231):
Yet having moon-ward turned his face by change -  
Gazes the orb with moon-like countenance 
With scant white hairs, with foretop bald and high 
He gazes still, his eyeless face all eye
279 Robert Falconer,p235.
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Here we can see that MacDonald’s use of the ‘eye’ motif in Lilith also refers in his work 
to a self-consciousness which stands in opposition to true ‘being’. Such an eye remains 
blind, for all its looking. Again, such a motif is connected to what we noted of subject- 
centred atonement theology, which is characterised by a lack of trust; an anxious need to 
ground the self and establish it in opposition to all other realities: In Robert Falconer
Morison wishes: “If God be thinking me....ah...but if he be only dreaming me ”280
Ward notes that in Christian desire, “the self is fissured...and fissured endlessly”, there 
being no boundary apparent which can define the self to the self as a ground of identity or 
reality. Morison wishes to be “thought” rather than “dreamed”, indicating the anxiety in 
his desire.
Being
Vane, by contrast, comes to exist for the reader -  or to disappear - in this Assuring of 
himself. He is no longer one who merely seeks the violin, like the boy Falconer, but is one 
who comes to feel that he is the violin, existing more and more purely in terms of a 
relationship to his creator. Perhaps MacDonald is remembering Falconer in relation to the 
violin (Lilith p251):
.. .but who made the violin? And who guided the bow across its strings? Say rather, 
again -  who set the song birds each on its bough in the tree of life...whence came 
the fantasia?...and whence the life that danced thereto? Didst thou say, in the dark 
of thy own unconscious self, “Let beauty be; let truth seem!...I have never again 
sought the mirror.. .1 was Adam.. .1 was not Adam.
He expresses his hope in this Assuring, by contrast to Morison, in the words of Novalis, as
quoted earlier: “Our life is no dream, but it should and will perhaps become one...”.
Ward goes on to note in considering being, that (pi68):
In Greco-Roman culture (of bodies)... “the differentiation between the inner and 
outer body was Auid and permeable...”
280 Robert Falconer, p214. However, even in this, to Falconer “...such  words, falling from 
such a  man, were to him as  dim breaks of coloured light from the rainbow walls of the 
heavenly city.” Therefore he does not condem n Morison’s  fear, but s e e s  in it evidence of the 
longing of the man for more knowledge of God. It is possible that Ericson is modelled on his 
brother John, who died in early middle age, and w hose outlook w as characterised by a  great 
but tragic sort of hope. Such a  hope to MacDonald is better than an ill-founded certainty, 
which betrays a certain arrogance (p216): “If there is no God, let m e know it” Yet in his 
misery, he cried upon God.
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It seems that MacDonald has recovered this aspect of thinking about the self in relation to
reality, through his concentration upon the meaning of ‘being’ in relation to Christ. Ward
goes on to quote (pi68):
For most people of Greco-Roman culture the human body was of a piece with its 
environment. The self was a precarious, temporary state of affairs, constituted by 
forced surrounding and pervading the body....the body is perceived as a location in 
a continuum of cosmic movement
This is the initial adjustment which is required of Vane when he is originally addressed by 
the Raven in relation to his own selfhood in what seems initially to be a strange and new 
world, which may only be understood symbolically, at the beginning of the novel. But 
later, as promised, it comes to him in relation to his perception of the outer as well as the 
inner world, going somewhat further than would be expected (Lilith p251):
...I look round on my books, they seem to waver as if a wind rippled their solid 
mass, and another world were about to break through
Ward goes on to say of this culture of thinking that (pi 68):
....Even so, the displacement of Jesus’s body at this point (the Eucharist) is 
somewhat different, more radical.. .it is not just a blurring of the boundaries between 
one person and another -  though it effects that through the handing over and the 
eating of the ‘body’... for “this is my body” is not a symbolic utterance. It is not a 
metaphorical utterance... the bread is also the body of Jesus...the body of Christ can 
cross boundaries -  gender boundaries, for example.
What happens to Vane indicates both this blurring of boundaries and a displacement of
being which results in his admission of his inability to create new grounds for being out of
himself. Whereas before, MacDonald has emphasised the mediation of Christ; his
humanity, in Lilith he seems concerned, at the end of his writing, to make clear the radical
difference of this ground of being, the difference between self-consciousness and
consciousness of God. He seems to want to send the reader back to the place in which he
has begun himself. It is as though he feels that he has emphasised Christ’s humanity
rather too much without explaining what it means to him, and must now ensure that we see
what a radical change this humanity of God proposes to all previous notions of existence.
So instead of a reassuring end to the novel, we are faced with that passage (...who made
the violin...?) in which God is drawing attention to his difference from Vane, which is
rather like the address to Job (38):
Where were you when I laid the foundations of the earth? Tell Me, if you have 
understanding....have you commanded the morning since your days began?.. .Where
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is the way to the dwelling of light? Can you bind the cluster of the Pleiades, or
loose the belt of Orion...who provides food for the raven, when its young ones cry 
to God...
In regard to being, it seems that in these closing passages of Lilith, MacDonald is seeking 
not only to show the instability of ‘bodies’ as they were perceived in ancient culture but 
how, in relation to theories about matter and space and perception (as we saw in the 
section on Goethe’s colour theory), such concepts may open up the possibilities closed 
down in an atonement theology which has relied heavily upon intellectual categories of 
reality and being. This closing down is related to the rendering of the symbolic as merely 
psychological or linguistic, bringing with its closedness a radical anxiety about the nature 
of the self. And so, in Lilith, the question of being is related only to the personification of 
Hope that informs this new concept of being, since it is also a questioning of the outer 
world not only the projection of the inner onto the outer.
In the final chapter of Lilith, MacDonald is making it clear, as he does in his essay, that the
imagination cannot be equated with the creating power of God, although it can go so far as
to deconstruct itself as a ground of reality. It seems that here, MacDonald goes as far as
the crucifixion in his novel, where Ward notes that (ppl69-70):
The displacement of the body here effects a detachment... Displacement is becoming 
loss, and with the loss a new space opens for an economy of desire experienced as 
mourning281.... without the sharing and participation there cannot arise the sense of a 
coming separation and loss. With the sense of loss comes also, paradoxically, the 
recognition of an identification, but an identification now passing...his body 
becomes the symbolic focus for all bodies loved... .the allure of the abject, and the 
mourning which now will always accompany Christian desire, manifests an 
internalisation of displacement itself...the lack will now foster an eternal longing 
and will structure our desire for God....our bodies, too, participate in that 
displacement in and through the crucifixion...
In reflection of that participation, all of the characters in the novel must lie down to sleep, 
but Vane realises that his sleeping begins in his life; in his waking (p251):
All the days of my appointed time will I wait till my change come....
281 Perhaps this is why the theologian Karl Barth says that: “...there is no positive possession 
of men which is sufficient to provide a foundation for human solidarity...genuine fellowship is 
grounded upon a negative...”. (Romans, p100) And yet that (p119) "In this man what he is 
calls to mind what he is not, that a secret... is hidden a s  well a s  illustrated by his conduct.” 
And (p106): “True negation is directed a s  much against the denial of this life a s  it is against 
the acceptance of it."
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As Ward notes (pi73):
This redemption is not an emptying of oneself into nothingness; but a recognition of 
the lack of foundations within oneself which requires and enables the reception of 
divine plenitude. Lacan returns the subject to the nihilo and denies that God made 
anything out of it. The Christian awareness of the absent body of Christ, and of 
death itself, returns us to our createdness -  to the giftedness of creation out of 
nothing.
Lilith has up until this point described the instability of being, has witnessed this dying and 
reception and sought to communicate it by means of language. Now it seems that 
MacDonald enacts such a death; laying the responsibility of response upon the reader, as 
to whether they will choose to continue to read this question of ‘being’ as read by 
psychological or metaphysical categories (as those moments when Vane looks within to 
his self conscious), or whether they will choose to treat this absence as hope. MacDonald 
places us the readers, as the disciples are placed (Ward p i76):
The disciples are caught between memory and anticipation
It seems that we are offered, in Lilith, hope itself rather than the incentive to hope; the
opportunity to lie down in this ‘cold’ place; this tomb of selfhood; which may be also
interpreted by the reader as a womb, in the way in which Ward speaks of it (pi 76):
The logic of the ascension is the logic of birthing...not dying....The withdrawal of 
the body of Jesus must be understood in terms of the Logos creating a space within 
himself, a womb, within which the Church will expand and creation be recreated
MacDonald himself does not provide us with any ground for so doing apart from the clues 
given in the narrative itself. He does not, in this work, as much as in his others, provide 
any positivistic method of placing or identifying the ‘good’ or the truly Christian, nor 
does he bring Vane face to face with Christ while he is yet in the process of dying, 
for... (Ward, pi 77)
...it is pointless not only because it is a human attempt to give Christianity an 
empirically verifiable foundation and because the metaphysics implied in believing 
that project to be possible are profoundly anti-Christian (atomism, positivism, 
atemporality, immanentalism, access to the immediate and subjectivism). It is 
pointless because the Church is now the body of Christ...
In Lilith, we come to see that all along the Christ-self, the ‘life’ that is for you, and all of 
the other wonderful things by which MacDonald has sought to attract the reader to a love 
of Christ as the good, the true and the beautiful, involve a certain death to one’s grasp of 
selfhood and the concept of all things as ‘things in themselves’. This death he finally 
enacts by making the ultimate sacrifice in letting go of his cherished imaginative faculty in
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case the reader may treat it as a ‘thing in itself; a positivistic method of locating the self 
without Christ; or of locating Christ in the narrative, without reference to the self. It is a 
way of witnessing that his imagination, too, receives its being from “Another”, and so 
places vision out of the reader’s reach, in the realms of this new personification of ‘Hope’. 
MacDonald allows the reader, through his acknowledgment of the contingency of Vane’s 
imagination, both a way out and a way in, should they choose to live consciously in 
relation to the presence of Christ, mediated through the absence of his body. It is reality 
experienced purely as Hope.
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C. George Macdonald’s Lilith and Jurgen Moltmann’s Theology o f Hope
In the previous chapter we noted how the perceiving of the kingdom of heaven, that 
magical state of reality which is presented by MacDonald as its truth in his fiction, must be 
preceded by an identification with the body of Christ, which makes “the Christie the 
measure of the human”, to quote Ward. In Lilith, especially, it seems that he is returning 
to bring to the reader the importance of this identification with Christ in terms of death or 
sleep, before a true perception of such a kingdom may begin. The emphasis in the novel 
on the contingency of human ‘being’ brings with it a renewed emphasis on the importance 
of hope when undertaking this identification. With this emphasis comes a certain return 
to the Calvinistic emphasis upon faith (or Hope) as justification, but with a difference 
which is made clear by the nature of symbolism as that which substantially connects the 
meaning and future of being to that which is experienced by being hoped for. The 
personification of Hope in the final chapter of Lilith emphasises its importance as a real 
presence which mediates the reality of Christ, rather than as a form of belief, which word 
had already lost much of its significance with the advent of enlightenment methods of 
verification of reality. In this section, we shall look briefly at MacDonald’s treatment of 
hope in relation to Moltmann’s work. Then, in the context of Moltmann’s eschatological 
thinking and MacDonald’s views on the ‘end’ as a delimiting of ethics, time and history, 
turn to examine the differences and similarities between them.
Calvinism, Hope and Reality
MacDonald presents the power of the imagination as that which both works for and
against Vane, in the process of a laying down to ‘sleep’ in the Hope of Christ. At the very
beginning of the novel he notes how it is that the imaginative ability to ‘see’ draws him
into metaphysical dreams, prematurely exciting his desire to know and master the patterns
dimly perceived by the imagination in intellectual terms alone (p5):
I was constantly seeing, and on the outlook to see, strange analogies, not only 
between the facts of different sciences of the same order, or between physical and 
metaphysical facts, but between physical hypotheses and suggestions glimmering 
out of the metaphysical dreams into which I was in the habit of falling. I was at the 
same time much given to a premature indulgence of the impulse to turn hypothesis 
into theory...
The novel seems to function very much as a warning against this ‘premature indulgence’ 
of the imagination by the intellect. Lilith ends on a quite different note to most of his other 
works; one which more directly confronts the nature of the Hope which lies behind and
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ahead of such indulgences. Hope is seen to be distorted or transmuted in this process of 
pursuing knowledge in order to pacify the imagination. Yet this Hope which arouses the 
desire of the imagination is never satisfied by the intellect. It has to do with eschatology, 
with a certain ‘end’ of things which is yet not the ‘balanced repose’ which MacDonald 
speaks against in his essay upon the imagination. Hence, perhaps, the idea of an “Endless 
Ending” to quote the chapter title of Lilith. Such an ending denotes constancy, but not 
permanence; deconstruction but not destruction, harmony but not repose. It is not, as it 
might be interpreted, the same as a circle or as a feeling of being trapped in time, since it 
denotes the kind of delimiting which is promised to satisfy the hope of the imagination 
through its translation by death282. As we noted, MacDonald directly alludes to the word 
‘eschatology’ in previous Lilith manuscripts. It seems to function for Vane as that which 
is enacted in the form of apocalypse, of the uncovering and deconstruction of all hopes 
and hypotheses which might replace this one Christian Hope, and for which, as Ward 
notes, metaphysical speculation tends to lay its own foundations, instead of allowing one 
to exist in Hope and so partake of the absent body of Christ which makes room for such a 
Hope to grow into its true desire.
By making so very much in the novel of Vane’s tendency towards premature indulgence, 
and by continually confounding the satisfaction of any of his desires (whereas in other 
works the protagonists may get married, ascend the rainbow, or in some way be very 
definitely on the way ‘home’ to their true end) MacDonald may be noticing that his own 
imaginative and intellectual powers can tend very much in the same direction of that
282 And it is not the delayed ending of Germ an Idealism, a s  it is portrayed in Delayed Endings 
(p2): “...a  theoretical problem ...com m on to the Germ an Idealists: what does it m ean to lose 
the belief in endings and ultimacies?....in Romantic novels at the turn of the century....closure 
in unstable... .open ended texts bespeak  a hesitancy and self-interrogation on the part of the 
writer in his question for a  proper voice....” However, MacDonald is seeking to show  that this 
open-endedness is symptomatic of something lacking in our concept of identity; the lack of a 
“proper voice” is not merely a  problem for the writer, but a  m etaphor for the way in which 
Christianity continually seek s  positive grounds for a faith which can only be built upon a 
relationship....a relationship w hose desire increases near death, and is able to em brace 
death rather than to put it off, or glorify it either. The writer goes on (p5) “writing which seek s 
to be sacred  by withholding closure in fact adm its also a  lack of divinity in its lack of 
willingness to be human. To be human is to err...to  be subject to death .” However, a s  we 
have clearly seen , and shall see , MacDonald em braces above all the humanity of Christ, and 
humanity in general, rather than seeking to attain to som e transcending ideal. Therefore his 
open-endedness in Lilith m ust be read a s  an attem pt to dem onstrate the self-grounding and 
harmony of faith -  and such a  harmony as  this cannot be wrought by the narrator, such a  faith 
m ust consist in “his own righteousness, wrought in him by Christ.”, a s  we quoted earlier from 
Robert Falconer. Indeed, in this case, open-endedness is symptomatic of the text’s  
embracing of the author’s  humanity, and trust in God to provide fulfilment, rather than an 
attem pt to usurp divine ground himself.
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wrong thinking about the atonement in Federal Calvinism, which tends to look within, or 
to the natural light of reason, to ‘chinese metaphysics’ as he puts it, to find some extra, 
substitute ground on which to found its existence or being; to avoid a certain completeness 
of death which is required of one before it finds the self in true harmony with the ‘life that 
is for it’. Lilith seems very much to represent MacDonald’s own battle to expose the death 
out of which his Christian identity comes to be grounded in Hope.
We will briefly look at some comments of Moltmann on the nature of such a hope, to 
establish how MacDonald may be addressing the thinking of some twentieth century 
theology, where it sometimes seems to return to Calvinism, and where he may be able to 
add a different or fuller interpretation to this twentieth century return to his childhood 
religion. (Theology o f Hope, pi 8):
Hope’s statements of promise....must stand in contradiction to the reality which can
at present be experienced...they do not seek to make a mental picture of existing
reality, but to lead existing reality towards the promised and hoped-for
transformation.
And also p40:
The real language of Christian eschatology.. .is not the Greek logos, but the promise.
At the beginning of Vane’s journey, the Raven affirms that his experience will begin to 
bring him into a troubling conflict with the reality he has hitherto experienced, which will 
no longer be resolvable by the natural light of reason. However it is both Vane and reality 
which change together; the inner transformation corresponding with the outer. The idea of 
a conflict or battle with reality is gradually itself destabilised as it is translated into its 
correspondence with Hope. And we saw earlier that MacDonald resisted the tendency in 
Goethe’s interpretations towards battle as a final state of being, while also seeking to resist 
a sense of premature completion. He places great importance upon the sense of 
correspondence or harmony which rests upon Hope and which enables such a conflict with 
existing reality to have meaning; even when it cannot be externally verified by 
explanation. And MacDonald always emphasises that for such contradiction with reality 
to effect a change depends upon the changing of inner characteristics in line with a 
perceived and underlying sense of harmony. Robert Falconer’s vision of the city 
corresponds with the presentation of his character as itself the result of a transformation 
which makes his perception positive and his action meaningful as well as challenging. 
Vane finally comes to the point which perhaps precedes the change which has already
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taken place in Falconer. It is the point at which he accepts, through Hope, the meaning of 
such correspondence between inner and outer destabilisation which transforms his 
perception of death. It should not be confused with resignation, because of the emphasis 
upon Hope283.
Moltmann goes on:
Everywhere in the New Testament the Christian hope is directed out towards what is 
not yet visible....
And interestingly he quotes Calvin (pi9):
To us is given the promise of eternal life -  but to us, the dead. A blessed 
resurrection is proclaimed to us -  meantime we are surrounded by decay. We are 
called righteous -  and yet sin lives in us. We hear of ineffable blessedness -  but 
meantime we are here oppressed by infinite misery....What would become of us if 
we did not take our stand on hope....
Moltmann says that “it is in this contradiction that hope must prove its power”.
Undoubtedly Lilith presents us with a dark vision, and one which is somewhat more black
than MacDonald’s work taken as a whole. His work has often tended to express Hope by
symbolic transformation of the present in anticipation, yet, as he confesses in Lilith (p5) “I
was at the same time much given to a premature indulgence....”. Is MacDonald coming
back to Calvinism? Partly, perhaps, because, as Moltmann notes in response to these
comments of Calvin, (Moltmann, pi 9):
Faith does not overstep these realities into a heavenly utopia, does not dream itself 
into a reality of a different kind ...it can overstep the bounds of life, with their 
closed wall of suffering, guilt and death, only at the point where they have in actual 
fact been broken through.. ..Where the bounds that mark the end of all human hopes 
are broken through in the raising of the crucified one, there faith can and must 
expand into hope...
However, MacDonald is perhaps attempting in Lilith to wake Hope in the reader, as he has 
stated that he attempts to wake meaning in his other fiction. To do this, he can lead the 
reader only so far -  up to the point at which “the bounds that mark the end of all human 
hopes are broken through...”. But he cannot go further than this. For it is in the space 
between inner and outer death that the meaning of Hope establishes its link with the future 
and its reinterpretation of the present.
283 To em phasise this, we should consider the com m ents of Kierkegaard upon the difference 
betw een faith and resignation, when he sp eak s of the faith of Abraham in Fear and 
Trembling.
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MacDonald is also exposing himself in Lilith, in revealing that his struggle against the 
more extreme varieties of Calvinism, its neuroses and tendency to look away from Christ 
in despair, is one which is deeply personal to him. He has existed in tension between his 
awareness of the need to escape this stark theology into ‘a reality of a different kind’ and 
his motivation to look to Christ, in order to ground that imaginative pursuit in this Hope.
However this leads us to think that he has an even higher view of Hope or faith than 
Moltmann (or Calvin). Hope has substance in Lilith, and affirms the role of the 
imagination in its substantial connection to its creator. He affirms that ‘Another’ dreamed 
this dream and not himself; but he grounds that affirmation not in the strength of his 
imaginings but in Hope. He cannot present this as a straightforward affirmation in the text, 
for Hope would be denying its own nature, but clearly indicates that he holds in hope that 
such a hope has been the origin of his writing and dreaming. It seems then that Lilith 
indicates for MacDonald the triumph of this Christ-principle over his own tendency to 
create for himself. And of course the stronger that impulse is, the more one tends to rely 
on it as a ‘thing in itself. Hence the terrible beauty of Lilith. It seems that he overcomes 
Calvinism with Calvinism, in applying its own principle of Hope in order to reaffirm the 
role of the imagination.
“The bounds of life” as Moltmann puts it, must then be continually overstepped in this 
living in Hope by grace. For nothing -  and especially the perceived bounds of reality - 
can precede the new creation in Christ; for he himself forms both the old and new creation. 
He exists before creation, as grace precedes and informs the natural light of reason. This 
is what we discovered in the similarities between McLeod Campbell and MacDonald in 
their approach to Calvin’s theology. And so the contradiction between reality as 
experienced and this Hope is already broken down; and so the struggle must not in any 
way whatsoever be informed by “reality as experienced” in terms of present conflict, but 
in terms of conflict past, won and transformed from conflict into harmony, as it is 
experienced in the mediation of Christ’s reality through Hope.
In the thinking of MacDonald and McLeod Campbell such an experience of conflict does 
not tend to anxiously concentrate on its own struggle as though it could in any way be 
interpreted by itself to itself, but looks to Christ, who has preceded and exceeded those 
“bounds”; who informs the manner in which this conflict is to be thought of. So where
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Moltmann feels that Hope must prove itself284 (as some Calvinists felt that they must 
prove ownership of their own particular saving faith, and so came to deny the primacy of 
faith), for MacDonald the voice of Hope, as it addresses Vane in the final pages of Lilith, 
is no other than the voice of God. This is both one’s own hope and not one’s own hope; 
but the hope of God, mediated in Christ. As such, it exists for one; it is the Christ-self, 
speaking of the Father, requiring the ‘other’ self to wait and to obey; to die. For 
MacDonald believes that God is deeper in us than we are in ourselves. The being-in- 
ourselves must give way to this new and deeper identity. It is therefore the Christ-self 
who comes to stand in conflict with reality (so reinterpreting that conflict as joyful 
paradox); not the self as pre-existent individual standing in puzzled opposition to the 
‘being’ of God, as happens initially with Vane. When it is the Christ-self who comes to 
stand in conflict with reality, that reality is itself reinterpreted and transformed.
Here MacDonald is true to his favourite Biblical writer, Paul, on the dying of the old man 
or ‘Adam’ and the coming to life of the new man or Adam. Vane is caught between the 
one and the other, he is both Adam and not Adam, as he says himself. Hope is leading 
him to his ‘being’ in God. It seems to lead him initially into conflict with reality, but it 
ultimately comes to bring him to conflict with his old, dying self; to put himself to death. 
Such a putting oneself to death, however, is not possible without the presence of a living 
Hope, as Lilith’s experience makes clear (for she cannot put herself to death, she has 
tried). Hope or faith provides its own witness to the reality of that which it hopes for.
It seems that in Lilith, MacDonald is trying to walk a fine line between the Calvinism 
which has engendered so much despair by setting the ‘natural’ against the ‘graceful’ in a 
way which does not make clear that the true ground of natural being is only ever found in 
the ‘graceful’. He is trying to walk between this, and the tendency which opposes it with 
an overly optimistic view of the way in which appearance comes to conform to the reality 
of its being grounded in grace; in the fact of universal redemption. He must promote this 
sense of universal grace; without asserting it in the form of a new metaphysics of grace,
284 Moltmann argues that in making eschatology a  question of identity, we m ake it 
transcendental, a s  does Kant (p46): “...revelation and the eschaton coincide in either c a se  in 
the point which is designated God’s  or m an’s  ‘se lf .” However, he seem s to think that this 
always am ounts to a reduction of eschatology, reading it a s  concluding that it becom es a 
c a se  of subjectivity, not having any future greater than itself, without allowing that the coming 
of the ‘Christ-self to man can open up his perception of things in general rather than simply, 
being a  case  of “the coming of the eternal to man or the coming of man to himself.”
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which denies the fact of the battle altogether, and in fact renders it worthless through such 
a systematisation, resulting in antinomianism. Both extremes are similarly results of the 
Federal Calvinism which separates nature from grace.
And this may be why he states (as we noted earlier) that “far too much is said about faith”, 
and prefers to direct his reader through a route which he hopes will lead them to Christ. 
The route itself, however, is both inner (towards the Christ-self), and outer (towards the 
symbols in nature which communicate the universal grace of that personal presence). In 
Lilith, he shows that he is aware of the danger of this route, for self-consciousness will 
seek to take precedence in this turning inwards, and one has the ability either to turn 
outwards in Hope, or outwards in the sense that one will project one’s self-consciousness 
outwards in anxiety rather than Hope, so seeking to establish ‘selfhood’ before the Christ- 
self; either in the form of the metaphysical speculation of Vane or in his despair of reality.
MacDonald is drawing our attention to the role of the artist as it reflects this tendency, the 
process being often stimulated by anxiety to seek Hope through a renewed ‘discovering’ 
of creation. This may be why MacDonald insists that the artist does not create, but 
discovers. For to state that one is happy to create worlds for oneself is to render one’s own 
venture meaningless. While to undertake the venture with more anxiety than hope will 
prevent much discovery. This links the way in which the atonement is variously received 
to the way in which the artist seeks for truth. Both undertakings find themselves in 
relation to the same economy of anxiety and hope. For MacDonald, the key thing to note 
is that he is deeply aware of the possibilities which confront the artist and the pursuer of 
truth, and so he should never be underestimated as though he were blindly projecting 
wishful thoughts, or took the hope of meaning which is inherent in the artistic pursuit for 
granted. We see clearly in Lilith that without the testament of Hope he feels that his work 
would be meaningless if it were a work which was merely projected; is aware that others 
may take it to be so; and has feared at times that this is the case.
We shall now move on to briefly consider a few of Moltmann’s comments which deal 
more specifically with eschatology in relation to hope.
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Identity and history
Moltmann speaks of the “eternally present” of Hellenization as being a substitute for 
(pi 59)
...the old apocalyptic dualism which understood the coming as the eternal and the 
passing as transient... in place of the eschatological ‘not yet’, we have a cultic ‘now 
only’
It seems that, just as he tries to walk between despair and Hope in relation to Calvinism, 
MacDonald is also trying to walk between two notions of apocalypse which both result in 
the loss of hope; between a sense of premature completion through the formation of a 
metaphysical structure (eternal versus transient) and the interpretation of the eternal 
present (now only) in terms of despair. The Lark in ‘The Giant’s Heart’ can clearly be 
seen as representing one aspect of this attempt to transcend the ‘now only’, which has 
resulted from the despair of Hellenization and which goes on to transform itself into the 
permanent metaphysical assertion that ‘God is dead’. Moltmann quotes Paul (Theology o f 
Hope, pl61):
Against the uniting of the believer with the dying and rising Lord, Paul asserts an 
eschatological distinction...the baptized are not already risen with him...they attain 
participation in the resurrection by their obedience, which unfolds itself in the realm 
of the hope of resurrection...trials...are not understood as signs of a paradoxical 
presence of the eternal.. .but.. ..in terms of seeking after, and waiting for, the coming 
freedom.
Here, against his earlier emphasis upon the confrontational aspects of Hope, Moltmann
defines this seeking after as also a waiting, which is a little more in line with MacDonald’s
promotion of the worth of an active passivity and of the significance of greyness and ‘in-
between’ aspects of light. It is seen in the way in which he differs from Goethe in his
perception of the ‘battle’ between light and darkness. Moltmann also emphasises the
importance of promise; of the rainbow. Seeking after and waiting for is not defined in by
him in terms of (pi 03):
evolution, progress and advance...but the word of promise cuts into events and 
divides reality into one reality which is passing....and another which must be 
expected and sought...
In terms of the way in which MacDonald communicates these aspects or attitudes towards 
reality(ies), it seems that Tangle is the more expectant, while Mossy is more actively 
seeking. He emphasises the worth of this expectation as vital in the process of seeking,
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both in ‘The Golden Key’, and in Lilith in relation to the manner of Vane’s seeking.
Moltmann further asks, when one is trying to find the nature of such a seeking (pi25):
Does the eschaton mean merely ‘future’, or is it applied to the absolute future as 
opposed to history?
In other words, does a certainview of eschatology imply the delimiting of history, in the 
same way that it implies the delimiting of ethics? By a challenge to its limits, rather than 
to its nature. For the word of promise of which Moltmann speaks, functions also as a 
sword in Lilith as that which “cuts into events....”, dividing ‘being’ from ‘being in itself; 
as ethics or time may behave as ‘beings in themselves’. But because it is a word of 
promise (for the sword is described as for “healing and not for hurt”) it perhaps can be 
likened to the action of that endless “fissuring” described by Ward, which comes about as 
a sign of the presence of Christ’s body, as it re-informs creation with a new logic of being, 
reuniting it with its limitlessness in the process. This cut delimits ethics and time, 
allowing growth where the branches of ‘being in itself are cut off.
Therefore eschatology is related to apocalypse in that the cutting off is also an exposing of 
history in its new light. In MacDonald’s writing such a cutting off is applied in ‘The 
Endless Ending’, where Vane, finding reality thus delimited, finds himself in the position 
of an active “waiting for the coming freedom”. In seeking to reveal the secret, he finds 
himself exposed. So MacDonald is not seeking to create myths which function 
psychologically, but to expose this new logic of being, which creates a ‘waiting’ attitude 
and radically exposes and makes deliberately vulnerable the one who waits. This 
vulnerability enables the continuation of the narrative, for such exposure is a gift to the 
reader, who may be open to experience limitless life in the ‘endless ending’.
This makes MacDonald different to Blake, for Martensen notes that (Jacob Boehme, p63)
As Blake’s conception of his myth became increasingly psychological, the linear 
shape of his narrative began to break down. Instead of dealing with unique 
events... he ceased thinking of the apocalyptic as a final state and began to view it as 
an ongoing activity...
It seems that Blake succumbs to the despair of the ‘now only’. For MacDonald, such an 
‘end’ of the imagination has never represented a ‘final state’; but finds in the process of 
the constant discovery or uncovering or delimiting of its own ‘ends’ -  of ethics, identity or 
metaphysics - the emergence of the precedence of hope. The process finds its own end,
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then, not as the grand discovery or grand uncovering; not as the apocalypse towards which 
one has wended one’s way, but rather it finds its end in its source -  hope. Hope witnesses 
to its own origin. The end is the beginning285.
As Ward notes, the logic is not one of dying but of being bom -  and it is not a cycle of
rebirth, but the birth of authentic identity into a space created by a mourning which
represents hope rather than despair. Identity itself has its origin in God’s I AM, and its
movement is outward in expansion, in the giving nature of identity286. This takes place in
and through time (though not confined by time) because of Christ’s humanity. And,
because it takes place in time and space, such a process is able to re-inform, reinterpret
and transform (not transcend) time and history. This corresponds with the transformation
of bodies which we noted in the chapter on Graham Ward. The New Testament literature
itself speaks of identity as absolute in relation to Christ, which is to become a most
startling assertion of the way in which Christ’s identity as God re-informs humanity with
its true identity through hope because of his bodily absence (John 8:57-8):
Then the Jews said to Him “You are not yet fifty years old, and have You seen 
Abraham?” Jesus said to them, “Most assuredly, I say to you, before Abraham was,
I AM.”
Hope, in Lilith, represents the presence of the bodily absent Christ, and this reflects the
emphasis upon Hope as signifying the presence of Christ, rather than being thought of in
terms of abstract belief in the New Testament. For example Colossians 1:27: “ .. .Christ in
you, the hope of glory.” Or Christ’s words in John 16:7:
Nevertheless I tell you the tmth. It is to your advantage that I go away; for if I do 
not go away, the Helper will not come to you; but if I depart, I will send Him to you.
And in Alec Forbes, we have this hint of the way in which MacDonald will present the
idea of this final receiving of identity (p213):
“...do ye min’ the veesion that the apostle John saw...they war gran’ sichts! It was 
the veesion o’ the saviour himself -  Christ himsel’”....I suppose that Tibbie was 
right in the main...but was it another kind of brightness....that Moses was unfit to 
see....until the humble son of God went up from the lower earth to meet him there,
Revelation 1:8: “I am the Alpha and the Omega, the Beginning and the End” says 
the Lord, “who is and who was and who is to come...”
286 The Marquis of Lossie, p121: “The individual, that his individuality may blossom, and not 
soon be m assed  into the common clay; m ust have the vital indwelling of the primary 
Individuality which is its origin. The fire that is the hidden life of the bush will not consum e it.”
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and talk with him face to face as a man with his friend?...Annie went home....and 
she dreamed that she saw the Son of Man.
If MacDonald sees Lilith as his own Revelation of George, then he clearly leaves room for 
this ‘other kind of brightness’, opening up a space for mourning which anticipates its hope 
in Vane’s ‘dreaming’ the Son of Man, but does not present this vision ‘face to face’ in the 
narrative as metaphysical assertion. The ‘waiting’ and the ‘mourning’ are regenerative of 
time. For rather than being hastened by time, or conditioned by death, they deliberately 
choose not to treat it as that which confines the event of Christ, but as that which is 
defined by the ‘new’ time made by resurrection.
In relation to time, we may further note that Isaiah is alluded to in Lilith, as we have seen,
and Moltmann states that the vision of Isaiah (pi 33):
...speaks of history as the ‘work of Yahweh’..yet that is not a history surveyed 
apocalyptically from the standpoint of the end at which all things stand still.. .but.. .a 
future announced from the midst of the process of history...
Vane may dream of the end and of the Son of Man, but MacDonald presents this dream as 
‘announced from the midst’. The visionary does not survey time but announces from 
within it. The reader of MacDonald’s written dream is required to enter the process of 
history. Just as the Federal Calvinists cannot announce the general plan of salvation as a 
something which can be surveyed, the visionary cannot say of history that it may be 
located here or there; that time is this or that, without losing the sense of contingency in 
relation to truth which enables hope to be present, and reading to continue. Vane is a part 
of the process and not I AM, and this is both a terrifying and a glorious thing for him to 
realise.
The lust after identity may be understood in this context as a substitute for the mourning of 
the loss of the visible identity of Christ within creation; a loss which is marked by absence, 
rather than non-existence. And finds itself through discovery rather than one (work of art 
or world) being superseded by another, different creation. This absence enables Hope to 
speak to Vane, and elicits from the artist a regenerative mourning and searching for what 
is withdrawn from the self, and for which the self reaches out in hope. For Vane, the 
search is ‘shadowed’ by the temptation to lust after identity as though identity consisted of 
knowledge and could be contained within the borders of the shadow-self.
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Vane, then, does not turn his back upon the shadows which play upon the walls of Plato’s 
cavern. Neither does he deduce from them a metaphysical proposition about light. He lies 
in the darkness and imagines what the light will be when it comes. He accepts the 
imagination as being that gift of sight which comes through Hope. The imagination for 
which MacDonald is noted is described as childlike by Chesterton in his introduction to 
MacDonald’s biography, because the childlike attitude is one in which hope remains 
undeterred by appearances, and so keeps alive the link between imagination and hope. 
This is also the explanation given by Falconer for the beatific attitude of the child as it is 
held by its despairing mother . So, too, Vane is held in death by life. Christian identity 
is represented in Lilith as an acceptance of death as gift, which takes the form of a 
challenge to its nature, rather than a resignation to its appearance, or a transcending of the 
mortality through which it speaks of life. Derrida notes of Patocka, in speaking of 
Christian life, that he “speaks less of a past event....than he does of a promise.” (The Gift 
o f Death, p29). In the next section we shall consider a little further the idea of death as 
gift in relation to Derrida, and the relationship between hermeneutics and the idea of death 
as delimiting, with reference to John Caputo.
287 S ee  previous allusion, and Robert Falconer, p346.
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D John Caputo’s More Radical Hermeneutics and Derrida’s The Gift of Death
288
289
Caputo’s More Radical Hermeneutics and Lilith
In his book, Caputo is concerned with almost exactly the same themes which occupy 
MacDonald’s Lilith. In this brief consideration, we should consider especially their shared 
emphasis upon the effects of delimitation or borderlessness. First, in relation to the notion 
of understanding or interpretating meaning.
“Tragic knowledge” and Christian wisdom
There are a number of things which bring MacDonald’s fiction into dialogue with
Caputo’s thinking. First, this extract from Lilith:
The fact is, no man understands anything, when he knows he does not understand, 
that is his first tottering step -  not towards understanding, but towards the capability 
of one day understanding.2 8
From this, it might be expected that Vane would give up striving completely, would resign
himself to not-understanding, and enjoy life as it presents itself. But he cannot. He is
constantly thrown into situations in which he is required to undertake actions which appear
to have no ground in theories of knowledge. He is required to be involved. Just as we
noted that suspension of belief is not a desirable state in which to read a story, if one wants
to receive the ‘shock’ of failure as a desirable prelude to creative interpretation, one cannot
prematurely conclude that the absurd task should not be undertaken. We can relate this to
Kierkegaard’s thinking upon the absurdity of Christianity, and his corresponding emphasis
upon the nature of faith. Caputo seems to agree with the above statement by MacDonald:
There is no royal road that some philosopher’s Method or divine Revelation will 
open to us, if only we obey its methodological strictures, or pray and fast, or learn 
how to run Windows 2000289.
But then MacDonald makes it clear that the failure of a Royal Road, a method or a 
revelation to deliver fulfilment, a true end or a good death, is a lack which may only be 
experienced as genuine lack, once one has tried and failed with Royal Roads, methods and 
revelations; has taken some action in sincerity; and continues to do so. In the novel, Vane 
eventually unlearns something, and passes his wisdom on to an old man, tired of life and 
wishing to die; to enter the house of Mara, the mistress of death:
Lilith, p152
More Radical Hermeneutics, p2
251
You wish to die because you do not care to live; she will not open her door to you, 
for no-one can die who does not care to live.290
The acceptance of death of which we spoke in the last chapter has this curious quality 
about it, in that it is an acceptance which comes about through a love of life, rather than a 
love of death. It is a death experienced only through life, rather than through a certain 
attitude to metaphysics, or a determination to reserve judgment which betrays a certain 
resignation or weariness. It is, then, not a matter of the ‘normal’ course of life running 
itself down into death, but of a passing through this bitterness in hope of a greater, sweeter 
sense of life which is to be even more fully experienced. This attitude to death and life is 
linked, through the person of Mara, to Wisdom, that female Biblical personification, with 
whom Vane comes to be acquainted, and who teaches him the true source and goal of 
what he originally experiences as a lust for knowledge.
As is the case in Lilith, Caputo also links meaning with identity. He begins his book with
a chapter entitled ‘On Not knowing who we are; madness, hermeneutics and the night of
truth in Foucault’. He asks “suppose we confess that we do not know who we are?” Of
course, this is the confession to which Vane is led in MacDonald’s novel; is led to feel that
he is not yet a true self at all; even forgetting that there are such things as names. And
Lilith will pass through such a ‘night of truth’ in the chapter entitled ‘That Night’.
Caputo goes on to speak in this chapter of the importance of “tragic knowledge” in
Foucault’s thinking (p20):
Foucault is not saying that the mad are the true philosophers but rather that they are 
precisely not philosophers at all, that they are the most forceful testimony to the 
breakdown of philosophy. They...speak with tragic knowledge...from the depths of 
an experience in which both the reassuring structures of ordinary life and...of 
scientific knowledge have collapsed. They experience the radical groundlessness of 
the world.. .they are voices from an abyss.
Vane begins his search in the library of his ancestors, of whom a notable number had been 
given to study. He confesses (p5) an inherited tendency to scientific, systematic modes of 
thought, which tends to this “premature indulgence of the impulse to turn hypothesis into 
theory”. He describes this inherited tendency as a “mental peculiarity”, rather than as a 
normal state of affairs, which perhaps provides us with the first clue that we are on our 
way to being introduced to a view of reality which will radically dissociate itself from the
290 Lilith, p225
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“reassuring structures...of scientific knowledge....” and will present itself as a voice from 
the abyss of which Foucault speaks. MacDonald is acknowledging philosophy as Vane’s 
starting point, in this discussion of Vane’s ancestors, but making it clear that the 
exploration will take us beyond, over the edge of philosophy, and will result in its 
breakdown but strangely in its fulfilment in such a direction (in the Wisdom of death). We 
have already examined MacDonald’s tendency to disorient the reader of his fiction, 
pointing them in the direction of such a breakdown. In Lilith, both Vane and Lilith speak 
more directly to us about this disorientation; with tragic knowledge in their lostness, as 
such knowledge reveals that it is its very nature which betrays the fact of its lostness; of 
the homesickness291 which reveals that it is not at home. Knowledge desires what it 
cannot have, and loses even what it does have. In doing this it encounters the Wisdom of 
learning the meaning of its desire; which must grow in order to pass through death. Death 
is that which delimits. Desire and anticipation themselves are seen to be continually 
disappointed, because it is in their nature to desire what occurs beyond and through death.
On closer study, we find that it is always where MacDonald refers to the Biblical literature
that he anticipates such thoughts. Especially in relation to Paul, on whom he writes many
essays and sermons, and whose common theme is the seeming madness and difficulty of
belief in Christ and how to understand the relation of life to death. Vane’s learning that he
knows nothing is reflected in MacDonald’s essay on Philippians, ‘On Christian
Ministering’, where he quotes from it:
...if anyone thinks he knows anything, he knows nothing...but God will yet reveal 
even that....
Such thoughts are common in the Biblical literature, where Christ’s death is seen as the
revelation of a divine economy of knowledge which challenges the unstated motive of
^ 0 1human knowledge .
291 MacDonald quotes Novalis a s  saying that philosophy is really hom esickness (as we noted 
earlier); and it is Novalis he quotes a t the end of Lilith. W e can se e  this in V ane’s  worry about 
how he is ever to get home. Behind the casual m anner in which he begins his enquiries rests 
a  radical and anxious uncertainty about the nature of his own being. He characterises what 
will later em erge a s  twentieth century existential anxiety. He is told not that ‘hom e’ is a  bad 
idea, but that neither can it ever be represented a s  an object or thing -  it is to do with the 
nature of his own desire.
292 To go behind God; to seek  to understand the being of God from an independent point of 




Caputo goes on to speak in chapter 7 of ‘The End of Ethics’, and here, too, by referring
back to our study of ‘The Giant’s Heart’, we see how fully MacDonald has anticipated this
end of ethics, and how he is carrying it through more radically in the confounding of all of
Vane’s expectations and desires. They are confounded, yet exceeded, as Vane comes to
view Lilith as an ‘other’, rather than as an object which may contain the object of his
desire, or as one who may hinder him by falsely presenting herself as the object of his
desire (the two are related). In both cases he is governed by the tendency to limit his
desire to her objectification, either by demonising or divinising her. On p i73, Caputo
notes how, at the delimitation of ethical responsibility
Everything turns on a specific affirmation of the other.. ..something that exceeds our 
horizon of expectations...
Here, MacDonald’s receding landscapes and moveable horizons may be seen to 
correspond with the de-objectification of the ‘other’ which causes Vane to have to be 
“specific” in his affirmation of Lilith, rather than being able to objectify her. It also shows 
how desire is to be delimited rather than suppressed; freeing that which it desires from 
objectification -  allowing the ‘thing in itself to find its true relation to God. In the 
process the desire can no longer ‘fix’ upon an object and is allowed to seek the face of 
God.
Again, his Christian belief may be seen to be informing MacDonald’s writing, since it is 
taken from Jesus’s delimiting of the law294, in which the ‘other’ is no longer objectified. 
More than this, his belief involves a certain kind of interpretation of Jesus’s words. We 
have already examined how he uses symbolic methods of communication, because that is 
what he notes takes place in Jesus’s stories. Further, the parabolic mode of relating truth 
is equally important to him, since it allows the reader to reflect on and participate in the
90Sstory at the level of meaning which is specific to him or her . Here, hermeneutic 
thinking and practice are combined where MacDonald is most closely adopting the New
9Q^ for example 1 Corinthians 3:19 “For the wisdom of this world is foolishness with 
God”
294 Matthew  5:41-44: “And whoever com pels you to go one mile, go with him two. Give to 
him who asks you, and from him who w ants to borrow from you do not turn away. You have 
heard that it w as said, ‘You shall love your neighbour and hate your enem y.’ But I say  to you, 
love your enem ies, b less those who curse you ...”
295 Which, a s  we saw, has already been examined by Cynthia Marshall in her essay  ‘Reading 
“The Golden Key”: Narrative strategies of Parable.’ (in For the Childlike)
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Testament writing style. This makes his writing (at its best) affirmative without being 
positive. It is far from the didacticism which his Victorian readers wanted, and of which 
his modem readers accuse him (mainly because of a misunderstanding of the nature of the 
Christian belief which he wanted to communicate).
Caputo further asks of this delimiting of ethics; of this non-positive affirmation (pi 74):
...why does all hell not break loose...? Thinking at the end of ethics is affirmative 
but without being positive. That is to say, such thinking is through and through the 
affirmation of something it dearly loves, yet without setting out a positive....rule 
governed programme....
Interestingly, Caputo relates this being positive to the idea of a gift (which in Christian
thinking is known by the word grace). This delimiting is precisely what enables Vane to
begin to be a self; to begin to experience the nature of true responsibility which goes
beyond duty. Here, Caputo notes that it is what entails a taking account of the singular,
and quotes Derrida, “tout autre est tout autre”, (every other is wholly other) p i85:
.. .the whole idea of a gift is to go beyond.. .what I must do.. .is parasitic on the idea 
of duty, for without duties there would be nothing to exceed... we should put an end 
to ethics, not in the sense of putting it off.. .but in the sense of delimiting it...
Here, again, is the link to questions of interpretation which seek to suppress the parables of 
Jesus by rationalising them so as to escape the singular interpretation: “who is my 
neighbour?”. So when MacDonald is saying that his story has a specific meaning for a 
specific reader, he is seeking that relation in the interpretation of his work. And so the 
hermeneutics of his work cannot be separated from their Christian origin.
The form of the parable is related to the emergence of grace (or gift) in relation to the law
as being that of a singular relation. And because the law is related to death in the Biblical
literature; grace brings with it a new relation to death, and affects the way in which the
atonement of Christ is interpreted by the individual. So Caputo goes on to say (pi 80):
...the singular is something for which one cannot make a substitution...I cannot ask 
someone else to bear my responsibility to you...or to die for me...when I am in a 
singular situation.. .1 do not have it, but rather it has me....
This brings us back to the singular gaze of the Light Princess, for whom substitutionary 
atonement is a “wicked lie”, as MacDonald puts it in Robert Falconer, she is ‘had’ by the 
gaze of the Prince. Rather than having him die for her, she comes by identification with
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his death as a singular event in relation to her own being, to be enabled to experience her 
own ‘death’ as gift, in her mourning (of tears).
And yet it is precisely where she feels that she is being let off the hook of the law (by 
substitutionary atonement) of her being (too light) that she is caught by this singular 
responsibility296. For the Prince offers to die for her freely. That is, the gift precedes the 
demand of the law, as well as exceeding it297. Whereas for Caputo, the gift is parasitic 
upon ethics; here the gift strangely precedes ethics, and therefore is able to interpret even 
ethics (and death) as gift. This brings us to Derrida’s The Gift o f Death.
The Gift o f Death and MacDonald’s interpretation of Christ’s atonement
This final chapter will also serve as a conclusion to this exploration of MacDonald’s 
understanding of Christian identity.
The experience of Lilith corresponds to a remarkable extent with what Derrida speaks of 
in The Gift o f Death. In making much of Lilith’s incapability of independent action, we 
can see how MacDonald seems to be addressing what Derrida notes of Patocka {The Gift 
o f Death, pp5-6) in that there is, in the European understanding, a tendency to make issues 
of freedom and responsibility ahistorical, not acquired or conditional, so that ethics seeks 
to divorce itself from religious revelation. The reason for such a tendency, Derrida says, is 
that to acknowledge historicity would imply a certain (religious) concept of freedom, but it 
is also because the very notion of historicity is difficult to deal with without falling into 
the trap of a “totalising closure”, which would ironically mark the end of history. 
MacDonald reveals his complex thinking on this issue, in that he seeks to deal with this 
difficult matter of freedom and responsibility in such a way that historicity is not rendered 
closed (as the end of Lilith attempts to show in its insistence that the narrative remains 
open), but that neither does such openness mean that historicity and religion is ultimately 
denied, for then Lilith would be capable of carrying through alone the autonomous, ethical
296 It should be noted, then, that MacDonald
297 Here, again, we refer back to the wrongful separation of the covenants of grace and 
nature, a s  though there w ere ever a  time when the law preceded grace in som e objective 
point in history. Law com es to be seen  a s  a mediation of grace, because  it is a  mediation of 
death, rather than being necessary  a s  a ‘thing in itself. It all depends upon how death is 
interpreted. And how can death be reinterpreted a s  a  blessing? This is the important 
question for MacDonald.
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choice which her (God-created) self wishes, but she is not. {Lilith p207): “I yield”, said
the princess...not the less, I cannot open my hand.” For this same reason, within the
novel, the vision of Christ and of the heavenly city is related as having meaning within
history, while such meaning must yet be discovered “outside of knowledge or given
norms...” It has a historicity which is (The Gift of Death, p5):
...made...through the very ordeal of the undecidable; to religious faith through a 
form of involvement with the other that is a venture into absolute risk.. .to the gift...
This provides a context for the importance of Hope which is introduced at the end of the
novel, but towards which Vane’s undecidability has been tending. But how does Lilith
make this first move? How can Vane embrace death?
Derrida asks this key question (pi6):
How does one give oneself death (se donner la mort)? How does one give it oneself 
in the sense that putting oneself to death means dying while assuming responsibility 
for one’s own death, committing suicide but also sacrificing oneself for another, 
dying for the other -  perhaps giving one’s life by giving oneself death....?
Between Derrida’s question and Caputo’s answer lies perhaps MacDonald’s and 
Campbell’s interpretation of atonement. For Caputo seems, too easily, to slide into a 
certain logic of singularity, which denies its own nature. He seems in danger of creating a 
new method of exceeding ethics, which cannot work without a new relation to death, since 
death is singular, and cannot be systematised. This, perhaps, is why he comes to the 
conclusion that grace (the gift) is parasitic upon ethics (the law or death). This makes 
death defining of life, and seems to result, as we saw, in the attitude of the old man 
encountered by Vane, who longs for death as a ‘thing in itself, and makes all affirmation 
meaningless. The very affirmation which Caputo wishes to promote. For Caputo fairly 
easily accepts that there is no secret perhaps because he is in the process of creating an 
alternative secret or privileged knowledge (of non-secrecy). Whereas MacDonald speaks 
of the non-existence of deliberate or constructed secrets, because death is seen by him as 
the revealer of the secret, because Christ’s death for him reveals the nature of death and 
makes death subject to grace (to the gift).
How does MacDonald address Derrida’s question, which is so pertinent to any Christian 
theology of Christ’s atonement? Central to MacDonald’s story is the gaze (the gaze of 
Tangle upon the child; the gaze of the Princess upon the Prince). Characters in his novels 
begin a process of death to the primacy of a certain kind of seeing. As they die to this
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primacy of logic -  which is also a logic of death as a ‘thing in itself- they awaken to the 
sight of another reality. As the characters in Lilith lie down one by one in the terribly cold 
communal tomb, the world emerges in an apocalyptic light, in which (p243):
...all things interchanged a little light...the microcosm and macrocosm were at
length atoned, at length in harmony!
This interchange is a continual giving and receiving of the gift of light, but is a world in 
which the concept of light as an abstract quality of sun or moon no longer exists (just as 
the sun is not needed in the apocalyptic city of Revelation). Concepts of life and death, 
like light and darkness, are exchanged for this continual giving. The giving and receiving 
are, however, unselfconscious, since they are not measuring themselves by any dualistic 
external standard of light as a ‘thing’. Everything is finally in harmony; and it is not the 
repose which MacDonald wishes to avoid, but a harmony of continuity in which 
everything is fluid; nothing is any longer ‘fixable’ to entities, since things no longer 
conceive of their own borders, and, correspondingly, abstracts (objectification) and 
abstract religion no longer exist(s).
So, too, as long as the Princess’s sight in ‘The Light Princess’ remains fixed upon the 
water as an external necessity, she cannot actually perceive it as gift; it is not related to 
her, but exists for her. As such, it cannot be received as a gift. Here, MacDonald is 
speaking of the false appropriation of the atonement, of the death of Christ. When 
conceived of in the abstract, it has not the quality of the gift; it does not speak of grace, it 
is rendered meaningless. The true meaning of sacrifice, therefore, only emerges as excess, 
as a true gift, through a seeing of the utter uniqueness of the one giving by the one being 
given the gift.
But, back to Derrida’s question, how may death, in its utter uniqueness, be given by one to 
another? Only if we explain uniqueness or identity in a paradoxical fashion as that which 
is only unique when shared. This idea that individuality involves not the setting up, but 
the breaking down, of the borders of selves or bodies is one which has already been 
touched upon in the chapter on Graham Ward’s thinking about the meaning of the absent 
body of Christ. It is true also in relation to the ‘borders’ of fairyland, and is seen in the 
sexual and paradoxical seeking of identity through the breaking down of the division 
between male and female in sexual intercourse (which MacDonald hints at constantly in 
his fiction). Christ’s is a body which comes to precede creation universally through its
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absence or death (the gift of death), as it exceeds and recreates creation in its re-informing 
of creation with its own unique and universal identity - I AM; (the gift of life). That 
which is unique must also become that which is universal, otherwise it cannot be unique 
either. For the exceeding of life comes only through the universality of such a death. For 
if God’s death in Christ is not universal, then resurrection cannot precede, inform and
^ Q O
delimit death itself with this new meaning or grace . This may be why MacDonald and 
Campbell both insist that Christ’s atonement has universal implications, and is not merely 
an abstract event to be appropriated by the ‘elect’.
How does one give it to oneself, while assuming responsibility? Only in that, like the 
exceeding of sexuality and polarity, the ‘other’ for whom one is responsible is also 
oneself, by virtue of that universal body of Christ, which links one to another. Not a 
general principle of connectedness, but only true inasmuch as this does not become a 
general principle, but remains aware that I AM precedes IT IS. Once the Princess’s eyes 
are fixed upon the Prince, she forgets the gift as an it, and only then is she able to fully 
receive “it”, without ever understanding that she is receiving. In fact, her receiving is 
already ready being transformed into a giving back of love, even in the instant that it is 
received, since it is love’s nature to love back again, to enjoy giving more than receiving. 
Love requires endless movement, characterised by harmony and not by repose, as 
MacDonald puts it.
And because of this, the source cannot be located to an it, having no beginning and no end 
in a reciprocity which must continually exceed itself, or die (which perhaps is seen in the 
death in life of Lilith, where such reciprocity is denied). Love and symbolic 
understanding are related in this, then: that we partake in a sense of meaningfulness of 
which we can have no prior concept. Just as grace cannot be fitted into a theological 
framework which takes some other starting point prior to grace. Or which, if it does, 
concedes the death of that framework as a ‘good’ thing, being a hoped-for end or 
delimiting of the dead life of the ‘it’ in exchange for the unique and excessive life of I 
AM.
298 With the life which, a s  MacDonald notes, is treated a s  ‘life a t all’ in the New Testam ent.
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The gift is always hidden in this experience of being in the presence of one who exceeds 
us and who gives to us, by drawing from us a preceding love of which we have not been 
previously aware as a ‘thing in itself. Christ individually communicates God’s preceding 
and universal love. Identity then becomes alive through the giving of love or gazing upon 
an ‘other’, rather than through self-reflection. It emerges in the movement or tension of 
love, and its related metaphoric or symbolic language. Identity exceeds death as it is 
commonly presented, since it already experiences and reinterprets death in the giving of its 
own life; a giving which is the manifestation of life. And so identity - I AM - exceeds 
death because it is not defined by death but by the life which gives itself endlessly, being 
completely itself only in the activity of selflessness and limitlessness299.
Derrida quotes Patocka (The Gift o f Death, p25):
In the final analysis the soul (in the Christian mystery) is not a relation to an object, 
however elevated (such as the Platonic Good)...but to a person who fixes it in his 
gaze...as for knowing what this person is, such a question has not yet received an 
adequate thematic development within the perspective of Christianity.
Derrida takes this further by suggesting that the inadequacy of this thematization comes to 
a question of responsibility:
.. .it doesn’t thematize what a responsible person is, that is, what he must be...
However, perhaps the concentration of MacDonald and Campbell upon the importance of 
grace in the development of Christian identity takes us much further than we might think 
in this direction. The implications of the direction of their thought as making grace 
universally defining of Christian identity suggest that thematization is simply an 
insufficient response to this question of Christian identity. Because identity is that which 
exceeds thematization, being founded upon grace. In fact, we really cannot go any further 
than the concept of grace or the gift; it is the concept which founds all concepts; the goal 
and foundation of desire. It is the true soul of being human, and cannot be made subject to
299 J e s u s ’s  words (quoted in Romans 13:9): ‘And if there is any other com m andm ent, are  all 
sum m ed up in this saying, namely, “You shall love you neighbour a s  yourself.”’ le, a s  though 
he or sh e  were you, because  this actually tells the truth about the extent and limitlessness of 
identity, a s  it experiences limitlessness in its source. Being and doing are completely the 
sam e in this moment, and experience a  m om ent of insight into the absolute nature of being. 
The moment of self-reflection, however, is significant of the unfinished nature of the activity 
and being. W e can see , then, why McLeod Campbell brings back the em phasis of the 
Eastern Orthodox fathers into W estern atonem ent theology. Eastern thinking s e e s  that the 
person and work of Christ cannot be separated, identity and action are the sam e thing. 
Soteriology and Christology, when separated, bring about a  neurosis in Christian identity; it no 
longer understands itself in relation to Christ; or its being now in relation to its future.
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thematization, being the force which causes the sense of responsibility to find its goal. A 
deep awareness of this grace at the foundations of being is, perhaps, the reason why 
MacDonald is able, as Chesterton notes, to see what we might call ‘ordinary’ human 
beings as princes, princesses, kings and queens.
In fact, Derrida himself seems to come in some way to this conclusion about 
thematization, by emphasising the activity of responsibility (p26):
Hence, the activity of responsibility...will have to decide...before any thematic
determination... .(my italics)
That activity is primarily conceived of for MacDonald by means of the idea of harmony in 
relation to imagination -  that divine link to the grace-filled ‘seeing’ action of God, which 
is not limited, challenged or frightened by the appearance of death. Being human is to 
exist in creative tension between this borderless world of the imagination -  MacDonald’s 
fairyland - and all kinds of physical, ethical and geographical borders. Such a tension 
requires of us movement and generates, rather than satisfying, a desire for love, meaning 
and identity. This desire has, then, to be left to find its own goal or meaning for each of 
MacDonald’s readers; for those in whom it is awakened by his writing. In Vane’s search 
for identity we find many themes in common between theories of interpretation and 
theories which have surrounded the meaning of the death and resurrection of Christ.
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Conclusion
We have examined MacDonald’s treatments of ethics, symbolism and theology, and have 
found that they all find movement -  ‘true life’ - only in their ultimate relation to Hope, as 
the journey of Vane illustrates. Such a hope is in turn related not to weakened concepts of 
belief in propositions; just as Derrida or Caputo find that theorising is not an adequate 
response to questions of meaning or identity. Rather, hope emerges on the threshold of 
death; in liminality; in a pushing out at the borders which would seek to limit desire to the 
manageable. It is not a thing which can be independently verified or proved; but can be 
seen to bring with it its own proof, which is the movement necessary for harmony. The 
experience of such a harmony, as it is communicated in the experience of love; brings 
which it a true sense of human identity or meaning is. This movement is, in turn, linked to 
desire. Such desire is not experienced in its fullness as a longing for a certain object, 
although it is frequently translated into that, and continually disappointed. Such 
disappointment in the object must therefore be reinterpreted as a disappointment of desire. 
This should not be read as a condemnation of desire but as a lesson that desire precedes 
and is greater than any object which could be simply appropriated, and therefore belongs 
to some realm in which it finds fulfilment in giving and receiving (as two aspects of the 
same act), rather than in taking, competing or appropriating.
There is a great excess in the experience which relates desire to grace, or to the gift. We
cannot swell into giants in a continual reception of this excess as definitive of an identity
owned by right (which perverts its nature). Neither can we continually place ourselves as
givers, without finding some impossible weight of responsibility upon ourselves (which
relates to the failure of forgiveness when we experience it as a burden). Identity in its
fullest sense, is movement in grace. It is the endless ending of Vane; the continuing
journey of Mossy and Tangle, the reciprocity of Photogen and Nycteris; the harmony
towards which desire leads us, and the ‘end’ of education, which, like the ‘end’ of ethics is
.. .a noble unrest, an ever renewed awaking from the dead, a ceaseless questioning of 
the past for the interpretation of the future, an urging on of the motions of life, which 
had better far be accelerated into fever, than retarded into lethargy....30°
The rediscovery in MacDonald’s work of the foundation of life’s (and interpretation’s) 
activity as desire and as the search for harmony makes it especially valuable for those in
300 T h e  imagination: its functions and its culture’, A Dish ofO rts  p1.
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whom the search has been overtaken by anxiety, and where it has become too self-aware, 
too disconnected from the outward-tending of the desire which both initiates it and 
integrates it creatively with our identity as human beings. Process is important, but Lilith 
seems to be a reminder that there is no creativity in process without the continuation of 
desire. Perhaps, then, the “search” for meaning and identity is much better expressed as a 
“desire”. This allows for indeterminacy, without associating it with hopelessness, or 
estranging it from reason. Otherwise we may be inclined to think that knowledge and 
wisdom are the same thing; and so be tempted to give up, or to assume success, when we 
have only just begun to discern the nature of this desire.
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Conclusion
We have examined -  in the three sections of this study -  the implications and outworking 
of MacDonald’s treatments of ethics, symbolism and theology, and have found that they 
all find movement -  the ‘true life’ of which he speaks - in their relation to one other, 
through an ultimate relation to “Hope”300, as the journey of Vane in Lilith illustrates. Such 
a hope is related not to weakened concepts of belief; to a prepositional faith (just as 
Derrida or Caputo find that the suppression of the ‘religious’ by the reasonable is not an 
adequate response to questions of meaning or identity). Rather, hope emerges on the 
threshold of death; in liminality; in a pushing out at the borders which -  for example - 
would limit desire to acquisition; ethics to reasonable duty; language to the allegorical; 
wisdom to analogy; identity to role-playing.
Hope will not be independently verified or proved; but can be seen to bring with it its own 
proof, which is the movement that is necessary if harmony is not to become stasis. The 
experience of such a harmony -  or tension, as it may be experienced - is communicated 
especially in the experience of desire; bringing with it an irreducible sense of identity and 
meaning. This movement or tension which comes about through hope is always linked to 
desire in MacDonald’s work. It is to this end that the imagination is educated by the 
nature of its desire. He seeks to show that desire is not experienced in its fullness as a 
longing for a certain object, although it is frequently translated into that, and continually 
disappointed, even perverted, as Lilith shows. Such disappointment in the object is not, 
however, read by MacDonald as a condemnation of desire but as evidence that desire 
precedes and is greater than any object which could be simply appropriated. It belongs to 
a realm in which it finds fulfilment in giving and receiving (as two aspects of the same 
act), rather than in taking, competing or appropriating.
There is a great excess in the experience which relates desire to grace, or to the gift. We 
cannot swell into giants in a continual reception of this excess as definitive of an identity 
owned by right. Neither can we continually place ourselves as givers, without finding 
some impossible weight of responsibility upon ourselves, and this relates to the failure of 
forgiveness when we experience it as a burden. Identity in its fullest sense is movement 
in grace. It is the endless ending of Vane; the continuing journey of Mossy and Tangle,
™ Lilith, p251.
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the reciprocity of Photogen and Nycteris; the reinterpretation of the text; the harmony 
towards which desire leads us, and it is the ‘end’ of education, which, like the ‘end’ of 
ethics is
.. .a noble unrest, an ever renewed awaking from the dead, a ceaseless questioning of 
the past for the interpretation of the future, an urging on of the motions of life, which 
had better far be accelerated into fever, than retarded into lethargy....301
The rediscovery in MacDonald’s work of the foundation of life’s (and interpretation’s) 
activity as desire and as the search for harmony makes it especially valuable for those in 
whom the search has been overtaken by anxiety, and where it has become too self-aware, 
too disconnected from the outward-tending of the desire which both initiates it and 
integrates it creatively with our identity as human beings. Process is important, but Lilith 
is a reminder that there is no creativity in process without the expansion a n d  proper 
direction of desire.
Perhaps the “search” for meaning and identity is much better expressed as a personal 
“desire”. The interpersonal emphasis in MacDonald’s thinking about theology and the 
nature of meaning allows for indeterminacy, without associating it with hopelessness, or 
estranging it from reason. The solitary, existential and lonely search of modernity is not 
suppressed but brought into an awareness of the relation of its own indeterminacy -  its 
own ‘freedom’ -  with hope (which by its nature is interpersonal). Lilith is a reminder, in 
an age of indeterminacy, that we need not assume that knowledge and wisdom are the 
same thing. Despair is not compulsory, neither is a “fixed repose” . MacDonald’s work 
remains relevant for, in every person, the worth and nature of the desire for identity needs 
to be remembered, hoped for and imaginatively rediscovered.
301 T h e  Imagination: its functions and its culture’, A Dish ofOrts  p1
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The Flight of the Shadow (W hitethorn, Calif., J o h a n n e s e n  1994)
The Gold Key and the Green Life (ed . G  M acD onald  & F iona 
M acL eod, London, C o n stab le )
The Hope of the Gospel/Miracles of Our Lord (Jo h a n n e s e n , 
W hitethorn , Calif. 1892 ed . 1995)
The Marquis ofLossie (K egan  P au l, T ren ch , T ru b n e r & Co, London, 
1906)
The Portent and other stories (W hitethorn, Calif, J o h a n n e s e n  1994) 
The Princess and Curdie (W hitethorn, Calif. J o h a n n e s e n  1993)
The Princess and the Goblin (ed . W ith a n  introduction by R oderick  
McGillis, O xford
University P re s s ,  1990)
The Seaboard Parish (K egan  P au l, 1892)
Thomas Wingfold, Curate (H urst & B lackett, 1876)











Total Presence; the language of Jesus and the 
language of today (Seabury Press, N.Y., 1980)
Peter Pan and other plays (Clarendon Press, Oxford, 
1995)
The Epistle to the Romans (Oxford University Press, 
1968)
The Poems of William Dunbar (Association for 
Scottish Literary Studies, Glasgow, 1988)
The Poems of John Davidson (Scottish Academic 
Press, London, distributed by Chatto & Windus, 1973) 
The Cult of the Black Virgin (Arkana, London, 1995) 
The Complete Writings of William Blake (Oxford 
University Press, 1966)
Creation and Temptation (SCM Press, London, 1966) 
Ethics (SCM Press, London ,1971)
Broadie, Alexander





























MacDougall Hay, J 
MacQuarrie, John
The Tradition of Scottish Philosophy (Polygon, 
Edinburgh 1990)
The House with the Green Shutters (Andrews 
Melrose, London, 1923)
Pilgrim’s Progress (Penguin, Harmondsworth, 1987)
A Clockwork Orange (Ballantine Books, N.Y., 1965)
The Complete Poetical Works of Burns (Riverside 
Press, Cambridge, Mass., 1897)
The Damnation of Newton, Goethe’s Colour Theory 
and Romantic perception (de Gruyter, Berlin, 1986)
The Nature o f the Atonement (Handsel P ress, 
Eerdmans, Edinburgh, 1 9 9 6 )
Memorials o fJ  McLeod Campbell (MacMillan, London 
1877)
Creature and Creator, Myth Making and English 
Romanticism (Cambridge University P ress 1984)
More Radical Hermeneutics: on not knowing who we 
are (Indiana University Press, 2000)
The Victorian Church (Black, London, 1966-70)
The Atonement and the Modern Mind (Hodder & 
Stoughton, London, 1903)
The Gift of Death (University of Chicago Press, 1995) 
Discourse on Method and the Meditations (Penguin, 
1968)
From a Northern Window; papers, critical, historical 
and imaginative (London, Nisbet 1911)
Edwin Muir: Selected Poems (Faber & Faber Ltd, 
London 1969)
Sunset Song (Pan Books, London, 1978)
The Moral Gap: Kantian Ethics, Human limits and 
God’s assistance (Clarendon Press, Oxford, 1996)
The Moral Vision of the New Testament (T & T Clark, 
Edinburgh 1997)
The Private Memoirs and Confessions of a Justified 
Sinner (Panther, London 1970)
A Treatise of Human Nature (2nd ed. Oxford 1978)
The Implied Reader: patterns of communication in 
prose fiction from Bunyan to Beckett (John Hopkins 
University Press, Baltimore, London, 1974)
Love is of the essence: an introduction to the theology 
of J McLeod Campbell (St Andrews Press, Edinburgh, 
1993)
Either/Or: A fragment of life (Oxford University Press, 
London, 1946)
Fear and Trembling; and, The Sickness unto Death 
(Doubleday, Garden City, N.Y., 1954)
The Concept of Irony, with constant reference to 
Socrates ("Collins, London, 1966)
Delayed Endings: non-closure in Novalis & Holderlin, 
(University of Georgia Press, Athens, 1987)
Miracles (Fontana Books, London & Glasgow, 1960) 
The Allegory of Love: a study in the medieval tradition, 
(Oxford University Press, N.Y., 1967)
They Asked fora  Paper (Geofrey Bles Ltd, London, 
1962)
Collected Poems (Chatto & Windus, 1988)
George MacDonald and His Wife (George Allen & 
Unwin Ltd, London, 1924)
Gillespie (Constable, London 1914)
An Existentialist Theology (SCM Press, London, 1914)
MacQuarrie, John 
M artensen, H 
McGillis, Roderick (ed.
McIntyre, J
Ward, G, Milbank, J, 
















Young, F rances M
Mary for all Christians (Collins, London, 1991)
Jacob Boehme (Hodder & Stoughton, London, 1885) 
)Forthe Childlike (The Scarecrow Press, Metuchen, M 
J & London, 1992)
The Shape of Soteriology: studies in the doctrine of 
the death of Christ, (T & T Clark, Edinburgh 1992) 
Radical Orthodoxy: a new theology (Routledge, 
London, N.Y., 1999)
The Theology of Hope (SCM P ress Ltd, London, 1967) 
The Grammar of Assent (University of Notre Dame 
Press, 1979)
Thus Spoke Zarathustra: a book for everyone and no- 
one (Harmondsworth, Penguin 1969)
The Meaning of Meaning, a study of the influence of 
language upon thought and of the science of 
symbolism (Kegan, Paul, Trench, Trubner, London, 
1923)
George MacDonald: Scotland’s Beloved Storyteller 
(Minneapolis, 1987)
The Gold Thread, essays on George MacDonald 
(Edinburgh University Press, 1990)
George MacDonald (Tring, 1987)
George MacDonald (Edinburgh 1987)
On Becoming a Person (Constable, London, 1987) 
Goethe’s Theory of Colour (Hew  Knowledge Books,
Frankenstein (London, Dent, 1912)
De incarnatione (trans. By Archibald Robertson, Nutt, 
London 1911)
The Romantic Period in Germany: Essays by 
members of the London University Insitute of 
Germanic Studies ( Weidenfeld & Nicholson, London, 
1970)
The Stars and the Stillness (Lutterworth Press, 
Cambridge, 1986)
Paradox and Discovery (Blackwell, Oxford, 1965) 
Sacrifice and the Death of Christ (SPCK, London, 
1975)
Articles
G e d d e s , William B lackw ood’s  M ag azin e  (M arch 1891)
H ym an, G avin ‘Jo h n  M ilbank a n d  Nihilism: A m etap h y sica l
(m is)re ad in g ? ’, Literature and Theology, Vol 14, 
No 4, D e c e m b e r 20 0 0  
M uirhead, G ra e m e  ‘M e ta -P h a n ta s te s : A self-referen tia l fa e rie
ro m an c e  for m en  a n d  w o m e n ’, (Scottish Literary 
Journal, vol 19, No 2, Nov. 1992)
Wolff, G ary  K ‘David L indsay  a n d  G e o rg e  M acD onald ’, (Studies
in Scottish Literature, p139)
G ivens, Jo h n 'A rt an d  R em em b ra n ce : J o s e p h  B rodsky’s  ‘In 
m em ory  of m y F a th e r’ (Essays in Poetics,
A utum n 1998, Vol 23)
McGillis, R oderick  ‘G e o rg e  M acD onald  -  T h e  Lilith M an u sc rip ts ’,
(Scottish Literary Journal 4, 2, D e c e m b e r 1977. 
pp40-57
H apgood , Lynne T h e  R econceiv ing  of C hristianity’:
S ecu la risa tio n , realism  an d  th e  relig ious novel 
1 8 8 8 -1 9 0 0 ’ (Literature & Theology)
Biblical books quoted (NKJ V ersion) 
1 & 2  Corinthians  
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